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This work is the first major study of the political career of 
Charles Spencer, third Earl of. Sunderland. It covers the period 
from his entry into the House of Commons in 1695 to his death in 
1722. As an M. P. Lord Spencer, as Sunderland was then known, was 
a committed Whig in his political beliefs, but at the same time his 
conduct was influenced by the attitudes and example of his father. 
The hold that the second Earl of Sunderland had over his son was 
not strong and Spencer was soon increasingly associated with the 
leaders of the 'Whig Junto' . In 1702, when he succeeded as third 
Earl, Sunderland's standing was such that he was eagerly welcomed 
into the leadership of the Junto. Sunderland was staunch and 
aggressive in his Whiggery and this, together with his Marlborough 
family connection, led to his playing a prominent part in helping 
the Junto renew their political fortunes between 1702 and 1705. The 
extent of Sunderland's success can be judged by his being sent as a 
special envoy to Vienna in 1705 and his appointment as Secretary of 
State the following year. As Secretary Sunderland was determined to 
prosecute the war against France with vigour but he achieved no 
outstanding success abroad. At home, however, he played the leading 
role in helping the Junto to gain control of the administration. The 
Whig dominated ministry was not built upon strong foundations and 
within a year it had collapsed despite Sunderland's unceasing industry 
to maintain its existence. From 1710 to 1714 Sunderland was in 
opposition yet this did not prevent him doing all he could to safeguard 
the Protestant Succession. His fierce commitment to the House of 
Hanover rather disturbed the new monarch and his ministers and as a 
result Sunderland did not obtain the office he sought under the new 
dynasty. Sunderland, as a result of his experience in opposition, was 
a much shrewder and subtle politician and was able to win the 
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confidence of the King, his German courtiers and a number of prominent 
English politicians. He secured a decisive influence in the 
government but he was still threatened by powerful and dangerous 
rivals in the Whig party. It was his attempt to diminish their 
authority and to establish his own ascendancy which produced the Whig 
schism in 1717. As Prime Minister from 1717 onwards Sunderland had 
to establish his government on firm foundations. In this he was 
largely successful but he was unable to dominate the House of Commons 
and this failure forced him to come to terms with his Whig opponents. 
In 1720 and 1721 the South Sea Bubble and the loss of his leading 
associates severely undermined his authority and gave his rivals an 
opportunity to challenge his power. Sunderland, however, recovered 
and after marshalling his forces it seemed likely that he would have 
recovered his former influence, but before the outcome of the 1722 
election was known he was dead. 
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A NOTE ON DATES 
In the late seventeenth-century Britain's calendar was ten days 
behind that used in most European countries and the gap widened 
to eleven days at the turn of the eighteenth-century. In this 
work all dates are given in the Old Style except where the New 
Style is indicated or both dates are used, e. g. 20 March 1705. 
The new year is taken as beginning on 1 January and not 25 March, 
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PREFACE 
Charles Spencer, third Earl of Sunderland was one of the most 
prominent early-eighteenth-century politicians who was at the centre 
of political life for twenty-seven years. His career spanned three 
reigns. Under William III he was M. P. for Tiverton in Devon from 
1695 to 1702, With the accession of Queen Anne Spencer succeeded 
his father as third Earl, became one of the leaders of the celebrated 
Whig Junto and was Secretary of State for the South between 1706 and 
1710. It was in the reign of George II, however, that Sunderland 
reached the height of his power and influence. He held office 
successively as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Privy Seal, 
Secretary of State for the North, Lord President of the Council, 
First Lord of the Treasury, and Groom of the Stole. He was the 
closest confident and advisor of George I and from 1717 to 1722 he 
was Prime Minister, Surprisingly, however, apart from H. L. Snyder's 
1963 University of California Ph. D. Thesis, which only covered the 
years 1706 to 1710, there has been no serious study of Sunderland's 
political career. This work is intended to provide such a study. 
It is intended to provide a comprehensive picture of Sunderland's 
political activities from his entry into the House of Commons in 1695 
to his death in April 1722. In this respect the main focus of this 
work will be with the political conflict at Court and in the Houses 
of Parliament. An analysis of Sunderland's entire political career 
is a major undertaking and as a result it has been necessary to 
neglect certain aspects or' his life which could only have been covered 
within the framework of an extensive biographical treatment, There 
has been no attempt to examine Sunderland's private life and his 
personal relationships except in the instance of his connection with 
the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough which had important political 
consequences. Similarly, Sunderland's activities as a bibliophile 
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have been excluded from this study, No attempt has been made to 
examine the duties and significance of the various offices which 
Sunderland held, particularly under George I. There has been some 
analysis of the office of Secretary of State, but even here the 
present work has only been concerned with Sunderland's handling of 
the direction and implementation of foreign policy. What discussion 
there has been of the office of Secretary of State relies heavily on 
the work of Henry Snyder and Mark Thomson. 
The work has been organised on a thematic and chronological basis 
with each chapter dealing with a specific period of Sunderland's 
political career. For example Chapter Six covers the period when 
Sunderland and the Whigs were in opposition from 1710 to 1714, The 
bulk of the primary material available for the years 1706 to 1710 meant 
that Sunderland's activity in domestic politics for these years and 
his tenure as Secretary of State would have to be dealt with separately, 
These aspects are covered in Chapters Three and Four. 
During the course of my research I have profit el from the advice 
and assistance of other scholars. My greatest debt is to my 
supervisor Professor Harry Dickinson. It was he who suggested that I 
should study Sunderland and my work has benefit el immeasurably from 
his constant advice, criticism, and encouragement. I would like to 
thank Dr, Eveline Cruickshanks for her help and assistance in providing 
transcripts and allowing me access to material at the History of 
Parliament Trust. Dr. David Hayton also gave me valuable advice on 
Ireland, provided me with transcripts and allowed me to read his own 
work prior to publication. I owe a similar debt to Mr. Clyve Jones of 
the Institute of Historical Research who gave me references to material 
I would otherwise have missed as well as placing a microfilm of 
Bishop William Nicolson's diaries at my disposal. Finally I would 
like to thank all the librarians and archivists who assisted my 
inquiries, particularly those at the British Library. The faults and 
errors contained in this work are entirely my own responsibility. 
CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL APPRENTICESHIP 1695-1702 
'My Lord Spencer's character both for sobriety 
and for all qualification in a young man that 
are so rarely found in this age are acknowledged 
by all people. ' 
From the very beginning Lord Spencer's political attitude was 
characterised by a combination of principle and expediency which was 
to persist throughout his career. His entry into Parliament in 
1695 was the inevitable outcome of belonging to a family which had 
been at the centre of English politics for almost thirty years. 
The atmosphere of the Spencer household was heavy with political 
intrigue and manipulation and, given these circumstances, 
Lord Spencer's passionate interest in the pursuit of power was a 
natural development. His father, Robert, second Earl of Sunderland, 
was perhaps the most notorious politician in late-seventeenth-century 
England. Pragmatic and flexible in his beliefs Sunderland nevertheless 
had proved an indispensable servant to three successive monarchs and 
he was bound to be an important influence on Spencer's conduct during 
his early years in Parliament. It was his father's attempt to reach 
an agreement with the more independently minded Whig M. P. 's which 
helps to explain Spencer's apparent espousal of a more country oriented 
Whiggery in 1696 and 1697 and which no doubt contributed to the belief 
held by some contemporaries that he was an out and out Republican. 
It was unlikely, however, that Spencer would be content merely to 
follow the lead provided by his father indefinitely. Though both men 
were extremely ambitious circumstances and differences of temperament 
produced a contrasting political outlook. Sunderland had risen to 
power in a cynical and individualistic age but by the time his son 
entered politics affairs of state were increasingly dominated by the 
struggle for authority between the Whig and Tory parties. Consequently, 
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young politicians who were both ambitious and capable were found, 
more and more, in either of these two parties depending on how they 
viewed tne great issues of the day. It was clear to Lord Spencer 
that this was almost certainly the only way he could hope to fulfil 
his aspirations. Furthermore, whereas his father had displayed 
an almost total indifference to principle Lord Spencer began his 
political career with a number of principles to which he was to 
adhere for the rest of his life. He had little sympathy with the 
xenophobic Country Whiggery with its hostility to prerogative and 
standing armies, and which was such a powerful force in the House of 
Commons at this time. Spencer's conception of Whiggery was very 
close to that held by the newly emerging Whig Junto of Somers, 
Wharton, Montagu, and Russell which gave a positive and vital aspect 
to Whig principles and enabled Whig ideology to accommodate the 
desire to-hold and utilise political power. Spencer, with his 
belief in the fundamental unity of European Protestantism, his 
hostility to France and his approval of William III's foreign policy 
together with his support for the Protestant Succession in the House 
of Hanover was clearly ideal material as far as the Junto were 
concerned. Significantly, Spencer was also personally acquainted with 
Wharton and Montagu and was on very close terms with Somers. It was 
this familiarity which helped to reinforce Spencer's political 
intimacy with the Whig leadership. From 1698 onwards it was Spencer's 
association with the Junto rather than the attitude of his father 
which is of greatev- significance in his future development. By the 
time Spencer succeeded as third Earl of Sunderland in 1702 his 
allegiance to the Junto, his political beliefs and his power and 
influence as a peer in his own right, as well as his family 
Irefl ationship with the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough, meant that 
it was only natural that he should become the fifth member of the 
Whig Junto. 
2 
By the summer of 1695 both the Earl of Sunderland and the 
Junto felt that it was necessary to dissolve Parliament and to hold 
a general election. 
1 
Electioneering had already begun prior to 
the dissolution in October 169S2 and prominent among those working 
industriously to secure their return was Charles, Lord Spencer the 
son and heir of the Earl of Sunderland. Sunderland was trying to 
get Lord Spencer chosen as a Knight of the Shire for Northampton 
where the Spencer interest was located. 
3 Unfortunately, the county, 
though subject to the influence of the Montagu's and the Mordaunt's, 
was traditionally Tory in outlook and the electors were unlikely to 
support a Whig candidate particularly one whose father was intimately 
associated with leading Whig politicians. 
4 Lord Spencer's 
difficulties were increased by personal animosities amongst the 
candidates and in August Sir Justinian Isham, a prominent local 
Tory was informed: 
Mr. Cartwright ... having got the start of my Lord Spencer in making his interest and my Lord 
not willing to set his pocket at stake has fully 
laid aside his intention of trying for a 
parliament man; and being justly nettled at 
Mr. Parkhurst's usage of him, as also convinced of 
Mr. Cartwright's resolution to go through with the 
matter, and opposing Parkhurst (who continues to 
make interest for himself) desires all his friends 
to vote for Sir St. Andrew St., John and. Mr. Cartwright, 
Presumingly speaking I believe he has no great 
opinion of the latter, but of the low men of the west 
he is adjudged the least evil. S 
Because of the difficulties attendant upon an expensive and formidable 
campaign Lord Spencer chose a much less arduous route into the House of 
Commons. He stood for Henry Guy's pocket borough of Hedon in 
Yorkshire as well as the borough of Tiverton in Devon. 
6 
There seems 
to have been little doubt that Spencer would be elected for at least 
one of these seats for he does not appear to have been greatly 
preoccupied with appealing to the constituents. At the end of 
August 1695 he was to be found visiting his father-in-law, the 
Duke of Newcastle, at Welbeck 
7 
and in early October he was at Althorp 
when the King, together with leading politicians, visited his 
father. 8 Spencer was returned for both Tiverton and Hedon and 
he chose to sit for the former borough. 
9 Thomas Bere was also 
chosen at Tiverton and the fact that he was a staunch Junto Whig 
would appear to suggest that Tiverton was a safe Junto seat and 
that Spencer's candidature was approved by the Junto. 
10 
Lord Spencer was one of the hundred and seventy-four M. P. 's who 
had not sat in the previous Parliament and the new House of Commons 
was to prove a cause of anxiety for -the ministry as they were unable 
to manage the chamber. The problem which faced the administration 
was the emergence of a powerful opposition group in the Commons 
centered upon independent Whigs like Paul Foley and Robert Harley 
together with Tory M. P. 's such as Clarges, Gwyn, Musgrave, and 
Seymour. This new Country party was xenophobic, it disliked 
standing armies and high taxation, it was hostile to placemen and 
financial corruption and was opposed to the idea of a general excise. 
The Whig and Tory groups which composed this alliance had been moving 
towards each other from 1691 onwards and by 1695 with Robert Harley 
at its head it was able to challenge the government in the Commons. 
The success of this Country party greatly impressed the Earl of 
Sunderland and he was now eager to bring the Country Whigs into the 
government in order to strengthen the King's administration. It 
was the influence of his father which explains Lord Spencer's 
flirtation with the opposition in 1696 and 1697.11 
The discomfort of the ministry was heightened by the intractable 
problems which had to be faced when Parliament met. There were severe 
financial difficulties which were complicated by the deterioration of 
the coinage, the war effort was threatened by a shortage of soldiers 
and seamen, and the state of trade required immediat%-- attention. In 
December both Houses of Parliament began to inquire into the trade of 
the nation and on 12 December the question of a Parliamentary Council 
of Trade was raised in a Commons committee of the Whole HoLkSv. ý 
administration, caught off balance by the incompleteness of its own 
4 
plans for a Royal Council of Trade, had to agree to proceed with a 
bill for a Parliamentary Council, but it was able to adjourn the 
committee. 
12 The committee resumed its consideration on 
2 January 1696 and though nothing was settled as to the powers 
of the Council it was agreed by 175 votes to 174 that the members 
of the Council should be chosen by Parliament. Sunderland supported 
the idea of a Parliamentary Council of Trade and Lord Spencer voted 
with the majority. 
13 The committee met again on 20 January 1696 
when the ministry introduced two wrecking motions; Wharton 
suggested that M. P. 's should not be eligible to sit on the Council 
and all those selected to serve on it should have to take the 
Abjuration Oath. Though agreed to by the committee these two 
resolutions were thrown out when they were reported to the House 
eleven days later. Lord Spencer favoured rejecting the first 
amendment but he was among those who wanted to accept the second. 
14 
Before the House proceeded any further on this subject it was 
announced that there had been a plot to murder the King which was to 
coincide with an invasion from France. This news helped to rally 
support to the administration. 
The whole course of the session had emphasised the strength of 
the opposition in the Commons. Paul Faley had been elected Speaker 
of the House, the ministry's recoinage proposals were severely mauled 
while approval had been given to a scheme for a Land Bank and a 
Parliamentary Qualifications bill was introduced in February 1696, 
is 
On 24 February William informed Parliament that he had received 
information of an assassination attempt and an FrOA-( 
Both Lords and Commons immediately agreed to an 'Association' which 
would designate William 'a rightful and lawful king'. 
16 Peers and 
M. P. 's were obliged either to sign this document or to make explicit 
their refusal to do so. The Junto clearly sought to exploit the 
situation to divide the opposition Whigs from their Tory allies, 
but Harley, aided by Musgrave, was able to persuade most Country 
Tories to sign the 'Association'. In the Lords., however, nineteen 
peers led by Nottingham refused to subscribe. The initiative now 
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lay with the administration.. In April 1696 a bill was passed to 
secure both the King and government while the recoinage proposals 
and the Land Bank project were modified to suit the taste of the 
ministry. The King was able to procure some supply for the Civil 
List and to veto the Parliamentary Qualifications bill; nothing 
more was heard of the Parliamentary Council of Trade. 
17 
There is 
little evidence of Lord Spencer's activity after January 1696. He 
signed the 'Association', 
18 but on 2 March the Commons ordered 'that 
the Lord Spencer have leave to go into the country for the recovery 
of his health'. 
19 The nature of his illness is unknown but it does 
not appear to have been either prolonged or severe for at the 
beginning of May Spencer was dining at Lambeth Palace with the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and John Evelyn. 
20 
Five days earlier the 
King had brought the parliamentary session to an end, but the summer 
of 1696 was to be dominated by issues which had been prominent during 
its course. 
The first difficulty was the deepening of the financial crisis which 
had beset the government the previous year. The inadequacy of the 
measures to implement the recoinage of 1695 resulted in a shortage of 
money which threatened the conduct of military operations on the 
continent. It was only when the Bank of England made Z200,000 
available in August 1696 that the short term crisis was overcome. 
21 
The government also had to face the aftermath of the assassination 
conspiracy. Sir John Fenwick, who had been a General under James II, 
was arrested in June 1696 for his part in the affair and proceeded to 
make a number of declarations which implicated prominent politicians, 
including Shrewsbury, Russell, Marlborough and Godolphin, in the 
attempt to murder the King. The Junto were determined to vindicate 
Shrewsbury and Russell while punishing Fenwick at the same time. As 
a result of the flight of one of the principal witnesses against Fenwick 
it would be impossible to convict him in a Court of Law so the Junto 
decided to prosecute him by means of a bill of Attainder which merely 
had to be approved by both Houses of Parliament. Sunderland, though 
he had favoured prosecuting Fenwick, was unwilling to countenance such 
6 
a proceeding. He felt it would divert attention from important 
parliamentary business but he was also concerned lest the inquest 
should extend to him and his own rather dubious connection with 
Lord Arran. Lord Spencer was to be directly involved in his father's 
attempt to sabotage the prosecution. 
22 
The Junto were not prepared to give way and the Attainder was 
introduced into the Commons on 6 November 1696. The strength of the 
opposition was soon evident but the bill was committed on 17 November 
by 182 votes to 118. Three days later 'my Lord Spencer made a very 
unadvised motion... about excluding the Lords spiritual out of the 
bill'. 23 The motion was defeated, but had it passed it could have 
resulted in the defeat of the Attainder for the Bishops played an 
important part in its passage through the House of Lords. On 
22 November the bill was read for the third time and was approved 
by 189 votes to 156 and sent up to the Lords. The hostility it 
aroused in the House was so great that it only passed by 68 votes to 
61 on 223 December 1696. Fenwick was beheaded on Tower Hill on 
28 January 1697.24 The Attainder of Fenwick was not the only 
occasion on which Lord Spencer identified himself with the opposition 
to the ministry. 
When Parliament had met in October 1696 Sunderland, whose relations 
with the Junto were now deteriorating rapidly, was backing Harley and 
ruggle with the Junto for control of the Commons. 
25 
Foley in their st, 
On 26 November 'the Lord Spencer, according to order presented to the 
House a Bill for examining, taking, and stating the public accounts of 
the Kingdom'. 
26 The Commission of Accounts was one of the most 
important weapons employed by the Country opposition in its struggle 
with the ministry. Originally designed to inquire into governmental 
expenditure it assumed a more political character when its inquiries 
were continually frustrated by the executive. By February 1697, 
however., the Commission was in danger of being manipulated by the 
administration and to prevent this the bill was thrown out by 148 votes 
to 115 on 15 February. 
27 It would appear that it was Spencer's .1 
association with the Country opposition at this time which helps to 
account for the belief that he was a Republican. 
reference to Spencer's alleged controversial views is 
to be found in the writings of Jonathan Swift during Queen Anne's 
reign when Spencer had succeeded as Earl of Sunderland. Swift 
commented: 
It seems to have been this gentleman's fortune, 
to have learned his divinity from his uncle and 
his politics from his tutor. It may be thought 
a blemish in his character, that he hath much 
fallen from the height of those republican 
principles with which he began; for in his father's 
lifetime, while he was a member of the House of 
Commons, he would often, among his familiar friends, 
refuse the title of Lord (as he hath done to myself), 
swear he would never be called otherwise than 
Charles Spencer, and hoped to see the day when there 
should not be a peer in England. 28 
The reliability of Swift's opinion concerning any member of the Junto, 
whom he blamed for the failure of his clerical pretensions in 1709, 
is open to serious doubt yet Swift met Spencer's father on occasion 
during the 1690's and it may be that he was also acquainted with 
Lord Spencer who may have uttered some ill-considered remark. 
29 if 
so it would not have been untypical as Arthur Onslow remarked that 
Lord Spencer 'came early into business, and before his father's death, 
was then in the House of Commons but made no advantageous impression 
of himself there, from a disagreeable impetuosity and ungraceful 
manner of speaking'. 
30 The only other references to Spencer's 
Republicanism were made by foreigners. The French envoy in London 
remarked in 1714 that Sunderland, as Spencer then was, 'pourtant 
montre quelque fois des sentimens de Republicain' 
31 
and Bonet the 
Prussian resident also commented on Spencer's republicanism in 1699 
as did the Imperial minister Count Wratislaw. in 1705. Subsequently, 
Wratislaw admitted he had misjudged Sunderland and it seems that in 
Europe the Whigs in general were regarded as Republicans. 
32 Whatever 
the origin of this belief about Spencer the available evidence leaves 
little doubt that it was unmerited. Spencer's political beliefs were 
8 
almost identical to those held by the Junto and it is only the 
influence of his father which accounts for his conduct in 1696 and 
1697 yet even at this time Sipencer's sympathy with the Junto is clear. 
Spencer had already indicated his support for William by signing 
the 'Association' in 1696 and the following year bcaxcked proposals for 
a General Naturalization bill which anticipates his favourable 
disposition to foreign Protestants which was apparent under Queen Anne. 
On 21 December 1696 he was named as a- member of the committee to which 
the bill to naturalize the sons of the Earl of Athlone was referred-0-1 
More significantly in February 1697 a General Naturalization bill was 
introduced into the Commons by two Junto Whigs Goodwin Wharton and 
Sir Henry Hobart. 34 The opponents of the bill argued it would produce 
a flood of impoverished immigrants who would threaten the domestic 
textile trades. On 2 March it was moved to commit the bill but upon 
the division it was rejected by 168 votes to 127 with Lord Spencer and 
Hobart acting as tellers for the minority. 
35 From now on Spencer's 
support for the Junto was to become clearer and clearer as the 
influence of his father declined. 
Throughout 1697 the connection between Sunderland and the Junto 
had become increasingly strained. Following the prorogation of 
Parliament in April Montagu became First Lord of the Treasury, Somers 
was made Lord Chancellor and Russell was named as First Lord of the 
Admiralty and Treasurer of the Navy. The King, unfortunately, could 
not be . persuaded to create Wharton Lordp Deputy in Ireland. 
36 
The 
most remarkable appointment of all was that of Sunderland as Lord 
Chamberlain which surprised most people including the Junto. 
37 
Sunderland and Somers were continually bickering over a number of 
issues ranging from the instalment of John Methuen, one of Sunderland's 
adherents, as Irish Lord Chancellor to a major financial scandal 
involving Guy Palmes an associate of Somers. 
38 The chief point of 
contention was the desire of the Duke of Shrewsbury to retire as 
Secretary of State. Orford, as Russell now was, Wharton and Somers 
were trying to turn Shrewsbury against Sunderland but with no success 
though at the same time the Duke was persuaded to retain the Seals as 
Secretary of State. On 1 December 1697 the other Secretary, 
9 
Sir William Trumbull, resigned and Sunderland had James Vernon 
appointed as his successor. The Junto had wanted Wharton to replace 
Trumbull but they had been outmanoeuvred by Sunderland and, despite 
their frustration, could do little but acquiesce in the change. 
Sunderland, however, came under attack in the House of Commons and 
with the Junto unwilling to assist him and the threat of an 
impeachment growing Sunderland's nerve broke and he resigned at the 
end of December 1697. The King had little sympathy with the Junto 
and blamed them for Sunderland's withdrawal and as a result they were 
left exposed politically. Their vulnerability and Sunderland's 
recovering his nerve in January 1698 led to an attempted reconciliation 
between Sunderland and Somers, 
39 Lord Spencer was very eager to heal 
the breach between the Whig leaders and his father but his rash 
behaviour early in the year helped to jeopardize the outcome of this 
attempt. 
In 1684 the Earl of Clancarty had married the thirteen year old 
Lady Elizabeth Spencer. Clancarty, an attainted Jacobite, had been 
captured at the siege of Cork in September 1690 and imprisoned in the 
Tower of London while his wife, their marriage never having been 
consumated, lived with her parents. In 1694 Clancarty escaped from 
the Tower and turned up at the exiled court at St. Germain where he 
was created a Gentleman of the Bedchamber and given a military command, 
In December 1697 he returned to London and sent for his wife. On 
Saturday 1 January 1698 Clancarty: 
came ... to Lord Sunderland's house (my Lord and Lady being gone to the country) and asking to speak with 
Lady Clancarty's woman, was by her carried up to the 
young lady's chamber ... but the porter of the house 
upon recollection knowing the Earl of Clancarty, he 
sent to Lord Spencer to acquaint him with it, and his 
Lordship giving immediate notice thereof to the 
Secretary of State, who found him [Clancarty] in bed 
with his Lady, and brought him to Whitehall. He was 
kept that night upon the guard and the next day was 
committed to Newgate, being outlawed for treason, and 
attainted by an Act of Parliament that passed the last 
sessions in Ireland. This was the first time the Earl 
of Clancarty bedded his Lady. 40 
10 
Lord Spencer had shown little consideration for the feelings of his 
sister and the whole family had been put in an extremely embarrassing 
predicament. The affair was also to assume a political significance 
for it served to undermine the negotiations between Sunderland and 
the Junto in which Lord Spencer was acting as an intermediary. 
41 
The approaches to Somers on Sunderland's behalf were being made 
by Spencer and Overton and they tried to explain the reasons-for 
Sunderland's resignation as Lord Chamberlain. Somers informed 
Shrewsbury: 
Since I have been so long on this subject, I will 
add this, that my Lord Sp[encer], Overt[on] and 
others, who are his [Sunderland] confidents, all 
say, that Dunc[ombe], G[uy], and Tr[evor], did so 
perpetually alarm him, with stories of his being 
delivered up by the Whigs, in order to engage him 
to change his side, and these stories were aggravated 
in such a fiery manner, by my Lord P[eterborough]; 
that the physic was too strong., and operated quite 
contrary to their design; so that he durst not stay 
the time of turning out others, but shifted away 
himself. 42 
In order to settle the Clancarty scandal Sunderland remained out of 
London in early January 1698, but at the same time a group of M. P. 's, 
Charles Duncombe, John Methuen, Sir William Trumbull and 
Robert Molesworth., who were regarded as his creatures, attacked 
Montagu with accusations of fraudulent endorsement of exchequer bills. 
Sunderland denied responsibility for this assault and he ordered 
Henry Guy, who apparently instigated the whole thing, to desist. 
Sunderland also kept up his contact with the Junto in the hope that 
despite this setback an accommodation could be achieved. 
43 
James Vernon remarked: 
I hear by my Lord Spencer, that Mr, Overton was 
with Mr. Montague this morning, and that he found 
him very well disposed towards an accommodation, 
and expressed himself as if the event of that day 
would be of consequence, and that it would be much 
easier if Duncombe were well mortified, That part 
is now done to purpose, and Itis certain the party 
will be more considerable by it, and some of those my 
Lord Sunderland might have an inclination for, he will 
be ashamed of. 44 
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A rapprochenent. between Sunderland and the junto depended upon 
punishing those who had attacked Montagu and Lord Spencer was 
dete-imined to do his utmost to achieve this end. 
Montagu easily demonstrated that he was innocent of financial 
mismanagement and he then sought revenge in a blistering attack on 
Charles Duncombe. On 25 January Duncombe was committed to the Tower 
and at the beginning of February he was expelled from the Commons and 
a bill of Pains and Penalties was brought in against him. The bill 
was committed on 14 February and sent up to the Lords at the end of 
the month. 
45 
During the debates in the lower House it was observed 
that 'my Lord Spencer showed a great deal of warmth for Mr. Montague 
and nobody in the House is more violent against Duncombel. 
46 
Duncombe's bill met fierce opposition in the House of Lords and on 
7 March 1698 the peers requested a conference with the Commons upon 
the subject-matter of the bill. Lord Spencer was named as one of 
the Commons' managers at the conference. The Lords declared that 
they wanted an explanation of the charges against Duncombe. After 
considering the report of the conference on 9 March a committee was 
appointed, including Spencer, to give an account of the reasons for 
prosecuting Duncombe which was to be presented to the Lords. 
47 The 
following day Lord Hartington reported the committee's statement to 
the House: 
This report was debated paragraph by paragraph. 
It was again endeavoured to leave out the word 
confession. What was most insisted on was 
whether Mr. Duncomb told D'Acosta he might 
write other people's names as well as his own; 
many said they did not hear these words, but 
others positively affirmed it, viz.: Mr. Methuen, 
Mr. Hore, Lord William Pawlet and Lord Spencer, 
and the others being but a doubtful denial, it 
was determined it should stand. However there 
was a division upon it, which was carried by 
90 against 68.48 
The Common? ' statement was delivered to the Lords on 11 March and 
four days later the peers rejected the bill against Duncombe by 
48 votes to 47.49 The Commons immediately appointed a committee, 
including Lord Spencer, to examine the Journals of the House of Lords 
12 
and to present an account of their proceedings. 
50 After this 
report had been delivered Spencer was named on a further committee 
to search for precedents for the Lords discharging Duncombe from 
confinement in the Tower. 
51 Lord Hartington reported from this 
committee on 22 March 1698 and after consideration it was resolved 
that the order to release Duncombe was a breach of the privileges 
of the House of Commons and that he should be taken into the custody 
of the Serjeant-at-Arms. On 31 March the Commons ordered that 
Duncombe should again be remanded to the Tower where he was to 
remain until the end of the session. 
52 Spencer' W&., T Pm5wr to bring 
about a reconciliation between the Junto and his father and 
his support for Montagu and his hostility to Duncombe clearly indicateS 
this increasing disposition towards the Junto. This process was 
facilitated by his personal acquaintance with Montagu, Somers, and 
Wharton and his association with them was to grow during the next 
Parliament while his father remained at Althorp for much of the time. 
53 
The King's disenchantment with his Whig ministers was such that 
the Junto fought the 1698 election without the backing of the Crown. 
This, together with the continuing tensions between the Junto and the 
more independently minded Whig M. P. 1s, allowed the opposition to secure 
control of the Commons. 
S4 Lord Spencer was again returned for 
Tiverton along with Thomas Bere. 
55 The inability of the administration 
to manage the House of Commons was not immediately apparent and they 
were able to obtain the Speakership for Sir Thomas Littleton. After 
the King's speech had been read in the House of Lords the Commons 
were directed to return to their own chamber and choose a Speaker: 
'accordingly they went back, and the Marquis of Hartington moved, that 
Sir Thomas Littleton might fill the chair, and was seconded by the 
Lord Spencer; and after near two hours debate, the question was put 
whether he should be speaker or not; yeas 242, noes 13SI. 
56 Spencer 
and Hartington then conducted Littleton to the chair where he desired 
to be excused this responsibility but eventually gave way to the demands 
of the House. 
57 From now on the tide ran against the ministry and 
they were to prove particularly vulnerable on the question of the 
13 
standing army. Lord Spencer, however, was determined to show that 
he would support the Junto through thick and thin and that he nom had no 
sYmpath-v with Country WH. g attitudes. 
The division between Court and Country Whigs reached its height I 
over the question of the size of the standing army and no other issue 
could bind backbench Whig and Tory M. P. 's so closely together. 
S8 
William was greatly concerned at the continuing ambitions of Louis XIV 
of France and to deal with this threat he wanted to retain as large a 
standing army as possible, but the Commons were unwilling to continue 
to maintain a large army after the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697.59 On 
14 December 1698 the King's speech was under consideration when 
Lord Spencer indicated his approval of William's foreign policy by 
moving that a supply should be granted to the King. 
60 Spencer's 
motion was laid aside and it was agreed to examine the state of the 
nation in relation to the army. Lists of the troops in England and 
Ireland were delivered to the House on 16 December and Harley moved to 
reduce the army in England to 7,000 men which was accepted without a 
division. The following Cý day it was resolved that these troops should 
only include native Englishmen. The House went into committee 
upon the Disbanding bill on 4 January 1699 and the divisions in the 
Whig party hampered the administration's attempts to defeat the 
measure. The only change made was that Scots and Irishmen were to 
be allowed to be of the 7,000 men. The final reading of the bill took 
place on 18 January. It had already been predicted that Lord Spencer 
would oppose disbanding 
61 
and when the bill was approved by 231 votes 
to 154 Lord Spencer was in the minority. 
62 It was then sent up to 
the Lords where it was agreed to without amendment and though Somers 
persuaded William not to carry out his threat to leave the kingdom the 
King left no doubt of his displeasure at the passage of the Disbanding 
act when he came to the Lords to accept it on 1 February. 
63 Lord 
Spencer was included in the committee to address thanks to the King 
for his speech. 
64 The defeat over the army was a major setback for 
the government and it set the tone for an unpleasant year. 
14 
The administration was censured in the Commons for 
mismanagement and corruption at the Admiralty and an inquiry 
began which assumed the character of a personal attack on Orford. 
The ministry was unable to carry a proposal to include 300 marines 
in the seamen who were to be provided for the fleet and the King could 
not persuade the Commons to allow him to retain his Dutch Guards 
in England. A Place bill was introduced into the House and the Old 
East India Company tried to undermine the gains their rivals had made 
the previous year. Fortunately the Junto were able to withstand most 
of these attacks, but little progress had been made in supply when a 
very unsatisfactory session was brought to an end in May 1699. The 
situation worsened as the ministry began to disintegrate. Shrewsbury 
had resigned as Secretary of State in December 1698 while Orford, 
nettled by the attack on the navy, stood down as First Lord of the 
Admiralty and Treasurer of the Navy. Likewise Montagu gave up the 
offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer 
preferring the post of Auditor of the Exchequer. These alterations 
saw the introduction of Jersey, Pembroke, and Lonsdale into the 
government and though nominally Tories they were primarily loyal 
servants of the King. As a result of these difficulties Shrewsbury 
had been trying to bring about a reconciliation with Sunderland but 
the attempt broke down because of Shrewsbury's ill-health. Sunderland 
was to have more success with the attempt to marry Lord Spencer to 
Anne Churchill the daughter of the Earl and Countess of Marlborough. 
65 
Lord Spencer's first wife, Lady Arabella Cavendish, had died of 
smallpox in June 1698 
66 
and, with rather indecent haste, the following 
month Lady Sunderland approached the MarlboroughSý with a proposal for 
a marriage between Spencer and Anne Churchill. Though Sarah Marlborough 
favoured the match her husband did not approve of Spencer and there 
seemed little chance of success despite the discussions continuing. 
Sarah kept in contact with Lord and Lady Sunderland through Godolphin 
and Mrs. Jael Boscawen and by September 1699 Marlborough had given 
way to his wife. There were numerous reports that an agreement had 
been reached and the news was confirmed on 26 September. 
67 In 
15 
December 1699 Sunderland came up to London to complete the 
formalities of the marriage 
68 
and he assured the MarlboroughS 
that Spencer 'will be goveýcned in every thing public and private 
by Lord Marlborough'. 69 Sunderland was obviously out of touch for 
by now it was clear that Spencer would only be governed by his own 
inclinations which were by this time synonymous with those of the 
Junto, Significantly, when Lord Spencer had come up to London in 
September 1699, when his engagement had been announced, he 
immediately waited upon Somers. Vernon told Shrewsbury: 'I hear 
today that my Lord Chancellor [Somers] has admitted of some visits, 
my Lord Spencer was with him, and he asked very obligingly about his 
father's health, and kept up a discourse about him, which he did not 
do the last time my Lord came from Althorp'. 
70 The marriage took 
place on 2 January 1700 and Princess Anne, despite disapproving of 
the match because of her hostility to the Spencer family, contributed 
Z5,000 to the bride's dowry and made her a Lady of the Bedchamber. 
71 
Spencer's connection with the Marlboroughs was to be of the utmost 
importance in the next reign, 
Following his son's marriage Sunderland remained in London at 
the request of the King to try and come to terms with Robert Harley 
in order to establish a new administration. The Junto were clearly 
on the defensive. At the beginning of the parliamentary session in 
November 1699 a number of attacks were launched against Somers, He 
was criticised for the piracy of Captain Kidd who had held a 
commission under the Great Seal, the grant of royal lands, and the 
alterations which had been made in the County commissions. The 
pressure was kept up after the Christmas recess and the major issue 
before the Commons was a bill to resume the grants of forfeited estates 
in Ireland which the King had given to his favourites. The bill was 
sent up to the Lords on 2 April 1699 and when the Lords, encouraged 
by William, amended this measure a dispute broke out between them 
and the Commons who were unwilling to accept any alterations. Lord 
Spencer was a member of the committee which drew up the Commons' 
reasons for opposing the Lords' amendment and was a manager at the 
16 
conferences with the Upper House. 
72 
A major crisis was avoided when 
the Kin and the peers gave way on 10 April. Somers, who disapproved 9 4-- 
of the attempt to block the Resumption bill in the Lords was dismissed 
by the King on 27 April following the end of the session. The 
removal of SIDomers ended the Junto's connection with the Court and a 
new ministry would have to be formed. 
73 
The King again turned to Sunderland who wanted to bring Somers 0 
back into the ministry but the former Lord Chancellor would not 
agree to this plan. 
74 The death of Princess Anne's son., the Duke of 
Gloucester in July 1700 meant that a strong government would be 
necessary in order to settle the success-Lon, Sunderland now 
favoured a Tory administration led by Harley and Godolphin. In 
the summer and autumn of 1700 Sunderland was in contact with Harley 
and it was Harley's assurances which convinced William of the 
feasibility of a ministerial reconstruction. In November 1700 
Tankerville became Lord Privy Seal and Sir Charles Hedges Secretary of 
State. The following month Godolphin was declared First Lord of the 
Treasury, Rochester was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and it 
1: Commons. was understood that Harley was to be Speaker of the House of 
On 17 December the King dissolved Parliament. Though the Tories made 
significant advances in the North and West of England they did not 
obtain the sweeping gains they expected and considering recent events 
the Junto did remarkably well. 
75 In September 1700 it was observed 
that 'Lord Spencer has been at Tiverton to secure his interest therel 
76 
and the following day Spencer wrote to the Duke of Newcastle 'I am 
but just come to town from my western journey'. 
77 His efforts proved 
to be successful for he and Bere were again elected at Tiverton, 
78 
The new Parliament was to show the extent of Lord Spencer's loyalty 
to the Junto for he remained committed to them even in adversity. 
The session began on 10 February 1701 and the King made it plain 
that he favoured Harley for the speakership of the Commons. William 
directed Sir Thomas Littleton not to oppose Harley yet Lord Spencer and 
other Whigs were not prepared to yield without a fight. Sir Edward 
Seymour nominated Harley and he was seconded by Leveson Gower. 
17 
Lord Hartington proposed Sir Richard Onslow and he was supported by 
79 Lord Spencer, but Harley was elected by 249 votes to 125. The 
influence of the Earl of Sunuerland on his son was clearly declining 
and L'Hermitage remarked of Harley: 'On le dit aussi amy du Comte 
de Sunderland, quoy-que my Lord Spencer, son fils, luy voulut donner 
Vexclusion, mais le manege et les maximes de ce pays icy estant 
80 diferentes de beaucoup d1autres on Wen est pas surpris', With 
Harley in a position to dominate the House the new ministry could 
turn to the question of the succession an issue which gave Spencer a 
further opportunity to demonstrate where his loyalties lay. 
In his speech at the opening of Parliament William had urged that 
immediate provision should be made to settle the Protestant Succession. 
On 20 February Harley advised the Commons to turn its attention to 
this question and six days later, upon Lord Hartington's motion, it 
was agreed to take up the matter in committee on 1 March 1701. On 
this day two resolutions were approved. The first specified that 
the Crown should devolve on the next Protestant line after William, 
Anne, and their heirs. The second declared that further provision 
should be made for the securities and liberties of the people. Then 
'Lord Spencer moved to name the person (viz. ) the Duchess of Hanover 
and her issue but it was thought improper till these resolutions were 
reported to the House and agreed to'. 
81 
The additional safeguards were 
drawn up in committee in early March. They included: resolutions 
that all important affairs of state should be transacted by the Privy 
Council with the members signing their advice; the exclusion of 
placemen and pensioners from the House of Commons; foreigners were 
barred from the royal service, both Houses of Parliament, and could not 
receive royal grants; the kingdom was not to go to war except in 
defence of land attached to the English Crown and the monarch was not 
to go abroad without the consent of Parliament. The resolutions 
'combined hitherto unsuccessful Country proposals.., with restrictions 
that reflected the experiences of William's reign and the precedents 
provided by the marriage contract between Mary Tudor and Philip II of 
Spain'. 
82 Lord Spencer was unlikely to have approved these terms. 
18 
The question of a successor was considered on 11 March and 
John Verney reported: 
We have this day finished our considerations 
that relate to the succession and have 
declared the succession to the Duchess Dowager 
of Hanover and her issue. My Lord Spencer 
did at the first attempt to nominate her but 
was stopped till there was a further declaration 
of the rights of the people. Which being over 
Sir John Bowles nominated her and introduced it 
with a very handsome speech. Sir Rowland Gwyn 
seconded him and so the question passed 
unanimously and without a debate and my 
Lord Spencer was disappointed of the merit of the 
actiOn-83 
All the resolutions were approved, with minor alterations, the 
following day and by 22 May the bill had been approved by Parliament 
without amendment. 
84 
With the Act of SeýýJp-, Oftt passed the House 
turned its attention to foreign affairs. 
William had requested Parliament to consider the state of affairs 
in Europe and had recommended the fitting out of a strong fleet 
together with provision for the debts and deficiencies remaining from 
the last way. In reply the peers addressed the King to lay before 
them all treaties concluded since the Peace of Ryswick. The treaties 
were delivered on 12 March and among them was the Second Partition 
Treaty of 1700 though not the First Partition Treaty of 1698. The 
partition treaties stemmed from William's desire to solve the problem 
of who was to succeed Charles II as King of Spain and the fate of 
the vast Spanish Empire without a major European war. Negotiations 
had started early in 1698 with Louis XIV and in order to facilitate 
a solution the King had sought the opinion of Somers, Montagu, Vernon, 
and Orford. They had agreed to fix the Great Seal to the projected 
treaty before it was completed and without the approval of Parliament 
in order to help the King. The First Partition Treaty was concluded 
in September 1698 and under its terms the Electoral Prince of Bavaria 
was to succeed Charles II. The Prince's death in February 1699 meant 
a further agreement would be necessary and this resulted in the 
19 
Second Partition Treaty of 1700 which was approved after 
consideration by the English ministers. 
85 The second treaty was 
attacked in the Lords and on 21 March the Lower House addressed 
William 'to lay before his Majesty the ill consequences of the Treaty 
M 
of Partition to this Kingdom and the Peace of Europe'. Lord 
Spencer was named in the committee to draw up the address. 
87 Three 
days later the Commons took up the Lords findings on the treaty and 
though Portland was impeached for his part in the treaty Somers 
managed to escape censure. The affair took on. a new dimension when 
Portland, under examination by the Commons, revealed the existence 
of the First Partition Treaty of 1698.88 
On 8 April the Commons requested William to lay before them the 
First Partition Treaty and related documents along with the 
correspondence between Vernon and Portland. Four days later Lord 
Spencer was included in the committee to translate the letters of 
Vernon and Portland. 
89 
These communications were read on 14 April 
and the same day it was resolved, by 198 votes to 188, to impeach 
Somers for ratifying the treaty. Orford and Montagu, who was now 
Lord Halifax, were also impeached for their involvement, The 
articles against Orford and Somers were sent up to the Lords in May 
but the Commons, conscious that the upper House was unlikely to convict 
the Whig leaders, became involved in a series of disputes with the 
Lords over procedure and prerogatives. The issue was finally settled 
in June when Somers was acquitted and the charges against Orford and 
Halifax were dismissed. 
90 Lord Spencer is unlikely to have witnessed 
the final stages of this dispute for on 21 May he was once again 
given leave to retire into the country to recover his health. 
91 
When 
Spencer returned to London at the end of the year the balance of 
politics had shifted back towards the Junto. 
The impeachments of Somers, Orford, and Halifax illustrated the 
unwillingness of the Commons to support William's foreign policy and 
as no definite steps for the defence of Europe could be made without 
Parliament's approval the King was forced. to wait on events. By the 
summer of 1701 Sunderland, alarmed at the myopia of the administration 
20 
he had helped to create, was in touch with Somers and both men were 
scandalised by Parliament's attitude towards affairs on the continent. 
Sunderland advised William to cunsult Somers and to dissolve 
Parliament. After hesitating the King at last approached Somers 
through Galway in October 1701 and when Louis XIV recognized James III 
as King of England William granted Somers' request for a dissolution 
in November. 92 
The election brought the Whig and Tory parties to a position of 
near equality in the Commons. 
93 
Lord Spencer, as usual, was elected 
at Tiverton. 
94 
Spencer was also engaged in a careful analysis of 
the returns of M. P. 's in order to establish the gains made by the 
Whigs. His calculations show that the Whigs made fifty-two gains 
and suffered twenty-three reverses which gave them a net gain of 
twenty-nine. Recent research has confirmed that Spencer's estimate 
was almost correct as the Whigs appear to have made thirty-two gains 
rather than twenty-nine. 
9S On 17 December the King declared that he 
supported Sir Thomas Littleton in the election for 15peaker and a 
fortnight later he instructed them to make their decision: 'Lord 
Spencer acquainted the House, that, their first business being to 
choose their Speaker, they ought to make a choice of a person of 
experience in Parliamentary affairs, and of zeal for his country. 
And, as such, proposed, that Sir Thomas Littleton, who had been 
formerly Speaker, might be Speaker again. ' Spencer was seconded by 
John Smith, but the Earl of Dysqrt proposed Harley who was elected by 
216 votes to 212.96 The contest for the speakership had shown that 
the two parties were closely balanced in the Commons and this situation 
was to continue into the new year. 
At the beginning of January 1702 the King delivered a long and 
eloquent speech, drawn up by Somers, and both Houses voted strong 
addresses of support. Lord Spencer was named in the Commons, 
committee to draw up the address of thanks and was also included in 
the committee of privileges and elections. 
97 Sir Rowland Gwynn 
reported from the latter committee on 27 January upon the petition of 
21 
Irby Montagu against the election of John Comyns for the borough 
of Malden in Essex. The committee resolved that Comyns, a Tory, 
was duly elected and the House agreed to this resolution by 226 
votes to 208 with Lord Spencer and Sir Walter Yonge acting as 
tellers for the minority. It was then agreed that Montagu's agent, 
William Coe, was guilty of bribery and cori7Upt practices and he was 
ordered to be taken into the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms. 
98 
There was virtual unanimity in the voting of supplies and ways 
and means but there were fierce party disputes over the Abjuration 
bill and the report of the Maidstone election while an attempt to 
revive the impeachments of the previous year came to nothing. The 
initiative switched from Whig to Tory and then back again and the 
proposals for a union with Scotland received a favourable response 
from the Lords and the Whigs in the Commons. A riding accident 
suffered by the King was not regarded as serious, but as a result of 
the complications which developed William died on Sunday morning 
8 March 1702. Lord Spencer was named in the Commons committee of 
condolence and congratulation and their address was presented to 
the new Queen the following day. 
99 Queen Anne's inclination towards 
the Tories and her devotionto the Church of England was reflected 
in the appointments which followed her accession. Sir Charles Hedges 
and the Earl of Nottingham became Secretaries of State, Godolphin 
Lord Treasurer, Marlborough Captain-General, Sir Edward Seymour 
Comptroller, the Earl of Jersey was named as Lord Chamberlain, 
Normanby was created Lord Privy Seal while Rochester retained the 
Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. The leaders ofthe Junto were struck 
from the rolls of the Privy Council. 
100 Lord Spencer, however, 
once again demonstrated that his loyalty to the Junto was unshakeable 
and that politically he and his father now had little in common. 
On 18 April 1702 the Commons were debating Irish petitions when 
Henry St. John and Sir John Bolles reflected upon Sunderland for 
which Bolles was rebuked by Harley: 
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My Lord Spencer stood up and said that that 
gent, [Bolles] had often reflected upon his 
father, but that he never thought anybody 
minded what he said and that therefore he 
was not worth the answering, but now since he 
had named him he thought himself obliged to 
say something in his vindication. He said 
he must own that his father when he was 
minister of state had committed some faults 
and so had all those before and since him 
that he knew of that had been in those great 
stations, but this he could say for him that 
he always loved England, valued his native 
country and never betrayed its interest to 
France: and that he believed the worst 
fault his father had was that he could not 
go into any comply with the councils of those 
men that had been for forty years last past 
been selling us to France-101 
The mildness of Lord Spencer's defence was probably due to his desire 
to vindicate his father personally, but it left no doubt as to the 
differences between them politically. 
The early months of the new reign were overshadowed by the 
impending war with France. On 2 May Seymour informed the Commons 
that the Queen had directed him to lay before them a convention agreed 
between England, the Dutch Republic, and the Emperor concerning the 
declaration of war on France and Spain. Lord Spencer was included 
in the committee to draw up the address of thanks which was agreed 
to and ordered to be presented by the whole House. 
102 A motion was 
then made to restrict the grant of commissions in the army to officers 
of English parentage but it was defeated by 94 votes to 91 . 
'Then 
Mr. Walpole moved to address the Queen that no officer in the army 
should pay anything for renewing their commissions. The Lord Spencer 
and I [Sir Richard Cocks] seconded it. Sir Christopher Musgrave said 
it was reasonable as to the half pay officers but no for the other. 
I gave the reason for it the charge of their equippage. The question 
was put and carried. ' 
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Two days later war was declared and on 
25 May Parliament was dissolved and the Tories had the full backing 
of the Crown in the election. 
104 
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For the first time Lord Spencer stood as a candidate in 
., ning 
in April and he and Northamptonshire. He was already campaig 
Sir St. Andrew St. John challenged tne two incmbent Tory M. P. 's 
Cartwright and Isham. 
105 
Spencer was supported by his father and 
Lord Montagu 
106 
but his most pressing advocate was probably his 
mother-in-law who was extremely solicitous on his behalf as her 
letter to Lady'Bathurst reveals. Sarah wrote: 
Tis with some trouble that I write to you, dear 
Lady Bathurst, upon this occasion, because I fear 
it may be uneasy to Sir Benjamin, who perhaps 
is engaged, or may not have inclinations to do 
what I am to desire, which is to assist my Lord 
Spencer with his interest in Northamptonshire, 
who designs to stand with Sir (something that I 
cannot remember) St. John to be Knight of the 
Shire. You know the relation I have to 
Lord Spencer who I do really think is upon the 
whole matter a man of honour and has a great many 
good things in him, but I know very well that he 
has never yet been what Sir Benjamin likes in the 
House of Commons, and that made me begin this 
letter with a very just apology, for I can't 
think it reasonable to constrain Sir Benjamin in 
his choice, nor I can't I (sic] deny anything I 
can do to serve one I love so well as I do my 
Lord Spencer. I will therefore leave this 
matter to you, who can judge what is fit to be 
done in anything much better than I, and desire 
only when you are at leisure, some answer for me 
to give to my Lord Spencer. 107 
A close relationship had obviously developed between Spencer and 
Sarah Marlborough and it was to be even more important in the following 
years. Despite all these efforts Lord Spencer and Sir St. Andrew 
St. John were unable to oust the Tory M. P. 's. 
108 To rub salt into 
the wound the Tories also carried the election for the town of 
Northampton and 'this may have sent Lord Spencer home very 
melancholy'. 
109 Spencer's list for the election only deals with 
twelve constituencies 
110 
and it may be that he gave up his calculations 
when it became apparent that the Tories were going to win with a 
large majority. 
ill The defeat at Northamptonshire was not personally 
24 
significant as far as Spencer was concerned for, upon his father's 
death on 28 September at Althorp, he had succeeded as third 
Earl of Sunderland. 
112 
Though he had entered Parliament as a Whig in 1695 Lord Spencer's 
conduct was obviously heavily influenced by his father's inclinations 
towards the opposition Whigs in the House of Commons. Initially, 
Spencer was willing to follow his father's lead and fall in with this 
group. Yet it was plain that he had little sympathy with Country 
Whig beliefs, particularly when this group of Whigs W-O, -S ready to 
co-operate with the Tories, and that his views had much more in common 
with the attitudes of the leaders of the Whig Junto. There was an 
obvious conflict between personal and political loyalties and further- 
more for a man who was both extremely able and incredibly ambitious, 
as Lord Spencer was, supporting the Junto seemed to offer the best 
hope of fulfiBing his political aspirations. Lord Spencer's desire 
to reconcile this conflict probably explains the zeal with which he 
tried to renew the alliance between his father and the Junto in 1698. 
When this attempt failed and his father retired to Althorp Spencer 
made it clear that his chief loyalty was to the Junto and he continued 
to work industriously on their behalf in the lean years at the end of 
William's and the beginning of Anne's reign. It was this devotion 
combined with his political beliefs, personal friendship with the Junto, 
and his important family connection with the Duke and Duchess of 
Marlborough which encouraged the Junto to admit Spencer into their 
inner council when he succeeded as Earl of Sunderland in September 1702. 
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CHAPTER TWO: FROM JUNTO LORD TO SECRETARY OF STATE 1702-1706 
'the great reputation your Lordship's behaviour 
hath everywhere brought to the Queen's service 
and to Your country' 
The accession of Queen Anne to the throne had forced the Junto on to 
the defensive. The new monarch, in terms of personalities and 
politics, was bitterly opposed to the Whig leadership while the more 
extreme elements of the Tory party were determined to exploit the 
favourable turn of events to proscribe the Whigs and to consolidate 
their own advantage. The situation facing the Junto was not, however, 
completely without hope, The new administration was based upon a 
fragile alliance between moderately inclined men such as Marlborough, 
Godolphin and Harley together with more thorough-going Tories including 
Nottingham, Rochester and Seymour. Divisions in policy soon began to 
emerge within the government and the Junto, basing their strength upon 
their majority in the House of Lords, were determined to use every 
opportunity to drive a wedge between the moderates and their more 
zealous High Tory adherents and to offer themselves as alternative 
partners in a coalition with the Court interest. If the Junto had 
any doubts about Sunderland's admission to the Whig leadership they 
were soon dispelled. Sunderland quickly mastered the procedures 
and practices of the House of Lords and was soon acquainted with the 
political affiliations of its membership. Utilising this knowledge 
Sunderland made a decisive contribution to the struggle in the Lords. 
On every important issue which came before the House from the defeat 
of the Occasional Conformity bills to the inquiry into the 'Scotch 
Plot' Sunderland acted as the driving force behind the Junto effort 
inspiring his colleagues with his youthful zeal, diligence, 
application, industry and commitment. Sunderland was eager to use 
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every occasion to demonstrate his devotion to Whig ideals in both 
Church and State and to emphasise his allegiance to the Protestant 
Succession in the House of Hanover even if it meant alienating the 
Queen. His contribution on behalf of the Junto was such that when 
they were in a position to force major concessions from the Court 
Sunderland was put forward as their candidate for the post of 
Secretary of State, Though the Queen's hostility to Sunderland had 
been fuelled by his conduct during these years the support which he 
and the Junto were able to obtain from Godolphin, Marlborough, and 
the Duchess of Marlborough was sufficient to overcome the Queen's 
opposition and force him into office. 
RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL 1702 to 1705 
IAZZ honest men who wish weZZ to their Country' 
Sunderland's admission into the ranks of the Junto leadership put him 
at the head of a group of 'Whigs who represented by far the most 
important element in the party after the Glorious Revolution'. 
' 
During King William's reign the Junto had been chiefly associated with 
four outstanding figures. Sir John Somers, later Lord Somers, had 
been the most prominent member of the Junto during these years and 
was to serve in a similar role for much of Queen Anne's reign. Somers 
was an outstanding lawyer and perhaps the most important intellectual 
in the Whig party; attributes which he combined with personal virtue 
and political responsibility, Charles Montagu, Lord Halifax, was a 
man of a different order. He was vain, irascible, restless and 
ambitious but was also an outstanding debater both in the Commons 
and the House of Lords and was an acknowledged master of financial 
administration. The most attractive member of the Junto leadership 
was Thomas, Lord Wharton. Personally Wharton was almost certainly 
the most vivid and colourful character of his age and though his 
conduct was often immoral he was in many ways a man of principle averse 
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to power and favour purely for their own sake. He was a master of 
electoral politics in which his courage and resilience doubtless 
played an important part. Edward Russeli, Earl of Orford, took 
little part in parliamentary politics by 1702 though his personal 
following in the Commons was invaluable to the Whigs. His 
reputation far outshone his contribution to the Junto for he was 
related to the famous Whig martyrLord William Russell, he had signed 
the invitation to William of Orange in 1688, and had defeated the 
French navy at La Hogue in 1692.2 These then were the men who were 
to be Sunderland's closest associates for the next twelve years. 
The Junto: 
As individuals... were an oddly-assorted bunch. 
They were cemented together into the most 
effective political combination of their day 
neither by kinship nor by compatability of 
character and temperament, but simply by the 
strength of the principles which they shared, 
the compelling force of their mutual quest 
for power, and a sense of loyalty to each other 
which in the circumstances of the time was 
astonishing. 3 
The first years of the new reign were to reveal the strength and dogged C> 
perseverance of both Sunderland and the Junto, 
The more extreme Tories were hopeful that the support of the 
Crown would enable them to purge the administration of Whig office- 
holders, reduce the political influence of the Dissenters, and to 
bring the Junto to account. Anne, however, like her two closest 
confidents Marlborough and Godolphin, together with the third member 
of the Triumvirate Robert Harley, was disposed towards moderation 
in domestic politics wanting to concentrate on the war against France. 
These priorities were not shared by the High Tories led by Rochester 
and Nottingham who wished to establish a Tory ascendancy at home and 
who also disliked Marlborough's war strategy which involved large-scale 
military operations against France on the continent. Rochester quickly 
expressed his opposition tv. the conduct of the war, even going so far 
as to oppose the actual declaration of hostilities in May 1702. 
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Marlborough, angered by Rochester's obstructiveness, suggested in 
August that he should be sent to Ireland to take up his duties as 
Lord Lieutenant. The administration was already under strain 
and further tension seemed likely when Parliament met in October. 
Encouraged by their success in the election, which had given them 
a majority of about 133 in the House of Commons, the Tories were 
preparing to take the offensive. 
4 
At the beginning of the session Sunderland was engaged in the work 
of the committees in the House of Lords which provided an opportunity 
of acquainting himself with the routine of the House and its membership. 
Sunderland was a member of the committee appointed to congratulate 
the Queen's husband, Prince George of Denmark, upon his recovery from 
a prolonged and dangerous asthmatic attack. 
5 Sunderland was also a 
member of the committee 
6 
which addressed the Queen not to dismiss 
William Lloyd, Bishop of Worcester as Almoner, which had been requested 
by the House of Commons, upon the complaint of Tory M. P., Sir John NcKkjton) 
Arp-uuA SP, --oý 7 Lloyd's attempts to prevent him being elected to 
Parliament. The Queen agreed to this request and as a result the 
Lords resolved that no 'Lord of this House ought to suffer any sort 
of punishment, by any proceedings of the House of Commons, otherwise 
than according to the known and ancient rules and methods of 
Parliament'. 7 The Lords did achieve some success for the Commons 
contented themselves with Lloyd's dismi. ssal and did not proceed any 
further in the matter. 
8 This dispute between the two Houses was 
to set the pattern for the remainder of the parliament's lifetime 
and at the centre of the conflict was the struggle over the 
Occasional Conformity bill in which Sunderland was to play a decisive 
part. 
The Occasional Conformity bill was the most cherished measure of 
the High Tories. Alarmed as they were at the threat posed to the 
authority of the Church of England by Protestant Dissent the Tory 
zealots were intent upon striking at the very basis of the Dissenters' 
political influence. The proposed legislation was designed to remove 
the anamolies of the Test and Corporation Acts which allowed 
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Dissenters to take the sacrament according to the rites of the 
Church, thereby qualifying themselves to hold office, and thereafter 
to revert to their own Chapels. Transgressors were to be subject 
to stiff financial penalties and the loss of office. Despite 
having the approval of the Queen the measure only served to 
exacerbate the divisions in the government for Marlborough and 
Godolphin both saw it as unnecessary and deliberately provocative. 
They realised, however, that they would. have to approve the bill to 
avoid estranging their Tory allies. 
9 
The bill easily passed the Commons in November and was brought up 
to the Lords on 2 December 1702. Rather than rejecting it outright 
the Whigs added a series of amendments which they hoped would prove 
unacceptable to the Commons. These included altering the schedule 
of fines to be imposed and an instruction that prayers should be 
given for the Queen and the Dowager Electress of Hanover in all 
private assemblies. The bill, with the alterations, was sent back 
to the Commons from the Lords on 9 December: 
Immediately a debate began [in the House of Lords] 
(much heated [by] the E[arl] of Sunderland's 
affirming that the Commons were just now considering 
how to tack this [the Occasional Conformity bill] to a 
money bill) which brought in a division of the house, 
51 against 47 and ended in the following order: 
"that the annexing any clause or clauses to a bill 
of aid or supply, the matter of which is foreign 
to and different from the matter of the said bill 
of aid or supply, is unparliamentary and tends to 
the destruction of the constitution of this 
government". All Lords that please had leave 
given to subscribe this order, which is to be 
added to the roll or standing orders. 10 
Sunderland, his Junto colleagues, and a further fifty-seven peers took 
the opportunity to sign this order in the Journal of the House. 
11 
On 17 December the Commons requested a conference with the Lords in 
order to consider the amendments. The Junto, together with other 
leading Whig peers, were nominated as the Lords'managers at this 
conference and their report of the proceedings was agreed to by 
52 votes to 47 with Sunderland acting as teller for the majority. 
12 
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The following day the Lords decided to insist on their amendments 
and a committee was established to draw up their reasons for this 
resolution which were to be delivered to the lower House at a 
further conference. The committee was also directed to search for 
precedents for the House of Lords altering bills containing penalties. 
Sunderland and his Junto associates were once again named in the 
Comm ittee. 
13 The precedents were reported to the House on 8 January 
1703 and following a motion by Sunderland it was agreed to insert 
them in the Journal of the House. 
14 Sunderland and the other Junto 
Lords acted as managers at a further two conferences with the Commons 
after which the Lords insisted upon their amendments to the bill and 
it was then rejected. 
is No sooner had the Occasional Conformity 
bill been thrown out than another parliamentary dispute arose with 
the bill to settle a revenue upon Prince George of Denmark. 
As a result of her anxiety for the welfare of her husband the 
Queen wished to provide for his maintenance in the event she should 
pre-decease him. A bill bestowing the sum of Z100,000 upon the 
Prince at the Queen's death was introduced into the Commons where the 
Tories mischievously added a clause to exempt the Prince from the 
disabilities imposed on foreigners by the Act of Settlement. This 
implied that a specific exemption from these penalties was necessary 
and consequently the estates of King William's Dutch peers. were under 
threat. Concern for the welfare of these Dutchmen and hostility to the 
tacking of extraneous clauses to money bills, highlighted by Sunderland 
in the debate on the Occasional Conformity bill, led to stiff opposition 
in the upper House with the Junto at the centre of the resistance. 
Sunderland's conduct indicates once more that his chief loyalty was 
to the Junto even if it meant embarrassing his mother and father-in-law 
and increasing the Queen's hostility towards him; the promise 
Sunderland's father made to Marlborough at the end of 1699, that his 
son would follow Marlborough's advice in all things was shown to be 
worthless. It was only after a ruling in favour of the Dutch peers 
by the judges that Prince George's bill passed the Lords by a small 
majority. The Whigs protested at the clause added to the bill as 
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well as the clauses which related to grants. Sunderland signed 
16 the second protest on 19 January 1703) . Sunderland was 
unconcerned that Marlborough, -given the Queen's peronal interest in 
the bill, was eager that it should pass and Sarah Marlborough was 
furious at his behaviour while the Queen was unlikely to forget such 
a slight. 
17 
The 1702-1703 parliamentary session came to an end with Sunderland 
helping Halifax to defeat the attempt, of the Tory dominated Commission 
of Accounts., to censure him for his handling of public funds in the 
previous reign. 
18 To prevent this dispute getting out of hand the 
Queen prorogued Parliament on 28 February 1703 and though this helped 
to reduce the pressure on the government it came too late to prevent 
the first break in the administration. 
19 The uncompromising Toryism 
of Rochester, together with his insistence that England should 
concentrate upon a naval war in order to secure trade and possessions 
rather than engage in military operations in Europe, had finally 
become too much for Marlborough and Godolphin. Unlike the previous 
August Marlborough now had the full support of the Queen who was 
impatient with the presumptious conduct of her uncle. Rochester 
was instructed to take up his position as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 
in Dublin and when he refused he was dismissed and replaced by the 
Duke of Ormonde. Despite rumours to the contrary no further changes 
were made in the ministry. 
20 Sunderland and the Junto were doubtless 
delighted. at the removal of Rochester and it seemed clear that if they 
continued their strategy of keeping up the political temperature they 
could force the government into a position where they would have to 
turn to the Whigs for succour. 
If the Queen found Rochester's behaviour obnoxious then it seems 
obvious that Sunderland's actions were equally likely to displease 
Anne for her uncle's extravagant Toryism was matched by Sunderland's 
enthusiastic Whiggery. Sunderland's Whig zeal was conspicuous in 
both State and Church in the second half of 1703. During the summer 
Sunderland was using his best endeavours to get Dr. Charles Trimnell 
appointed as 0.,,, prebend of Westminster. Trimp. ell had been intimately 
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connected with the Spencer family since attending Sunderland's Cý 
father in Holland in 1689 and he had been on very close terms with 
Sunderland from at least 1694.21 
- Through this connection Trimnell 
was presented to the rectory of Bodington in. Northamptonshire in 
1694. Two years later he exchanged this for Brington the Parish 
in which Althorp stood. In July 1698 Trimnell became Archdeacon of 
Norfolk and was Chaplain Ordinary to Princess Anne. He was a 
vehement Whig violently opposed to High Church doctrines and 
Erastian in his attitude to Church-State relations. 
22 Sunderland 
approached the Archbishop of York on Trimnell's behalf and the 
Duchess of Marlborough spoke to the Queen. 
23 Trimnell's candidacy, 
however, was to be unsuccessful, but he was to be closely associated 
with Sunderland for the rest of his career as Bishop of Norwich and 
then Bishop of Winchester, 
Sunderland was also demonstrating his commitment to the Whig 
cause, in terms of its sentiment and its practical organisation, in 
November 1703. Since his entry into the Commons as M. P. for Castle 
Rising Robert Walpole had pursued a strongly pro-Junto course and 
this., together with his ability in the House, contributed to his 
esteem in the Whig ranks. 
24 At the end of October his fellow Whig 
James Stanhope wrote to him: 
Having heard that you do not intend to come up 
till Christmas your friends have commissioned 
me to write to you. Lord Hartington, Lord 
Halifax, Mr. Smith and Lord Sunderland are 
particularly sollicitous about it and as to what 
concerns the public you might as well not bother 
coming. Having thus writ I don't presume any 
thing I say will have any weight but for both 
the public and myself I would be glad of your 01 
company. 25 
Sunderland's relations with both Walpole and Stanhope were to assume 
greater significance under George I. Sunderland was also active in 
celebrating the anniversary of William III's birthday. It was 
reported: 'The last 4th of this month [November] was King William's 
Birthday. 'Twas kept with illuminations etc., in the chie4: streets 
all over the town, and Lord Orford, Lord Sunderland made bonfires etc., 
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and at the Kit-cat Itwas very great. Lord Hartington, Duke of 
T Somerset etc., were there. Ihe glass sent down was to the immortal 
memory of King William. ' 
26 Sunderland's actions can only have 
served to heighten the Queen's antipathy towards him. 
During the spring and summer of 1703 events both at home and C), 
abroad were to illustrate the growing divergence between the Court CP 
and its erstwhile Tory allies. Marlborough's efforts on the CP 
continent failed to produce any worthwhile result and Louis XIV, who 
had now been joined by the Elector of Bavaria, was able to hamper the 
Imperial war effort by stirring up the Emperor's Hungarian subjects. 
It must have been extremely mortifying for Marlborough to observe 
that the progress made in the war was largely due to the efforts of 
Nottingham as Secretary of State. Unlike Marlborough, who was 
primarily occupied. with the campaign in Flanders, Nottingham felt that 
the war effort should be concentrated in the Mediterranean, on the 
Iberian Peninsula., and in the West Indies. As part of this strategy 
Nottingham had helped to promote the Methuen Treaty with Portugal and 
an alliance with the Duke of Savoy. Nottingham's frequent disputes 
ly 4 with the Dutch mere Lncreased Marlborough's resentment. On the 
domestic front in August Godolphin and Harley, aware of the 
administration's weakness, tried to reach an agreement with 
William Bromley, the High Tory M. P. for Oxford University, to help 
secure the passage of the supply when Parliament met. Though the 
approaches to Bromley came to nothing Sir Charles Hedges was- detache. 1 
from Nottingham)-in October 1703.27 
Parliament met in November 1703 and the intense party conflict 
of the previous session was quickly renewed with the introduction of 
the second Occasional Conformity bill. Marlborough and Godolphin, 
zealots, were now owing to their growing impatience with the Tory . 
ready to oppose the bill though in public they pretended to approve 
the measure. More significantly the Queen now had little enthusiasm 
for the legislation and she was ready to allow Prince George to absent 
himself from the House of Lords when they considered the bill, Once 
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again the Tory dominated House of Commons received the bill with 
great acclaim and its dispatch to the Lords was deliberately designed 
to coincide with the passage of the Money bill on 14 December 1703. 
The Junto had been preparing to oppose the Occasional Conformity bill 
and Sunderland. using his extensive knowledge of the political 
affiliations of the members of the House of Lords, played a vital part 
in its defeat by his careful predictions of the outcome of divisions 
in the chamber. 
28 Sunderland drew up his first estimate in 
November 1703 based upon the division of 16 January 1703 on the 
penalties clause in the first Occasional Conformity bill. On that 
day the Whigs had carried the motion by 65 votes to 63 and on this 
basis, together with an analysis of the Lords who were absent that 
day but were now present, Sunderland gave the Whigs a majority of two. 
Sunderland's second list was drawn up after the death of the Bishop 
of Bath and Wells and probably dates from 8 December 1703, He gave 
the Whigs a lead of five over the Tories and on the basis of this 
analysis the Junto felt it was possible to risk a division. A 
motion for a second reading of the bill was thrown out by 71 votes to 
59 on 14 December. Sunderland's prediction of the Whig vote was 
correct in terms of the total though he did err by identifying 
Bridgewater as a gain instead of Richmond. Despite winning over 
Bridgewater and Exeter the Tories lost eight votes including Prince 
George and as a result Sunderland over-estimated Tory strength, He 
had, however, amply demonstrated his expert knowledge of the political 
views of the members of the assembly and the importance of his 
contribution to the Junto leadership. 
29 
Up till now the Junto had 
been on the defensive but the controversy known as the 'Scotch Plot' 
gave them an opportunity to attack the Tories and put further pressure 
on the unstable coalition which constituted the government. As with 
the defeat of the second Occasional Conformity bill it was 
Sunderland who led the Junto assault. 
Throughout 1703 the administration had received repeated warnings 
of a projected Jacobite insurrection in Scotland. Nottingham, as 
Secretary of State, had passed these reports to the Court's 
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representative in Scotland, the Duke of Queensberry. Queensberry, 
however., was more interested in using this opportunity to stigmatise 
his opponents north of the border as Jacobitesýbasing his accusations 
upon the unreliable testimony of Simon FrdSer, Lord Lovat. Upon the 
promise of further information Queensberry obtained a pass from 
Nottingham to allow Lovat to go to France. Shortly. afterwards the 
treacherous behaviour of Lovat was made plain in the declarations 
made by two other Jacobites, Sir John Maclean and Robert Ferguson. 
It was obvious that the affair had been ineptly handled and in order 
to prevent a cover up either Devonshire or Somerset, the two Whigs 
left in the Cabinet, leaked information which forced the government 
to reveal what had happened. The Lords were informed of the situation 
by the Queen on 17 December 1703 and a full account of the proceedings 
was promised. 
30 A ballot was taken immediately to appoint a committee 
to examine James Boucher and other suspects who had been apprehended 
while coming over from France. The result was a clean sweep for the 
Whigs with Sunderland, Somers, Wharton, Scarborough, Townshend, 
Devonshire and Somerset being nominated. 
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From 18 to 20 December the committee met at Northumberland House 
in order to cross-examine suspects and to consider correspondence 
including letters sent to Nottingham. It was Sunderland who 
shouldered the responsibility for leading the Whig inquiry into the 
'Scotch Plot' diligently attending the meetings of the committee and 
making a detailed account of all the proceedings. From the notes 
which he made it is apparent that Sunderland pursued every available 
piece of information with relentless vigour in the hope of turning up 
some evidence that would discredit Nottingham and allow the Whigs to 
force him out of office. Sunderland's energy, industry, perseverance, 
and application in this painstaking and difficult search is quite 
staggering. The extent of Sunderland's commitment as a politician and 
the remorseless and determined way he sought any opportunity to 
victimize his opponents for the benefit of the Whig party is obvious. 
His stamina, resolution, his capacity for sheer hard work and unceasing toil 
are remarkable and leave no doubt that politics gave his whole existence 
36 
both meaning and purpose. The struggle for power totally consumed CP 
Sunderland and his chier' loyalty was to his Junto colleagues and to 
vVhig principles; to serve these ends Sunderland was prepared to 
consider almost any course of action. 
32 
On 21' December Devonshire reported. to the House of Lords and it 
was agreed to address the Queen to prosecute James Boucher to which 
she agreed the following day, The Commons., meanwhile, had complained 
to the Queen at the Lords taking prisoners into their custody and 
desired her not to suffer any diminution of her prerogative. In 
January 1704 the Lords declared that it was their right to examine 
persons upon criminal matters, condemned the Commons' address to the 
Queen, and appointed a committee, including Sunderland, to inform Anne 
of this matter. The Queen gave thanks to the Lords for their concern, 
but expressed her anxiety at the disputes between them and the Commons, 
33 
Papers relating to the affair were delivered to the Lords in 
January and February 1704 
34 
and of particular interest were a series 
of letters in cipher which Sunderland described as 'the Gibberish 
letters'. 3S Nottingham urged that the committee of inquiry should 
examine William Keith who, along with Robert Ferguson, had been taken 
into custody on 11 February. The committee found that Keith had 
tried to delay the investigation and pronounced that he was not a fit 
object of the Queen's mercy, 
36 Little progress had been made in 
deciphering 'the Gibberish letters' and a proclamation was issued for 
persons to come forward and assist the examination in return for a 
reward. 
37 The committee's scrutiny of this correspondence was 
assisted by a cipher which was delivered to them and Sunderland was 
once again at the head of the search decoding and meticulously 
analysing the papers for any thing which could be used against 
Nottingham. 
38 
Unfortunately his efforts did not yield the information 
he so eagerly sought as he himself declared: 
The committee in pursuance of the power given 
to them by the House proceeded to treat about 
the explanation of the gibberish letters and 
Ihey have attained to the 
knowledge of the t 
greatest part of what is contained in them but 
37 
not to the knowledge of the persons to whom they 
are directed or the persons named in them. 
And at last the committee so far prevailed as 
to gain a consent to lay the general account 
hereafter following of the substance of the 
letters before the House, so as in all other 
points the terms insisted on before were 
strictly observed. 39 
On 23 February 1704 Sunderland, Devonshire, Somerset, Scarborough, 
Townshend., Wharton, and Somers were appointed as a committee to make 
further inquiries into the plot. 
40 
The committee again met at 
Northumberland House and they examined prisoners continuously from 
23 February to 17 March 1704 and on one occasion they went to Newgate I- 
prison in order to examine James Boucher. Sunderland again directed 
the inquiry making a detailed account of the committee's proceedings 
with his usual aggressive determination and devotion, but as in 
December 1703 he was unable to obtain anything concrete against 
Nottingham. 41 
Somerset reported the committee's examination and two days later, 
on Wednesday 22 March, the House passed several resolutions to the 
effect that there had been a dangerous conspiracy in Scotland to 
subvert the government and bring in the Pretender; that the greatest 
encouragement to this unrest was that the succession in Scotland had 
not been settled in the House of Hanover; that the Queen should 
undertake to settle the succession and to frustrate the designs of 
her enemies; and finally that when the succession in Scotland had been 
determined the House would do all in its power to promote a union of 
the two kingdoms of England and Scotland. Sunderland was named in 
the committee to address the Queen upon these heads. An attempt 
to censure Nottingham over his handling of the examination of 
Sir John Maclean was beaten off and the Junto Lords and other prominent 
Whigs protested at this resolution. A similar fate befell the 
attempt to bring Maclean to the bar of the House to be heard on 
criticisms of Nottingham's inquiry. On 2S March, however, the 
Whigs carried a resolution condemning the failure to prosecute 
Robert Ferguson for his attempt to discredit the claims that there 
38 
had been a conspiracy in Scotland. At the end of the month the 
Queen, in reply to the address of 22 March, declared her resolve 
. 42 to settle the succession in Scotland as a preliminary to a union. 
Sunderland had directed the Junto's campaign during the'Scotch Plot' 
and he was also involved, less prominently, in the disputes between the 
Lords and Commons over the disfranchising of Whig electors at 
Aylesbury and the amendments which the upper House made to the Public 
Accounts bill. In both instances Sunderland assisted his Junto 
colleagues in the work of the committees appointed by the Lords and 
as a manager at conferences with the Commons. He would certainly have 
applied himself with the same vigour, enthusiasm, and determination he 
had adopted in the inquiry into the 'Scotch Plot'. Neither of these 
quarrels had been determined when the Queen prorcpej Parliament 
on 3 April 1704 to put an end to the squabbling of Lords and Commons. 
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Sunderland must have been delighted at his efforts to defeat the 
second Occasional Conformity bill and in the examination of the 'Scotch 
Plot' for it was his endeavours which helped to precipitate Nottingham 
from office. 
Exasperated by the setback over Occasional Conformity and the 
criticism of his handling of the 'Scotch Plot' Nottingham was 
determined to force the remaining Whigs out of the Cabinet and if he 
did not receive satisfaction he was intent upon resigning, Nottingham 
was un-aware of the decision to dismiss Sir Edward Seymour and the Earl 
of Jersey and, consequently, the Queen was able to persuade him to 
retain the Seals, but news of these dismissals produced his formal 
resignation on 22 April 1704. -It was rumoured that Sunderland would 
be created Lord Chamberlain or Secretary of State. 
44 The problem facing 
Marlborough and Godolphin was to find a suitable candidate-for the 
post of Secretary of State. Their alliance with the High Tories was 
at an end whilst the Queen was opposed to any of the leading Whigs. 
They eventually persuaded Robert Harley to accept the position and it 
was the natural choice for Harley and the Duumvirs had worked 
effectively together from the beginning of the reign. Harley's allies 
Sir Thomas Mansell and Henry St. John became Comptroller of the 
39 
Household and Secretary-at-War respectively, and a Whig nonentity, 
the Earl of Kent. was made Lord Chamberlain. The ministry, however, 
was even more vulnerable than before for with the more extreme 
Tories in opposition the administration would be unable to manage 
Parliament if they were attacked by the High Tories and the Junto 
Simultaneously. 45 The problems which faced the government in 
managing Scotland gave the Junto an opportunity to exploit this 
weakness. 
The session began well with the defeat of the third bill against 
Occasional Conformity in November 1704. The Tories had tried to 
ensure the passage of the bill through the Lords by 'tacking' it 
to the Land Tax legislation. Harley and Godolphin, through an 
intense lobbying of M. P. 1s, had managed to outwit the Tory zealots and 
the 'Tack' was defeated by 251 votes to 134 on 28 November. The 
Occasional bill by itself passed through the House of Commons but was 
rejected in the Lords on its second reading by 71 votes to 54 with 
Sunderland again almost certainly prominent in opposing the bill. 
46 
Sunderland and the Junto, however, were able to haro-Syl the ministry 
over Scottish affairs. 
The investigation into the 'Scotch Plot' had left the 
administration committed to settling the succession in Scotland. 
achieve this end Godolphin had turned to the Marquis of Tweeddale 
and his Country party (known variously as the New Party or the 
Squadrone) to carry the Hanoverian Succession through the Scottish 
Parliament. Regrettably, Tweeddale and his followers were not up 
to the task and the Act of Security, which empowered the Scottish 
To 
Parliament to provide for the descent of the Crown of Scotland 
irrespective of who ruled in England, was again passed on S August 
1704. Under considerable pressure Godolphin had advised the Queen 
to approve the Act of Security. The Act was intensely unpopular 
in England and Godolphin could expect severe criticism in Parliament. 
47 
On Friday 10 November Lord Haversham moved: 
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that all the Lords might be summoned against 
Monday he having several matters then to move, 
wherein the honour and security of the nation 
and religion were much concerned. Lord 
Sunderland proposed that the House might 
rather be called over and that the Lord Keeper 
issue out his letters to all absent Lords against 
Thursday sennight. Which was ordered 
accordingly. The said Lord Sunderland moved 
also that an humble address might be made to her 
Majesty.... that she'd please to have a regard 
to the Protestant refugees in the Galleys, upon 
the exchange of the Bishop of Quebec and other 
ecclesiastics taken this summer by the [ship] 
Dreadnought and now prisoners in England. 
Upon which, the Lord Treasurer observed.., 
that the French King would look on the refugees 
as his own subjects, and would (therefore) 
hardly give them in exchange. But, however, 
he approved the motion (manifestly concerted) 
as what might show an acceptable concern in this 
House for the Protestant interest. So Itwas 
ordered. 48 
Sunderland's first motion was probably designed to allow the Junto 
to rally their supporters up to the House of Lords for the debate. 
His second motion was almost certainly an attempt to test Godolphin's 
responsiveness to offers of assistance for the administration from the 
Junto. 
The debate began on 23 November with Haversham assailing the 
administration over the navy, the state of the coinage, the Act oil 
Security and Scottish policy in general. After discussion a committee 
was appointed, to which Sunderland was nominated, 
49 
to consider the 
condition of the navy. It was agreed to look into Scottish affairs 
on the following Wednesday and the question of the coinage was pushed 
aside. On that day the House was in a committee of the Whole with 
so 
Sunderland as chairman and the Queen in attendance. Godolphin was 
soon in difficulty over the decision to give the royal assent to 
the Act of Security and while Halifax was attacking the government 
Wharton slipped over to speak with the Lord Treasurer. After a short 
exchange Wharton returned to his place and after conferring with 
41 
Somers and Halifax the course of the debate changed. When 
Haversham moved that the question be put as to whether the situation 
iii Scotland had become dangerous as a result of the Act of Security 
Somers argued that the question was unnecessary and it was agreed 
to adjourn. Sunderland reported to the House that the 'committee 
had been in consideration of the State of the Nation with reference 
to Scotland and desire another time may be appointed, for the House 
to be in committee again'. 
51 
By now the crisis was over as far as the ministry was concerned 
and the further proceedings of the committee, with Sunderland in the 
chair, made it clear that some tentative agreement had been reached 
between Godolphin and the Junto. With Sunderland carefully 
controlling the committee the heads of a bill on Scottish affairs 
were drawn up and reported by him on 11 December 1704; 
52 
they 
formed the basis of the Aliens Act, The terms were: after Christmas 
Day 1705 most Scots in England and Ireland would be regarded as aliens; 
the export of sheep, cattle, and wool from Scotland to England and 
Ireland was prohibited; and measures would be taken to stop Scottish 
trade with France. Other measures discussed by the Lords in 
December 1704 were allowed to drop, while the inquiry into the navy 
achieved little apart from allowing the Junto to keep the pressure on 
Godolphin. The co-operation between him and the Junto led to rumours 
that Sunderland was to be Secretary of State and Somers Lord President 
of the Council. 
53 These reports proved to be unfounded, but the 
administration did begin to make concessions to the Whigs with the 
appointment of Sunderland's former father-in-law, John Holles, Duke of 
Newcastle, as Lord Privy Seal in the spring of 1705.54 The 
Parliamentary session once again came to an end with a dispute between 
the Lords and Commons over an attack on the rights of the Whig voters 
at Aylesbury. Sunderland was again active in the conflict serving as 
a manager at the conferences with the House of Commons and reporting 
what had passed to the House. As with the previous electoral haggle 
between Lords and Commons the Queen brought the wrangle to an end by 
dissolving Parliament on 14 March 170S. 
S5 
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The elections for the new Parliament in April and May 1705 saw 
the administration attempting to reduce the political influence 
of the High Tories by excluding from the Commons most of the Tories 
who had voted for the 'Tack' in November 1704. There is little 
evidence for Sunderland's electoral activities though it is certain 
he would have spared no effort to secure the return of as large a 
number of Whig M. P. 's as possible. His endeavours in Northamptonshire 
were unsuccessful for the two incumbent Tory members were again 
elected. 
56 Sunderland exhibited his usual interest in the outcome 
of the election and a list of returns drawn up at this time gave the 
Whigs a net gain of 61. Sunderland's list was almost correct for 
recent research has shown that before election petitions were considered 
the Whigs had secured an extra 58 seats. 
57 Following the election there 
were about 267 Tory members to 246 Whigs in the Commons which was a 
substantial shift of power away from the Tories with the Court now 
holding the balance between the two parties, About a third of the 
'Tackers' failed to be re-elected but the attempt to keep the Tories 
divided failed, partly due to ministerial mishandling of relations 
with moderate Tories, but also because of the fierce party propaganda 
employed during the election, 
58 
In less than three years the fortunes of the Junto had been 
transformed. At the start of the reign they were consigned into the 
political wildernessyet, by the beginning of 1705, an effective working 
relationship had been established with the Court. Sunderland must 
take much of the credit for this success. The force of his 
personality added a new and vigorous dimension to the Junto's. 
conduct. Ostentatiously proclaiming his devotion to Whig principles 
and to his Junto colleagues, even at the price of antagonising the 
Queen, Sunderland launched the Junto on the road to power. He used 
his expert knowledge of the House of Lords to thwart the ambitions of 
his Tory opponents and to loosen the ties which bound them to the 
Court. Building upon this success, while he was at the centre of 
the continual disputes between the Lords and Commons, Sunderland 
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proceeded to wreck the Court-Tory alliance by his ruthless and 
vindictive pursuit of Nottingham. With the collapse of the 
ministerial coalition which left the Court politically isolated 
the Junto were now ready to offer their support. It was 
Sunderland who made the first approach to Godolphin and who showed, 
in his chairmanship of the inquiry into Scottish affairs, the value 
of the Junto's assistance.. The Junto's price for their help was 
high office in the adminis(. ration and there was no more appropriate 
a candidate than Sunderland especially given his relationship with 
the Duke and Duchess ofMarlborough. That the newest and youngest 
member of the Junto should be the first to enter the gove rnm ent was 
perhaps surprising, but his conduct from 1702 to 1705 shows that of 
the leaders of the Junto none had a better claim to power than 
Sunderland. 
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disposition to make Lord SunderZand Secreta--, gl 
In return for their benevol#. nce the Junto wanted a major concession 
from Godolphin and they took advantage of his problems in finding a 
suitable envoy to be sent to Vienna by suggesting that Sunderland 
should be employed on condition that when he returned to England he 
would be appointed Secretary of State. Godolphin readily agreed to 
these terms for he knew that without the aid of the Junto the ministry 
would be in an impossible predicament surrounded by hostile Whigs as 
well as Tories. The Lord Treasurer had to go to considerable lengths 
however, to get the Queen to approve Sunderland's being sent and this 
difficulty forshadowed the conflict which preceded Sunderland's 
promotion to the Secretaryship. Sunderland fulfilled the 
expectations of his colleagues during his mission, acquitting himself 
with considerable success and, upon his return to England, it was 
expected that Godolphin would fulfil his part of the bargain. 
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Godolphin, however, does not seem to have been in any great hurry Cý- 
to implement the agreement probably because he was aware of the 
depth of the Queen's hostility to Sunderland. The Junto, however, 
were determined to get their reward and as the months passed the 
necessity of satisfying their demands became more and more urgent. 
The outcome was a prodigious struggle between the Duumvirs (with CO 
interventions by Sarah Marlborough) and the Queen who had the backing 
of Robert Harley who, like Anne, was thoroughly averse to the Junto. 
Sunderland's mission to Vienna arose out of the intrinsically 
hostile relations existing between the Emperor and his Hungarian 
subjects in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-centuries, 
The most recent example of this strained association was the Rackoczi 
rebellion which broke out in 1703 and Louis XIV was able to undermine 
the Imperial war effort by helping the insurgents. To bring about 
an accommodation with the Hungarians Emperor Leopold requested England 
and the Dutch to act as mediators in the dispute. The problem facing 
Godolphin was that the English envoy at Vienna, George Stepney, was 
believed to be too sympathetic towards the rebels and this, combined 
with his low social standing, roused the ire of the Imperial ministers. 
Godolphin also had major difficulties finding a suitable replacement, 
whilst the death of the Emperor meant that a special envoy would have 
to be sent to present condolences and congratulations to the new ruler. 
S9 
On 15 May 1705 Halifax wrote to the Duchess of Marlborough telling 
her that he had been visited by Godolphin: 
He spoke to the sending of some man of quality 
to Vienna, in such a manner, as if he would have 
had us propose somebody to be employed in that 
compliment. I was not prepared to offer one and 
that discourse fell. I have since thought that 
if there was a disposition to make Lord Sunderland 
Secretary, the employing him on such an embassy, 
for three or four months, might properly introduce 
him into the method of the business, the Queen 
45 
would be better acquainted with him, and he 
would soften by degrees. If the Emperor ever 
makes peace with the Hungarians it will be 
done on his first entrance on the government, 
and it would give great reputation to the 
English minister that was then employed... 
Your Grace can best determine whether such a 
short excursion would bring him quicker into 
the Secretary's office, and I would turn my 
judgement by that. 60 
Though the Duchess could see little value in Sunderland going to 
Vienna she gave her approval and with Godolphin agreeing to the choice 
of Sunderland, Halifax, Somers, and the Duke of Montagu all urged 
Sunderland to accept the embassy. 
61 The Queen, unfortunately, did 
not share the zeal for Sunderland's appointment and there appears to 
have been some uncertainty in late-May and early-June 1705 whether he 
would actually go to Vienna. 
62 The Queen, however, gave way and told 
Godolphin to 'speak to that person you proposed should go to Vienna 
to try whether he will care for that employment'. Yet it is clear 
that Godolphin had to go as far as threatening to resign before Anne 
would yield. 
63 
By 12 June 1705 Sunderland was known to have been 
accredited with the embas-sy to Vienna. 
64 
His instructions were 
issued at Windsor on 17 June and they not only included directions 
about his mission to Vienna, but also orders to consult with Marlborough 
and to persuade Pensionary Heinsius to settle the command of the 
allied troops in Portugal upon the English commander, Lord Galway. 
65 
Marlborough appears to have been responsible for the suggestion that 
Sunderland should visit him on his way to Vienna. 
66 On 20 June 
Godolphin informed La. ý Marlborough that, when Sunderland kissed 
hands on his mission to Vienna, 'the Queen seemed to be very well 
satisfied with Lord Sunderland's behaviour to her, and I think he had 
reason to be so with hers'. 
67 
Before Sunderland left for the continent 
the groundwork for his talks with the Dutch was being laid and he was 
also advised to court goodwill in the Republic, 
68 On 26 June 
Godolphin gave Sunderland the last of his instructions to request the 
Emperor to replace Prince Louis of Baden as commander of the forces on 
the Rhine. 
69 The same day Sunderland embarked at Greenwich and arri. ved 
at The Hague three days later. 
70 
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As soon as he arrived in the Dutch Republic Sunderland was 
unable to conceal his impatience to return to England 
71 
and it is 
obvious that he had only agreed to the mission to Vienna because 
he would be made Secretary oil State when he came back home. As 
Alexander Stanhope told George Stepney at Vienna: 'You will be 
very happy in my Lord Sunderland who speaks of you with great respect 
and esteem. His behaviour to me is very free and obliging, All 
those lately come from England tell me for certain that at his return 
he will be Secretary of State in Sir Charles [Hedges] room. ' Even 
with the assistance of the Duke of Portland the negotiations at The 
Hague did not go as smoothly as Sunderland would have wished and 
there was considerable opposition to the attempt to get Galway put 
at the head of the troops in Portugal, 
73 
Eventually a tentative 
agreement was drawn up whereby command would alternate between Galway 
and the Dutch commander, Fagel, in the ratio of two campaigns to one 
respectively. The Dutch deputies also agreed to press the King of 
Portugal, in conjunction with the Queen, to join 13,000 of his troops 
to those of the allies. The States General quickly agreed to the 
second proposal, but the issue of command of the army would first have 
to be ratified by the Council of State. 
74 In the interim the projected 
agreement was unacceptable in England and Harley instructed Stanhope 
to try and get a provisional settlement under which Galway would 
command the army during the next campaign and then a more permanent 
arrangement would be hammered out between England and the Dutch. 
7S 
Sunderland left Stanhope to continue the discussions and he was soon 
informed of the frigid response of the Dutch to Harley's initiative. 
76 
Sunderland arrived at Marlborough's camp at Meldert. on 19 July 
1705 77 and the chief topic under consideration was the command of 
the allied forces on the Rhine. Sunderland had received further 
injunctions from Godolphin and Harley urging him to press the Emperor 
to recall Prince Louis, 
78 
and he was now given detailed instructions, 
on how to conduct himself at Vienna, by Marlborough, Sunderland was 
to ask the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor Wratislaw to remove 
Prince Louis from his command; Sunderland was to obtain leave for 
47 
Marlborough to go to Vienna at the end of the campaign; he was to 
rely on the assistance and advice of Wratislaw and to concert 
measures 4ith the Hanoverian envoy at Vienna; and IL 'inally Sunderland 
was to try and patch up Stepney's relations with Wratislaw and to 
inform the Imperial minister that as soon as a place could be found 
for Alexander Stanhope Stepney would be transferred to The Hague. 
79 
Sunderland left Marlborough on 26 July and the Duke observed that 
Sunderland was much more moderate than usual, so that I hope this 
journey will do him good'. 
80 The Duke's confidence was probably 
fortified as a result of the considerable efforts he had made on 
Sunderland's behalf, and in particular his attempts to assuage the 
fears of Wratislaw that Sunderland and Stepney would try to establish 
a Republic in Hungary. 
81 
Though Marlborough had expressed some reservations about the 
prospects for the mediation between the Emperor and the Hungarians 
82 
Sunderland was deeply pessimistic about achieving anything. On 
9 August he wrote to Godolphin telling him as much, 
83 
and Sunderland's 
fears were doubtless increased by the far from sanguine reports he 
received from George Stepney 
84 
yet it is apparent that, as at The 
Hague, Sunderland was in a hurry to get back to England and was 
apprehensive that the mediation with the Hungarians might prove to be 
a long drawn out affair, and could lead to someone else obtaining the 
post of Secretary of State. Sunderland's fears are manifest in a letter 
to Harley, He declared: 
I find by Mr. Stepney we have hopes of beginning 
a treaty within a few days, but I fear there is 
not much reason to expect to bring it to a 
conclusion. However, if once we get it afoot 
we shall soon be able to judge whether they will 
trifle with us to eternity as, I must own, I am 
very much afraid they will. 85 
The situation Sunderland found 
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seemed to confirm his fears. The new Emperor had agreed to renew the 
Anglo-Dutch mediation but was less inclined towards compromise and had 
sent the Hungarian field army into Transylvania. By so doing Joseph 
hoped to strengthen his bargaining position, while the rebel leader, 
48 
Prince Rackoczi, had summoned a meeting of the Hungarian nobility 
to the same end. 
86 
On 17 August 1705 Sunderland's audience with the Emperor and 
Empress took place and after the Emperor had assured Sunderland of 
his desire for an accommodation with the Hungarians, Sunderland, 
Stepney and the Dutch mediators presented a memorial concerning the 
peace negotiations. Sunderland was not optimistic as he informed 
Secretary Harley, 87 and eleven days later Sunderland wrote to 
Godolphin and this time he made no attempt to disguise his impatience 
and discontent. Sunderland unburdened himself: 
The affairs of Hungary are perfectly at a stand 
with us till we have some return from the 
deputies, but by our private informations here, 
and the disposition of the armies in that country, 
we have reason to apprehend that neither this 
Court, nor the chiefs of the Hungarians, will ever 
decide this matter otherwise than by arms, so that 
I must beg of you, my Lord, according to your 
kind promise, before I left England, not to leave 
me in this country to no purpose, but to let me have 
a letter, with directions from the Queen, to take 
my leave of this Court as soon as we shall see 
there's no hopes of bringing these matters to any 
conclusion. Monsieur D'Amelo is so much of this 
mind that he writ to the States, the last post, 
to desire the like orders for himself, as they 
had also promised him before he came. And indeed, 
as I have writ to Mr. Secretary, I can't but 
think it's very necessary we should be armed with 
such directions as soon as possible, and I hope by 
the first post, for otherwise we may run the 
hazard of staying here maybe two months, after all 
hopes of any treaty is gone, which would not have 
a very good appearance for the Queen or States, or 
for us that are their ministers. My Lord I rely 
upon your favour and goodness in this matter, for 
besides the reasons I have already given the only 
happiness I desire in this world is to see England 
and those I left in it. 88 
Sunderland made a similar request to Harley and Sunderland now put 
89 
the blame for the lack of progress in the mediation upon the Hungarians. 
The Cabinet agreed to Sunderland's plea on 17 September and he was told 
of the decision by Harley who also forwarded Sunderland's warrant and 
49 
letters of revocation. 
90 Sunderland did not return immediately 
because he was waiting for his father-in-law to arrive at Vienna. 
Deadlock persisted throughout September but by 20 October N. S, 
the Hungarians were ready to negotiate and preparations were underway 
to begin the discussions. 
91 There was an initial dispute about where 
the Hungarian commissioners were to be located and this led to a 
further outburst of resentment by Sunderland against the Hungarians. 
92 
The talks made little headway and by 27 October 1705 Sunderland was 
back at Vienna where he informed William Cowper that neither side had 
much inclination for peace. 
93 
A week later Sunderland told Harley: 
Mr. Stepney has given you an account of our 
Hungary affairs so that I won't give you the 
trouble of repeating it. You will see by 
what he writes that hopes of peace are 
remoter every day than other, however we do 
what we can to keep the negotiation afoot, 
that whenever any favourable opportunity 
happens those who will be here from England 
and Holland, when we are gone, may improve 
it to the best advantage. Lord Marlborough 
came here the day before yesterday. 94 
Marlborough's arrival at Vienna marked the successful culmination 
of the scheme outlined to Sunderland at Meldert in July and August 1705. 
Sunderland had spoken to the Emperor about removing Prince Louis of 
Baden from the command of the army on the Rhine and both the Emperor and 
Wratislaw agreed to write to Marlborough requesting him to make a 
short visit to Vienna in order to settle this matter, The Emperor 
also instructed his envoy in London, Count Gallas, to get the Queen to 
allow Marlborough to go-to Vienna for a few days at the end of the 
campaign. Sunderland wrote detailed letters to both Godolphin and 
Harley, obviously designed to be used to persuade the Queen to agree 
to the Emperor's request, explaining the reasons for Marlborough's 
visit to Vienna. Sunderland deserves considerable credit for 
successfully carrying out his father-in-law's directions. 
95 
At Vienna 
the Emperor informed Marlborough that it was inconceivable to replace 
Prince Louis though Marlborough promised a loan of Z250,000 from 
England and the Dutch to finance the Imperial reinforcement which had 
SO 
been sent to Italy. 
96 This reinforcement had been agreed on largely 
Q7 
through the efforts of Sunderland, Stepney and the Dutch mediators, - 
Sunderland took leave of the Emperor on 19 November N. S. and he and 
Marlborough left Vienna four days later. 
98 
On 1 December N. S. Sunderland and Marlborough arrived at Berlin 
where the Duke persuaded the Prussian Court to maintain their 
contingents of troops on the Rhine and in Italy. From Berlin they 
proceeded to Hanover where feathers ruffled by the defeat of 
Lord Haversham's motion in the House of Lords in November, to invite 
the Dowager Electress of Hanover to reside in England, were smoothed. 
Marlborough also persuaded the Elector of Hanover not to recall his 
troops from the allied army. Sunderland and Marlborough then travelled 
to The Hague in order to embark for England. Their departure was 
delayed by contrary winds and it was only on 7 January 1706 N. S. that 
they boarded the Peregiine yacht and sailed for home; they arrived in 
London on 31 December 1705.99 
Sunderland's achievements on the contine4twere clearly significant 
while he had gained valuable diplomatic experience and knowledge of 
England's principal partners in the conflict with France, He had 
been moderate and cautious in his actions and had closely followed the 
advice and counsel of Marlborough in conducting himself at Vienna. 
The subtlety and tact with which he handled the Emperor and the 
Imperial ministers together with the sympathy he had shown for the 
Imperialists in their troubles with the Hungarians created a very 
favourable impression. Wratislaw, who to begin with had been highly 
suspicious of Sunderland, declared 'Cette Cour eSL tres contente 
avec des manieres et de la conduite de my Lord Sunderland'. 
100 
As a result of Sunderland's endeavours at Vienna reinforcements were 
sent to Italy and Marlborough was able to visit the Imperial capital 
and prepare for the forthcoming campaign. Robert Harley wrote, 
congratulating Sunderland, that it was a pleasure 'to hear from all 
hands the honour wherewith you have sustained the employment you have 
undertaken. It is not only froin Count Zinzendorf's letter to [the] 
D[uke of] Marlborough but from divers others that I learn the great 
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reputation your Lordship's behaviour hath everywhere brought to 
the Queen's service and to your country'. 
101 Sunderland aDDears 
to have successfully concealed, at least from foreign o. oservers, 
his impatience to return to England. His pessimism about the 
possibility of a quick solution to the Hungarian problem was shared 
by Somers and Marlborough and his views were shown to be correct for 
it was only in 1711 that a treaty was agreed between the Emperor and 
his Hungarian subjects. 
102 
Sunderland's desire to return to England can only have been 
increased by the news which reached him while he was abroad. In 
October 1705, despite the opposition of the Queen and Harley, the 
Whig, William Cowper, succeeded Sir Nathan Wright, a Tory, as Lord Keeper, 
Godolphin, in contrast to Harley, had worked with Somers and Halifax 
to secure Cowper's appointment and the different attitudes of the Lord 
Treasurer and the Secretary of State towards the Whigs were increasingly 
noticeable. 
103 Sunderland congratulated Cowper upon his promotion, 
remarking: 
I received by yesterday's post the agreeable 
and welcome news of her Majesty's having 
given the Great Seal to your Lordship, which 
I congratulate, both upon your own account as 
well as that of the public. I own I have 
expected this news with a great deal of 
impatience ever since I left England and, after 
this, I can't doubt that everything will be done 
to the satisfaction of all honest men who wish 
well to their country. 104 
More significantly when Parliament met Godolphin made a decisive 
shift towards the Whigs. In the contest for the speakership of the 
House of Commons the Court backed the Junto's candidate, John Smith, 
who., in a ful-I House, defeated the High Tory, William Bromleyby 
248 votes to 206.105 As the session progressed the bonds linking 
the Whigs to the Court grew tighter as Tory policy became increasingly 
reckless. 
On 15 November 1705 Lord Haversham moved that the dowager Electress 
Sophia of Hanover should be invited to reside in England to safeguard 0 CP 
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the Protestant Succession, The intention behind this Tory proposal 
was to embarrass both the Court and the Whigs; to support the motion 
would alienate the Queen whilst failure to do so would cause unrest 
at Hanover. Godolphin, however, had consulted with the Whigs 
beforehand and the motion was heavily defeated much to the delight 
of the Queen. The Whigs then introduced a Regency bill which set 
forth that, in the event of the Queen's death, Parliament and the 
Privy Council would continue to sit and the kingdom would be governed 
by Lords Justices until the Hanoverian successor arrived, This was 
followed by further legislation to naturalise Sophia and her heirs. 
Both measures had been approved by the Lords at the beginning of 
December. The Tories, almost in desperation perhaps, then raised 
the question of the 'Church in Danger', The motion was debated in 
the Lords and Somers' motionrejecting the validity of this assertion, 
carried by 61 votes to 31. The Church was declared to be flourishing 
and anyone maintaining the contrary was stigmatised as an enemy to the 
Queen, the Church, and the Kingdom. The Commons echoed this verdict 
on 8 December 1705 and a joint address was presented to the Queen to 
proceed against those who originated such rumours. 
106 Sunderland 
relished, as he told Lcvý, ý Marlborough, the 'defeats of the French in 
both Houses for I think they are of as great a consequence as victories 
abroad'. 
107 At his return Sunderland was soon back at the centre of 
the Junto's activities. 
In January 1706 Sunderland was involved in the debates in the 
Lords on the amendments which the Commons had made to the Regency bill. 
The alteration which excluded office-holders from the Commons was 
opposed by Wharton who moved to adjourn the debate on this clause. 
'The motion was seconded by Lord Sunderland who hinted at the haste - 
wherein the Lords were forced to pass the forementioned bill. 
Accordingly the debate was adjourned (nem. con. ) till Thursday. 
108 
When the consideration was resumed on Thursday 1-51 January Nottingham 
complained of the powers given to the Lords Justices by the Regency 
bill to which 'Lord Sunderland said this arraigning of what had 
already obtained the fiat of the House was not parliamentary and that 
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he well remembered the House of Commons had sent one Jennings to the 
Tower for the like crime-' 
109 Eventually the Lords agreed to repeal 
the self-denying clause in the Act of Succession together with a 
further clause which required Privy Councillors to subscribe to all 
the acts of the Council, while the commissioners of prizes and newly 
created offices were to be barred from sitting in Parliament. The 
Commons would not accept these changes and Sunderland acted as one 
of the Lords'managers in the discussions between the two Houses. 
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The problems stemmed from the opposition of Country Whigs in the 
lower House who were always tenacious in their opposition to placemen. 
The Junto brought considerable pressure to bear on this Whig group 
and a compromise was obtained. The list of excluded officers was 
increased, those who remained in Parliament would have to be re-elected, 
and the clauses were to be effective from the end of the present 
Parliament. The bill, along with the amendments, passed the Commons 
on 15 February 1706. 
ill As a further concession to the Whigs 
Halifax was appointed special envoy to Hanover to carry over the 
Regency legislation and he took with him letters from several Whig 
peers including Sunderland, Somers, Cowper, Newcastle, Wharton, Orford 
and Rivers. 
112 Sunderland assured the Elector of Hanover that no-one 
was more capable than Halifax Idlinformer vostre altesse Electorale... 
de toutes les personnes qui ont toujours temoigne le plus veritable 
pour la succession comme de ceux Pont aussi constamment opposeel. 
Sunderland was also closely involved in the negotiations to bring about 
a union of England and Scotland. 
Originally the Junto's chief interest in Scotland had been in 
securing the Hanoverian Succession in that kingdom, but, surprisingly, 
the Scottish Parliament of 1705 had shown no interest in the succession 
yet agreed to negotiate a treaty of union and gave the Queen the power 
to nominate the Scottish commissioners. The Junto quickly changed 
policy, adopting the union as their own in order to gain maximum 
political advantage. Somers carried through the repeal of all the 
clauses in the Aliens Act except that allowing commissioners to be 
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nominated to treat for a union. Godolphin, much to Harley's 
dissatisfaction, was prepared to let the Whigs take the lead in 
this matter. The Junto and the Duke of Queensberry arranged the 
choice of the Scottish commissioners and they were a virtual 
Queensberry monopoly. The English commissioners were chosen just 
prior to the discussions and sixteen of them were Junto men, including 
Sunderland, Somers, Wharton, Halifax, and Orford. 
114 The greater 
part of the arrangements were agreed to privately beforehand by the 
Junto and part of the Scottish commission. Formal discussions began 
on 16 April 1706 and an incorporating union was quickly agreed upon 
and the Scots were to trade freely within the Empire and it was this 
which proved to be the foundation of the treaty. Scottish membership 
at Westminster was settled at sixteen representative peers, chosen by 
the Scottish nobility, and forty-five M. P. 1s, In return for their 
contribution to the revenue of Great Britain the Scots received an 
equivalent of Z398,085 10s. The treaty was signed on 22 July 1706 
and was presented to the Queen at St. James's the following day; all 
that remained was for it to be ratified by the English and Scottish 
parliaments. 
115 The Junto now turned its attention to the question of 
Sunderland's appointment as Secretary of State. 
Once Sunderland had returned from Vienna it was generally accepted 
that he would replace Sir Charles Hedges as Secretary of State for the 
South. 116 Reports to this effect were still circulating in March 
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and by now the Junto were unhappy with Godolphin for failing to carry 
out his promise made in May 1705. In April 1706 Godolphin informed 
Marlborough of the difficulties he was having with both the Queen and 
the Whigs. 
118 It is not difficult to account for the Queen's 
hostility to Sunderland. She had disliked his parents intensely and 
had opposed his marriage to Anne Churchill while Sunderland himself 
had served to increase Anne's antipathy towards him. 
119 He had 
opposed the bill to settle a revenue on Prince George in 1702 and his 
unbending adherence to Whig principles did not go down well with the 
Queen to say the least. Anne 'had escaped the overbearing extremism 
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of Rochester and Nottingham and had no wish to have another extremist 
in government office'. 
120 That Sunderland was Marlborough's son-in- 
law probably carried little weight with the Queen. 
Because of his difficulties in persuading the Queen to agree 
to Sunderland's promotion Godolphin sought Marlborough's help and 
between them they arranged that Marlborough should write to her 
advising Sunderland's appointment. 
121 
The'Queen replied: 
you may easily believe I shall be very willing 
to grant any request you make for anybody that 
I can especially for one who is so near to you 
and has shown so much zeal for my service as 
Lord Sunderland has lately done, but you know 
very well it is not in my power at this time to 
comply with your desire. 122 
Sunderland was surprised when his mother-in-law told him of the Queen's 
answer. He remarked: 
As to what you mention in relation to me and 
Mrs. Morley's [the Queen] answer, I own it is 
a great deal more favourable than I expected, 
having been represented to her, I suppose, as 
having cloven feet; but be that as it will, I 
shall have, and act with the same zeal always 
for her service, and I own I have no other 
concern in this matter, but that one would not 
make a very ridicuIous figure which next to doin 
an ill thing I would always endeavour to avoid. 113 
The Queen did not discuss Marlborough's letter with either Godolphin or 
the Duchess. The Duke was confident that, given time, the Queen would 
accept Sunderland and derided his wife's fears that there was a 
secret influence at work upon Anne. The apprehensions of the Duchess, 
however, were to prove well founded, 
124 
In July Godolphin wrote to Marlborough requesting some remarks in 
favour of Sunderland to put to the Queen. The Duke had some 
reservations about Sunderland, perhaps he did not want to push the 
Queen too far, but their exact nature is unclear, and he complied with 
the Lord Treasurer's application. 
125 It seems likely that Godolphin 
made a further approach to the Queen on 20 August threatening to 
resign if she did not agree to his proposal, Anne answered three 
so 
days later refusing to replace Sir Charles Hedges, but proposing 
to bring Sunderland into the Cabinet without portfollo. 
126 
The 
Junto, whose frustration was mounting with Godolphin, refused to 
consider such a suggestion. 
127 Godolphin's failure was followed by 
the first open intervention by the Duchess of Marlborough on behalf 
of Sunderland which resulted in a quarrel between her and the Queen. 
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On 30 August the Queen informed Godolphin that all she sought was 
to avoid being governed by either Tories or Whigs. Anne continued: 
You press the bringing Lord Sun[derland] into 
business that there may be one of that party 
in a post of trust to help carry on the 
business this winter, and you think if this 
is not complied with they will not be hasty in 
pursuing my service in the Parliament; but is 
it not very hard that men of sense and honour 
will not promote the good of their country 
because everything in the world is not done as 
they desire, when they may be assured Lord 
Sunderland shall come into employment as soon 
as it is possible? Why, for God's sake, must 
I., who have no interest, no end, no thought, but 
for the good of my country, be made so miserable 
as to be brought into the power of one set of men, 
and why may I not be trusted, since I mean 
nothing but what is equally for the good of all 
of my subjects? There is another apprehension 
I have of Lord Sunderland's being Secretary, 
which I think is a material one, and proceeds 
from what you told me of his temper. I am 
afraid he and I would not agree long together, 
finding by experience my humour and those that 
are of a warmer will of ten have misunderstandings 
between one another. 129 
Whether these words were the Queen's own or those of Robert Harley is 
perhaps irrelevant, but what is beyond doubt is that Harley was now 
secretly advising Anne to oppose Sunderland's appointment. Both he 
and the Queen felt that the Junto sought a monopoly of power and it 
seems Anne had turned to Harley in August 1706 when Godolphin had 
threatened to resign. 
130 Harley disingenuously informed Newcastle, 
about the difficulties in getting the Secretaryship for Sunderland, it 
'makes some inquiring people at a stand and a gaze to consider where 
this delay springs'. 
131 
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In reply to the Queen's letter of 30 August Godolphin made a 
further threat to resign, 
132 
though he did try to end the dispute 
between the Queen and the Duchess of Marlborough. 
1133 Sarah, however, 
was determined to keep the pressure upon the Queen and she wrote to 
her on 6 September declaring that the only course which Anne could 
follow was to accept the advice of Marlborough and Godolphin. 
134 
Sarah's efforts were doubtless encouraged by Sunderland who wrote 
to her that 'upon the whole matter we expect no end in this affair, 
nor any good in anything else, but from you, and are truly sensible of 
all the vexations and uneasiness you undergo, but I am sure without 
you we had been in confusion long ago'. 
135 
Godolphin pressed the Queen once again, but after an emotional 
outburst he agreed to await Marlborough's response to the proposal to 
bring Sunderland into the Cabinet without portfolio. 
136 Given the 
intransigence of the Queen this proposal may have been put to the 0 
Junto again and, if so, it was evidently dismissed out-of-hand, The 
Junto's dissatisfaction at what appeared to be Godolphin's delaying 
tactics was now reaching dangerous proportions and Sunderland and 
Halifax even cancelled a proposed visit to the Duchess of Marlborough. 
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On 13 September 1706 Godolphin attempted to answer the Queen's 
objections to, Sunderland, observing that though Sunderland was hot 
tempered 'his warmth is entirely well directed, and nobody has more 
138 
zeal and concern for your Majesty's service and interest'. 
Godolphin was becoming increasingly desperate. 
139 After consulting 
Harley, Anne responded to the Lord Treasurer's letter by repeating that 
she and Sunderland would not get on together and once more offering 
a Cabinet place without portfolio. Godolphin was warned that 
appointing Sunderland would only be the first step and she would 
eventually become the tool of the Whigs. 
140 Godolphin answered that 
he only proposed what was necessary for her service and these were 
not points of little consequence. 
acknowledgement of his letter. 
141 
The Queen merely gave a sharp 
It appears that the Queen appealed to Marlborough for support on 
27 August 1706, but the boat carrying the letter to the continent sank. 
142 
58 
When this loss became known the Duke wrote to Anne urging her to 
support Godolphin who could only be maintained by the Whigs and 
who would 'by placing some few about you, gainesuch a confidencejas 
shall make your business and himself safe, Vill not this be the 
sure way of making him so strong that he may hinder your being forced 
into a partý? 1143 Probably due to his concern at the situation in 
England and in response to further letters from the Queen Marlborough 
wrote in stronger terms. He argued that for Anne not to accept 01 
Godolphin's advice would put her into the hands of the Tories from 
which there would be no escape; furthermore it was only with the 
support of the Whigs that the war could be prosecuted with vigour. 
Marlborough concluded by requesting the Queen not to rely on any 
counsel but that of the Lord-Treasurer. 
144 Godolphin was not 
optimistic about the effect this letter would have, but he felt 
that if Marlborough used the same arguments when he arrived in 
England then Anne would give way. 
145 
The Queen's relations with the Duchess of Marlborough were now 
deteriorating rapidly though Anne did try to resurrect the friendship 
early in November 1706 out of fear that Sarah would influence 
Marlborough and Godolphin to resign, 
146 At the same time some of 
Harley's associates, alarmed at the Junto's hold over the Lord Treasurer, 
began a policy of disruption which was a cer-tain sign of disaffection, 
Despite this, Marlborough retained his faith in Harley and urged 
Godolphin to take him into his confidence and Harley was still confident 
that he could persuade Marlborough round to his point of view and 
outlined to him his scheme for a non-partisan. administration. Similar 
arguments were tried with Godolphin, but Harley placed his greatest 
hopes in the Captain-General. 
147 
Marlborough arrived in London on 18 November 1706 and two days 
later he and Godolphin conferred with Harley, The Secretary's scheme 
was finally rejected and, fearing further resistance might lead to his 
dismissal, Harley gave way. 
148 Anne now had little choice but to 
acquiesce, though she still endeavoured to maintain her resolve and 
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Marlborough had to give considerable assurances to her including 
promising to force Sunderland to resign if he did anything that 
displeased the Queen. 
149 Parliament met on 3 December 1706 and 
Sunderland's appointment as Southern Secretary was declared the 
same day. 
150 The Whigs also made other gains, Cowper was made a 
baron, Wharton an earl and Halifax's brother, Sir James Montagu, was 
created Solicitor-General. Nottingham, Rochester, Jersey and 
Buckingham were struck from the Privy Council and the only Tories 
-remaining in office were St. John, Harcourt, and Mansell)along with 
Harley. 151 
Sunderland's emergence as Secretary of State in December 1706 was 
the culmination of four years of success and achievement. Sunderland 
had renewed the vigour, aggression, and optimism of the Junto at a 
time when even the most sanguine of their members must have been 
apprehensive about the future. Not content with inspiring his 
associates Sunderland led the way by demonstrating that a revival of 
Whig fortunes depended upon isolating the Court from their High Tory 
allies and forcing the Queen's servants to come to terms with the 
Junto. Sunderland made the most important contribution to this 
strategy; High Tory aspirations were frustrated and their leaders 
harried out of office, In implementing this policy Sunderland was 
remorseless, ruthless, determined and industrious, traits that were to 
characterise his conduct for the rest of his career. Sunderland was 
at the cent-re of the Junto's political organization encouraging his 
colleagues by his zeal and commitment while devotedly adhering to both 
Khig principles and the Junto in a way which frightened and disturbed 
those, like the Queen, Harley and Marlborough and Godolphin, to a lesser 
extent, who were more moderate in their political outlOok. As a result 
of his endeavours, and his connection with the Duke and Duchess of 
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Marlborough,. when the Junto came to nominate one of their number 
for high office Sunderland's claims could not be overlooked. His 
behaviour as Envoy Extraorainary at Vienna was beyond reproach. 
Prudent, cautious, willing to listen to and to follow advice 
Sunderland, though greatly impatient to return to England to claim 
the prize of the Secretaryship, conducted himself admirably and 
even impressed those who had serious doubts about his character. 
When he returned to England there could be no excuse for not making 
him Secretary of State. The Queen, however, thought differently, 
but she was unable to resist the pressure on Sunderland's behalf 
when Godolphin, Marlborough, and Sarah espoused his cause so 
vigorously and despite her deep hostility to Sunderland the Queen was 
forced to give way. In just over ten years Sunderland had risen to 
occupy one of the most important offices in the administration and 
for someone who was still only thirty-two years old this was a 
phenomenal success. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SECRETARY OF STATE 1706-1710 
'Such great men of such assiduity' 
The office of Secretary of State was one of the most important in 
the executive branch of government. It was a position of great 
power and influence yet it carried a very heavy administrative 
responsibility which meant a particularly gruelling workload for any 
incumbent. The burdensome duties weighing upon Sunderland as 
Secretary of State become even more daunting when the political and 
parliamentary activities in which he was engaged are also considered, 
Sunderland, however, was ideally suited to the office of Secretary of 
State, As an administrator he was hard working, vigorous, decisive, 
perceptive, resilient, energetic and reliable. He responded 
immediately to unfavourable developments, was determined to maintain 
his authority, and his resolve was fortified by an almost 
unquenchable optimism. His stamina and sanguine temperament proved 
to be a major source of strength particularly in dealing with the 
complex and difficult circumstances and problems which he faced in 
trying to prosecute the war in the Iberian Peninsular and Northern R-01ý- 
OftTt, ht though Sunderland was a strong and able 
Secretary of Statehe achieved no major success between 1706 and 1710 
and this experience was both frustrating and exasperating. Ironically, 
Sunderland in holding one of the most powerful positions in the 
administration was constantly reminded of the constraints and 
limitations of power and the near impotence that can sometimes be 
associated with it. 
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I THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE 
'Her Majesty has been pLeased to give me the seaLs 
and has aZZoted me the Southern Province' 
As Secretary of State Sunderland had a full time staff of seven to 
assist him. In-his office there were two under-secretaries, a first 
clerk, and four junior clerks, Sunderland made few changes when he 
took up his office in 1706. He kept Joseph Addison as under-secretary 
for he had proved himself to be an efficient and expert administrator, 
he was well connected in the Whig party, and he shared Sunderland's 
literary interests. Sunderland dismissed the other under-secretary 
and replaced him with Thomas Hopkinswho was a staunch Whig, was 
like Addison an experienced and capable administrator, and had 
accompanied Sunderland to Vienna in 1705, Hopkins remained with 
Sunderland throughout his period in office, but in 1708 Addison went 
to Ireland as Wharton's chief secretary. He was replaced by 
Robert Pringle, a Scot, who was a member of the Squadrone, the Junto's 
Scottish allies. Pringle was an experienced public servant having 
been a personal secretary to King William III and he helped serve as 
an intermediary between the Junto and the Squadrone. Sunderland also 
retained Charles Delafaye, who had served under Sir Charles Hedges, 
whom he promoted to the position of first clerk. Delafaye 'was a 
1 
true civil servant and had a long career in the Secretary's office'. 
As well as being responsible for his own staff the Secretary also had 
influence over a number of other office-holders in the performance 
of his duties. These included the decyphering branch and the 
secret office of the post office for the interception and decoding of 
correspondence, the State Paper Office, and the Messengers who not 
only carried the Secretary's dispatches but also apprehended persons 
for questioning or arrest, helped control the press, and were in many 
p014 ways a private ice force. 
The Secretary's offices were located at the Cockpit in Whitehall 
though Sunderland also received a house in the Privy Garden which had 
been previously occupied by the Earl of Nottingham. 4 Unfortunately, 
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Sunderland's accounts for the period when he was Southern Secretary 
are not extant, but it appears that the Earl of Nottingham's 
estimate of his net income at Z6,000 a year is about the average for 
a Secretary of State at this time. In terms of expenditure the 
expenses varied with each individual Secretary, but the staff were 
probably the largest item on his budget. 
The various political, administrative, and ceremonial duties that 
a Secretary had to carry out meant that he had to leave the routine 
management of the office to the under-secretaries. The workload of 
the office was particularly heavy and the clerks worked long hours 
every day of the week. Each day began with the arrival of the mail. 
Letters would be summarised for the Secretary of State and he would 
read the more important dispatches to the Queen or the Lords of the 
Committee. The heads of a reply would be agreed upon and a draft 
answer would be prepared, approved, and dispatched. Petitions 
constituted a considerable proportion of domestic business. Each one 
would be referred to the appropriate governmental body and its 
recommendation, along with the petition, was then presented to the 
Queen by the Secretary who then carried out her orders. 
.1 The Lord Treasurer, thchwoSecretarieSof State, and the Lord Chancellor I 
were the 'Fwr -most important offices in the government in the 
eighteenth-century. During Queen Anne's reign the Lord Treasurer 
was the most influential official followed by the Secretarlt: Sof State. I 
It was the possession of the Signet which gave the Secretary his power 
for it was through him that a decision was implemented. Every order 
made in the name of the Queen was communicated by the Secretary. All 
appointments, orders, patents, proclamations, and warrants carried his 
authentication. All letters, petitions, and information directed to 
the Queen went via the Secretary. The Lord Chancellor and the 
Archbishop of Canterbury did have some exclusive powers, but even 
their official communication with the Queen was conducted through a 
Secretary. It was only the Lord Treasurer, carrying out his official 
duties, who normally came into direct personal contact with the 
sovereign apart from the Secretary of State. The Secretary was 
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involved in the formulation, direction, and organization of military 
policy. He countersigned all the warrants for appointments and 
promotions and was responsible ior providing the troops with clothes, 
food, arms, and transport. The Secretary also had great influence 
on naval affairs. The Lord High Admiral had to receive his orders 
in writing from the Secretary while Admirals at sea were ordered to 
take their instructions from the Secretary of State. In 
combined operations involving both the army and the navy only the 
Secretary had the necessary authority to direct both services. 
The Cabinet Council and the Lords of the Committee were the two 
most important executive bodies with which the Secretary of State had 
to deal. The distinction between them derived from the fact that 
the Queen and Prince George attended the meetings of the Cabinet but 
not those of the Lords of the Committee. Sunderland was present at 
these gatherings by virtue of being Secretary as wcASRobert Harley 
and his successor Henry Boyle. The other members were the Lord 
Treasurer, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Keeper, the Lord 
President, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 
Apart from these ex officio members the Dukes of Marlborough, Somerset, 
and Devonshire were also present because of their importance as 
office-holderýý6Captain-General, Master of the Horse, and Lord Steward 
respectively, txaýgLýpoliticians. Because the principal business discussed 
by the Cabinet and the Lords of the Committee was foreign or military 
matters the meetings were usually determined by the Secretaries of 
State and the Lord Treasurer. Most of the time was taken up with 
reading, discussing, and preparing answers to letters from English 
envoys or commanders abroad. Once a reply had been decided upon the 
Secretary would draft a letter to be approved at the next meeting. The 
Lords of the Committee could interview foreign diplomats, military 
commanders who had returned home, and call in officials such as the 
Secretary-at-War and the Solicitor-General when it was thought 
necessary. Once policy had been decided it was presented to the 
Queen for approval at the Cabinet Council. When the Queen had given 
her sanction there could be no alteration without her consent. 
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The Secretary of State was also a member of the Privy Council. 
This body was only important upon very extraordinary occasions though 
it was regarded as the only official group of royal advisers. 0, The 
Queen issued proclamations in Council and a meeting was often called 
to authenticate a royal order, prorogue Parliament or to choose 
Sheriffs. In reality these were merely formalities and the few 
matters usually discussed were quasi legal. ' The Secretary prepared 
the agenda and probably conducted the meeting though officially the 
Lord President should have presided. The Privy Council was usually 
called when the Cabinet was to meet and either at the beginning or 
end of its meeting the clerk of the council was called in and the 
Cabinet was transformed into the Privy Council; all Cabinet members 
were Privy Councillors. Some committees of the Privy Council survived 
into Anne's reign including that which heard appeals from Jersey, 
Guernsey, and the plantations while there was another committee to 
consider Irish legislation which had to be approved by the Privy 
Council before it could be introduced into the Irish Parliament. 
The distinction between the two Secretaries of State was primarily 
in foreign affairs. The Southern Secretary was responsible for 
relations with France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey and Flanders. 
His Northern counterpart dealt with Russia, Poland, the Empire, 
Scandinavia, and the Dutch Republic. This distinction also extended 
into maritime affairs with the Northern department concerned with the 
Baltic and the North Sea, and the Southern with the Channel, the 
Mediterranean, and the Atlantic, Each Secretary corTesponded with 
English envoys, military commanders, and Admirals in his own sphere of 
activity. Likewise he interviewed and negotiated with the appropriate 
foreign envoys in London. English envoys abroad were expected to 
write regularly but the frequency of a Secretary's correspondence 
might vary greatly. The War of the Spanish Succession greatly increased 
the importance of the Southern Secretary as he dealt with a large area 
of military operations in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Flanders. 
The duties of the Southern Secretary were more wide ranging than 
the Northern because he was also responsible for Ireland and the 
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Colonies. On Irish affairs the Secretary corresponded primarily 
with the Lord Lieutenant or the Lords Justices. The major Irish 
concerns were Parliament, political maaagemfitand the army. In 
relation to the Colonies most of the supervisory work was carried 
out by the Board of Trade and Plantations. The Secretary, however, 
was kept informed of all Colonial developments and brought these 
matters before the Cabinet and the Lords of the Committee. Sunderland, 
4 on occasion did intervene Ln Colonial affairs. In 1707, following 
repeated French assaults on the Leeward I-slands in the West Indies, 
Parliament agreed to provide aid for the Islands and the Governor, 
Colonel Parke, requested that an expedition involving some 10,000 troops 
should be sent against the French colony of Martinique. Parke made 
some uncomplimentary remarks about the troops and he was quickly 
reprimanded by Sunderland. Commissioners were appointed to examine 
the damage caused by the French attacks in order to establish what 
reparations should be paid. Sunderland let the Board of Trade and 
Plantations deal with this matter and the Board supervised the inquiry. 
In December 1707 news reached England that the Islands had been 
devastated by a hurricane and supplies and transports were immediately 
ordered. As a result the Leeward Islands were a prominent concern of 
Sunderland's during his tenure as Southern Secretary. 
In domestic affairs there was no division of duties between the 
two Secretaries. Presenting petitions, as has been noted, was an 
important aspect of their work. They were also responsible for 
appointing the agents of central government in the localities, the 
prevention and suppression of unrest, and dealing with political 
offences. Sunderland helped to quell riots in the South of England 
arising out of grain shortages in 1709 and in the same year he punished 
J. P. 's for obstructing the activities of recruiting officers. In 
1709 Sunderland also encouraged foreign Protestant refugees to come to 
Britain and helped them settle in the country. The Secretaries were 
also involved in apprehending suspected persons. War-rants were issued 
to Messengers by the Secretary and after the person or persons had been 
arrested they would be examined by the Secretary who decided whether they 
were to be discharged or brought to trial. 
3 
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I, THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 1706-1710 
'there is not a man of more resoZution' 
As Secretary of State for the South Sunderland was responsible for 
a large area of the military operations against France and his chief 
preoccupations were the conflicts in the Iberian Peninsular and in 
Northern Italy. In both theatres of war the operations of 1706 had 
been encouraging if not completely successful. In Spain the allied 
armies had captured Madrid in June and, but for the irresolution of 
the Earl of Peterborough and King Charles III, it seemed likely that 
the Habsburgs would have recovered control of Spain. In September 
1706 the Imperial army defeated the French at Turin and with the 
evacuation of French troops from Italy it appeared that the allies 
could now carry the war into France itself. Sunderland must have 
felt that with a vigorous and aggressive prosecution of the war in 
both Italy and Spain decisive blows could be inflicted upon the French. 
Both areas, however, presented Sunderland with major problems which 
had to be overcome if the war was to be pursued with any success. 
There were important climatic and logistical difficulties which were 
aggravated by touchy and over-sensitive allies. The King of Spain, 
the King of Portugal, the Duke of Savoy, and the Emperor all seemed 
intent on making excessive financial and material demands whilst being 
mainly concerned with their own petty disputes and rivalries rather 
than making any serious contribution to the allied war effort. To 
begin with Sunderland, with his energy and enthusiasm, and confident 
that only one campaign was necessary to bring France to her knees, 
made light of these problems, but even he could not conceal his 
cynicism and disillusion as each campaign passed with no real progress. 
It was a tribute to his resilience and strength of character that 
even by 1710 his dispatches still urged resolute action when the 
faint hearted would have despaired of achieving anything. 
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The Military Operations in the Iberian Peninsular 1706-1710 
In the Iberian Peninsular in 1706 allied troops led by the Marquis 
das Minas and the Earl of Galway had advanced from Portugal and had 
occupied Madrid on 29 June. The other allied army, under the 
leadership of Charles III, and the British commander, the Earl of 
Peterborough, had been dilatory in its proceedings and was plagued 
by arguments and ill-feeling between Charles and Peterborough. As 
a result when the two armies eventually joined each other the 
initiative had passed to the Bourbon forces and the allied forces 
were forced to retreat to Valencia where Peterborough obtained 
permission to retire to Italy and command of all the British troops was 
given to Galway. Towards the end of the year an expedition was sent 
from England, under the command of Earl Rivers and Admiral Shovell, 
to capture Cadiz, but upon arrival at Lisbon both the ships and the 
troops were in poor condition and being unable to undertake any 
immediate operations it became increasingly uncertain how the force 
should be employed. At the same time the Earl of Galway was more 
and more reluctant to continue serving in Spain, 
4 
Sunderland was at the centre of a- difficult and confusing situation. 
To begin with Charles III had requested that Rivers should bring the 
forces under his command to Valencia and the English commander set 
about complying with this request. At a Cabinet Council in London on 
1S December 1706 it was decided that Rivers should remain in Portugal 
and -- join his force with the Portugo-e; searmy, These orders were 
dispatched two days later and the same day Sunderland wrote to Galway 
urging that he should continue to serve in Spain. At a further 
Cabinet meeting on 20 December it was agreed that Sunderland should 
inform Rivers that despite any orders he might have received to the 
contrary he and the troops under him should now proceed to Valencia. 
The next day the Cabinet resolved that letters should be sent to 
Galway to persuade him to remain in Spain, but if this failed to 
influence Galway then Rivers was to be given command of the British 
forces. It was also decided to inform Peterborough that his presence 
was no longer necessary in Spain and that he should return home 
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immediately. Sunderland sent his letters to Galway, Peterborough, 
and Rivers on 23 December. In his letter to Rivers Sunderland 
repeated his orders to proceed at once tO-Valencia. Before receiving 
these orders, however, Rivers had 
initiative and at a council of war 
orders were issued to accompany th 
Valencia. In January 1707 Rivers 
pleased to have the Queen's orders 
done. 5 
already decided to act on his own 
held at Lisbon on 19 December N. S. 
e fleet under Shovell to Alicante in 
informed Sunderland that he was 
to undertake what he had already 
At the same time Sunderland was determined that the failures of the 
previous campaign in Spain were not to be repeated and clear, decisive, 
and vigorous orders were sent to the English envoys and commanders in 
Spain and Portugal. Sunderland directed the new envoy at Lisbon, 
Paul Methuen, to press the Portugta%, to send their recruits to 
Valencia forthwith. 6 Sunderland told James Stanhope, who was serving 
as British minister to Charles III, that: 
by every letter our affairs seem to be worse and 
worse with you, but I hope my Lord Rivers coming 
will restore them; I must acquaint you that 
Her Majesty does entirely approve of his going 
as soon as possible to Valencia, with the troops 
under his command ' according to the desire of 
the King of Spain, and Lord Galway, but at the 
same time does expect., that all the troops there 
shall act together in one body, in order to march 
to Madrid, and not be divided upon twenty 
different projects, as they have been hitherto, 
and as I fear some about the King of Spain, will 
have a mind to again'. 7 
Similar instructions were dispatched to Galway and Rivers. 
8 
Given these precise and definite instructions Stanhope's letter of 
15 January N. S. 1707 could only serve to alarm Sunderland. Stanhope 
declared that at a council of war Lord Peterborough, who had just 
returned from Italy, had urged that the allied forces should be 
divided and should stand on the defensive. Stanhope, with the support 
of Lord Galway, pressed vigorously for offensive action and went so 
far as to announce that he would protest in the Queen's name at the 
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adoption of defensive measures. Charles III requested the opinion 
of the officers in writing and Stanhope, Galway, and Sir Charles O'Hara 
issued a joint statement in favour of taking the offensive. 
9 
Sunderland responded immediately in support of Stanhope. He wrote: 
I have the favour of yours of the 15th January N. S. 
with the enclosed copies of yours, Lord Galway's 
and Sir Charles O'Hara's opinions at the council of 
war. I am sorry to find, that you three were the 
only ones of that opinion, for nothing but private 
interest, I am sure, can be an argument for the 
contrary opinion. I am commanded by Her Majesty, 
to acquaint you, that she does entirely approve of 
your opinion and of every thing you said and did, 
in her name, upon that occasion. You will see by 
my former letters, that it has always been the 
opinion here, that the dividing the army, would be 
the loss of all, and that the only way of putting 
King Charles in possession of the monarchy of 
Spain, is by marching straight to Madrid, with the 
forces in one body. This is so much the Queen's 
opinion that she would have you insist upon it, in 
the most positive manner, as being the condition, 
upon which she sends these additional forces there. 
Her Majesty has writ to the King of S ain, upon this 
subject, in the most pressing manner. 
ýO 
Once again Sunderland sent similar instructions to Galway and Rivers. 
Further news from Spain brought little encouragement. Charles III 
decided to leave the army in Valencia and return to Barcelona and though 
he promised to return when the allied army was ready to enter Castille, 
Galway doubted if he would. There were disputes among the commanders 
of the army about the best way to march to Madrid together with 
difficulties in agreeing about the place of the PortugqcStforces in the 
line of battle. Galway appears to have underestimated the strength 
of the enemy forces under the command of the Duke of Berwick. Stanhope, 
however., felt that the enemy superiority in horse and the problems the 
allies had in getting forage and provisions would make an. offensive 
operation a dubious undertaking. Stanhope went to Barcelona with 
Charles III, but was unable to persuade him to return to Valencia and 
he was soon reporting to Sunderland that the Court of Charles III 
showed no disposition to act offensively and that there was even talk 
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of an attempt on Rousillon in France. The only encouraging news 
was that Lord Rivers had agreed that the command of the British 
troops should be given to Galway. The news from Portugal was 0 
little better with Methuen facing considerable problems in getting 
the Portug: qe4to advance into Spain. 
12 
Despite Stanhope's warning Sunderland remained confident that 
the allied army would be victorious and he sought to bolster the 
spirits of both Galway and Stanhope. 
13 On 15 April he in-formed 
Galway that he was, 
heartily glad to find our affairs in so 
good a condition with you, and particill. arly 
that the desires of all your friends have 
induced you to stay. I own we here did 
reckon everything forgone, if you had left 
the service and as I don't doubt but you will 
have the satisfaction once more of seeing 
Madrid, so I am to assure you in the Queen's 
name, that you may depend upon everythings 
being done, that is possible to make you 
easy in the service. 14 
With the approval of a council of war Galway had decided to advance 
into Murcia where he came upon the forces of the Duke of Berwick. 
The battle of Almanza took place on 25 April 1707 
is 
and Galway told 
Sunderland, 'I'm under a deep concern to be obliged to tell your 
Lordship we were entirely defeated... I cannot my Lord but look upon 
the affairs of Spain as lost by this sad disaster'. 
16 Almanza was 
certainly the decisive battle in the peninsula and the Bourbon forces 
were now clearly in the ascendant. 
17 Galway was wounded, but along 
with a number of his subordinates and about 3,500 men he managed to 
reach Tortosa on the Catalan Frontier. 
18 Sunderland echoed Galway's 
sentiments when he informed the Duke of Marlborough that 'a great deal 
will be wanting to retrieve our misfortune in Spain, which I fear is 
hardly retrievable in that country'. 
19 
Following their success at Almanza Berwick's forces advanced into 
Valencia which, apart from strongholds like Alicante and Denia, was 
soon under their control. Requenna, the last outpost in Castille, 
also fell and Galway and Stanhope were involved in preparing defensive 
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positions in Catalonia to meet the expected enemy assault. Both 
men complained of the lethargy of Charles III and his Court. The 
Duke of Orleans, the newly appointed Bourbon commander-in-chief in 
Spain, occupied Saragossa and most of Aragon. Galway managed to 
hold his own on the river Cinca for some time whilst the d1version 
of French troops to Toulon also eased the pressure upon the allies. 
By September, however, the Bourbon forces had been strengthened and 
they concentrated upon taking the town of Lerida. Though the allied 
position here was a strong one and despite an attempt by Galway at 
raising the siege the town fell at the beginning of October, followed 
by the castle six weeks later. These operations marked the end of 
this campaign and by December 1707 the allied forces in Catalonia were 
in winter quarters. Apart from Alicante and Denia the allied 
position in Spain was restricted to the area of Catalonia bounded by 
the Segre and Ebro rivers. 
20 
The operations undertaken in Portugal in 1707 had a similarly 
undistinguished outcome. The preparations for the campaign went on 
very slowly and it soon became obvious that the Portuguesewould not 
do anything until the four regiments which had been promised from 
Ireland arrived, Upon the news of the defeat at Almanza Sunderland 
directed Methuen: 
the Queen would have you use your utmost 
endeavours to keep up the spirits of the 
Portugese, and represent to the King the 
absolute necessity there is of prosecuting 
the war with more vigour than hitherto has 
been done. The Queen hopes that His Majesty 
will do all that is in his power towards 
sending such a force into Spain, that if 
possible, we may have a superiority in that 
country; the Queen is resolved to have 
nothing undone, that may contribute 
towards it. 21 
Military operations were centred upon the towns of Serpa and Moura. 
The allied forces lost these two places in June 1707 and were unable to 
recover them. By August Methuen was very apprehensive about the 
growing strength of the enemy though the Bourbon forces were unable to 
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exploit the opportunity because they had to await the outcome of 
the siege of Toulon. They occupied Ciudad Rodrigo in October but 
bad weather brought the campaign to an ena the same month. 
22 
As CP 
far as Sunderland was concerned the military operations in the 
Iberian Peninsular had been disastrous in 1707. 
In order to improve allied prospects in Spain following the 
reverses of 1707 both Galway and Stanhope had requested that a 
detachment of Imperial troops should be sent to Spain preferably under 
the command of Prince Eugene. Sunderland agreed with this suggestion 
and considerable efforts were made to persuade the Emperor to send 
Eugene to Spain but to no avail. 
at Almanza had soured relations 
It was felt that as the defeat 
between Galway and Charles III and 
since the Imperial commander who came from Italy would be at the head 
of all the allied troops in Spain it would be futile for Galway to 
remain with the allied forces.. It was resolved to send him back to 
Lisbon as Ambassador and officer in charge of the British troops in 
Portugal. Sunderland prevailed on the reluctant Galway to accept 
this commission. Stanhope, meanwhile, left Spain to return to 
England in January 1708 and it was agreed in London that he should 
return to Spain as Envoy Extraordinary and commander of the British 
forces. At the same time it was finally agreed to send Count Guido 
Sta4T. 'emberg to command in Spain. He arrived at the end of April 1708 
with nine infantry regiments and 3,000 horse and further infantry 
reached Spain in July. Stanhope was optimistic upon his return to 
Spain but there were difficulties with the expenses that were being 
incurred by the allied forces in Catalonia whilst in July the enemy 
had captured Tortosa. 
23 It was not in Spain, however, that the 
allies were 'to obtain their success in 1708. 
The operations to capture Port Mahon on the island of Minorca 
was the only encouraging development in the war in Spain in 1708. 
Stanhope was the prime mover behind the project, but he received 
considerable support and encouragement from Sunderland. The Royal 
Navy played an important role in transporting and convoying across 
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the Mediterranean but these services could only be provided for 
part of the year as most of the fleet had to return to England for 
the autumn and winter months. If the fleet was to remain in the 
Mediterranean all year it would be necessary to have a good harbour 
nearby where the ships could anchor and refit. Stanhope had been 
arguing the case for wintering a fleet in the Mediterranean for some 
time and he had managed to obtain the approval of the Duke of 
Marlborough. On his return to Spain early in 1708 Stanhope had 
visited The Hague where, in discussions with Marlborough, Heinsius, 
and Eugene, it was decided that a search should be made for a base in 
the Mediterranean. In April Sunderland informed Stanhope that the 
matter had been referred to the Admiralty. 
24 
The Admiralty replied 
that they did not know of a suitable base in allied control. In May 
Sunderland wrote to Stanhope advising him that everyone accepted that 
it was necessary to winter a fleet in the Mediterranean if Port 
Mahon or any good harbour on the Spanish coast could be secured. 
25 
On 22 June Godolphin authorised Stanhope to make an attempt to capture 
Port Mahon and the following day Sunderland received a second report 
from the Admiralty which declared that Port Mahon. was the only place 
suitable for wintering a squadron. 
26 
In July Admiral Leake was 
ordered to consider the feasibility of leaving a fleet in the 
Mediterranean and the following month Sunderland wrote again to the 
Admiralty informing them that Stanhope had answered some of their 
objections and that they should reconsider the matter, 
27 
Stanhope began preparations for the attempt on Port Mahon in 
August 1708 and he requested Admiral Leake to provide naval assistance. 
Sunderland had already ordered Leake to demand satisfaction from the 
Pope for the support given by the Papacy 
28 
to the Pretender's 
expedition against Scotland earlier in the year but the Admiral agreed 
to join Stanhope at Minorca. Stanhope left Barcelona on 3) September 
N. S. 1708 with two men-of-war, two galleys, and 2,000 men. Leake 
arrived off Minorca two days- later and began reconnoitring the island 
and taking-soundings off the harbour of Port Mahon. He was joined by 
7S 
Stanhope on 13 September. Because it was by now late-summer 
Leake set out for England the following day but he agreed to leave 
Admiral Whittaker and about half the ships in his force together 0, 
with 800 marines. The assault began on 14 September N. S. and most 
of the island was easily subdued the only difficulty was capturing 
Fort St-Philip which guarded the entrance to Port Mahon. The siege 
of the Fort commenced on 23 September N. S. and by the end of the 
month the entire island was secure. 
29 
Sunderland had written 
encouraging Stanhope in September 30 and in October he congratulated 
him upon the success of the operation. 
31 
Stanhope was determined that Port Mahon should be retained in 
British possession. He arranged that only British troops were to be 
admitted into Fort St. P 
of the island Stanhope's 
governor of the fort and 
by the Spanish governor. 
to retain Minorca and in 
island from Charles III. 
hilip and though a Spaniard was made governor 
chief engineer, Colonel Petit, was made 
was directed to prevent any interference 
Stanhope advi. sed the ministers in London 
December 1708 he was ordered to obtain the 
Before any real progress could be made in 
these negotiations the Dutch, who opposed Britain's possession of 
Minorca because of the threat posed to their trading interests, were 
informed of the proceedings and, as negotiations were underway to 
settle the Dutch Barrier and secure Dutch recognition of the 
Hanoverian Succession, it was found expedient to declare that Stanhope 
had carried on the negotiations without the approval of the Queen 
and that they would be stopped at once. Nevertheless, Minorca 
remained firmly under British control and its acquisition by Britain 
was confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.32 
Following the success at Minorca operations in Spain gave 
Sunderland little encouragement up to his dismissal in 1710. In 
1708 the Bourbon forces turned their attention to the two remaining 
allied outposts in Valencia at Denia and Alicante. Denia fell in 
November 1708 and despite a relief attempt by Stanhope Alicante was 
captured in April 1709. In Catalonia the allied forces faced growing 
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difficulties with provisions and in February 1709 Stanhope was 
apprehensive that there would be a famine. The previous month 
James Craggs had told Sunderland that if Stanhope left Catalonia then 
things would fall into utter confusion and that Stahremberg would also 
leave Spain. Stanhope engaged in some rather dubious negotiations 
with the Duke of Orleans which came to nothing as did an expedition 
against Cadiz. Stahremberg did have a small success in Arragon in 
1709 which increased the territory under allied control but generally 
there was little activity in 1709 as Louis XIV was mainly concerned 
with removing French troops from Spain in order to placate the allies. 
At the end of 1709 Stanhope returned to England and there was little 
improvement in Spain the following year. 
33 The conduct of military 
operations in Spain from 1707 to 1710 had proved frustrating and 
disappointing for Sunderland in spite of all his endeavours and the 
situation in Portugal proved to be much the same. 
At the end of 1706 the English ministers had agreed that if 
Portugal was to make a significant contribution to the allied war 
effort in the Iberian peninsular it would be necessary to pay the 
Portugveýe troops directly out of the subsidies which were being paid 
to the Portugtnegovernment and that a British commander should be at 
the head of all the allied troops in Portugal. There was also the 
added problem of paying the Portugat-4f-troops in Catalonia as the 
Portugese Court was very reluctant to provide for their troops in Spain; 
it was felt that these troops should be paid in Spain and the money 
deducted from the subsidies sent to Lisbon. On 22 July 1707 
Sunderland wrote to Methuen: 
I am sorry to find the Portugese are so 
forward to undertake that which can 
signify nothing, but to ruin the army in 
this hot season, when at other times they 
are so hardly prevailed upon to do anything, 
and indeed the more one thinks of it, the more 
one is convinced that your opinion is well 
grounded, that whatever forces are sent 
thither, nothing is to be expected from them, 
at least whilst the command is in the hands of 
their generals. Her Majesty would therefore 
7-1 
have you once more attempt the obtaining 
their consent, that the Commander of the 
Queen's troops may Command-in-Chief the 
Portugese that act in conjunction with 
them, or at least such a proportion of them 
as are paid by the Queen and the States. 34 
Sunderland gave repeated directions to Methuen upon this point and 
the envoy repeatedly informed the Secretary of State that the 
Portugvecrtwould not give way on anything but particularly the issue 
of the commander of the forces. 
35 
Galway's arrival did not produce any improvement as the Portugv(ýSe 
continued to refuse to give way. Sunderland kept reiterating the 
importance of the PortuglLeR agreeing to the demands which had been made 
and on 22 June 1708 he informed Galway that the Queen, 
has ordered a Committee of the Lords at a 
conference with the Portugal envoy, to let 
him know in the strongest manner that Her 
Majesty takes so ill this treatment of Her 
in so just a demand as that of having a 
separate body of troops under the command of 
her General, and is so convinced of the 
impossibility of any success on that side 
without it, that she is resolved to send no 
more troops to Portugal till this preliminary 
is granted, and to desire the said envoy to 
acquaint his master with this resolution of 
Her Majesty, and that they can't complain of 
any violation of the treaty, in this, since 
they have performed every part of it so ill 
on their side. 36 
Sunderland did, however, inform Galway that given the importance of 
the operations in Portugal even if the PortugeteSt did not give way on 
the point of the command of the allied forces troops would still be 
sent from Britain though he was not to inform the PortugýMS-tof this. 
37 
Likewise on 22 September Sunderland told Galway: 
I must now acquaint you that Her Majesty 
thinks it absolutely necessary to insist 
upon her paying the Portugese troops in 
Catalonia, and deducting the same from 
their [the PortugUW] subsidies, the King 
of Spain and Mr. Stanhope representing that 
without this it will be impossible to keep 
those troops from mouldering away, and 
becoming of no manner of service, 38 
78 
Yet despite the obduracy of the Portugaek Sunderland directed 
Stanhope that the PortugQýSttrOOPS in Catalonia should not be 
allowed to starve though, as he had told Galway, tne cost would be 
deducted from the subsidies sent to Lisbon. 
39 In November 1708 
Stanhope told Sunderland that unless the Portug*tki troops JLn 
Catalonia were paid it would be better to do without them. 
40 
As 
a result it was agreed that the Queen would pay for the troops and 
they were to be put upon the Spanish establishment. The PortugUt*e 
were pleased at this arrangement particularly as there was no 
deduction from their subsidies. As a result of receiving regular 
pay and provisions both the performance and the reputation of the 
Portugq%-ttroops improved markedly. 
41 
Galway worked hard to try to get the Portug*Wto take the 
offensive but the failure to obtain the command of the army and any 
arrangement about the payment of subsidies greatly hampered his 
efforts. No major engagement had been fought in 1708 and in 1709 
there was only one significant encounter at Val Gudifia in May. The 
allied force was defeated and though Galway had advised against a 
battle he was blamed for the failu're. 
42 From August 1709 Galway's 
dispatches to Sunderland became more and more despondent 
43 
and at 
the beginning of 1710 Sunderland informed him that upon consideration 
of affairs in Portugal 'the Queen has come to the final resolution of 
sending no more troops there this year, nor of increasing the 
subsidies, being persuaded that it could not be justified here the 
flinging away of more men and money in a place where there is a 
general certainty they will be of no use, but rather a disgrace to the 
government here'. 
44 There had been no improvement in the situation 
when Sunderland was dismissed as Secretary of State in June 1710. 
The failures, setbacks, frustration, irritation, and unfulfilled 
promise which characterised the military operations in the Iberian 
peninsular were to be repeated in northern Italy between 1706 and 
1710. 
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The Military operations in Northern Italy 1706-1710 
The problems which Sunderland faced in Northern Italy not only 
involved the struggle with France but also the complications arising 
from the rivalry and animosity which existed between the Emperor and 
the Duke of Savoy both of whom were allied with Britain against 
France. By the Treaty of Turin of 1701 the Duke of Savoy had 
aligned himself with Louis XIV, but the Duke's desire for territorial 
aggrandisement, the threat he perceived from the French occupation of 
Milan, and the increasingly peremptory treatment he received from 
Versailles led to him entering into negotiations with the Emperor, 
A treaty was signed in November 1703 under which Vienna promised 
to give Victor Amadeus parts of the Milanese together with the Imperial 
fief of Montferrat which belonged to the Duke of Mantua. In July 
1704 the Emperor also agreed to give up the strategic territory of 
the Vigevanese. The determination of the Duke of Savoy that the 
Emperor should honour this agreement, the reluctance of Vienna to meet 
its obligations, and the very ambiguity of the treaty itself was to 
cause the Maritime powers continual anxiety. 
45 
Upon taking office Sunderland was immediately involved in the 
complications of the dispute and with his usual thoroughness he 
familiarised himself with the details of the problem by making a study 
of the Imperial-Savoyard treaty of November 1703.46 Upon the 
instances of Count Briancon, the Savoyard 
agreed to send the Earl of Manchester to 
to the Imperial Court and the British and 
to put pressure on the Emperor to satisfy 
informed the English envoy at Turin, John 
Royal Highness being put in posse-ssion of 
envoy in London, the Queen 
put the Duke-of Savoy's case 
Dutch governments resolved 
Victor Amadeus. Sunderland 
ChetwYnd, that 'as to His 
what is yielded to him by the 
treaty Her Majesty will use her best offices with the Court of Vienna, 
to procure his being satisfied in so just and reasonable a demand'. 
47 
In response to the efforts of the Maritime powers the Emperor consented 
to hand over the Milanese districts of Lomellina, Valenza, Sessia, and 
Alessandria to Victor Amadeus at the end of February 1707.48 
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For the Duke of Savoy this success was merely the beginning and 
he now turned his attention to the part of the treaty which stipulated 
that the Vigevchne-se or an equivalent should be given to him along 
with the Montferrat which belonged to the pro-French Duke of Mantua. 
If Victor Amadeus was to obtain the Montferrat the Emperor would have 
to publish the ban of the Empire against the Duke of Mantua. Vienna, 
however, refused to discuss the cessation of the Vigevo,. qese or an 
equivalent until a general European peace was settled and the Duke of 
Lorraine opposed giving the Montferrat to the Duke of Savoy. Victor 
Amadeus again turned to the British government for help and Sunderland 
instructed Manchester to do all he could in order to get a satisfactory 
settlement. 
49 Sunderland also directed the Northern Secretary, 
Robert Harley, to order the British envoy at Berlin,. Lord Raby, and 
the Duke of Marlborough to press the King of Prussia and King 
Augustus of Poland to use their infli 
him to publish the ban of the Empire 
Manchester could make little headway 
there was little change for the rest 
of Victor Amadeus. 
51 
The wrangling 
uence with the Emperor to get 
against the Duke of Mantua. 
so 
with the Imperial Court and 
of 1707, much to the annoyance 
between Turin and Vienna over 
the Duke of Savoy's claims was overshadowed for much of 1707 by the 
expedition against Toulon. 
The defeat of the French at Turin in September 1706 left allied 
forces dominating Northern Italy and the Duke of Savoy was eager to 
consider ways of exploiting this advantage. Both he and the 
Imperial commander in Italy, Prince Eugene, had discussed the 
possibility of an expedition against Toulon with the Earl of 
Peterborough. The Duke of Savoy wrote in enthusiastic terms to 
Queen Anne while Peterborough submitted a scheme to Sir Charles Hedges 
who was then Secretary of State for the South. By the time the 
letters reached London Sunderland had replaced Hedges. The Queen's 
answer to the Duke of Savoy, which was drawn up by Sunderland, expressed 
approval of the proposals made by the Savoyard ministers in London, 
Counts Maffei and Briancon. Victor Amadeus was told that a project 
.1 
81 
for an expedition would be given to Count Maffei in order to be 
sent to him. -- The Earl of Peterborough, who was now very unpopular 
with the British government which held him responsible for the loss 
of Madrid in 1706 and disapproved of his leaving Spain for Italy 
without permission, 
S3 
was left in no doubt as to his standing at 
home. Sunderland told him: 
Her Majesty has commanded me to acquaint you 
that it has allways been her opinion (as 
His Royal Highness the Duke of Savoy knows 
by the propositions that have been made to 
him, from time to time) that the most effectual 
way of bringing France to reason, was to carry 
the war into their own country, and that it 
could be done nowhere with so much advantage to 
the common cause, as in Provence or Dauphine, 
and that Her Majesty is pursuing such measures 
with the States General, and the Duke of Savoy 
as may best contribute to the execution of so 
great a design. As for any ships that may be 
necessary Her Majesty has long ago ordered the 
ships that are at Lisbon to be in a readiness 
to go into the Mediterranean, and given 
directions for so many more to go from hence, 
as will make up a complete number for assisting 
His Royal Highness in the execution of that 54 service. 
In December 1706 the projected incursion into south-east France was 
discussed in London. The meetings were attended by Sunderland, Harley, 
Marlborough, Godolphin and the two Savoyard ministers Maffei and 
Briancon. SS On 27 December Sunderland drew up the heads of the 
P 
scheme which had been agreed upon. In essence the operation involved a 
combined land and sea campaign with the intention of entering France 
and occupying the French naval base at Toulon which would provide the 
British navy with an anchorage from where it could dominate the 
western Mediterranean. The land forces were to be led by the Duke of 
Savoy and Admiral Shovell was to command the fleet. 
56 Further 
preparations took place in the first quarter of 1707. The Earl of 
Manchester was sent to Vienna to acquaint the Emperor with the plan 
and to solicit him to allow an Imperial commander to help in its 
execution. In February Sunderland directed Admiral Shovell to 
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dispatch an officer to concert measures with Victor Amadeus and at 
the end of March Shovell ordered Admiral Norris to proceed to 
I problems. Turin. 
57 
The expedition, however, was soon beset wit,, 
The Imperial Court wanted to annex the Kingdom of Naples which 
meant that troops would have to be diverted from the Toulon expedition. 
In March 1707 John Chetwynd wrote anxiously to Sunderland about 
58 Imperial preparations to send a force to southern Italy. At 
the same time news reached London that Eugene*and the French were 
negotiating an agreement to allow Louis XIV to evacuate his troops 
from northern Italy. 
59 Sunderland immediately ordered Chetwynd 
that if the treaty between Eugene and the French 'does take place, 
and that upon it the Germans should persist in sending away troops 
upon the design of Naples, you are to endeavour all you can to prevent 
any such design, by showing Prince Eugene, how fatal that must be to 
the main design, of carrying the war into France, upon which the Queen 
does reckon that the good or bad issue of this war does depend'. 
60 
Similar instructions were sent by Sunderland to the Earl of Manchester 
at Vienna. 
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Chetwynd did not receive Sunderland's directions until 
13 April N. S. 1707, but in the meantime he co-ordinated the opposition 
to the descent on Naples with the Duke of Savoy and the Dutch envoy 
at Vienna. He felt, however, that the Emperor would not change his 
mind. 
62 Sunderland tried to encourage Chetwynd in April by observing: 
As for the expedition to Naples, it seems resolved 
on, and though it is certainly wrong, and to be 
prevented if possible; yet I can't think 
considering our superiority now in Italy, that 
it can obstruct the main design of entering 
France, provided the Imperialists do heartily 
intend it, and will make the necessary 
preparations for magazines, which I own I have 
the better hopes of, since you tell me Count 
Slick is recalled., and that, the affair will 63 continue in the hands of the Marquis de Prie. 
The Earl of Manchester was initially hopeful that the operations 
against Naples would be dropped, but by early-May 1707 he was reporting 
to Sunderland that the plan had been settled and that about 10,000 
Imperial troops would be sent to Naples under the command of 
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Marshal Daun. It was only the threat to Imperial territory posed 
by Charles XII of Sweden, who was then in Saxony, which delayed 
the departure of this force. The news of Galway's-defeat at 
Almanza injected a new sense of urgency into matters. The Duke of 
Savoy asked Chetwynd to press Eugene to stop the march of the troops 
to Naples and it was agreed in London that the Queen should write 
to the Emperor on this subject. Sunderland directed Manchester to 
protest in the strongest possible manner against the expedition. 
64 
Chetwynd continued his efforts with Eugene but by 1 June N. S. there 
was little chance of stopping the march of Daun's troops who completed 
the reduction of the Kingdom of Naples in the summer and autumn of 
1707.65 
While the Emperor was under pressure to halt the Naples venture 
the preparations for the Toulon expedition continued. In mid-May 
1707 Norris arrived at Turin where he, Chetwynd, Eugene, and Victor 
Amadeus discussed the project. The only problem was that the Duke of 
Savoy felt there was insufficient powder and ball. He expected the 
Queen to provide the extra provision and also requested further credit 
from Britain. Sunderland immediately told Chetwynd and Norris that 
orders had been given to provide further powder and ball and that the 
Duke of Savoy could have further financial assistance, Norris., 
Chetwynd, and Shovell were all engaged in procuring further supplies. 
In July Sunderland went so far as to direct Shovell to spare any 
quantity of powder and ball that was necessary for he would receive a 
sufficient replacement. The shortages of supplies continued 
throughout May and June and they had still not been settled when the 
troops began their march in July. To add to this Chetwynd's initial 
prediction that the army would take the field at the beginning of May 
proved to be far too optimistic as the snow was late in clearing on 
the passes into France. Despite these delays the Duke of Savoy was 
still eager and enthusiastic and Shovell even reported that Eugene 




Towards the end of June 1707 Victor Amadeus and Eugene were 
making the final preparations for the army's march and on the last 
day of the month the expedition finally started. Though nominal 
command was exercised by the Duke of Savoy effective authority lay with 
Eugene. After an arduous march across mountain terrain the army had 
reached the French frontier by 1 July. Doubtless Eugene's discomfort 
was increased by Chetwynd's repeated urging that they should march 
straight to Toulon. The Duke of Savoy directed Shovell to join him 
between Nice and Villefranche after which the naval and land forces 
combined to force the river Var in mid-July. Following this 
successful operation a council was held where, at Shovell's insistence, 
it was agreed to march directly to Toulon. Shovell established a 
base at Hyeres and Byng was sent with twelve men-of-war to carry the 
provisions which the army would need. As the troops advanced into 
France there-was increasing disorder and ill-discipline in theirranks 
while the intense heat merely increased the dissatisfaction and 
discomfort. Chetwynd was surprised at the lack of French resistance 
though he felt that having been caught unawares the 
French were now concentrating their forces at Toulon as they were in 
fact doing. 67 
The allied forces arrived at Toulon on 26 July N. S. but from the 
very beginning things went badly. In the first days after their 
arrival there appears to have been so little activity that Chetwynd 
felt compelled to speak to the Duke of Savoy, but the situation did not 
improve. The operations that were undertaken were of little consequence 
and ill-discipline was still rife in the army. The Duke of Savoy 
complained that he had little influence and that his orders were not 
obeyed and it seems that Eugene faced similar difficulties in getting 
his instructions carried out. On 9 August N. S. 1707 Chetwynd 
informed Sunderland 'this is the fifteenth day that our army has been 
before Toulon and I know no good that it has done'. 
68 Both Chetwynd 
and Shovel', had little doubt that the Duke of Savoy was eager to CO 
prosecute the siege, but Eugene, who was anxious about the strength of 
the enemy forces and the weakness of the allied infantry, cauDed 
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Chetwynd considerable unease by his caution and the objections he 
raised against continuing the expedition. The British envoy was 
reluctant to blame Eugene, but he felt that Imperial management was 
either stupid or malicious - he did not know which - and he regretted 
having to do*anything in conjunction with Vienna. Relations between 
Eugene and Victor Amadeus began to deteriorate and rumours. of further 
French reinforcements together with the French undertaking a 
localised attack seemed to confirm the view that the operations would 
have to be abandoned. In spite of some successes achieved by the 
fleet it was decided to end the siege and to retreat. The army 
decamped on 22 August N. S. and on the return march Chetwynd sourly 
observed that the progress away from Toulon was much quicker than it 
had been towards it and no complaints were heard; the unrest in the 
army, however, continued. 
69 
In the face of the various setbacks in the start of the Toulon 
expedition and the failure to prevent Imperial operations against 
Naples Sunderland remained somewhat over sanguine about the outcome 
of the undertaking. With the news that Shovell's fleet had joined 
the land forces he told George Stepney 'the news from Provence ... 
is beyond expectation'. 
70 Robert Harley was informed 'our affairs in 
Provence go on as prosperously as we could wish'. 
71 This was certainly 
an exaggeration of the progress that was being made but apart from 
keeping up morale and hoping for the best there was little that 
Sunderland could do. By early-August it was clear that little was 
going to be achieved and at the end of the month he told Marlborough 
that 'we have the melancholy news of our disappointment at Toulon. 
The greatest apprehension I have from it, is the ill effect it may have 
in Holland that makes it more necessary for England to show a spirit 
upon this occasion'. 
72 Sunderland himself was certainly intent on 
keeping up the spirit of the allies. Realising that the only thing 
that could be done was to forget about what had happened and to 
concentrate on the next campaign he wrote to Admiral Norris: 
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notwithstanding our disappointment in the main 
design... yet considering how it has broken the 
enemy's measures everywhere else, I believe they 
will have little reason to boast, nor are we 
without good hopes that the Duke of Savoy and 
Prince Eugene by the taking Suze or Fenestrelles, 
may put matters into such forwardness towards 
Dauphine as will promise us a very successful 
campaign. 73 
By making the best of things and looking to the future Sunderland 
was, perhaps, pursuing the only realistic course of action. 
Unfortunately, however, military operations in northern Italy, were 
for the remainder of Sunderland's tenure as Secretary of State, to 
be hampered by the disputes between the Duke of Savoy and the Emperor. 
The first half of 1708 saw no real progress in the territorial 
disputes involving Vienna and Turin despite the continued efforts of 
the Queen and the dispatch of Francis Palms to Vienna to argue the 
Duke of Savoy's case. This stalemate and the Imperial delay in 
making the necessary preparations for the ensuing campaign caused 
Victor Amadeus considerable unease and he doubted whether any military 
operations would be possible that year. Sunderland's response was 
quick and decisive. In May 1708 he directed Marlborough to write to 
Prince Eugene and Count Wratislaw to represent the fatal consequences 
if Vienna allowed matters to drift on in this way. 
74 Marlborough 
wrote to Wratislaw in the strongest terms though it seems that even 
before his letters could arrive a change was taking place and his CP 
efforts could only serve to hasten any progress, The troops under 
General Visconti received orders from Vienna to begin preparations for 
the campaign and to follow the instructions of the Duke of Savoy. 
The Duke of Lorraine was now ready to allow Victor Amadeus to obtain 
the investiture of the Montferrat and the Emperor agreed to publish the 
ban of the Empire against the Duke of Mantua. On 7 July the 
Duke of Savoy's minister at Vienna received the investiture of the 
Montferrat. 
7S 
Chetwynd was hopeful that with this concession the Duke of Savoy 
would undertake a vigorous campaign, The Imperial Court, however, 
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was certain he would do very little and after capturing Exiles and 
Fenestrelle Victor Amadeus brought military operations to an end. 
Sunderland could not conceal. his frustration and suspicion at the 
conduct of the Duke of Savoy and he complained to Palms, 'I must own 
it makes us here very uneasy to see that the Duke of Savoy ends his 
campaign by the taking of Fenestrelle... this looks too much as if he 
thought he had now done his own business, by getting so great an 
acquisition as the Montferrat etc., and by shutting up the entrances 
to Piedmont. I wish it may not prove so, but one can't help having 
some suspicions of this kind'. 
76 Sunderland conveyed similar 
sentiments to Marlborough 
77 
and the reports of Palms and Chetwynd of 
the Duke's good disposition towards making a good campaign the next 
season could have been little consolation. 
78 
Sunderland can hardly have been surprised when, in December 1708, 
the Duke of Savoy renewed his demands for the cessation of the 
Vigevanese or an equivalent together with the payment of debts owed 
to him by the Emperor and some disputed villages in the Milanese. 
Victor Amadeus broke off his negotiations at Milan with Vienna and 
once again requested the assistance of the Queen and the States General 
to induce the Emperor to satisfy his demands. Sunderland again 
informed Chetwynd that the Queen would use her utmost endeavours on 
behalf of the Duke of Savoy. The Imperial Court was determined not 
to yield on the question of the Vigevanese and Victor Amadeus 
resolved that unless he received satisfaction he would not take the 
field in person in 1709.79 
Sunderland meanwhile was constantly urging both Chetwynd and 
Palms to assure Victor Amadeus that the Queen was sparing no effort 
with regard to his demands both at Vienna and at the peace negotiations 
which were then underway at The Hague. Both men were instructed to 
press the Duke of Savoy to take the field in person and as early as 
possible. By July, however, Sunderland could not conceal his 
exasperation. He told Palms that the Queen, 
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is very much both surprised and concerned to 
find the Duke of Savoy persists in his 
resolution of not taking the field in person. 
Her Majesty was in hopes, that, after all she 
had done, at his desire, and for his interests 
he would not, for such small matters as are 
in dispute, have had so little regard to the 
pressing instances of such good allies, as 
his highness must be sensible the Queen and 
States have been to him, especially at a 
time when his own interests, one would think, 
should have engaged him not to neglect the 
opportunity of the ill condition of the enemy. 
And as Her Majesty does entirely approve of 
what you have said, and done on this occasion, 
so it is her pleasure, that you represent this 
matter anew to His Royal Highness in the 
strongest manner, so as to make him understand, 
that, notwithstanding Her Majesty shall be 
always inclined to do what she can to support 
his interests, yet such a proceeding as this 
must necessarily weaken any arguments and 
instances she can use with the rest of the 
allies to join with her in promoting his 
concerns, as it must render it unjustifiable to 
her own people to be at such great expense to 
so little purpose. 80 
The Duke of Savoy, however, would not change his mind and consequently 
the Imperial General Daun was put at the head of the allied force. 
Daun advanced slowly into Savoy and after doing very little the army 
began to retreat in September and by the beginning of October Chetwynd 
reported that the campaign was over-. Sunderland could not derive 
any satisfaction from the operation. 
81 
The dissension between Vienna and Turin was to continue until 
Sunderland was dismissed in June 1710. In an attempt to find a 
solution the dispute was ref erred to The Hague where Marlborough and 
Townshend pressed Eugene and Zinzendorf about making some concessions 
to the Duke of Savoy. Marlborough and Townshend even persuaded Heinsius 
to write to Vienna in the strongest manner about ending the controversy 
and Marlborough wrote in similar terms to Wratislaw. These discussions 
seemed to offer the possibility of a settlement but initially neither 
Sunderland nor Chetwynd w-Agpoptimistic of a satisfactory outcome being 
89 
agreed upon. Sunderland became more hopeful in 1710 that the project 
concerted at The Hague would be acceptable to both sides, but the 
Duke of Savoy refused to put himself at the head of the army until 
he received satisfaction from the Emperor. Sunderland continually 
urged that preparations should be made for a vigorous campaign and 
that Victor Amadeus should lead the army, but appropriately, the last 
two letters Sunderland wrote to Chetwynd as Secretary of State reveal 
the uncertainty concerning the intentions of the Duke of Savoy. The 
dispute was still unsettled when Sunderland left office. 
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III DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 1706-1710 
'my Lord SunderZand sits up whoZe nights' 
Perhaps the most successful aspect of Sunderland's period as Secretary 
of State was the defeat of the attempted Jacobite invasion of 1708. 
It was an operation which required all his vigour and industry to 
bring it to a successful conclusion. The Jacobite Court and its 
followers were confident that they could exploit Scottish resentment 
at the Treaty of Union in order to raise a rebellion against the 
British government. The French government was willing to assist the 
Jacobites not because they had much faith in the success of the 
planned invasion of Scotland, but rather because they hoped that 
British troops and resources would be diverted from Flanders. 
Preparations for the invasion began in December 1707 and by February 
1708 the force was ready to embark. The activity at Dunkirk had, 
however, not gone unnoticed in London. At a Cabinet meeting on 
17 February 1708 it was decided to assemble a considerable naval force 
under Sir George Byng to patrol off Dunkirk and Cadogan was directed 
to be ready to embark troops at Ostend if necessary. Sunderland was 
confident that the French would not come out and face Byng's force, 
but unfortunately bad weather forced Byng to return to the Downs with 
his squadron. The Admiralty decided that when the weather cleared the 
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naval force should proceed to Graveline Pits where it would be split 
into two groups. The first group would take station off the north 
channel of Dunkirk and the second, smaller., force would cruise between 
Beachy Head and Dieppe to cover any French move from Brest. The 
French, however, seized the opportunity presented by the bad weather, 
The invasion fleet)with the Pretender and 6,000 troops. sailed on 
6 March 1708 and after anchoring at Nieuport headed for Scotland on 
9 March. 
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Cadogan immediately wrote to both Sunderland and Byng informing them 
that the French had sailed and that he was ready to embark ten 
batallions of troops as soon as a convoy arrived at Ostend. Upon the 
arrival of this news in London on 11 March, Sunderland, Marlborough, and 
Godolphin were at Kensington by 5 a. m. and a Cabinet meeting was held 
two hours later. It was agreed to bring over the troops with Cadogan 
at Ostend, all officers in Britain were to repair to their commands 
immediately, the Lord Lieutenant of Lancashire was to put the militia 
in order, two regiments of dragoons were to proceed to Nottingham, 
infantry was dispatched to York, and orders were given to prepare the 
transport of additional troops from Ireland. A further meeting was 
held at 6 p. m. to settle the transportation of the soldiers from Ireland. 
The next day another Cabinet meeting decided that the Scotch Lords 
should write to Scotland to prepare magazines for the troops that were 
to come over from Ostend. The LordgLieutenant of the Northern 
Counties were directed to apprehend any person going to Scotland without 
the necessary passes or certificates. On 14 March it was agreed 
that Marshall Tallard and the other French officers held prisoner at 
Nottingham should be deprived of their swords. The Lord Lieutenant of 
Ireland was to be instructed to order the convoy for the troops from 
Ireland to proceed to Belfast. 
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When the news of the French departure reached Byng he divided his 
force. Admiral Baker was sent to Ostend to bring over the soldiers and 
Byng took the rest of the squadron in pursuit of the French. As the 
English and French ships journeyed north the weather was appalling and 
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Sunderland's anxiety cannot have been eased by reports from Scotland 
which mistook Byng's ships for French vessels. The French anchored 
in the Fir-ch of Forth on 12 March, but Byng was only a few hours 
behind them. The signals made by the French ships to the shore met 
no response and when Fourbin, the French commander, detected Byng's 
presence in the Forth the following day he ignored the requests of 
the Pretender and the Scots to be put ashore and he fled north. 
Byng set off in pursuit and though the English ships managed to engage 
the French for a short time they only managed to capture the Salisbury. 
The haul of prisoners included French infantry and Irish and Scottish 
Jacobites. After this brief encounter the French made good their 
escape and with little prospect of catching up with them Byng returned 
to the Firth of Forth. The French sailed up the coast of Scotland and 
were considering making a landing at Inverness, but bad weather forced 
them to change their plans. They decided to return to Dunkirk by 
sailing down the west coast of Scotland and Ireland and back up the 
Channel. 85 
Admiral Baker had left Ostend with the ten batallions of infantry on 
17 March 1708, but by now the crisis was over. Sunderland, with 
considerable perception, believed that Byng's encounter with the enemy 
would put an end to their design. Baker arrived off Tynemouth on 
21 March, but at the same time Cadogan was already making preparations 
for the return of the troops to Ostend. In late-March Cadogan 
informed Sunderland that part of Fourbin's squadron had returned to 
Dunkirk and by the end of the month Sunderland instructed the Secretary- 
at-War, Robert Walpole, that the troops marching for Scotland should 
return to their quarters and the troops with Baker were back at Ostend 
by 19 April. Sunderland could derive considerable satisfaction from 
the effective and successful conduct of operations which had prevented 
the landing of the French troops in Scotland. 
86 
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Sunderland was an ideal administrator. He was hard working, 
energetic, resilient, able, decisive, vigilont, sanguine, and 
determined to use his authority as Secretary of State to the full. 
Upon taking up office Sunderland was convinced that if the struggle 
with Louis XIV was pursued aggressively and with sufficient 
enterprise and vigour in both Italy and Spain then the allies, as 
a result of their successes, would be able to dictate peace terms to 
France. Sunderland brought his influence to bear upon the formulation 
of policy in London and was then determined that it should be 
effectively and successfully implemented, He gave his subordinates 
precise instructions on how the war should be conducted and then gave 
them the necessary support and encouragement to help them overcome 
the obstacles in the way of achieving the goals which had been set in 
London. Sunderland knew that success would not be easily obtained 
and in the face of military setbacks and the problems caused by 
Britain's allies he kept urging and encouraging Chetwynd, Stanhope, 
Galway, Methuen, and Manchester to keep on with their efforts and to 
make yet another attempt to achieve some progress. Sunderland himself 
must have wondered if any good would come of all this ceaseless toil, 
but rather than retreat into despondency and despair he knew the only 
course of action was to hope for the best and to. keep trying. Yet the 
obstacles proved too great and the reality and illusion of power were 
brought into sharp contrast. Sunderland could draw up and direct 
policy but after this he relied on the individuals on the spot to 
carry it through. Despite using all their endeavours these men could 
not overcome the various circumstances, particularly awkward and myopic 
allies., which mitigated against their efforts. For much Of the time 
Sunderland was reduced to the level of an impotent spectator who could 
only shout and hope for a favourable outcome. Significantly, the 
defeat of the Jacobite invasion attempt and the capture of Minorca which 
were primarily British undertakings were the two bright spots for 
Sunderland between 1706 and 1710. Paradoxically, Sunderland was an 
outstanding administrator yet the achievements of his Secretaryship 
were not commensurate with his ability. 
aspect of his political career so far. 
It was the most frustrating 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DOMINANCE OF THE JUNTO DECEMBER 1707 
TO NOVEMBER 1709 
'Those that have behaved themseZves in such an 
extraordinary manner to me' 
From December 1706 to November 1709 the Junto pursued a single 
minded, ruthless., and determined offensive to secure control of the 
administration. Marlborough and Godolphin were as hostile to party 
domination as the Queen and Robert Harley but they were dependent 
upon Whig support to allow them to prosecute the war. The High 
Tories had been alienated by the Duumvirs' war strategy while Harley 
and his followers were unable to provide effective security for the 
ministry in the face of a hostile majority in Parliament, In these 
circumstances Marlborough and Godolphin had to give way to the demands 
of the Junto. By their willingness to make concessions the Duumvirs 
became more and more dependý, nt upon Sunderland and his colleagues and 
the concessions they made estranged Harley and his followers and 
culminated in their resignation in February 1708. Harley's departure 
left the Queen as the only obstacle to Junto ambitions and though Anne 
put up a skilful and resourceful resistance she was unable to stem 
the tide. In the struggle for control of the government Sunderland's 
energy, industry, and vigour were readily apparent and he was totally 
consumed in the Junto's drive for ascendancy. Sunderland was in the 
van of the Junto's assault and he was ready to follow any path which 
promised to reach the desired goal. Sunderland led the merciless and 
vindictive campaigm to drive Harley out of office. It was Sunderland 
who directed the Junto's Scottish policy which embarrassed Marlborough 
and Godolphin, and which so outraged the Queen that she threatened to 
dismiss the Secretary of State. Sunderland, however, also exhibited 
political skill and acumen in helping to ease the tensions and 
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animositles that arose within the ranks of the Junto as a result of 
its furious drive for power. On different occasions Sunderland 
helped to calm the resentment of Somers, Wharton, Orford, and Halifax, 
yet it was his relationship with Somers which proved the strongest and 
most enduring. Sunderland was perhaps the leading Whig protagGnist 
during these years and he and Somers are distinguishable as the heart 
and driving force of the Junto. 
In her speech at the opening of Parliament on 3 December 1706 the 
Queen announced that the Scottish Parliament was considering the 
Treaty of Union which had been concluded in July 1706. As Scottish 
representation at Westminster would be composed primarily of those 
Scots who were responsible for the passage of the Union at Edinburgh 
the Junto wanted the support of as many of the men who came to London 
to augment their following in Parliament. The Court, likewise, was 
canvassing support amongst the Scots. Godolphin was negotiating with 
the Squadrone and Harley was in contact with the Duke of Hamilton. 
1 
Sunderland was in touch with the Earl of Sutherland, the Earl of Mar, 
Sir David Nairne, Secretary Johnstone, and possibly the Earl of Seafield, 
and was trying to get Annandale, Hamilton, and Atholl to favour the 
union. The Earl of Marchmont kept Somers informed of proceedings in 
the Edinburgh Parliament and Somers sent John Shute to Scotland to get 
Presbyterian approval for the Union. Sunderland, Somers., and Halifax 
also accepted minor alterations, known as 'explanations', made by the 
Scottish Parliament in the Articles of the Treaty of Union which the 
Junto felt were justified so long as they did not affect the calculation 
of the equivalent. Having agreed to these concessions Sunderland, 
Somers, and Halifax had to persuade the Whigs in the House of Commons 
to accept them. 
2 
The efforts of the Court to win over Hamilton came to nothing and 
it was the Junto who managed to maintain control of the passage of the 
9s 
Treaty of Union through the Scottish Parliament. The Treaty, together 
with the 'explanations' and an act for the security of the Presbyterian 
establishment in Scotland, was agreed to and touched with the royal 
sceptre on 16 January 1707. The Queen informed the House of Lords 
of this ratification and on 28 January Sunderland, as Secretary of 
State, delivered into the House a copy of the Scottish ratification 
along with the proceedings of the English and Scottish commissioners 
who had drawn up the articles of union. 
3 
The High Tories in the Lords seemed to have deliberately restrained 
their criticism of the union but the Presbyterian Act of Security was 
bound to cause concern. On 14 January 1707 Nottingham, with the 
support of Rochester, Buckingham and Haversham, urged that the Church 
of England should be safeguarded from the dangers of the union. 
4 The 
Court and the Junto responded immediately. A fortnight later a meeting 
was held at Sunderland's office, attended by Godolphin, Marlborough, 
Wharton, Orford, Townshend, Halifax, Charles Trimnell and William Wake, 
where it was decided to insert a bill for the security of the Church 
into the Treaty of Union as well as measures to safeguard the bill's 
passage through Parliament. 
5 
The Archbishop of Canterbury introduced 
the bill into the House of Lords. The bill confirmed the existing 
rights of the Church though it did not mention the Test Act. On 
3 February the Archbishop of York, together with Nottingham, moved 
that the Test Act should be included in the bill. They were opposed 
by Sunderland, Wharton, Somers, Halifax, and the Archbishop of Canterbury 
and the motion was rejected by 60 votes to 33, The bill then went 
through without any amendments and it was reported by the Bishop of 
Salisbury and ordered to be engrossed. 
7 
By the beginning of March 1707 the Junto and the Court had 
successfully carried the Treaty of Union through the House of Commons. 
On 1S March the Lords began their consideration in a committee of the 
Whole House with Sunderland calling upon the Bishop of Salisbury to 
take the chair. 
8 The strength of the Court and the Junto in the 
Lords allowed Sunderland and Wharton to assure Sir David Nairne that 
6- 
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in the debates that day there had been no important speeches, 
9 
and 
this was despite the considerable efforts made by Nottingham, Guernsey, 
and Ha-versham in opposition to the union. 
10 Sunderland's confidence 
is evident in his letter to Queensberry at the beginning of February 
1707.9 
to congratulate with you, for your having brought 
this great work of the Union, to so happy a 
conclusion; I am sure, as there is nobody who 
did more sincerely wish it might have this good 
end, than I, so there's nobody, who has a 
greater and sincerer satisfaction, in the great 
share and honour your Grace has, in the having 
been at the head of an affair, that I don't 
doubt will prove so great, and so lasting a 
good to this whole Island, and it is that which 
both nations, will bless you, and your memory 
for. 11 
I 
This was even before the House of Lords had begun to consider the 
treaty. On 18 February Sunderland delivered into the House the Act 
for the election of the Scottish peers and M. P. 's that were to sit at 
Westminster. 12 In the face of tenacious High Tory opposition 
13 
Sunderland, Somers, Wharton, Halifax, Townshend, Godolphin, and the 
Bishops of Salisbury, Oxford, and Norwich argued for the union. 
14 
The treaty was passed in the Lords on 6 March and Sunderland was 
appointed to the committee to thank the Queen for her speech recommending 
the Union. The address was drawn up by the Lords and agreed to by 
the Commons two days later. 
15 
Harley's irritation at the way the Junto had dominated the 
proceedings led him to make one final effort against the Whig leaders. 
Harley sought to exploit the resentment of English merchants at what 
they regarded as manipulation of customs duties and thereby forcing 
the Junto to annoy either the Scots or the merchants depending upon 
whose side they took. Under the terms of the union trade restrictions 
between England and Scotland were to cease on 1 May at the commencement 
of the union. Up to this date the Scots were to retain their own 
customs and excise system which had lower duties than the English. 
Some merchants sought to exploit the anomalies of this arrangement by 
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importing goods into Scotland at the lower duties prior to 1 May 
and selling them in England after this date for a larger profit. 
There were complaInts in the House of Commons and it was certainly 
an issue on which the Junto were vulnerable. To give way to the 
merchants would antagonize the Scots but to ignore the complaints of 
the merchants would mean risking the loss of their support. 
16 
A bill was introduced into the Commons to prevent this abuse and 
to counter the objection that the legislation infringed the union 
Harley brought in an additional clause exempting Scottish merchants 
resident in Scotland who could prove their goods were imported on 
their own account. 
17 When the bill arrived in the Lords the Junto 
were in obvious difficulties. Somers described Harley's clause as 
unfortunate, Halifax said it was destroying the bill, and Sunderland 
vindicated his own conduct and disclaimed any involvement with the 
amendment. 
18 In an attempt to end this impasse the Lords agreed to 
Rochester's proposal for a prorogation. 
19 Sunderland was furious at 
this development and even more incensed at Harley as he told the Duke 
of Marlborough: 
I believe you will be surprised at this short 
prorogation. It is entirely occasioned by 
him [Harley] who is the author of all the 
tricks played here. I need not name him, 
having done it in my last letter to you. I 
will only say no man in the service of a 
government ever did act such a part. I wish 
those to whom he has acted it were ever capable 
of thinking*him in the wrong, for I fear it may 
be some time or other too late. I don't 
write so full of professions to you as some 20 do, but I am sure my heart is much sincerer. 
When Parliament resumed the Commons passed the bill again and to avoid 
further difficulties the Queen followed Godolphin's advice and 
brought the session to an end, 
21 
Foreign affairs saw a greater sense of common purpose between the 
Junto and the Court, but even here their relationship was still not 
completely harmonious. Halifax complained that Townshend was to be 
sent as the English envoy to the forthcoming peace negotiations at 
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The Hague when he and Marlborough had decided that Halifax should 
be employed in that capacity. Marlborough bitterly resented Halifax's 
14 accusations and Sunderland had to intervene on Ha Afax's behalf with 
his father-in-law and reassure him of Halifax's fidelity. 
22 
Sunderland 
knew that if the Junto were to build up their authority in the 
administration they would need the help of the Duumvirs and there 
was nothing to be gained by antagonising them unnecessarily. 
Sunderland's conciliatory spirit is clear in his letter to Marlborough 
of 9 May 1707. He wrote: 
As to what you mention in your letter I received 
by Mr. Craggs, in relation to a friend of ours 
[Halifax], I can assure you, nothing has given 
me so much uneasiness a great while, as that 
whole matter, but I am sure, the only reason 
that hindered him, from writing, was that he 
thought, the best way, to have all that was 
pastl forgot, was to say no more of it, and he 
is now as easy with Lord Treasurer, and all his, 
and your friends, as he ever was, and I will 
answer for it, you will find him, in all respects 
as you wish, and as he used to be: I can only 
say for my self, that as I have in this, so I 
will in every thing, do all I can towards making 
every thing easy, among those, who are the only 
people, that either will or can support this 
government. 23 
Sunderland was to act as a peace maker on a number of occasions as the 
Junto pursued their goal in the next three years. There were, 
however, more serious causes of unrest for the Junto and the Court. 
The Junto were dissatisfied about the appointment of Sir Simon 
Harcourt, a follower of Harley, as Attorney-General and the Earl of 
Pembroke as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, but the main source of anxiety 
was over the Church. The Junto had wanted one of their ecclesiastical 
adherents to succeed to the vacant bishopric of Winchester, but 
Godolphin had already promised it to the Bishop of Exeter, 
Jonathan Trelawny, and neither the Lord Treasurer nor the Queen would 
give way in spite of the remonstrances by the Archbishop of Canterbury 
on behalf of the Junto. Godolphin knew that some compensation would 
have to be made to the Junto and he felt the vacancies at Exeter, 
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Chester, and in the Regius Professorship of Divinity at Oxford 
University would give him the opportunity. The Queen meanwhile, 
probably acting upon the advice of the Archbishop of York, had 
promised the bishoprics of Exeter and Chester to Offspring Blackall 
and Sir William Dawes )ýespectively, and the Regius Professorship to 
George Smallridge. Smallridge was a protege of Harley and 
Blackall and Dawes were both High Tories. The Junto were furious 
at this development and Godolphin, who was under great pressure, did 
at least get a short breathing space by the death of the Bishop of Ely 
whom he replaced with John Moore, Bishop of Norwich. The Junto 
insisted that one of their supporters should be made Bishop of 
Norwich and that the Queen's promise to Blackall and Dawes should be 
rescinded. 
24 
For most of the time Somers was the most active member of the 
Junto during the bishoprics crisis. 
25 Sunderland was unable to do much 
for he was incapacitated by ill-health. He attended the Cabinet 
meetings in early May 1707 to discuss the re-organization of the 
Scottish administration but for the rest of the month he was ill with 
fever. Though he was back at Whitehall on 10 June he was still 
suffering from the complications of an eye infection. He does not 
appear to have fully recovered, despite transacting business as 
Secretary of State, for he had to retire to Althorp in August. In 
Sunderland's absence Harley was given responsibility for dealing with 
the Earl of Peterborough who had just returned to England and 
Sunderland did not recover fully until September 1707.26 
By June the Junto Lords were so exasperated that Godolphin felt 
that Sunderland could not be relied on to present Trelawny to the Queen 
so that he could pay homage for the bishopric of Winchester. 
Godolphin asked Harley to go to Windsor to prevent anything happening 
which might be regarded as an affront to the Queen. 
27 Shortly 
afterwards the Junto declared that unless their ecclesiastical 
claims were met they would go into opposition at the opening of 
Parliament and launch an attack on the Admiralty which was presided 
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over by Prince George, as Lord High Admiral, and Marlborough's 
Tory brother, Admiral George Churchill. 
28 Marlborough was very 
concerned about his brother and he requested Sunderland not to 
participate in the attack upon the Admiralty. 
29 Sunderland made 
it perfectly clear, as Marlborough must have known, that his first 
loyalty was to the Junto. The Duke wrote apprehensiyely to his wife: 
I have had a letter from Sunderland by which he 
lets me see the consequences that must happen if 
the Queen can't be prevailled with in the 
affaireSof the Church. It is pretty hard to 
me to give him an honest answer, since it would 
lay too great a weight upon the Queen. if 
other things go well, that will be done as thoy 
wish, but I am rather despaLr*jf? g-,. then otherw% 
I have done what I can, and let what will happen 
I hope to have nothing to reproc4 myself, and 
then God's will be done. 30 
Sunderland was confident that the Junto would eventually get what they 
wanted as he told Shaftesbury: 
thol I must be so plain, as to tell you, things 
at Court are far from being upon the foot, all 
honest men wish, but as we have hitherto, (in 
the Scripture Phrase) worked out our salvations 
with fear and trembling, so I don't doubt but 
standing to our principles, and going on with our 
main point, will get the better at least, of the 
difficulties, we have in our way. 31 
The Queen remained obdurate in. the face of the Duumvirs attempts 
to persuade her to compromise. In August 1707 Sunderland repeated 
his warning about what would happen if the Junto did not receive 
satisfaction. 
32 Marlborough replied that he had done all he possibly 
could to satisfy the Whigs. 
33 At the end of the month a Junto council 
was held at Althorp to prepare their strategy for the forthcoming 
parliamentary session. 
34 In the autumn the Duumvirs used the threat 
of resignation to the Queen but to no effect and a further Junto council 
was held at Orford's house on 2 October. 
35 A week later Sunderland 
left Marlborough in no doubt about the determination of the Junto to 
have their way: 
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I am fully convinced, that things are not so 
well, as they were last year between the Queen 
and Marlborough and Godolphin but I beg leave 
upon this occasion to say, that if Marlborough 
and Godolphin would have believed, what some 
of their friends and servants have told them 
often in relation to Harley this had never 
happened, but be that as it will, without 
looking back to what is past, I am sure it's 
high time, to try to retrieve them, before 
they are past recovery, and I can't but 
believe, as you say, that when it's very plain 
that Marlborough and Godolphin are in earnest 
the Queen will not part with them since what 
is insisted upon is so reasonable in itself, 
as well as what has been promised over and 
over; I am ashamed to trouble you in so many 
letters., with this over and over, and indeed 
I should not do it, but for the apprehension 
I have of the inevitable confusion must attend 
the Queen and all that have to do with them, 
if this obstinacy continues, for as to myself 
I am very easy, having long resolved, as an 
honest man, whatever happens to act upon the 
same principles, and with the same people I 
have always acted. 36 
At the meeting of Parliament in October 1707, exactly as 
Sunderland had told Marlborough, the Junto began to criticise the 
running of the Admiralty and they were joined by the High Tories who 
wanted to enlarge the Junto attack into a full-scale condemnation of 
the government. On the initiative of Wharton and Somers the debate 
on the address of thanks for the Queen's speech was postponed and the 
peers went into a committee of the Whole House to consider the State 
of the Nation with relation to the fleet and trade of the kingdom. 
A petition from merchants who had lost ships was delivered to the 
Lords in November. In this the merchants complained about the 
inadequacy of the protection provided for their vessels by the 
Admiralty. The examination of the petition began on 3 December 1707 
and the House appointed two committees; one under the Duke of Bolton 
to inquire into the truth of the merchants' allegations and the 
other under Halifax to consider suggestions to encourage privateering 
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in the West Indies. 37 Sunderland was responsible for laying papers 
38 from the Admiralty before the House. The ministry was soon in 
difficulties and Harley responded with a proposal to reconstruct the 
administration. He had met the Duumvirs on 5 December 1707 and 
revealed a scheme by which the moderate Whigs would be persuaded 
publicly to dissociate themselves from the Junto. Harley also 
requested permission to approach moderate Tories with a view to them 
supporting the Court. A further meeting took place four days later 
where the Whigs who were present agreed not to press the Queen into 
accepting unreasonable terms. At the same time overtures were made 
to the Tories. Godolphin then gave way to Anne over the appointments 
to the bishoprics of Exeter and Chester. In her speech on 18 December 
the Queen emphasised the necessity for an all party ministry and 
Harley had managed to outmanoeuvre the Junto. The all party scheme 
was reflected in the ecclesiastical appointments. The High Tories 
Blackall and Dawes obtained the bishoprics of Exeter and Chester, 
Charles Trimnell, the associate of Sunderland and the Junto's 
candidate, became Bishop of Norwich, and Marlborough's nominee, 
Dr. Potter was made Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford. As a 
result of this'agreement the Junto's parliamentary attack collapsed. w 
Their spokesmen in the House of Commons were unable to carry their 
motions on the Admiralty and on 19 December the Whig Lords deserted 
their High Tory allies. 
39 The pressure on the government did not ease, 
however, for the mismanagement of the war in Spain gave its opponents 
a further opportunity-to harry. the ministry. 
In December 1707 the House of Lords had begun an examination of 
the conduct of the war in Spain and the Earl of Peterborough was the 
prominent figure in this affair. Peterborough had been in command 
of the English troops in Spain but as a result of his dilatory 
proceeding and the hostility between him and Charles III allied success 
in Spain in 1706 had come to nothing. When it became apparent that 
he was an embarrassment to his allies he obtained permission to go to 
Italy to discuss with Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy the 
possibility of an expedition against France, as well as raising a 
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substantial sum of money for Charles III. Peterborough, after talks 
with Eugene and Victor Amadeus and raising eloo, 000 at Genoa, returned 
to Spain in January 1707 where he took part in the preparations for 
the campaign in Valencia. 
40 
By this time it had been decided in London to recall Peterborough. 
Sunderland informed him that the project he had concerted with the Duke 
of Savoy was irrelevant and impracticable; that the loan he had 
raised at Genoa was an extraordinary proceeding, as was his going to 
Italy in the first place, for which he had no authority; that he 
was to return to England immediately and to explain his conduct. 
41 
Peterborough wrote to Sunderland attempting to justify himself, but 
Sunderland merely repeated the order to return home as soon as possible. 
42 
In reply to Sunderland's directions Peterborough 'took his own self- 
willed and embarrassing mode of complying'. 
43 He visited Turin, 
Vienna, Leipzig, Hanover, and finally the Duke of Marlborough's 
headquarters at Soignies in August. On 16 August he wrote to 
Sunderland that he was ready to embark and requested a convoy. Since 
Sunderland was at Althorp Harley was given responsibility for dealing 
with Peterborough and the ministers in London were already preparing 
for his arrival. 
44 
Peterborough arrived in London in August but declined waiting upon 
the Queen as he claimed his name had been struck out of the Privy 
Council Register. Harley showed even more ill-will to Peterborough 
than Sunderland. On 25 August he directed Peterborough to prepare a 
written account of his proceedings to be laid before the Queen. In 
September Sunderland assumed responsibility for Peterborough and the 
ministers spent much of this month examining various papers relating 
to Peterborough. In reply to a letter from Peterborough Sunderland 
informed him of the points his paper should deal with. These were: 
Peterborough's not marching to Madrid when he knew that Galway was 
there; his discouraging Charles III from marching to Madrid through 
Valencia; Peterborough's refusal to serve with Galway; his departure 
from Spain for Italy; Peterborough's negotiating with the Duke of Savoy 
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without having authority from the Queen for so doing; and the 
apparent mismanagement of money drawn out of the Treasury by 
Peterborough. Sunderland concluded by telling Peterborough that 
his paper should be ready to be presented to the Queen by 12 October. 
45 
Peterborough caused continual difficulties and his memorial was not 
received until 19 October. Sunderland and the other ministers 
examined Peterborough's answer in December after which Sunderland 
told him that his answer was unsatisfactory and that a new account 
should be prepared by 7 January 1708.46 Peterborough did not reply 
to Sunderland until 7 January when he declared that he hoped the 
new paper would be ready in a few days. 
47 
Before any further steps 
could be taken the focus of attention shifted to Parliament where, 
following their attack over the Admiralty, Ithe. Junto resumed their 
role as principal parliamentary defenders of the lklinistry and the war'. 
48 
The Tories had rallied to Peterborough and were determined to use 
the inquiry into the war in Spain to embarrass the Whigs and the Court. 
The Commons had begun their analysis of the number of troops present 
in the Peninsula 
-,,. at 
the time of the battle of Almanza in early December 
and had appointed 17 January 1708 to. consider the matter further, 
49 
The Lords began their inquiry on 15 December and the following day in 
a committee of the Whole House Nottingham, Rochester, and Haversham. 
defended Peterborough. On the 19 December Nottingham suggested 
that the allies should concentrate their military efforts in Spain 
and that 20,000 troops should be transferred from Flanders to the 
Peninsulai. Rochester declared that before the war could be carried 
on vigorously it would be necessary to know how the government wq-3- to 
employ the supplies voted by Parliament. Marlborough answered that 
measures were already being concerted with the Emperor to send 
reinforcements to Spain. He was followed by Sunderland, Wharton, 
Townshend, and Cholmondeley who urged the necessity of supporting the 
war in Spain. 
so Somers then proposed that 'no peace can be honourable 
or safe, for Her Majesty and Her Allies, if Spain and the Spanish 
West Indies be suffered to continue in the Power of the House of 
Bourbon'. 
51 The Junto had successfully cut the ground from under 
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the feet of the Tories who had little choice but to support the 
motion. The resolution was reported and a committee, including 
Sunderland, was appointed to draw up an address to the Queen. The 
Commons agreed with the address and a joint recommendation was 
delivered to Anne who expressed her approval on 7 January 1708. The 
Lords began an official inquiry into Peterboroug h's conduct the same 
month with Sunderland delivering papers into the House, Though 
the charges against Peterborough failed, Rochester and Nottingham were 
unable to vindicate him and he received no vote of thanks. For the 
remainder of 1708 and 1709 Peterborough was preoccupied with a 
Treasury examination into his accounts as Commander-in-Chief in 
Spain and until he could refute the charges of appropriating 
government funds his property was confiscated. 
52 The Commons 
inquiry into the conduct of the war in Spain continued during January 
and February 1708 and became part of the struggle between the Junto and CO 
Robert Harley, with Sunderland determined to drive the Secretary of 
State for the North out of the ministry. 
The pressure which the ministry had been subjected to over the 
Admiralty and Spanish affairs indicated that the administration would 
have to come to terms with either the Whigs or the Tories if it 
was to avoid a political disaster. Robert Harley was intent on 
reorganizing the administration.. He wanted to get rid of Godolphin 
but to retain the services of Marlborough while reaching an 
accommodation with the Tories. In January 1708 Harley had been 
negotiating with the Tories while at the same time Godolphin was 
becoming more and more suspicious of the Secretary of State and by 
29 January relations between the two men had broken down. Harley 
continued his efforts to buy off both Marlborough and the Tories, and 
he sought to use the debates in the House of Commons over Spain to 
break the Junto's association with the Court. On 29 January, after 
a motion had been made that only 8,660 of the 29,395 troops provided 
by Parliament had been in Spain at the time of 'i-he battle of Almanza, 
the debate was adjourned by 187 votes to 182. Proceedings were 
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renewed on 3 February when Henry St. John presented a fresh account 
to the House of the state of the forces in Spain. In the debate 
Harley and his associates remained silent which pleased the Tories) 
but his attempt to embarrass the Junto failed. Instead of rushing 
to the support of the Court the Whigs in the Commons attacked it for its 
mismanagement thereby undermining Harley's scheme to show the 
inability of the Junto to support the Court in Parliament. Harley 
still tried to win over Marlborough but with no success and after a 
disastrous attempt to lead the meeting of the Cabinet on 8 February) 
in the absence of Marlborough and Godolphin)Harley and Sir Thomas 
Mansell resigned on 11 February followed by Harcourt and Henry St. John 
the following day, 
53 
Though not directly involved in Harley's fall, 
the Junto, and Sunderland in particular, played an important part in 
helping to bring about Harley's downfall. 
Throughout 1707 Sunderland had repeatedly complained to Marlborough 
of Harley's iniquity 
54 
and by October the Junto had decided to force 
Harley out of the administration 
S5 
and in December they were presented 
with an ideal opportunity which Sunderland exploited to the full, 
William Greg, a clerk in Harley's office, had been engaged in a 
treasonable correspondence with. France and though Sunderland had been 
watching Harley's office for some time he had as yet discovered nothing 
of significance which could be used against the Northern Secretary. 
56 
Marlborough, however, was informed of Greg's activities and he 
immediately told the Queen. 
57 On 31 December 1707 and 1 January 1708 
Greg was examined at Harley's office by Sunderland, Cowper, Godolphin, 
Devonshire, Marlborough and Harley after which Greg was committed to 
Newgate. It was agreed on 5 January 1708 to send the evidence 
against Greg to the Attorney-General in order to bring him to trial. 
The ministers continued their examination of Greg's conduct for the rest 
of the month. 
S8 
On 12 January Sunderland and Harley gave evidence 
at Greg's trial at the Old Bailey 
S9 
and a week later Greg was found 
guilty on the basis of his own confession and he was sentenced to 
death. Greg repeatedly denied that Harley knew what he was doing and 
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it seems it was the poor security and unsatisfactory organization of 
Harley's office which allowed Greg to carry out his treasonable 
behaviour. 60 Though not directly implicated the affair could not 
have come at a worse time for Harley because, with Sunderland 
hounding his tracks, he was forced to disclose his plans to 
reorganize the administration and to implement them prematurely. 
61 
The Junto were still determined to gain some advantage from the Z30 
Greg scandal especially Os they knew of Harley's negotiations with 
the Tories and his attempt to discredit them in the House of Commons. 
Sunderland and Harley continued to examine witnesses and on 9 February 
the House of Lords appointed a committee of inquiry which included 
Somers, Wharton, Halifax, Devonshire, Bolton, Townshend and Somerset. 
Two days later Sunderland delivered papers to the committee who 
continued their work for the remainder of February and the first 
half of March 1708. Despite a close examination of the witnesses 
there was no evidence of Harley's complicity in Greg's activities. 
Upon consideration of the committee's report it was resolved that 
Greg should be used as an example, that Harley had been indiscreet in 
the choice of persons he employed as his agents, and that information 
given to the French had contributed to the loss of ships of which the 
merchants had complained to the House of Lords in November 1707. 
It was agreed to lay the report and the resolutions before the Queen 
in an address and to request that in future greater care should be 
taken in the offices of the Secretaries of State. Anne replied 
that she felt that the entire episode would serve as an effectual 
warning for the future. Sunderland, however, was still trying in 
March and April to get evidence to implicate Harley but he met with no 
success. 
62 By this time anyway the Junto had got what they wanted)for 
Harley and his followers had resigned though their hopes of augmenting 
their influence in the ministry were disappointed. Henry Boyle 
became Secretary of State, Robert Walpole Secretary-at-War, and 
John Smith Chancellor of the Exchequer. Both Boyle and Walpole were 
Court Whigs rather than committed Junto supporters. The Queen took 
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no notice of Godolphin's recommendation that Halifax's brother) 
Sir James Montagu, then Solicitor-General, should be made Attorney- 
General. Once again, therefore, the Junto began to pressur'sethe LI 
Court for a greater share in the administration and this time they 
were able to exploit the situation in Scotland. 
In December 1707 the House of Commons considered measures to 
render the Union more effectual and the Junto and their new Scottish 
allies, the Squadrone)proposed the abolition of the Scottish Privy 
Council in the hope that it would undermine the authority of Queensberry 
in Scotland. The Commons agreed to abolition without a division and V), 
it was also decided that J. P. Is in Scotland should have the same 
powers as their English counterparts and that the Court of Justiciary 
should abolish Circuit Courts in Scotland. The bill was carried 
through the House of Lords by the Junto with the support of the 
Squadrone peers, the majority of the Bi-shops and the Earl of Rochester 
and his followers in February 1708 and it became law the same month. 
The abolition of the Scottish Privy Council also meant the disappear(Ace 
of the office of Secretary of State for Scotland, but Godolphin managed 
to keep Scottish affairs out of Sunderland's hands by giving the 
Signet to the Earl of Mar and appointing Sir David Nairne as 
Underkeeper of the Signet to act in Mar's absence. 
63 Sunderland 
and the Junto were to remain on the offensive in Scotland during the 
1708 election. 
Parliament had been prorogued on 1 April 1708 and dissolved a 
fortnight later. Sunderland was optimistic about the electionas he 
told his mother-in-law: 'As to our elections here at home, by the 
nicest calculation that can be made, they will be very considerably 
better than'in this Parliament. ' 
64 He enthusiastically informed 
Marlborough of the Whig victory at Southwark on 30 April 
65 
and helped 
to secure the election of Joseph Addison at Lostwithiel by 
persuading John Hickes to stand down. 
66 He was also involved in the 
elections at Shaftesbury and Poole. 
67 On 7 May Sunderland again 
wrote to Marlborough that 'our elections go on hitherto very 
109 
prosperously, and there is no reason to doubt, but we shall have 
a very good Parliament'. 
68 
He was keenly interested in the results 
of the elections as they came in. He gave up his calculations with 
sixty-nine returns still to be entered and though he made some errors 
he recorded the majority of electoral dhanges which accurately 
reflected the movement in favour of the Whigs. Sunderland measured 
69 the Whig gain at twenty-nine seats which agrees with the accounts 
'that the Whigs gained on balance thirty seats or more in the English 
and Welsh constituencies, which made them stronger in Parliament by 
over sixty'. 
70 
The election of the forty-five Scottish M. P. 's 
led to the return of about twenty-seven members belonging to the 
Seafield-Queensberry group; nine were followers of the Squadrone; and 
the other nine were Jacobites of varying distinctions. 
71 Sunderland 
wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: 
I heartily congratulate with your Grace upon 
the elections throughout England, being so 
well over as they are. I think one may 
venture to say, it is the most Whig 
Parliament, has been since the revolution. 
So that if our friends will stick together 
and act like men, I am sure the Court must, 
whether they will or no, come into such 
measures., as 
2 
may preserve both us and 
themselves. 7 
It was in the election of the Scottish Representative peers, however, 
that Sunderland played his most conspicuous and controversial part. 
Following the abortive invasion attempt in 1708 the government 
directed the Earl of Leven to round up potentially dangerous Scottish 
nobles who were then ordered to be brought to London together with the 
Jacobites who had been captured by Byng's squadron on board the 
Salisbury. Scottish opinion was outraged especially as those who 
were arrested included notable Whigs and Presbyterians. Lord 
Belhaven, for instance, was clearly being victimized for his opposition 
to the union. At the same time it was unclear who had advised 
73 bringing the Scots to Lon on, but subsequently Sunderland appears to 
have admitted that he was responsible. 
74 
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The first prisoners to be examined in London by Sunderland and 
Boyle were those taken on board the Salisbury, but the Duke of 
Hamilton was the most important captive to be sent up to London. 
7S 
Hamilton applied to the Court for bail and after being turned down 
he approached the Junto. Sunderland, Roxburghe, and Orford made an 
agreement with Hamilton under which in return for being released on 
bail the Jacobites and the Squadrone would oppose the Court in the 
election of the Scottish Representative peers. It was hoped that 
this combination would weaken the Court's grip on Scotland and 
increase the Junto's following in the House of Lords. It was 
agreed in Cabinet on 4 May that Hamilton was to be released on bail of 
E30,000. Hamilton was to provide E10,000 and Wharton, Halifax, 
Devonshire, and Newcastle stood a further Z5,000 each. 
76 Sunderland 
informed Montrose of these developments: 
Your Grace will hear of Duke Hamilton's being 
at liberty. This as it was dexterously 
managed so it has produced such an Union, 
as will in all probability carry the election 
of the sixteen peers, in the manner .1 your 
Grace, and all of us wish. I can only say, 
that the whole Squadrone is in the list agreed 
on, and as I am sure you may depend upon 
Duke Hamilton, and his friends to a man, so I 
beg you would shew the same confidence towards 
him, and his, and by doing so, I think we can't 
fail of carrying our point. All this matter was 
settled before the Duke of Roxburghe went away, 
so that I will trouble your Grace with no more, but 
beg leave to refer you, to my Lord Orkney who will 
inform you of the whole matter, if my Lord Roxburghe 
has not done it before. My Lord Orkney will 
acquaint you that Duke Hamilton, the Squadrone, 
and I may add the Whigs of England are now upon 
the same bottom, and I don't doubt will continue 
so. 77 
The alliance with the Jacobite Duke of Hamilton showed the lengths to 
which Sunderland was prepared to go to achieve control of the ministry. 
On his release Hamilton returned to Scotland and on his way he met 
groups of Jacobite prisoners being brought up to London. He and his 
brother, the Earl of Orkney, tried to persuade the prisoners to support 
ill 
the alliance against the Court and to give up their proxies. 
Hamilton told Sunderland that as soon as the prisoners had been 
examined in London they should be sent back to Scotland. Orkney 
and Hamilton also complained about Queensberry being made a British 
peer as Duke of Dover. In response Sunderland, acting on behalf of 
Somers, Halifax and Devonshire, wrote to Newcastle requesting that, 
before he passed Queensberry's patent as Duke of Dover under the Privy 
SeallNewcastle should write to the Queen pointing out the ill- 
consequences of such a creation. Defoe found it difficult to believe 
what was happening in Edinburgh and Marlborough reacted in much the 
same manner. Even the Jacobite prisoners on their way to London 
were surprised at Hamilton's unholy alliance with the Junto and the 
Squadrone. 78 
Despite Sunderland's confidence that the alliance of the Squadrone 
and the Duke of Hamilton would secure the return of a significant 
number of their candidates the struggle in Scotland proved to be a more 
difficult affair. Hamilton had repeatedly urged the necessity of some 
sign of favour from London and both he and Montrose were alarmed when 
Marlborough gave his proxy to the Earl of Mar for it clearly indicated 
who had the support of the Court. Montrose and Hamilton again 
pressed Sunderland to get the prisoners sent back to Scotland as soon 
as possible after their examination in London. Hamilton also told 
Sunderland that something must be done to bolster their influence in 
Scotland. Sunderland got the Jacobite prisoners admitted to bail as 
fast as he could and on 7 June 1708 he sent letters to Montrose, 
Roxburghe, and Hamilton. Sunderland's letter to Roxburghe was the 
most important as he informed Montrose: 
We are extremely obliged to Mr. Cockburn, for 
the trouble he has taken in coming up. The 
accounts he gives us seem very hopeful. All 
shall be done here that is in our power to 
assist. I will not trouble your Grace with 
any repetition, but beg leave to refer you to 
my letters to Duke Hamilton and the Duke of 
Roxburghe. You will see by my letter to the 
last, which I send to be shown publicly, if 
it's thought that will do any good, but I ýave 
no reserve. 79 
112 
Sunderland's letters were openly used during the election at 
Edinburgh, but their contents are only indirectly known. Mar 
claimed to have got hold of a rough copy of Sunderland's letter to 
Roxburghe in which he promised that the new Whig Parliament would 
inquire into the illegal practices employed. in the Scottish 
election. Mar also accused Sunderland of exploiting his authority 
as Secretary of State by writing to Dalhousie requesting him to use 
his vote against the Queensberry interest, Sunderland did write to 
Dalhousie and the contents of the letter were such that Hamilton 
thought it best to return the letter to Sunderland. In all probability 
it would seem that Sunderland used the Queen's name in his letter to 
Dalhousie. Mar was certain that the Court's success in the election 
would be seriously compromised as a result of Sunderland's behaviour. 
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The outcome of the election confirmed Mar's anxiety. The Court 
managed to get ten of its candidates elected including Seafield and Mar. 
The Squadone-Hamilton alliance brought in Hamilton, Orkney, Montrose, 
Roxburghe, Crawford, and Rothes, and they were also confident of 
bringing in Annandale, Marchmont, Ross, and Sutherland when the House 
of Lords considered the disputed elections. A decisive contribution 
to the success of the anti-Court group was made by a number of army 
officers: Crawford, Buchan, Glencairn, Dalhousie, Forfar, Torpýithenp. 
and Forbes. Sunderland was requested to prevent the Court venting 
its wrath upon them by depriving them of their commissions. 
81 
Sunderland was delighted at the result of the election as he told 
Montrose: 
I must congratulate with you upon our victory for 
indeed I think it deserves that name and I don't 
doubt, but it will prove a thorough one, if it be 
improved, towards which you may depend upon our 
doing all that is in our power, but above all 
things, I must recommend to your Grace, and the 
rest of our friends with you, the getting 
substantial proofs of the violences, threats 
and promises used upon this occasion, because 
that will effectually at one blow rid you, and 
us of a subaltern ministry. As for the 
protestations you have enclosed we have looked 
them over, and as far as we can judge enough will 
113 
hold to throw out several of the enemy and bring 
in several friends, but as to this, we cannot 
judge perfectly of it, till we have the honour 
of seeing some of you, and discourse the who"Le 
matter with you, so that we must beg your 
Grace, and the rest of our friends, that are 
chose, or petitioners, to come up to London as 
soon as your affairs will permit. That we 
may be so thoroughly apprised of the whole, so 
as to inform our friends fully of it. 82 
The Earl of Mar wasted no time in informing both Godolphin and 
the Queen of Sunderland's conduct. He directed Sir David Nairne 
to deliver papers concerning Sunderland's letter to Roxburghe to Anne 
and the Lord Treasurer. Nairne was also to tell Somerset and Boyle 
that Sunderland was responsible for the setback the Court had suffered 
in the election. On 18 June 1708 Mar delivered lists to the Queen which 
he claimed showed that had it not been for Sunderland the Court would 
have carried all its candidates in the election. 
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The Queen was furious with Sunderland and she could hardly contain 
her resentment as she wrote to Marlborough: 
there is -no wonder opposition should increase 
when one of my own servants are at the head of 
it, as you will see by the enclosed, which I 
could not forbear sending you, to give you a 
view of the ill treatment I receive from the 
person that is Mentioned in it. There are 
larger accounts come today from other hands, 
all to the same purpose. It is such a behaviour 
I believe as never was known, and what I really 
cannot bear, nor what no other I dare say would 
one minute, but I am willing out of sincere 
kindness and consideration I have for you, to 
defer taking away the seals till I receive 
again more confirmation of what the enclosed 
contains, not that I have doubt of the truth 
of it, all Lord Sunderland's own actions having 
shown so much of the same spirit. I have told 
my thoughts very freely to Lord Treasurer on 
this subject, and I do not doubt he will give 
you an account of what passed between us, and 
what his opinion is, and therefore will -not say 
any more on a thing that must be so 
disagreeable to you, only that it is impossible 
to bear such usage, and I am sure you are too 
reasonable, if you consider this matter 
impartially, to blame me when I send for the 
seals-84 
114 
Four days later the Queen wrote to Marlborough again telling him 
that further evidence, probably Max's letter of 18 June, had 
arrived concerning Sunderland. The Queen had questioned Sunderland 
who, though he denied using her namejadmitted that he had written 
very freely to the Squadrone Lords. Anne felt that whether 
Sunderland hadused her name or not was beside the point and the 
only course open to her was to dismiss him. 
85 
The Queen was 
determined to show her resentment and Marlborough decided to consult 
Godolphin and the Duchess before he answered her letters. In the 
meantime he told his wife to ask Sunderland not to annoy the Queen 
unnecessarily. Marlborough prepared his answer with the advice of 
the Duchess and Godolphin and sent it to the Queen on 22 July. He 
expressed his surprise that Anne had gone so far as to threaten to 
remove Sunderland and asked her to defer any decision until he could 
see her. Marlborough pointed out that to dismiss Sunderland would 
discourage the Whigs who were the government's only security. 
86 The 
Queen gave way to Marlborough's solicitation but she ominously observed: 
you tell me you think I am obliged in conscience 
as a good Christian, and as a mark of resignation 
to God, to forgive and forget all resentments 
may have to any particular person or party. 
thank God, I do forgive all my enemies with all 
my heart, but it is wholly impossible for human 
nature to forget people's behaviour in things so 
fresh in one's memory, so far as to have a good 
opinion of them, or any reliance on them, 
especially when one sees for all their professions 
they are still pursuing the same measures, and 
you may depend upon it they will always do so, 
for there is no washing a Blackamore white. 87 
The same measures' the Queen mentioned probably refers to the continuing 
attempt of the Junto to increase their power in the administration. 
Sunderland was still the only member of the Junto who held Cabinet 
office and by the Spring of 1708 the anger of the Whig Lords at 
Marlborough and Godolphin was intensifying. There had been rumours 
the previous year that Somers was to be made Lord President but nothing 
came of it due to the hostility of the Queen towards him. Pressure to 
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admit Somers into the Cabinet began to build up in April 1708. 
Godolphin, Devonshire, and Newcastle tried to persuade Anne to admit 
Somers into the Cabinet without portfolio. The Queen was obdurate 
and even Marlborough's efforts failed to influence her. The Junto 
were indignant and Somers went so far as to compose an indictment 
of ministerial deceit. 
88 
In June 1708 the Duchess of Marlborough's political confidant and 
advisor ) Arthur Maynwaring)had tried to persuade Sunderland that the 
Junto must keep firm to their alliance with the Court. Maynwaring 
was hopeful that Sunderland could moderate Junto demands but the 
continual delay of Somers appointment nullified his efforts. 
89 
At 
the end of July Sunderland wrote to Marlborough 'to lay before him what 
'I take to be the present state of things here in as plain and 
inoffensive manner as I could'. 
90 Sunderland further assured his 
father-in-law that he could only rely upon the support of the Whigs 
if their demands were met. 
91 In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, 
however, Sunderland revealed the full extent of his indignation and 
anger at the delay of the Duumvirs in satisfying the Junto. He wrote: 
the present posture of our affairs ... grow worse 
and worse every day at home; for without running 
over all the particulars, such as the villainous 
management of Scotland, the state of the fleet 
which is worse than ever, the condition in 
Ireland in which the Protestant interest is 
lower, and the Popish higher than ever; their 
late management in relation t-o the invasion., 
and in particular the pardoning Lord Griffin, 
is a declaration to the whole world, as far as 
in them lies, for the Prince of Wales, and 
against the Protestant Succession, these are 
such proceedings that if there is not a just 
spirit shown in Parliament, we had as good give 
up the game and submit to my Lord Treasurer's 
and my Lord Marlborough's bringing in the Prince 
of Wales. 92 
Sunderland made it clear that the 'just spirit' to be shown in 
Parliament included setting up Sir Peter King as the Junto's 
candidate for the Speakership of the House of Commons in opposition to 
Sir Richard Onslow who was the nominee of the Court. 
93 
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Somers and Wharton also exhibited the same impatience as 
Sunderland when they accused Godolphin of giving false assurances 
of support while attempting to form a government with the backing of 
more moderate Whigs. There were also problems with Somerset who 
felt that the Queen's aversion to Somers made his appointment 
impracticable and that he himself would be more able to lead a 
reorganized ministry. The Junto did less than justice to Marlborough 
and Godolphin for both men were pressing the Queen to make concessions 
to the Junto, but Anne would not 'submit to the five tyrannizing 
Lords'. 94 In July Sunderland retired to Althorp where, at the end of 
August, a Junto council was held and Godolphin, in an attempt to reach 
an agreement, also attended but nothing was settled. 
95 
In September 1708 Sunderland was negotiating with Godolphin and 
the Duchess of Marlborough and they agreed to a further meeting of the 
Junto with the Lord Treasurer at Newmarket in early-October. 
96 
Sunderland told Wharton that he hoped a favourable agreement would be 
reached. 
97 
The meeting was attended by Godolphin, Sunderland, 
Somers, Wharton, Halifax, Orford, Devonshire, Bolton, and Dorchester. 
The Junto proposed that the Earl of Pembroke, who was Lord President 
and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, should replace Prince George as Lord 
High Admiral thereby allowing Somers and Wharton to succeed as Lord 
President and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland respectively. Godolphin 
answered by proposing an act of Parliament to allow Prince George to 
continue in office but to empower his council to act for him. Godolphin 
was told that unless the necessary appointments were made the Junto would 
put Sir Peter King up for the Speakership of the House of Commons. 
98 
By mid-October Sunderland, Godolphin, and Maynwaring were pressing the 
Duchess of Marlborough to come up to London to help settle the dispute, 
99 
On 19 October Sunderland informed Newcastle of the meeting with Godolphin 
and he argued that the appointment of Sir James Montagu and Robert Eyres, 
as Attorney-General and Solicitor-General respectively was evidence 
that the Junto's firmness would meet with success in the end. 
100 
Sunderland's frustration with Marlborough and Godolphin got the 
better of him on one occasion for he remarked to Maynwaring that 
117 
'he believed there was a management in the struggle with Mr. Harley'. 
101 
Maynwaring informed the Duchess of Marlborough of Sunderland's 
remarks and he blamed Somers and Hallfax for Sunderland's rash comments. 
102 
Two days later Maynwaring again wrote to the Duchess of Marlborough: 
At Lord Halifax's before dinner I had a good 
deal of discourse with Lord Sunderland who 
was uneasy, and said he had received a letter 
from you that shewd you were not well pleased 
with him, and I was glad to find for his own 
sake as well as other people's, that it made 
so much impression upon him. I will not 
trouble your Grace with the wise talk I used 
about the politics, but I took occasion to say 
I was very confident you were not angry with him 
and that no one would do him an ill office if 
he would: which I the rather mentioned, because 
he took occasion to speak of my having been at 
the Lodge. Your Grace knows whether I am an 
enemy to him; and indeed I don't know that 
he thinks me so. But it is certain he is 
mightily deluded, and many of his notions 
cannot I think come from Lord Somers but 
from some underlings of the party that haunt 
his house, or at least from the master of the 
feast we were at. And I both hope and 
believe from what I did observe in him yesterday, 
that it will be in your power to do him good, 
and make him more reasonable, which I 
sincerely wish; because there is no one whose 
humour or qualities I like better. 103 
Nevertheless Maynwaring wished that Sunderland's zeal could be employed 
elsewhere 
104 
and Godolphin had few illusions about Sunderland's 
conduct. 
los 
On 26 October Sunderland wrote to Newcastle requesting the Duke to 
engage his followers in the Commons to support Sir Peter King in the 
election of the Speaker. 
106 The second part of the Junto plan was an 
attack on Prince George as Lord High Admiral. While she had been 01 
trying to thwart the Junto the Queen had been carrying the burden of 
her husband's illness. This added concern had helped to undermine 
her resolve and when Prince George died on 28 October 1708 the 
Queen's opposition collapsed. 
107 Sunderland informed Newcastle: 
118 
my Lord Treasurer has acquainted us, that 
the Queen had agreed to make Lord Pembroke 
Lord High Admiral, Lord Somers President, 
and Lord Wharton Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 
Lord Somers is out of town, so that whither 
he will be persuaded to accept it or no I 
can't tell, but he would be so much in the 
wrong, if he should not. That I don't 
doubt but he will. 108 
Sunderland's faith in Somers was justified for both he and Wharton 
took up their new offices on 15 November 1708.109 The plan to set 
up Sir Peter King was dropped 
110 
and when Parliament met Sir Richard 
Onslow was elected Speaker. 
ill The Queen was unable to attend the 
opening of Parliament due to her grief at her husband's death and 
commissioners were appointed to act in her place. They were: 
Sunderland, Cowper, Godolphin, Newcastle, Devonshire, and Somerset. 
On 18 November they approved the choice of the Speaker after which 
Cowper read the Queen's speech and Sunderland was a member of the 
committee to condole with, and to thank the Queen for her speech. 
112 
The 1708-1709 Parliamentary session saw Sunderland once more 
directing the Junto's Scottish policy. He was determined that the 
Junto and the Squadrone should seize the opportunity to increase 
their strength in the House of Lords by presenting protestations 
at the election of Court candidates in the Scottish Representative 
peers election. In July he had been urging the Scots to get 
evidence which could be employed in this attempt and he renewed his 
attempt to get the Scottish nobles up to London for the meeting of 
Parliament. 113 Sunderland urged Montrose to lose no time in coming 
to London: 
the Parliament now drawing very near, and after 
all the struggle we have had this summer, it 
would be pity, for want of any diligence, to 
fail in doing what I will venture to say, we 
are sure of if we stick together and act like 
men. I mean the making of the Union complete 
and entire, and happy for the whole island, by 
ridding you, of your subaltern ministry. We 
have the best Parliament that has been chose 
these many years, the greatest union of all men 
of reputation among us, those that differed 
119 
last year being now entirely united, so that 
if we fail of doing right, it's entirely our 
own fault. So that I must beg of your Grace 
not to strike such a damp upon your friends 
and those that wish the good of Britain as 
to stay any longer in the country, for there 
are a good many things necessary to concert 
well together, before the Parliament meets, 
which it is impossible to do in the absence 
of one of your consideration. 114 
The Junto and the Squadrone laid great hopes on their ability to 
carry the petitions of Annandale, Ross, Marchmont, and Sutherland. 
A meeting was held on 11 December to prepare their plans. 
115 The 
petitions of the four Scottish. peers were entered in the House of 
Lords on 18 December, but due to delays in getting the necessary 
papers from Scotland a committee was not appointed to consider the 
petitions and papers until 10 January 1709. Sunderland was named 
as a member of the committee. 
116 Sunderland and the Junto were 
particularly concerned to deny Queensberry's right to vote in the 
election by virtue of his sitting in the House of Lords as Duke of 
Dover, which was a British peerage created after the union. 
117 
In this context the Duke of Hamilton's protestation was specifically 
aimed at invalidating Queensberry's vote. Sunderland was so active 
in this affair that Godolphin complained to Marlborough that he had 
been unable to see the Secretary of State as 'so much of his time is 
applied to caballing and parliament meetings'. 
118 On 21 January 1709 
the Lords agreed by 57 votes to 50, with Sunderland voting in the 
majority, 
119 
that Queensberry's vote was invalid. It was declared: 
'That a peer of Scotland, claiming to sit in the House of Peers by 
virtue of a Patent passed under the Great Seal of Great Britain after 
the Union, and who now sits in the Parliament of Great Britain, had no 
right to vote in the Election of the Sixteen Peers. ' 
120 Despite their 
Z- - further endeavours with election petitions the Junto and the Squadrone 
were only able to unseat Lothian and bring in Annandale. 
121 
By December 1708 Nottingham was alarmed by reports he had 
received from William Bromley that a bill would be introduced into 
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Parliament to repeal the Sacramental Test and to bring about a 
General Naturalization of foreign Protestants. Nottingham felt 
tile only alternative open to the Tories was to attack the administration 
over how ill-prepared Scotland had been to meet the attempted invasion 
of 1708 together with the failure to prosecute Jacobites in Scotland. 
At the beginning of 1709 Haversham opened an inquiry in the House of 
Lords on the points suggested by Nottingham. Sunderland was 
responsi le for delivering papers to the House relating to the 
invasion attempt which were considered on 25 February when Haversham 
and Buckingham attacked the ministry. 
122 The Court, however, with 
the help of the Junto were able to beat off the assault. 
123 
For the remainder of the session the Junto and the Squadrone kept 
the pressure on the Court over Scottish affairs, The Queen announced 
that the Scottish administration was to be altered and there was to be 
a third Secretary of State with responsibility for Scotland. The 
Squadrone and the Junto wanted either Montrose, Roxburghe, or even 
Hamilton appointed but despite the efforts of Sunderland and Somers 
Godolphin was determined that the Court should retain its authority 
in Scotland and Queensberry was made. Secretary of State for Scotland 
in February 1709. Clearly there had been a great deal of wrangling 
over this point for as a gesture of conciliation Montrose was made 
Keeper of the Scottish Privy Seal and Roxburghe, along with Argyll, 
was added to the Privy Council of Great Britain. Nothing, however, 
was done for Hamilton. The Scottish law of Treason was also changed 
to bring it into line with England, and Somers appears to have 
influenced the framing of this legislation which, though it met stiff 
opposition from the Scots in both Houses of Paliament, was eventually 
passed. Somers also joined the other ministers in carrying through 
an Act of Grace and Free Pardon which granted an amnesty to all 
treasons which had been committed. Sunderland introduced the 
indemnity into the Lords on 20 April 1709 where it passed 
unanimously and was then sent down to the Commons for approval. 
124 
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Throughout 1707 and 1708 Sunderland had spared no effort on 
behalf of the Junto in their struggle with the Queen and the 
Duumvirs, pursuing any course of action he felt would help -, ýhe Junto 
tighten its grip on the administration. Likewise in 1709 he 
continued his unsparing endeavours but at the same time on 
different occasions during the year he acted as a moderate and 
restraining influence on the other four Junto Lords. Like his 
endeavours to reconcile Marlborough and Halifax in 1707 he probably 
believed that the Junto's quest to dominate the ministry should not 
be made any more difficult by allowing personal feelings or 
resentments and preoccupation with essentially secondary concerns to 
influence the Junto's behaviour. The problems he faced in this 
respect also highlight the strength of his association with Somers 
and the influence that each man could have on the other's conduct. 
It was Sunderland and Somers who constituted the heart and strength 
of the Junto at this time. 
Halifax was the most persistent source of concern for Sunderland 





with the allies raised the question of who the 
government should employ as its plenipotentiary at such a negotiation. 
Halifax seemed a likely candidate; he had been employed in discussions 
with the Dutch in 1706 and 1707 and at the end of December 1708 
Marlborough was advising Godolphin to consult with Sunderland and 
Somers about employing Halifax in the peace talks. The Duke, however, 
disliked the idea of Halifax being appointed as plenipotentiary and 
was strongly opposed to any suggestion that Halifax should be admitted 
into the Cabinet. Consequently, Marlborough was alarmed to find that 
Halifax, ostensibly with the support of Sunderland, was pressing for 
Cabinet status. Nothing came of this attempt and significantly it was t;, 
agreed to employ Somers' protege, Lord Townshend, at the talks at 
The Hague. Interestingly enough Halifax appears to have blamed Somers 
for his failure to gain admission to the Cabinet and for much of 1709 
relations between the two men were very uneasy. Furthermore by the end 
of the year Somers had persuaded Sunderland that it was unnecessary to 
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have Halifax in the Cabinet, Sunderland's support for Halifax 
early in 1709 was probably because he believed it was necessary to 
have a further member of the Junto in the Cabinet; by the end of 
the year with Orford's entrance into the Cabinet Halifax's case did 
not seem to be so pressing. Sunderland and Somers had to go to 
considerable lengths to get Halifax to move a vote of thanks for the 
Queen's speech at the opening of Parliament in November 1709 and to 
pay a compliment to the Duke of Marlborough in order to ease their 
relations which had been soured earlier in the year. Sunderland did 
in fact express his disapproval of Halifax's conduct towards 
Marlborough. 126 Relations between Sunderland and Somers, and Wharton 
were also uneasy in 1709. 
Following his appointment as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Wharton, 
together with his Chief Secretary, Joseph Addison, arrived in Dublin 
on 21 April 1709. Wharton was eager to assist the Dissenters in 
Ireland by removing the'Test Act but such a move would be very unpopular 
in both Houses of the Irish Parliament. Therefore, Wharton and Lord 
Coningsby, with the apparent approval of Somers and Godolphin, drew up 
a scheme by which a bill against Popery was to be sent over to England 
for review by the British Privy Council, as all Irish legislation had to 
be under Poy-ning Is law, and the ministry would -5aý5q. VeAflj 44 a--GIUSC716 
reptal 
the Test Act. Wharton would then force the amended bill through the 
Irish Parliament. Wharton, however, was concerned that the plan might 
go awry in England and his suspicions centred on Godolphin. The Lord 
Treasurer and the Lord Lieutenant had already clashed over a vacancy 
in the office of Irish Muster Master, Wharton had requested, through 
Sunderland, to be allowed to fill the vacancy with his own nominee, 
but Godolphin, much to Wharton's annoyance, had supported Marlborough's 
candidate, Colonel Pennyfeather. Only when he was directed to do so 
by Sunderland did Wharton allow Pennyfeather's patent to pass. The 
Cabinet now felt that the repeal of the Test Act ii) : Jrr-jqý4 wag dA 
unnecessary risk and Coningsby told Wharton that Somers was chiefly 
responsible for this decision. When the Popery bill was sent back to 
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Ireland the clause for the repeal of the TestAcýhJhor been added. 
127 
A new source of friction quickly arose between Wharton and the 
ministers in London over the Irish Money bill. 
Following Wharton's first speech to the Irish Parliament the Irish 
House of Commons brought in the heads of several*bills, the most 
important being the Money bill. The heads of the Money bill were 
passed in May 1709 and they included provision to buy arms and 
ammunition and store them in four arsenals which were to be built 
throughout the kingdom. The ministers in London had been kept 
informed of the progress of the heads of the Money bill and the clause 
concerning the building of arsenals was viewed with concern for it 
was feared that the arms and ammunition might be seized by rebels 
in the event of an uprising. On 10 June 1709 it was decided that 
Sunderland should write to Wharton to get this provision removed 
before the heads of the Money bill were sent over to England 1--or 
consideration. In reply to Sunderland Wharton argued that there 
would be no danger from the clause as the arsenals which were to be 
built would be under direct government control and that it was the 
only way to provide effective security for the Protestant interest in 
Ireland. On 20 June Wharton wrote to Sunderland, 'I take the 
liberty to enclose... a long letter I have writ to Lord President which 
I hope he will communicate to your Lordship, and which I also hope will 
set me right with your Lordship'. 
128 When the Irish bills were sent 
over to London in July the offending article had not been removed from 
the Money bill. 
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In England the Irish bills were examined by a committee of the Privy 
Council comprising the Cabinet, Lord Coningsby and two Chief Justices. 
The preamble to the money bill was altered so that only one arsenal 
was to be established at Dublin. Wharton, however, felt that this 
alteration would offend those it was least desirable to do and that 
as a result the Money bill would be lost in the Irish Parliament. As 
a result of Wharton's apprehensions a special meeting of the Cabinet was 
held to consider what reply should be made. 
130 On 27 July Sunderland 
told Wharton: 
12 4 
I am very sorry to find, your Lordship 
apprehends the alteration made here may 
prove the loss of the Money bill, but I 
will hope, (and indeed I can never 
believe otherwise, till I see it) that 
when the gentlemen of Ireland consider 
of this matter cooly they will not be so 
much their own enemies, as to insist upon 
a point, that is so untenable, and that 
is in effect overturning the whole 
constitution of that kingdom, as it has 
stood forthese two hundred years, ever 
since Poyning's law. 131 
Sunderland did not doubt that Wharton would secure the passage of the 
bill, though if the Irish insisted upon this point Wharton was given the 
power to prorogue the Irish Parliament. 
132 Sunderland concluded with 
a warning: 
I must not omit telling your Lordship that 
Her Majesty looks upon it to be of so great 
consequence to her government and the 
constitution itself, that any people that are 
in her service, that shall countenance so 
extravagant a proceeding must expect her 
severest resentment. I have now acquainted 
your Lordship with Her Majesty's pleasure in 
relation to this matter, and as I heartily 
wish you success in this and everything else, 
so I don't doubt but by your prudence and 
dexterity, you will bring this affair to the 
issue that is wished for. 133 
There was considerable opposition to the Money bill as it had been 
returned from England but Wharton exhibited his considerable acumen as 
a parliamentary manager and while the Irish Parliament was prorogued 
the members of both Houses were lobbied by the Viceroy. By early 
August Addison was optimistic that when Parliament met the Lord 
Lieutenant would prevail. The bill was read for the first time in 
the Irish Commons on 10 August and after consideration it was 
ordered to be given a further reading two days later. After a heated 
and laboured debate lasting over four hours it was agreed to commit 
the bill by 147 votes to 59. Sunderland congratulated Wharton upon 
'the great victory you have had, with relation to the Money bill the 
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majority is greater than I ever heard of in the Irish House of 
Commons'. 134 The Money bill was approved by the Irish House of 
Lords at the end of August. 
135 Once it was certain that the Money 
bill would pass Wharton wrote to Sunderland on 12 August complaining 
of the treatment he had received from his colleagues. 
136 Sunderland 
gave a conciliatory reply promising support for any alterations 
Wharton saw fit to make in the Irish administration and reassured the 
Lord Lieutenant that he and Somers would do all they could to prevent 
the appointment of the Archbishop of Armagh as a Lord Justice when 
Wharton returned to England. 
137 With this support Wharton was able 
to prevent the Archbishop's nomination as a Lord Justice and his 
relations with Sunderland and Somers were once again harmonious. 
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Together with their growing ascendancy at home the trend of events in CO 
Europe seemed to be moving more and more in favour of the Whigs, 
By the beginning of 1709 Louis XIV was convinced that France must 
have peace even if it meant accepting unfavourable terms from the 
allies. In March 1709 Pierre Rouille was sent as plenipotentiary to 
The Hague. This French overture helped give a stimulus to the 
negotiations between Britain and the Dutch over the establishment 
of an effective Barrier against France in the Spanish Netherlands. 
Somers and Godolphin were anxious at the growing desire for peace in 
the Dutch Republic which threatened the Junto's policy of restoring 
the entire Spanish monarchy to the Ha-bsburgs. Marlborough was 
sent as Ambassador to negotiate an agreement with the Dutch and to 
settle the peace proposals that were to be put to the French. The 
peace preliminaries were based upon the points outlined in Parliament's 
address to the Queen at the beginning of March 1709. The address 
stipulated: the restitution of the entire Spanish monarchy to the 
Habsburg claimant; a Barrier for the Dutch and the Duke of Savoy; 
Louis XIV was to recognize the Protestant Succession in Britain and 
to exclude the Pretender from French territory; the fortifications 
of Dunkirk harbour were to be demolished. Sunderland had served on 
the Lords committee to draw up the address. 
139 The Dutch were 
willing to accept these terms as outlined in Marlborough's inst-ractions 
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owing to their eagerness for a settlement of the Barrier, They 
presented their proposals to Marlborough who carried them to London 
on 30 Apiil. There was little enthusiasm for the Dutch proposals 
and a counter project was drawn up on which the Barrier Treaty was 
to be negotiated. Sunderland delivered the scheme to Marlborough 
on 3 May just prior to the Duke's return to The Hague along with the 
new English plenipotentiary, Lord Townshend. 
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When Marlborough and Townshend arrived at The Hague attention was 
concentrated upon the peace negotiations. Rouille had made little 
progress in his discussions and it appears that as a plenipotentiary 
he was a bad choice; at the end of April he was replaced by the 
Marquis de Torcy. Marlborough, Eugene, and Heinsius were confident 
that the French could be brought to accept any terms but though it 
became apparent that Torcy was prepared to make large concessions it 
was clear that he was not empowered to settle the question of the 
Spanish Monarchy. The allies presented Torcy with forty preliminary 
demands. Torcy delayed his response but Marlborough was confident 
that the proposals would be accepted. Sunderland claimed 'the 
proceeding of France in this affair has. been very extraordinary, 
and that must turn to their disadvantage, since there's so much 
firmness, and spirit in Holland'. 
141 In fact Louis XIV was willing 
to accept all the preliminary articles except number thirty-seven which 
required him to force Philip V out of Spain if necessary. Louis 
refused to accept the allied terms and issued a proclamation throughout 
France indicating the enormity of their demands. The result was an 
upsurge of loyalty to the French King. 
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With the breakdown of the peace talks the settlement of the Barrier 
became the Junto's prime concern. Marlborough was reluctant to give 
way to Dutch demands, particularly over the article requiring the 
restitution of the entire Spanish monarchy. Townshend, with the backing 
of Sunderland and Somers, was certain that the only way to prevent the 
Dutch coming to terms with France was to settle the Barrier question. 
As a result Townshend, Sunderland, and Somers were ready to make major 
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concessions to the Dutch including removing the article to restore 
the whole Spanish monarchy from the treaty. The Junto's willingness 
to reach an agreement served to alienate Marlborough who had never 
been enthusiastic about the negotiations and had in fact helped to 
hinder their progress. 
143 
Townshend kept Sunderland informed of his negotiations and at the 
end of 1709 forwarded the Barrier Treaty to him. 
144 'After the 
conventional clauses as to the renewal of a1liances, the Treaty 
contained provision for the succession to the throne of England: the 
States General pledged themselves "to assist and maintain" the 
Protestant Succession as ordained by Parliament, and to make no peace 
with France until Louis XIV had acknowledged the succession and had 
expelled the Pretender from his dominions. In return, the Queen of 
Great Britain pledged herself to obtain certain concessions from France 
and from the future sovereign of the Southern Netherlands, on behalf of 
the States General. ' 
145 
The Dutch were allowed to garrison a large 
number of towns and fortresses on the French border and throughout the 
Southern Netherlands. Accompanying the rights of garrison were 
considerable financial. and commercial privileges. Even the Junto were 
appalled at the concessions made to the Dutch yet they were forced to 
accept Townshend's arguments that this was the only way to keep the 
Dutch in the war against France. Townshend was directed to ratify 
the treaty as it stood and it was finally completed in December 1709.146 
At the same time as the Barrier Treaty was under negotiation the Junto 
were crowning their ascendancy at home by having Orford brought into 
the Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty. 
The Junto had always regarded Pembroke's appointment to the 
Admiralty in 1708 as a temporary expedient and were intent upon 
replacing him with the Earl of Orford. Pembroke's reluctance to 
accept the post in November 1708 produced an unsuccessful atteript by 
the Junto to get Orford installed. In May 1709 the Junto began a 
determined effort to get control of the Admiralty. By this time, 
however, the Queen had recovered from the loss of her husband and she 
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was once more a formidable obstacle to Junto ambitions. Anne's 
resolution was fortified by the support of Harley who was now fully 
restored iii her confidence and who advised the Queen through 
Abigail Masham who had replaced the Duchess of Marlborough as the 
Queen's favourite. Godolphin was again caught between the Junto and 
the Queen. 147 
The Junto made no progress in June or July 1709 and Sunderland 
began to express his unease to Maynwaring. 
148 Somers was particularly 
disgruntled 149 and Sunderland found it necessary to urge caution, He 
advised the Lord President: 
I am sorry to see you have such a fit of the 
spleen upon you; for though there is but too 
much reason for it upon the whole, yet if you 
will give me leave to say so, I think you push 
it a little too far; for if you will allow me, 
I will tell you just my thoughts in relation 
to the affair of the Admiralty, I own, I 
never did think they would do it in the right 
time and manner, either for themselves or for 
us: for they are not capable of doing any right 
thing with a good grace; but, at the same time 
I am fully convinced, that if it continues to 
be pressed by all of us, as I do not doubt it 
will, they both must. and will do it at last, 
as we would have it. 150 
If, however, the Junto did not receive satisfaction it would be I L. 
necessary to break with the Court at the opening of Parliament. 
Sunderland was also urging the Duchess of Marlborough to use her 
endeavours on behalf of Orford. 
151 
Marlborough tried to persuade the Queen to appoint Orford at the 
end of August 1709 while Maynwaring tried to convince Somers that 
the obstruction did not proceed from the Duumvirs or the Duchess of 
Marlborough. By the end of September Somers had delivered his views 
on the problem and these combined efforts appear to have forced the 
Queen to yield. On 27 September 1709 Godolphin wrote to Pembroke, at 
the Queen's request, suggesting that he retire. At this point Orford 
began to make difficulties. He demanded that the Admiralty should be 
put into a commission of his choice, To help settle this problem 
a meeting was arranged between Godolphin and Orford at Newmarket. 
152 
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To assist this meeting Sunderland got Maynwaring 'to write to 
Mr. Walpole ... to desire he would use all his endeavours that no 
mistakes snould happen between Godolphin and Lord Orford'. 
153 As 
an inducement to Walpole Sunderland proposed that Walpole's brother- 
in-law, Sir Charles Turner, should be included in the Admiralty 
commission. 
154 Sunderland did not approve of Orford's demand over 
the commission but felt that Godolphin would be equally in the wrong 
not to agree to this request. 
155 Sunderland told the Duchess of 
Marlborough that if Godolphin did not end the dispute at Newmarket, 
'I will venture to say there will be no end of it, This is 
Lord Somers' opinion, and if it be yours we must beg you to press him 
[Godolphin] to it'. 
156 No agreement was reached at Newmarket, 
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Undeterred Sunderland and Somers continued to press Godolphin 
and eventually he spoke to the Queen about the proposals put to him 
at Newmarket by Orford; surprisingly Anne accepted them. Godolphin 
wrote to Orford to come up to London to accept the Admiralty and 
Sunderland congratulated the Duchess of Marlborough on the success. 
With an almost perverse sense of his own importance, Orford now 
demanded that he should be offered the position of Lord High Admiral 
which he promised to refuse and to request that he be named as First 
Lord in a commission. Sunderland and Somers, doubtless exasperated 
by Orford's conduct, vainly sought to get him to give way over this 
matter. Godolphin did, however, get the Queen to agree, but she 
would not accept Orford's subsidiary demand that Admirals Byng and 
Jennings should be included in the commission, The Queen returned 
to London on 2 November 1709.158 
At Sunderland's request, May-nwaring visited Godolphin on 4 November 
to get him to settle the 
convinced that Godolphin 
Byng and Jennings in the 
blamed Godolphin who, he 
had refused to come into 
request in the spring of 
Admiralty that evening. Maynwaring was now 
was the real obstacle to the inclusion of 
Admiralty commission. Sunderland also 
said, opposed the two Admirals because they 
the Prince's Council at the Lord Treasurer's 
1708. Somers also spoke to Godolphin who 
said he would visit the Queen the next day. On 5 November Sunderland 
1130 
I 
told the Duchess of Marlborough that instead of visiting the Queen 
Godolphin had written to her and had said in reply that Anne had 
affirmed her aversion to Byng and Jennings though she had requested 
to see Godolphin that evening. Somers'patience was at breaking point 
and Sunderland pleaded with the Duchess of Marlborough to come up to 
London the following day. Sarah complied with her son-in-law's 
request and a compromise was agreed though Somers probably made a 
greater contribution to bringing it about. It was agreed to drop 
Jennings and bring Byng into the commission on his own. On 
9 November Orford was sworn as a Privy Councillor and took his seat 
in the Cabinet along with Sunderland, Somers, and Wharton. 
159 
The Junto were now the dominant force within the administration. 
By a policy of ruthless, relentless, and determined aggression they 
had brought Somers, Wharton and Orford into the Cabinet alongside 
Sunderland. No one had contributed more to this achievement than 
Sunderland. His drive and enthusiasm had provided the energy 
necessary to carry out the Junto's design. He had directed and 
co-ordinated Junto strategy and was intent on carrying it through to 
the end even to the extent of risking his own dismissal. His handling 
of the Junto's Scottish policy revealed his ruthless opportunism in 
its most blatant form. Sunderland acted as the intermediary between 
the Junto and Marlborough and Godolphin conveying the demands of the 
Junto to the Duumvirs and using his influence with the Duchess of 
Marlborough to help the-. Junto to get their way. Sunderland utilised 
his connection with the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough to the fullest 
on behalf of the Junto. Yet at the same time that his youthful vigour 
and Whig zealacM so prominently displayed Sunderland also showed that 
he could on occasion be a more subtle and calculating politician. 
He helped to moderate the resentments and excess of Somers, Wharton, 
131 
and Halifax at different times realising that their dissatisfaction 
was more likely to hinder rather than help the Junto to get control 
of the administration. Sunderland's shrewdness as a politician was 
to develop during the last years of Anne's reign and by the beginning 
of George I's reign he was to have become a much more sophisticated 
politician, though without losing his vigour and zeal. There is no 
doubt that Sunderland was by now the outstanding member of the Junto 
and his importance was to increase in the following years; it was 
clear that if the future lay with any member of the Junto it was w1rh 
Sunderland. At Orford's appointment Sunderland had declared that the 
Junto were now 'upon so solid a bottom, that nothing but our own folies 
and divisions can hurt us'. 
160 His reading of the situation was 
inaccurate. Ironically, it was Robert Harley, the man he had helped 
to drive from office in 1708, who was to destroy all that Sunderland 
had worked so hard to achieve. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE COLLAPSE OF THE WHIG ADMINISTRATION 17709-1710 
'The danger to the whoZe' 
There is perhaps no more fitting tribute to the political adroitness 
of Robert Harley than the destruction of the Whig administration in 
1710. Almost from his resignation in February 1708 Harley had 
been preparing the strategy by which he would reorganize the government. 
Proceeding with patience, dexterity, subtlety, deviousness and with an 
astute sense of the possible his political style contrasts markedly 
with the blunt, aggressive, and vigorous enthusiasm which so often 
characterised Sunderland's conduct. Harley built up an alliance of 
High and moderate Tories, together with dissident Whigs, that would be 
strong enough to topple the ministry. Sunderland appears to have been 
one of the first to appreciate the danger which threatened the Whigs and 
his perspicacity in this respect was further confirmed by his growing 
awareness of the political consequences of the impending Hanoverian 
Succession. Sunderland constantly emphasised the need for unity 
within the administration and was prepared to do his utmost to foster 
a common sense of purpose. His loyalty to Marlborough and Godolophin, 
but particularly to his father-in-law, was remarkable and seems to have 
been nearly as strong as his devotion to the Junto and to Whig 
principles, His constancy was such that Marlborough reciprocated it 
to a degree which transcended purely political and selfish reasons. 
Sunderland's behaviour at his dismissal again reveals his willingness 
to accept the necessity of sacrifice on behalf of the Whig interest. 
The election of 1710 reveals once more Sunderland's credulous optimism 
and yet, paradoxically, it was combined with a sense of grim realism. 
It is also typical of his sanguine temperament that, as Harley and his 
associates destroyed what Sunderland had laboured so hard to achieve 
from the beginning of the reign, Sunderland was already looking towards 
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the future and political salvation in the form of the House of 
Hanover. 
Harley's resignation in 1708 had been followed by a further reverse 
in the election; his supporters fared very badly and Henry St. John 
could not even get back into the House of Commons. Harley was 
aware, however, that the setback which the High Tories had also 
suffered gave him an opportunity to renew his political association 
with them. He made tentative overtures to William Bromley, the 
leader of the High Tories in the Commons, and, though the first 
contacts were rather frigid, by the summer of 1709 their relations 
were becoming more and more cordial. Through Bromley, Harley was 
able to come to terms with Rochester, though the other leading High 
Tory peer, Nottingham, held aloof as both he and Harley were too 
suspicious of each other. The support of the High Tories alone, 
however, was insufficient. Harley knew that if an effective 
challenge was to be made to the ministry he would have to canvass support 
from the Whigs themselves and his hopes centred on prominent Whig 
peers who were not close associates of the Junto and who also 
harboured grievances or suspicions against them. Harley's first 
efforts were directed towards Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury, 
Shrewsbury had been one of the outstanding Whig leaders following 
the 1688 revolution and he had been a close ally of the Junto during 
William III's reign. In his attitude to politics, however, 
Shrewsbury had much more in common with Harley and the Duumvirs, 
preferring to manipulate party. rather than to acquiesce in its 
superiority. His dissatisfaction with party wrangling resulted in 
him leaving England in 1700 for Italy and he did not return until 
the beginning of 1706. In spite of promptings from Somers, Halifax, 
and Marlborough he initially showed little inclination to resume his 
political activities. Harley had been in irregular contact with 
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Shrewsbury from 1701 and in 1708 he began to make direct proposals. 
Shrewsbury's prime concern was that the war had gone on far too long 
a-nd he was convinc; (, d -that peace was necessary and this helps to 
explain his receptiveness to Harley's proposals. By the beginning 
of 1709 Shrewsbury was regarded as one of Harley's adherents. 
Harley, meanwhile, had also secured the support of other Whig 
nobles notably Rivers and Peterborough and was to continue his search 
during the following year. Equally significant was that by the 
opening of 1710 Harley had recovered the confidence of the Queen. 
Anne had been deeply humiliated by the failure of Harley's attempt 
to form a ministry in 1708 and their relations had been lukewarm for 
much of 1708 and 1709. During the struggle over Orford's appointment, 
however, Harley was again indirectly advising the Queen and by the 
end of 1709 he had recovered his former authority at Court. 
1 
The struggle over the control of army patronage at the beginning 
of 1710 showe4the dilemma confronting Sunderland and the Whigs. With 
Orford's appointment at the Admiralty Sunderland felt that the Junto 
dominated administration was virtually unassailable. This belief 
wckS, reflected in his eagerness to prosecute Sacheverell and his 
willingness to support a parliamentary address to the Queen to remove 
Mrs. Masham. These were hardly the measures of men conscious of their 
political insecurity, yet paradoxically both courses of action indicated 
that the administration was not as firmly established as Sunderland 
believed. The extremity of these actions does in fact demonstrate 
the strength of the opposition to the Whigs. The crisis over the 
army shook Sunderland's confidence for by February 1710 he was 
appealing for greater cohesion between the Whigs and Marlborough and 
Godolphin. It also accounts for his change of attitude towards 
the trial of Doctor Sacheverell, In December 1709 he was a vigorous 
advocate of impeachment but during the trial itself his enthusiasm 
for the prosecution waned dramatically. Sunderland's willingness to 
back Marlborough throughout the Duke's dispute with the Queen helped 
to bind the two men closer together and though he quarrelled with 
135 
Godolphin he was soon conscious of the importance of having the 
full support of the Lord Treasurer. 
In 1709 the Queen had been ready to challenge Marlborough's 
authority in the army by refusing to give any employment to 
General Maccartney and also refusing two requests by Marlborough 
for the Captain-Generalcy for life, At the beginning of 1710 a 
further conflict took place. The death of the Earl of Essex meant 
there would be a vacant regiment and a new Lieutenant of the Tower 
of London would need to be appointed. Marlborough intended to 
nominate Northumberland to the Lieutenancy, but Harley advised 
Anne to make Lord Rivers Lieutenant of the Tower and to give 
Essex's regiment to Abigail Masham's brother, John Hill. Marlborough 
saw this as a direct challenge and in a fury he and the Duchess retired 
to Windsor Lodge on 14 January 1710. Marlborough identified 
Abigail Masham as the source of this new dispute and he drafted 
a letter to the Queen demanding that if Abigail was not removed 
he should be dismissed. The letter was sent to Godolphin to 
show to the Whigs, but the Lord Treasurer did not wish to show it to 
the Queen and prevailed upon Somers to ask Anne to give way. The 
same day there was a meeting at Devonshire's house attended by 
Sunderland, Arthur Maynwaring, and Orford. It was decided to 
support Marlborough to the utmost and Maynwaring was to speak to 
Wharton to have him consult with Sunderland. In the afternoon 
Cowper had an audience with the Queen, but, as with Somers, she 
remained obdurate about her decision. There was a further meeting 
at Devonshire's in the evening but Sunderland was absent because of 
a headache and no decision was. reached about how to proceed, The 
next day Devonshire became the third Whig Lord to have an unsuccessful 
audience with the Queen on this subject. 
2 
Sunderland kept Marlborough informed of developments in London 
and declared his intention to support his father-in-law who replied 
that though he would follow the advice of his friends in London it 
was absolutely necessary to remove Mrs. Masham. 
3 Marlborough directed 
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Godolphin to consult with Sunderland and other leading Whigs4 and 
he told Sunderland that he would follow their adviceS yet he also 
wrote a letter in which lie made it clear that he was determined 
to keep to his original decision and a similar communication was 
enclosed for Cowper. Godolphin did not show these two letters to 
the Whigs and both he and Somers had further audiences with the Queen. 
Godolphin then forwarded Marlborough's letter to Cowper along with a 
request that Cowper shoul. d. again speak with Anne. This pressure 
seems to have worked for the Queen agreed not to insist on 
John Hill having the vacant regiment and both Godolphin and Somers 
urged Marlborough to wait upon Anne. In the meantime, unable to 
get a positive resolution from London, Marlborough informed the Queen 
that he intended to resign. 
6 
The Duchess disliked the request of 
Godolphin and Somers and she directed Maynwaring to consult with 
7 Sunderland. 
Maynwaring met with Sunderland, Walpole, and Craggs on Friday 
8 20 January when they agreed that Marlborough should remain at Windsor, 
'Sunderland went after to Godolphin and spoke very warmly to him... and 
said ... that he was sure none that had ever pretended to be Whigs would 
fail in this dispute except Boyle and Mr. Compton; to which Godolphin 
made no reply, but seemed much nettled. ' 
9A 
meeting followed at 
Devonshire's houselattended by Sunderland, Maynwaring, Walpole, and 
Craggs, whereit was decided to make two changes in Marlborough's 
first letter which was to be sent instead of him coming up to London. 
10 
The other leading Whig Lords, together with Godolphin, agreed that 
Marlborough should wait on the Queen and Godolphin urged the Duke to 
do so enclosing a conciliatory letter from Anne. Marlborough agreed 
to their request, but he had also decided to try to-, get support 
for a parliamentary address to remove Mrs, Masham together with a 
further request that he be given the Captain-Generalcy for life. 
Sunderland was the only leading Whig ready to support Marlborough. 
11 
Rumours of the Duke's intention appear to have reached the Queen 
who was furious and who immediately began to canvass assistance in 
both Houses of Parliament. The result was a very full House of Commons 
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and because it was felt the address was unlikely to pass it was 
allowed to drop. on Tuesday 24 January Marlborough had an audience 
with the Queen. 
12 The dispute revealed the strength and influence 
of the Queen and Sunderland was quick to see the implications this 
had for the future. 
Aware of the danger which loomed Sunderland repeatedly emphasised 
how important it was to get Marlborough and Godolphin to act as one 
with the Whigs. Early in February he informed the Duchess of 
Marlborough that: 
Notwithstanding all the difficulties, and 
disagreeable things have happened of late, 
we shall get the better of them all, if 
we can but entirely cement together 
Lord Marlborough and the Whigs, which is 
so necessary and so plain that it can't 
fail. I am sure I will do my part towards 
it, with the greatest sincerity, and will 
only say, he may if he will, naý indeed 
must be the head of our party. ' 
The dispute in January had raised Sunderland's suspicions about 
Godolphin's reliability and seems to have soured relations between them 
for some time. He was, however, aware that the hostility of the 
Queen must be the government's prime concern and was eager that the 
Duchess of Marlborough should rekindle the Lord Treasurer's flagging Z") 
spirit. Sunderland wrote anxiously to his father-in-law: 
Lord Treasurer has a slowness, and coldness 
about him, that is really terrible, and therefore 
all that can be must be done., to keep him up, 
and to animate him, but I am sure it will be 
impossible to do it withou ,t 
Lady Marlborough, 
and therefore I must beg of you, in the name 
of all our friends that you would persuade her, 
to come straight to town, when you are embarked 
to keep Lord Treasurer up to do what is right, 
for without her, I know we shall all sink, I 
don't mean be out of our places, for that I think 
will be no mortification, to anybody of common 
sense, but besides the danger to the whole, none 
of our heads are safe if we can't get the better 
of what I am convinced Mrs. Morley [the Queen] 
designs, and if, Lord Treasurer, can but be 
persuaded to act like a man, I am sure our union 
138 
and strength is too great to be hurt, Lord 
President, Lord Steward, and Lord Orford, 
have charged me, with their compliments, and 
good wishes to you, and do hope and beg you, 
to press this of Lady Marlborough's being 14 here, as that upon which every thing depends. 
As if to'emphasise their unity the Whigs supported a parliamentary 
address to the Queen to allow Marlborough to go to The Hague to Zý 
attend the peace negotiations which were about to be renewed with 
Tt the French and also to prepare for the forthcoming campaign. I 
appears likely that Sunderland was responsible for drafting this 
address. 
is 
The impeachment of Doctor Henry Sacheverell for 'High Crimes and 
Misdemeanours I can have left little doubt that the initiative no 
longer lay with Marlborough, Godolphin, and their Junto allies. 
When the decision to impeach was made in December 1709 Sunderland, 
no doubt reflecting his confidence in the strength of the 
administration, was one of its leading advocates. Once again, as 
with his support for the address against Mrs. Masham, this served 
as a tacit admission of the ministry's insecurity. Sunderland's 
awareness that he and his colleagues could no longer pursue an 
aggressive policy grew during the early months of 1710 and probably 
explains his passivity in the debates upon Sacheverell in the House 
of Lords in March 1710. The Sacheverell riots at the beginning of 
the same month, in which he played an important part in suppressing 
and which emphasise his decisiveness, vigour and ability to respond 
to a crisis, can only have served to highlight the difficulties facing 
the government. 
There can be little doubt about the motives which induced 
Sir Samuel Garrard, the High Tory Lord Mayor of London, to invite 
Henry Sacheverell to preach before him and the City Fathers at 
St. Paul's on 5 November 1709. To have a well known High Tory 0 
firebrand preach on the anniversary of both the Gunpowder Treason and 
William of Orange's landing at Torbay in 1688 was deliberately 
provocative. Sacheverell's sermon, entitled 'In Peril Amongst 
False Brethren'jzwas nothing short of a full blooded assault on 
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Whiggery, Dissent, and the Glorious Revolution as well as a 
4 
vindication of the High Tory doctrines of passive obed . ence and 
non-resistance. Not content with this, and contrary to the ruling 
of the Court of Aldermen, the sermon was published and by the middle 
of December 1709 50,000 copies were being read and distributed. 
It would have been difficult for the government to ignore such a 
blatAnt affront and an impeachment before the House of Lords 
seemed the most effective way to censure Sacheverell, Furthermore, 
the original conception of the prosecution was vastly different from 
the ostentatious drama into which the trial developed. 
16 
Godolphin's wrath was exacerbated by Sacheverell's oblique 
reference to him in the sermon as 'Volponel and he pressed for 
impeachment. Though not as determined as Godolphin, Marlborough 
did not share the doubts of Cowper, Somers, and Boyle. Sunderland, 
along with Wharton, favoured impeachment and was intent upon condemning 
the Doctor's vindication of passive obedience and non-resistance. 
17 
In early-December the ministers agreed to proceed against Sacheverell 
and a further meeting then took place involving the Duumvirs and the 
Whigs. Marlborough proposed a prosecution 
18 
and 'when the ministers 
of state had debated for some time about the method of proceeding, 
and some were for leaving him [Sacheverell] to the ordinary judges, and 
some for calling him before themselves; others, and the Earl of 
Sunderland in particular, were of opinion that he ought to be impeached 
before the extraordinary judges in Parliament'. Somers advised 
moderation and caution but 'this opinion which tended to clemency was 
not agreeable to the Duke of Marlborough's friends, and especially to 
the Earl of Sunderland. The Lord Somers therefore came over to their 
sentiments'. 
19 
The House of Commons resolved on 14 December 1709 that Sacheverell 
should be impeached for High Crimes and Misdemeanours and the next day 
John Dolben formally impeached him at the bar of the House of Lords. 
20 
Sunderland was a member of the Lords, committee to consider the methods 
of proceeding. 
21 The Commons completed drawing up the articles of 
140 
impeachment on 9 January 1710, but the trial did not begin until 
Monday 27 February. The first three days of the trial were taken 
up with the prosecution case and of the Commons' managers 
Robert Walpole, James Stanhope, Sir Peter King, William Thompson 
all gave outstanding performances, 
22 but all these were surpassed 
by the incomparable effort of Sir Thomas Parker which 'can rarely 
have been matched in any British political trial', 
23 Following 
Parker's contribution on 1 March it was decided to adjourn the 
remainder of the prosecution's case until the following day. 
24 
From the beginning of the trial it was obvious that Sacheverell's 
cause had aroused great interest and stirred deep seated feelings 
within London. Large crowds had accompanied the Doctor to and from 
the proceedings at Westminster Hall, while, on 28 February, 
Daniel Burgess's Dissenting meeting house near Lincoln's Inn Fields 
had been attacked. The signs on 1 March were ominous. The crowds 
were very large and though the Queen had been cheered when she left 
the trial the Commons' Managers and other leading Whigs received a 
hostile reception. The trouble began in earnest at about 7p. m. with 
a full-scale assault on Bu-zgess's meeting house. As the evening 
progressed it became obvious that the mob was being manipulated for 
specifically political ends against Whig and Dissenting targets. 
There is little doubt that the unrest was directed by London Tories 
of some social standing in order to exploit the anxiety about the 
'Church in danger' to embarrass the government. 
25 
Sunderland was working at his office in Whitehall when, at about 
9p. m. on Wednesday 1 March, Cowper and Newcastle arrived to inform 
him that the mob was threatening their houses. At the same time 
news of the assault on Burgess Is meeting house was received. 
Sunderland immediately informed the Queen of the disorders and she 
instructed him to employ her horse and foot guards to quell the unrest. 
When Sunderland expressed his concern at leaving her unguarded Anne 
answered that God would be her guard. Upon returning to his office 
Sunderland gave directions to the commander of the foot guards to 
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send some troops to Burgess's meeting house. Because the commander 
could not be found Sunderland interviewed the senior officer on duty, 
Captain Horsey, and it was only after Sunderland informed him that 
it was the Queen's express commancL and that he would receive written 
orders the following day that Horsey agreed to go. Sunderland 
directed Horsey to act with prudence and to send some troops to the 
Bank of England. Sunderland also gave orders to the J. P. Is to 
suppress the unrest at Burgess's and to apprehend the ringleaders, 
while the Duke of Bedford was ordered to raise the militia. 
Sunderland's orders to Bedford were less restrained than those to 
Horsey; the Duke being allowed to use any means to put down the 
unrest. In the early hours of Thursday morning Sunderland gave 
orders to prevent any attack on the house of John Shute's brother in 
Hatton Gardens as well as ordering the Lieutenancy and Sheriffs of 
London and Middlesex to attend a Cabinet Council at 6p. m. that evening. 
26 
It was largely due to the excellent discipline of the troops involved 
that the disorder was ended without a shot being fired and with a 
minimum of casualties, By 3a. m. an uneasy quiet hung over London. 
27 
The riots were a severe shock to the ministry. Though there is 
no record of any Cabinet Council on Thursday 2 March among Sunderland's 
papers it is almost certain that any discussion would have been 
concerned with preventing further disorder in London and throughout 
the country. Sunderland received proposals from John Shute to 
prevent disorders outside London, while in the capital, on 8 March, 
which was the anniversary of Anne's accession, Sunderland gave orders 
to have troops and the trained bands ready to deal with the slightest 
hint of trouble. For the remainder of the month and during April 
Sunderland was vigorously engaged in maintaining order and prosecuting 
seditious behaviour in the provinces. In London he was responsible 
for preventing any repetition of the Sacheverell riots as well as 
bringing to trial and prosecuting those who had been arrested for their 
part in these disorders. 
28 
On Thursday 2 March Lechmere completed the prosecution case against 
Sacheverell and the court was adjourned until the following day. The 
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defence began on the Friday with Sir Simon Harcourt carrying the 
burden more or less singlehanded and in fact his performance, 
despite being inferior in quality to Parker's, was the one for 
which the trial was most remembered. Harcourt was unable to attend 
the trial after the Saturday for the writ-for the election at 
Cardigan in which he was involved had been returned. The rest of 
the defence performance was laboured and uninspiring, The last 
contribution came from Sacheverell himself on 7 March. In a speech, 
probably written by Francis Atterbury and other more subtle minds, 
that combined apology, self-justificat ion and protest he performed 
admirably. His audience was spellbound either out of sympathy, 
admiration for his nerve or amazement at his awesome hypocrisy. The 
prosecution replied two days later and though they effectively 
demolished any defence which Harcourt had built up it was clear 
that, like the administration generally, they no longer held the 
initiative. 29 
When the prosecution had finished its case Nottingham rose to 
ask a question upon which Sunderland immediately suggested that in order 
to - consider it the Lords should return to. their own house. 
30 This 
was agreed to and when the Lords had returned to their chamber 
Nottingham inquired whether in an indictment such as that against 
Sacheverell the words supposed to be criminal must be 'expressly 
specified'. It was decided to consult the judges who declared that 
the words must be specified. On Saturday 10 March the Lords debated 
the implications of the judges advice and Somers, Halifax, and Cowper 
carried the point that in passing judgement on Sacheverell the Lords 
should be guided by the laws of England and usages of Parliament. On 
Monday Sunderland was a member of a committee appointed to search 
and inspect precedents of impeachments involving High Crimes and 
Misdemeanours. 31 Bolton reported from the committee on the Tuesday 
and the Lords agreed by 65 votes to 47 that the words regarded as 
criminal did not need to be expressly specified. 
32 
The first article of the impeachment was considered by the House 
of Lords on 16 March and during the debate it was observed that 
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'Lord Sunderland spoke but not to be heard you know which way. ' 
33 
After a long discussion it was agreed that the Commons had made good 
their impeachment on the first article. The debate itself was an 
undistinguished affair and Sunderland's speech was one of many 
lacklustre performances. The next day-the three remaining articles 
were approved without a division. On 18 March there was considerable 
wrangling over how the question about Sacheverell's guilt was to 
be phrased. Sunderland, Rochester, Guernsey, Cowper, Nottingham, 
North and Grey, Wharton, Buckingham, Jersey, and Anglesey were all 
involved after which it was agreed that the question should be: 
'Is Henry Sacheverell, Doctor of Divinity, Guilty of High Crimes and 
Misdemeanours charged on him by the impeachment of the House of 
Commons? ' 34 The Tory Lords tried unsuccessfully to have the question 
put separately on each article to each individual peer but this was 
defeated by a majority of twelve. 
35 
The Lords declared Sacheverell guilty by 69 votes to 52 on 
Monday 20 March in Westminster Hall with Sunderland voting in the 
majority. 
36 
Significantly, Shrewsbury had argued in favour of 
Sacheverell during the debate and he voted against impeachment. This 
was merely a portent of the success which Harley had achieved. He 
had been negotiating with Somerset, Argyll, and Islay, while also 
working on Queensberry, Loudon., Roseberry and Orkney through Somerset 
and Mar. The reward of his endeavours appeared when, on 21 March, 
the punishment to be inflicted upon the Doctor was discussed. It 
was decided that he should only be banned from preaching for a year 
while the attempt to deprive him of any further ecclesiastical 
preferment was defeated by 60 votes to 59; Sunderland voted with 
the minority. 
37 
The intention to imprison Sacheverell was abandoned 
and apart from his suspension his sermon was merely burnt before the 
Lord Mayor of London. There was jubilation at the outcome and 
Sacheverell embarked upon a triumphal progress to take up the 
rectorship of Selattyn near Oswestry on the Welsh border. 
38 
The reception given to Sacheverell's sentence and the flood of 
loyal addresses to the Queen revealed the popular hostility to the 
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administration which was believed to be undermining the position 
of the Church and unnecessarily prolonging the war for its own 
benefit. Consequently, with the advice of Harley, Anne was ready 
to make the first open move in the attempt to change the gove-rnment, 
On 5 April 1710 Parliament was prorogued and Godolphin retired to 
Newmarket. Without prior consultation the Queen informed the 
Lord Treasurer that she had replaced the Earl of Kent as Lord 
Chamberlain by the Duke of Shrewsbury. Of further significance 
was the fact that on 6 April the Queen had a sour and fruitless 
audience with the Duchess of Marlborough; they were never to see 
each other again, 
39 
Sunderland, Somers, and Godolphin were mortified at this change 
40 
and Sunderland was deeply concerned that the, 
Lord Treasurer... knew nothing of this of the 
Duke of Shrewsbury, though, I will own, I 
should have been much better pleased, if he 
had known of it, for as it is, it seems striking 
at every thing, however I think Lord Treasurer 
is perfectly in the right,, that we must 
endeavour to weather it, as well, as we can, 
in order to preserve the Parliament, from being 
dissolved, I did assure Lord Treasurer that 
whatever he thought proper to be done, we would 
all stand by him in it, and I am sure it is the 
intention and resolution of all our friends 
to do so. 41 
Godolphin reciprocated Sunderland's assurances on behalf of the Whigs 
by complying with the request that Orford should be gratified by 
altering the Admiralty commission and that he should be made a Knight 
of the Garter. 
42 Sunderland, anxious that Parliament would be 
dissolved to undermine the government's authority, pressed the Queen 
about whether there was to -be a 
dis-solution and he was assured there 
were no thoughts of this as yet. 
43 Sunderland, Maynwaring, and 
Marlborough agreed that as Shrewsbury had been brought into the 
ministry they should try to come to terms with him and that Wharton 
should be sent to speak with Shrewsbury. Sunderland and Godolphin 
requested Wharton to visit Shrewsbury while at the same time 
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Sunderland agreed to meet Somerset where he met profuse 
expressions of loyalty. Though Marlborough was alarmed at the 
discussions with Somerset it would appear they were designed to 
buy time and to yield as little ground as possible. Sunderland 
had few illusions about Shrewsbury's sincerity and he almost 
certainly regarded Somerset in a similar light. 
44 Sunderland was 
also pressing the Duchess of Marlborough to attempt a reconciliation 
with the Queen 
45 
which was 'absolutely necessary to save them [the 
Whigs], Lord Marlborough, Lord Treasurer and the whole from ruin'. 
46 
Sunderland's emphasis upon maintaining the unity of the 
administration against their adversaries was highlighted by a further 
clash between the Queen and Marlborough over army patronage. The 
Duke was not prepared to promote Samuel Masham to the rank of Colonel 
and to make John Hill a Brigadier General. The Queen was determined 
on this point and the feiLd continued throughout May with the Secretary- 
at-War, Robert Walpole, attempting to reach a compromise solution. 
47 
Marlborough directed Walpole to consult with Sunderland and his other 
friends and after meeting with Sunderland, Godolphin, and Craggs, 
Walpole persuaded Anne to send Hill's commission to Marlborough to be 
delivered when the Duke saw fit. 
48 
To prevent any further 
difficulties Marlborough issued the commission immediately while 
Masham's was also approved. Marlborough had been forced to yield 
but Walpole, Sunderland, and Godolphin had prevented a public 
humiliation. 49 This success, however, was only temporary for it 
soon became clear that Sunderland was to be the first victim in the 
change of government. 
On 11 May 1710 Shrewsbury told Godolphin: 
that his friends are expecting and pressing for 
other alterations, and one particularly)relating 
to Sunderland, that must beeinsupportable to 
Marlborough and consequently to Godolphin. And 
therefoTe I [Godolphin] took the liberty to say 
that so plainly to Shrewsbury that upon it hee 
took up a little, and said that for his own part 
he could never press anything that could bee 
disagreeable to Marlborough and that he could 
live much better with Sunderland than with some 
others of his companions. SO 
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By the beginning of June Lord Poulet told Godolphin that the Queen, 
Rivers and Somerset were the leading advocates for removing 
Sunderland thougj Shrewsbury was trying to defer any decision-sl 
Neither Marlborough nor Godolphin were certain as to the game 
Shrewsbury was playing, but Maynwaring thought it was pure 
dissimulation. 52 There can be little doubt, however, that 
Shrewsbury and Poulet by divulging information were acting with 
the approval of Harley and with the specific intent of using the 
threat of Sunderland's dismissal to pressure the Whigs into 
negotiations about the formation of a new ministry. 
53 
In this he 
succeeded brilliantly as Godolphin informed Marlborough: 
Halifax, Somers, Sunderland, and generally the 
rest of the Whigs are so uneasy, that they are 
ready to make their court to Harley, who 
appears as ready to receive it, and is making 
advances and professions almost to everyone 
heethinks our friends. He has been twice with 
Hamilton, he has sent twice to Boyle, and is 
exceedingly desirous to be thought moderate. 
Somers and Sunderland are always employing 
54 Halifax and Newcastle to himor, ýoShrewsbury, 
Whig willingness to negotiate with Harley is to be explained by their 
desire to save Sunderland but above all to prevent a dissolution of 
Parliament which they felt would result in a Tory dominated House of 
Commons and expose them to the wrath of their adversaries. 
SS 
Despite 
being uncertain about Shrewsbury's motives the Duchess of Marlborough 
and the Duumvirs came to the same conclusion as their Whig allies and 
worked for the same end as the Junto. 
S6 
On 2 June Godolphin made his first direct approach to the Queen 
warning her of the implications of removing Sunderland and that it 
could not fail to affect Marlborough. She replied that the Duke was 
too reasonable to allow this to prejudice him and both he and 
Godolphin were aware of the repeated provocations given by Sunderland. 
The Queen agreed that Godolphin should write to Marlborough on this 
subject and the Lord Treasurer urged him to write to Anne asking for 
her support while he was engagedinser\W3-both her and the country. 
On 6 June Godolphin repeated this request and also advised Marlborough 
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to inform Shrewsbury and the Queen that they should not presume too 
much upon his good temper. Godolphin also advised Marlborough to 
ifrite a letter to Shrewsbury which could be shown -LO the Queen. 
Marlborough wrote to Shrewsbury on 19 June N. S. urging him to 
reflect on affairs at home and abroad and to do all he could to 
support Sunderland and to allow Parliament to run its course. The 
next day Marlborough penned his letter to the Queen requesting her 
to postpone Sunderland's dismissal until the end of the campaign. 
This last letter was delivered to Godolphin who was to consult the 
Duchess and they were to decide if it was to be shown to any of the 
Whigs. 57 
The Whigs themselves had also been active. Sunderland had a 
project to enlist the support of the Duke of Hamilton and his brother, 
the Earl of Orkney, but nothing came of it apparently due to the 
unenthusiastic response of the Duchess of Marlborough, 
S8 Robert Walpole 
was very zealous on behalf of Sunderland but his observation that 'the 
saving of Sunderland deserves the utmost industry, which alone can 
preserve the Parliament upon which the Whigs entirely depend' 
S9 
clearly 
shows the dilemma facing the Whigs when their own preservation meant 
renouncing perhaps the most effective means to prevent Sunderland's 
removal. 
60 At the request of Devonshire, Somers had written to 
Townshend about getting representations from the Emperor and the Dutch 
on behalf of Sunderland. Godolphin also suggested a similar 
communication from the States General to Marlborough, The Duchess of 
Marlborough wrote to the Queen on 7 and 13 June pleading with her to 
retain Sunderland while Devonshire requested Newcastle to intercede with 
Anne. There even appears to have been a scheme involving Maynwaring 
by which Godolphin was to assure the Queen that Sunderland, Somers, 
and the rest of the Whigs did not design anything personal against 
Mrs. Masham and that there would be no more disturbances. 
61 
It was all to noýavail. On 12 June the Queen contemptuously 
dismissed the Duchess of Marlborough's letter of 7 June and she 
summoned Somers to inform him of her intention to dismiss Sunderland. 
Next day Anne gave directions to Secretary Boyle about fetching the 
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seals from Sunderland and though he sought to avoid carrying out 
this task the Queen would not listen to any of his arguments. 
Godolphin then had an audience with Anne when he showed her 
Marlborough's letter but it had no effect. Godolphin then turned 
to Shrewsbury who was surprised at Marlborough taking Sunderland's 
dismissal so much to heart and showed no inclination to try to 
persuade the Queen to alter her resolution. The change in 
Shrewsbury's attitude towards Sunderland's replacement probably 
derives from Harley's realisation that it was no longer worth the 
trouble of deferring it. During the evening of 13 June the Queen 
informed Godolphin that she had directed Boyle about collecting the 
seals from Sunderland. Godolphin replied immediately pointing out 
the disadvantages of this alteration. The Queen answered, on 
Wednesday 14 June, that on Tuesday afternoon she had instructed Boyle 
to collect the seals from Sunderland the following morning and that 
Lord Dartmouth had been made Secretary of State in his place, 
62 
Dartmouth's appointment was something of a surprise for he proved to 
be the third choice. Poulet had declined the office and Anglesey 
was too much of a High Tory for Harley's Whig allies and so Dartmouth 
was chosen as a more moderate and acceptable Tory. 
63 
The Queen 
intended to give Sunderland a pension of Z3,000 a year to which he 
answered that if he did 'not have the honour to serve his country he 
would not plunder it'. 
64 
The decision to remove Sunderland caused Marlborough great unease 
and there seems little doubt that he intended to retire. Somers 
was amazed that Marlborough's letter to the Queen of 20 June N. S. 
had so little effect upon her and he, Halifax, Orford, Cowper, 
Newcastle, and Boyle were so perturbed that along with Godolphin they 
felt impelled to write a joint letter to Marlborough requesting him to 
remain at the head of the army. Sunderland also probably requested 
Marlborough not to retire in a letter he forwarded to him via 
Godolphin. 
65 Somers also wrote a separate letter declaring that 
everything depended upon Marlborough being in command of the army at 
the start of the ensuing campaign. It was probably these efforts 
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combined with the Duke's belief in the necessity of preserving the 
existing Parliament which persuaded him not to resign. He, however, 
like the Duchess, was extremely angry at Sunderland's being forced 
out and this explains his observations to his wife: 'would not 
Lady Marlborough have some time ago thought anybody madathat should 
have believed it would ever have been in the power of Harley to have 
turned out Sunderland, and the Whigs to remain tamely quiet7... for my 
own part, I have nothing to advise, for if the Whigs suffers 
Sunderland to be removed, I think in a very short time everything will 
be in confusion'. 
66 Marlborough's remarks are both strange and unfair. 
The Whigs had tried to prevent Sunderland's removal but they could 
not threaten resignation as this would lead to a dissolution 
67 
and 
Marlborough himself repeatedly stressed the importance of preserving 
the present Parliament. 
68 
It had long been apparent that Sunderland's dismissal would have 
important consequences in both domestic politics and foreign affairs. 
James Brydges believed that Sunderland was unlikely to be the only 
change in the ministry and according to Horace Walpole the consternation 
at The Hague was unlikely to have been surpassed in London. The news 
was immediately inserted into the Paris Gazette and investors in the 
construction of Blenheim Palace were very uneasy. Townshend was 
directed to reassure Heinsius that Marlborough's credit was as high 
as ever (though the contrary was blatantly obvious), that there would 
be no further alterations, and that the war would be prosecuted with 
the same vigour. The Pensioner's anxiety was only partially assuaged 
by Townshend's efforts and he still remained concerned about the 
possibility of a dissolution of Parliament. The City and the Bank of 
England were also apprehensive and a deputation from the Bank sought 
an audience with the Queen. The group included the Governor, 
Sir Gilbert Heathcote, the Deputy-Governor, Nathaniel Gould, and 
Sir William Scawen and Francis Eyles. They complained that any 
further changes would have a detrimental effect upon public credit. 
The Queen answered that no further alterations were intended and 
Sir David Hamilton felt that the Queen was sincere when she gave this 
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assurance. Certainly Sunderland was the minister the Queen disliked 
the most and her reluctance to part with Godolphin would seem to 
vindicate Hamilton's assertion. Harley, however, knew that 
Godolphin would have to go and his task was to get Anne to agree. 
Robert Walpole was correct when he commented that Sunderland's 
dismissal was only the beginning. 
69 
Though Shrewsbury had behaved equivocally in the Sunderland affair 
Marlborough still hoped that he might be the best means of preventing 
a dissolution. Shrewsbury had certainly revealed some unease to 
Godolphin about a new Parliament and Marlborough advised both 
Sunderland and Walpole to use Shrewsbury for their own ends. He also 
asked Sunderland to allow the Countess of Sunderland to remain as Lady 
of the Bedchamber to the Queen. 
70 The desire to preserve Parliament 
and the attempt to establish a mixed administration are the respective 
motives of the Whigs and Harley which produced further negotiations 
between them. The stumbling block was the unwillingness of the Whigs 
to sacrifice Godolphin. Harley was determined to get the Lord 
Treasurer dismissed and though he had secured control of patronage 
the problem was getting the Queen to agree to this step. Harley 
gradually convinced Anne that she would have to give way and he 
suggested that Shrewsbury should replace Godolphin. The Duke declined 
this offer., but he urged Harley to put himself at the head of a 
Treasury Commission. On 30 July there was an explosive Cabinet 
meeting when Godolphin used harsh words to both Shrewsbury and the 
Queen. Anne finally agreed to a Treasury Commission with Lord Poulet 
at its head and Harley as Chancellor of the Exchequer. On 8 August 
Godolphin was dismissed, 
71 Sunderland was shocked at this news 
observing to Marlborough that 'this last blow they have given in 
removing Godolphin, has perfectly stunned every body, and no part of it 
is more grievous than the trouble it must give Marlborough but I hope 
in God Marlborough will for the sake of the whole, have yet patience, 
though I believe nobody was ever more try'd'. 
72 
A fortniaht later 0 
Sunderland again wrote to encourage his father-in-law. He observed: 
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I... heartily congratulate the taking of Bethune, 
and hope in God you will have the remaining part 
of the campaign attended with your usual good 
success, though it is a grievous thing to think 
of the usage Marlborough meets with, at the same 
time, that he is doing what he is abroad with 
success, This proceeding is certainly without 
example and you may depend upon it, that the Whigs 
to a man, have a right sense of it, and will show 
it upon all occasions, and in whatever manner 
Marlborough shall think right, and I am sure if 
Marlborough, Godolphin, and the Whigs do act 
cordially and vigorously together, without 
suspicion of one another, which I am sure., there 
is no reason for, it is impossible but everything 
must come right again. 73 
With Godolphin's dismissal Sunderland assumed that 'Harley and 
Shrewsbury, are determined, to make a thorough buiness of it, and that 
the Parliament will be dissolved in a very few days'. 
74 His prediction 
was premature by about six weeks for Harley faced financial complications 
which required his attention. As the political uncertainty grew 
during the Summer of 1710 the Bank of England began to restrict the 
government's credit facilities which meant it would be difficult to 
obtain the money to support the armies abroad. The Bank was very 
concerned about Harley's ability to maintain a stable administration 
but he managed to raise a loan of E350,000 from a group of Tory 
businessmen which would provide for the forces in Flanders, With 
this success the Bank became more co-operative and in mid-September 
they gave Harley a loan of E100,000. Harley's concern with 
financial problems helps to explain why Parliament was not dissolved 
but more important was his continued willingness to negotiate with 
the Whigs. He tried to persuade individual Whig ministers to remain 
in the administration even if Parliament was dissolved but he met 
with no success. On 10 September Godolphin, Cowper, Somers, 
Sunderland, Wharton and Orford agreed that if there was a dissolution 
the remaining Whig office-holders would resign. 
75 Meanwhile, High 
Tory pressure on Harley to dissolve Parliament was mounting and though 
the Chancellor resented this intrusion he knew he would have to give 
way. In September Rochester replaced Godolphin as Lord-Lieutenant of 
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Cornwall and on 21 September Parliament was dissolved and an election 
was called. Devonshire, Somers, Cowper, Boyle, Orford, and Wharton 
either resigned or were dismissed. Hen--, y St. John became Northern 
Secretary, Sir Simon Harcourt Lord Keeper, Rochester - Lord President, 
Buckingham Lord Steward, Ormonde Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and 
Lord Raby, soon to be made Earl ofStrafford, succeeded Townshend as 
Plenipotentiary at The Hague. 
76 
Sunderland had been confident about the outcome of an election from 
early August when he had told Marlborough 'that by all the accounts from 
the countries, there is like to be a good election, so that the 
advisers of this dissolution, and the setters up of the hereditary 
right, as they call it, may possibly pass their times yet worse in a 
77 
new Parliament, than they would have done in this'. Neither the 
Duchess of Marlborough, Godolphin, or Lady Sunderland, however, shared 
his optimism, 
78 
yet it probably explains the vigour with which he 
campaigned. 
79 
He asked Marlborough to allow Scottish army officers 
to come over to help in the election. He advised Newcastle on the 
choice of candidates in Yorkshire and Lancashire and pointed out the 
unsuitability of one of Newcastle's nominees; a judgement confirmed by 
the candidatet subsequent conduct in the House of Commons. There 
were regular meetings at Sunderland's house in London and he tried to 
arrange a meeting of leading Whigs in London in order to prepare for 
the election. Sunderland and Wharton pressed Somerset, now 
disillusioned with Harley and radiating Whig zeal, to back James Stanhope. 
Significantly Somerset supported Stanhope's unsuccessful candidature 
at Westminster but with the help of Wharton Somerset had Stanhope 
returned for Cockermouth in Cumberland. At the end of September 
Sunderland was elected Recorder of Coventry and W4 lliam. Bromley was 
apprehensive that, though two Tories would be elected, the Sheriff, 
who had been advised by Sunderland, would not return them. In the 
event the Tories brought in two members for Coventry. Sunderland's 
efforts at Northampton were also unsuccessful as the two sitting Tory 
M. P. 's were again elected. 
80 
1S3 
The election was a disaster for the Whigs. The Tories 
successfully exploited the passions aroused by the Sacheverell 
trial and the clergy campaigned vigorously and aggressively on 
their behalf. The Dissenters-were, by and large, fully behind the 
Whigs, but they could do little to combat the violent clerical 
storm. Both sides exploited the press to the full and there was 
a record number of electoral contests. Only in Yorkshire, 
Cumberland, and Northumberland did the Whigs hold their own while 
Whig magnates such as Wharton, Newcastle and Somerset had only moderate 
success. The Whigs were routed in Norfolk and severely chastened in 
Cornwall; the Whig vote plummeted in London where four Tories were 
returned; in Norwich the Whig vote fell by over 20% while at Hereford 
the Tories transformed a Whig lead of 39 in 1708 into a Tory majority 
of 105. In Scotland the Whigs were outnumbered approximately two to 
one by the Tories and as Sunderland predicted 
81 
the election of the 
Scottish peers had been disastrous with the return of 16 Tories as a 
result of the Squadrone boycotting the election, The Tory majority 
82 in the new House of Commons was about 151. Sunderland, however, 
was already looking to the future. 
I. t is typical of Sunderland's sanguine character that as the 
authority of the government collapsed in 1710 he was thinking about the 
Hanoverian Succession and what lay ahead in the next reign. In 
August 1710 Harley had dispatched Earl Rivers to Hanover and in 
response Sunderland advised Marlborough to cultivate the friendship 
of the Elector of Hanover. Marlborough, to the great satisfaction of 
his wife, kept Sunderland informed of events at Hanover and reaffirmed 
his determination to consult with Godolphin and Sunderland about what 
passed between him and the Allies. Marlborough sought Whig advice as 
to when he should come over to England and Sunderland arranged a 
meeting with Cowper to discuss this matter and to consider news from 
Hanover which was causing some alarm. The meeting took place on 
26 October where it appears to have been decided to ask that Bothmer 
be sent over to England. Bothmer's intimacy with Halifax and 
1S4 
Sunderland was of great concern to Rivers and it may have been that 
he was trying to prevent his being sent to London. Rivers may also 
have been spreading rumours about the Whigs being Republicans for it 
was also agreed to assure the Elector about Whig support for the 
Hanoverian Succession and that the Whigs did not wish to establish a 
Republic or to render the monarchy elective. 
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Sunderland and the 
Whigs were determined that when the Elector came to the throne it was 
they he would look to for advice and support, 
The wheel had come full circle; Sunderland and the Junto, as at 
the beginning of the reign, were on the outside. The swiftness of the 
collapse between November 1709 and November 1710 was the most frustrating, 
and disappointing aspect of Sunderland's career to date. The man he 
had apparently consigned to the wilderness in February 1708 had, in 
less than two years, destroyed the fruits of almost a decade of 
unceasing toil. Sunderland had quickly identified the danger and 
had continually urged that the only way open to the Junto and the 
Duumvirs was to cement their union, set aside personal ambition and 
animosity, and to attempt to ride out the storm. He had done much 
towards this end. His loyalty to Marlborough and Godolphin was 
remarkable, he accepted his dismissal as Secretary of State without 
rancour or resentment, and his industry and vigour during the election 
seems unlikely to have been surpassed. All his efforts, however, could 
not prevent the fall of the government and the return of a Tory 
dominated House of Commons. Unlike the beginning of the reign, 
however, so long as Anne ruled and Harley was at the head of the 
administration it was inconceivable that the Junto would ever be able 
to recover their former authority. Consequently, Sunderland was now 
looking to a time when a new ruler would provide him with a new 
opportunity. 
iss 
CHAPTER SIX: THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION 1710 TO 1714 
'The best counseZ that couLd be foZZowedl 
The events of 1710 had been disastrous for the Whigs. They had 
been turned out of office and seen the Tories recover control of the 
House of Commons in the general election. The parallels with the 
predicament facing the Junto in 1702 are obvious and striking. They 
were again thrown back upon their slender majority in the House of 
Lords and once more, to begin with the main concern of the Junto was 
to weather the Tory storm which threatened to engulf them. Yet 
the vigorous aggression of their opponents throughout 1711 did have 
a dual aspect. It undoubtedly spelt danger for the Junto, but it 
also highlighted the most effective policy available to them and 
the best way to success. Tory extremism in 1710, as in 1702, 
revealed deep differences between the back-bench zealots in the House 
of Commons and the Prime Minister, Robert Harley, and it was soon 
clear that on the two most important questions of the next few years, 
the Peace and the Protestant Succession, there were major differenc-es 
of opinion in the administration. The Junto, once more, were ready 
to exploit these fissures in order to attack and embarrass the 
government with that single-minded ruthlessness which had always 
characterised their conduct. The success they achieved, particularly 
after losing control of the House of Lords early in 1712, is a 
testimony to their organization and unity. Sunderland, with his 
fanatical devotion to the Protestant Succession in the House of Hanover, 
was responsible for directing the Junto. He toiled ceaselessly, 
devised and co-ordinated strategy, and was ready to pursue any policy 
he felt would yield dividends. Despite a deep seated antipathy 
towards him he was ready to negotiate with both Harley and Nottingham 
both of whom he had driven from office earlier in the reign. 
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I 
Sunderland was willing to join with the Scottish nobility at 
Westminster in an attempt to dissolve the union which he and his Whig 
associates had played such a prominent part in eszablishing. The 
energy and enthusiasm with which he identified himself with the new 
dynasty was so marked that it even caused some alarm at Hanover, 
though it is clear his assistance was essential to the Hanoverian 
cause in Britain. His contributions as a debater in the Lords were 
more regular and significant than ever before. No other Junto Lord 
could match Sunderland in the range of his activities and doubtless 
he was aided by being significantly younger than Halifax, Wharton, 
Orford and Somers. With his vitality, ruthlessness, vigour, 
determination, stamina, optimism, and perseverance in the face of 
daunting adversity he undoubtedly encapsulates the spirit of the Junto 
at this time. It is apparent that for most of the time from 1710 to 
1714 Sunderland was the most prominent member of the Junto, but it 
would perhaps be going too far to describe him as the leader of this 
famous 'Whig gang'. 
Despite having successfully re-organized the Queen's administration 
and obtaining a resounding electoral victory Robert Harley still 
faced considerable problems. The Tory majority in the House of 
Commons was large and potentially troublesome. Many backbenchers 
were eager to vilify the former ministry and to carry out a thorough 
purge of remaining Whig office-holders. They had little time for 
Harley's more moderate ideas. Neither the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
nor the Queen had much enthusiasm for such partisan policies, 
especially at a time when it was imperative to restore public credit. 
The commercial interests had been anxious at the extent of Tory 
extremism in the Commons and were apprehensive of the new ministry's 
ability to control Parliament. Harley did manage to calm the fears 
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of the financial community and confidence began to revive once 
there was closer co-operation between the administration and the 
Bank of England. From the beginning of 1711 the credit situation 
was gradually improving, largely due to the sense and skill of Harley. 
1 
It was difficult, however, to stifle Tory excess completely and the 
desire to censure the previous ministry was to find an outlet in the 
House of'Lords. 
As far as many Tories were concerned, after Marlborough, 
Sunderland was perhaps their chief target. At the beginning of 
1711 a conference had been held at Rochester's house attended by the 
leading ministers and Nottingham who was at odds with the new 
administration. Nottingham argued that the former Whig ministry 
should be prosecuted and when bartmouth inquired who this should 
Nottingham, no doubt remembering the way Sunderland had driven him 
from office., replied, 'Lord Sunderland for one, and he was sure I 
[Dartmouth] could find matter enough in his office'. 
2 Such sentiments 
were likely to be echoed by many Tories. The two issues on which 
they chose to attack the Whigs emphasise that Sunderland was a much 
sought after victim. As Secretary of State Sunderland had been 
responsible both for military policy in Spain and Palatine 
immigration into Britain and it is plain that in January and-February 
1711 the Tories were after Sunderland's blood. 
On 2 January 1711 the Queen informed the House of Lords of the 
allied defeat at Brihuega in Spain in December 1710. After returning 
thanks for this message the Lords resolved to go into a committee to 
inquire into the war in Spain and Anne was requested to delay the 
departure of the Earl of Peterborough as Ambassador-Extraordinary to 
Vienna to allow him to assist the investigation. Three days later 
the House went into a committee. The Earl of Galway and Lord 
Tyrawly were examined on 6 January and the Queen was asked to transmit 
to the Lords papers concerning the Spanish war including correspondence 
between Stanhope and Sunderland. Lord Dartmouth delivered in some 
papers on 8 January amongst which was Sunderland's letter to Stanhope 
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of 14 February 1707. This letter was read the next day together with 
an extract of Sunderland's letter to Galway dated 18 April 1707. 
The Tory Lords wanted to investigate whether Stanhope had used the 
Queen's name when advising Charles III to take the offensive in 
January 1707. Sunderland, Wharton, Somers, Cowper, Marlborough and 
Godolphin argued that this matter should be deferred until Stanhope could 
be heard in person. The Whigs lost a motion to adjourn by 59 votes 
to 45 and Lord Ferrers then moved that the Earl of Peterborough had 
given a very faithful, just, and honourable account of the Councils 
in Valencia. This was agreed to and reported to the House. Two 
days later Galway was refused permission to deliver a written answer 
to the charges against him and he, Tyrawly, and Stanhope were held 
responsible for the setbacks in Spain and the defeat at Toulon because 
they had advised taking the offensive at a Council of War in Valencia 
in January 1707. Sunderland was one of the thirty-six peers who 
protested at both these decisions. 
3 
Further copies of Sunderland's correspondence with the Commanders 
in Spain were delivered to the House the same day and were read on 
12 January. On the basis of these letters Scarsdale moved: 
that it appears, by the Earl of Sunderland's 
letters, that the carrying on the war offensively 
in Spain, was approved and directed by the 
ministers, notwithstanding the design of 
attempting Toulon, which the ministers knew at 
that time was concerted with the Duke of Savoy, 
and therefore are justly to be blamed for 
contributing to all our misfortunes in Spain, 
and to the disa&pointment of the expedition 
against ToulVIL. 
In the debate which followed the Duke of Beaufort said 'he wondered any 
Lord in the ministry should approve and direýct an offensive war in 
Spain at that juncture, and in particular he named the Earl of 
Sunderland'. 
5 Cowper declared that the question was irregular and 
did not specify who was being censured. A long and rambling debate 
ensued during the course of which Sunderland owned, 
159 
that he gave his opinion for an offensive war 
because, to the best of his understanding, it 
was the best counsel that could be followed. 
That it was the general opinion and desire 
of the nation that the Earl of Galway should 
march again to Madrid; that all the ministry 
then were unanimous in their opinions for an 
offensive war; and that many inconveniences 
might have attended dividing the army, 6 
The efforts of Sunderland and his colleagues were to no avail for the 
motion was agreed to by 68 votes to 48. Sunderland and the Whigs 
protested at this decision while a further resolution was passed 
commending Peterborough's services in Spain. On 24 January 1711 
Galway was censured for allowing the Portugese troops to have the CP 
post of honour in the line of battle. 
7 
The remainder of the Lords' investigation was largely concerned 
with the discrepancy between the number Of trOOPS Parliament had voted 
for the war in Spain and the number who were actually present at the 
battle of Almanza. The Tory Lords carried all before them and were 
even able to expunge part of the Whig protest against the condemnation 
which had been passed on the failure to ensure that all the troops 
designed for operations in Spain were actually on the Iberian 
peninsula , Lord Abingdon reported the resolutions of the committee 
of inquiry on 8 February 1711 and they were delivered to the Queen in 
an address. 
8 It concluded by observing that: 
having laid before your Majesty this faithful 
representation of the mismanagements of those 
persons entrusted with your most important 
affairs, and to- whose counsels the fatal 
miscarriages of the war in Spain are in great 
measure to be imputed; we have an entire 
confidence, that your Majesty will give such 
orders, and take such measures with regard to 
our present circumstances, as may retrieve the 
bad effects of that unhappy management, to the 
advantage of the common cause, and to the 
obtaining a safe and honourable peace. 9 
10 
Sunderland and the Whigs made a final protest against the report. 
Sunderland was also under attack for the part he had played in 
encouraging the Palatine refugees to come into the country in 1709. 
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At Tory instigation the parishioners of St. Olave in Southwark, 
together with the inhabitants of other parishes, delivered a petition 
to the House of Commons complaining about the Palatines who had been 
brought into their parish. The petition was referred to an almost 
exclusively Tory committee and at the same time leave was given to 
bring in a bill to repeal the General Naturalization Act of 1709. 
Though the bill was to be rejected the Commons pressed on with the 
Palatine case. The report was received on 11 April 1711 and 
Sunderland was named as having urged the Commissioners of Trade to 
consider the best place to settle the Palatines; as having requested 
the Mayor of Canterbury to accept Pa-latines into that city and as 
being responsible for the loss of Z1,487 18s. 111d. in an unsuccessful 
attempt to establish a Palatine. community on the Scilly Islands. 
The House agreed to the report and it resolved that the petitioners 
had upheld their complaint; that the bringing over the Palatines was 
extravagant, unreasonable and of dangerous consequence to the Church 
and State; %kjiAl that whoSoe1re-r - advised the bringing over the poor 
Palatines into this kingdom was an enemy to the Queen and this 
kingdom'. 11 Some M. P. 's wanted to go further in condemning Sunderland 
but more moderate views prevailed and after several adjournments the 
matter was allowed to drop. 
12 
The offensive against the Whigs was not limited to the House of 
Lords. Jonathan Swift assailed them in the press and in January 1711 
Robert Walpole was finally dismissed as Treasurer of the Navy. 
In February the October Club was formed amongst back-bench Tory M. P. 's. 
One of the chief aims of the club was to strike at the Whigs and to 
expose Whig corruption. The intensity of the Tory challenge probably 
explains the readiness of the Whigs to use any means which came to 
hand to ease the pressure upon them. A Place bill had recently 
passed the Commons where it had met little resistance from the Court, 
probably because it had been decided to reject it in the upper House. 
Sunder land, aw4re ý6iKL had been at the beginning of the reign, of 
the uneasy association between the Court and the more extreme Tories 
hoped to use this issue to increase the tension which existed and to 
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4 
court popularity in the House of Commons. The bill was read for 
the first time on 2 February 1711 and in the debate Sunderland 
commented 'the Commons have of late years sent up this bill for 
form-sake., and only to throw the odium of it being lost upon the 
House of Peers; and therefore your lordships ought to at least 
give it a second reading, to let the Commons know that if they 
should send it up once more, the Lords will take them at their word 
and pass it'. 
13 Some Whig peers forced a division but it was agreed 
to throw out the bill. 
14 
The zeal of the more extreme elements within the Tory party was 
also a matter of concern for Harley and by the Spring of 1711 the 
situation in the Commons was such that the success of the ministry's 
financial policy was threatened. The hostility of the October Club 
to what they regarded as the pusillanimity of the administration was 
only surpassed by their detestation of the Whigs, and during February 
and March 1711 they kept up the pressure for a fully partisan policy. 
Harley initiated counter-measures by infiltrating the club with his 
own supporters, but it was the attempted assassination of Harley by 
Antoine de Guiscard, on 8 March which paradoxically eased Harley's 
difficulties. His popularity within the Tory party revived, but his 
rivalry with Henry St. John intensified. The Whigs hoped to exploit 
Harley's problems with his Tory supporters and perhaps set up a 
coalition government. In early-May Sunderland, Somers, and Halifax 
approached Harley and upon the death of the Earl of Rochester, on 
2 May 1711, the Queen secretly consulted Somers and Cowper who advised 
her to make Harley Lord Treasurer. Arthur Maynwaring was probably 
justified in concluding that Harley had fooled the Whigs for on 
23 May Harley was made Earl of Oxford and Mortimer and six days later 
he became Lord Treasurer. The establishment of the South Sea Company 
as a financial rival to the Whig Bank of England increased Oxford's 
popularity with the Tories and-it was clear he could ignore any Whig, 
proposals. 
is On 12 June 1711 Parliament was prorogued and Oxford's 
power was fully revealed in the ministerial changes which followed. 
Among his allies Robert Benson became Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Buckingham was made Lord President, and Poulet Lord Steward. 
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At the end of the 1710-1711 session Oxford was clearly dominating 
Parliament. The Tories in the Commons had rallied to him while the 
debates in the Lords over Spain and rhe Palatines showed that-the 
Whigs had lost control of the House. It is also apparent, however, 
that the Junto, having survived the worst of the Tory onslaught were 
ready to take the offensive themselves to try to recover some of the 
ground they had lost. The first sign of the Whigs bestirring 
themselves came in the passage of the Linen bill through the Lords 
during May and June 1711 when the Junto backed an ostensibly 
bipartisan measure to impose a duty upon exported British linen, 
The bill would be prejudicial to the Scottish linen industry and 
exacerbate the growing Scottish discontent with the union. This 
would hopefully sow discord between Oxford and the Scottish peers 
whose support was essential if the Lord Treasurer were to retain 
control of the House of Lords and allow the Whigs to assert their 
authority again. Throughout Sunderland's behaviour was deliberately 
provocative and this is the start of the policy which was to bear 
fruit at the end of the year when an attempt was made to allow the 
Duke of Hamilton to sit in the House because he possessed a British 
peerage created after the Union. 
Prior to the union linen production had been the most successful 
branch of Scottish manufacturing industry and the sale of exports to 
England had been so great that exclusion had been threatened under 
14 the terms of the A Aens Act of 1705. Anything detrimental to the 
linen industry was likely to cause substantial unrest in Scotland. 
The bill was introduced into the Commons in April 1711 and after 
being amended by a select committee it was sent up to the Lords on 
23 May. It was read for the first time the following day and ordered 
to be considered in a committee of the whole House on 1 June. The 
debate in the committee centred on the clause in the bill which stopped 
the export of unmanufactured linen yarn from Scotland to Ireland. it 
was felt, however, that this would be very prejudicial to Irish 
linen manufacture and there was pressure for an amendment. Somers 
spoke on behalf of Irish interests along with Guernsey, Abingdon, and 
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Anglesey. Hamilton, Atholl, Shrewsbury, Buckingham, Balmerino, 
Godolphin, and Islay opposed any alteration. It was noted that 
neither Oxford nor Halifax spoke in the debate and the most 
remarkable contribution came from Sunderland. In reply to Hamilton's 
request that, despite whatever promises had been made to the Irish, 
care should be taken of the Scottish linen manufacture,, Sunderland 
said that he prefer-red 'the interest of Ireland to any one county in 
England'. 16 Balmerino felt that Sunderland's 'free dealing' turned 
the debate and it was carried by 34 votes to 21 that unmanufactured 
linen should be allowed to be exported to Ireland. Lord Delawary 
reported the bill and its amendments from the committee and after 
having been read twice it was sent down to the Commons for their 
approval. The most significant aspect of the bill was the export 
duty which exposed Scottish manufacturers to severe competition from 
German and Austrian cloth in colonial markets. The duty was to be 
lifted in 1717 and though it did not ruin the linen industry 
Scottish discontent at the union increased as a consequence. 
17 The 
Junto were determined to keep hold of the initiative. 
The question of peace with France gave the Whigs a more immediate 
and successful means of challenging Oxford's ascendancy and it was an 
opportunity they eagerly seized. The issue was of great concern to 
the Whigs for they were the party which was identified with a 
determined and aggressive commitment to the continental struggle 
against Louis XIV. The Junto eagerly. embraced any strategy which 
could change or at least modify the basis upon which peace was being 
negotiated. Offers were made to both oxford and Nottingham, promising 
Whig support in return for adjusting the peace preliminaries. 
Sunderland was prominent in these approaches and was prepared to go 
to any length to implement Junto policy. It was he who conducted 
the negotiations with Oxford yet his hostility to Oxford was manifest 
in the warning he gave to him in the House of Lords that, ý. the 
ministry's peace policy might ultimately prove to be the Lord 
Treasurer's undoing. 
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It was generally accepted that when the new administration took 
office in 1710 that it would try to agree peace terms with France. 
To begin with Oxford's government had been unable to carry out a I. 
radical peace policy, but preliminary discussions did take place 
involving the Earl of Jersey and the Abbe Francois Gaultier, the j 
Marquis de Torcy's London agent. These preliminary talks took place 
on the basis of proposals outlined by Jersey: Britain and France 
were to reach a secret understanding irrespective of Britain's allies, 
except the Duke of Savoy whose interests would receive special 
attention; Philip V was to retain Spain and the West Indies while in 
return Britain would secure great commercial advantages in Europe 
and America; a new Barrier Treaty, more acceptable to Britain, was 
to be settled with the Dutch; (AAlthe agreement with France was to be 
the preliminary to a Jacobite restoration at the Queen's death. This 
last point was not, however, agreed ministerial policy. To cover 
this betrayal of the allies there were to be two-tier negotiations. 
The official negotiations would take place in the Dutch Republic, 
while there were to be secret talks in London and Paris. Britain 
would appear to support all the allied demands though a secret 
agreement arranged beforehand with France would only be disclosed to 
the allies in stages. These terms were first revealed to the Queen 
and the Cabinet in April 1711 and in July Matthew Prior was sent to 
France to assist the conversations with the French. The following 
month.. Prior returned to London with Gaultier and Nicholas Mesnager. 
Mesnager spent two months negotiating with Oxford and Henry St. John, 
though it was Oxford who dominated the administration's search for 
peace, and in late-September the preliminary articles, containing the 
secret agreement between Britain and France as well as the terms to 
be shown to the allies, were signed. 
18 
The Whigs were very concerned at the progress Oxford was making. 
Sunderland writing to Marlborough, congratulating him upon his 
outmanoeuvring the Duke of Villars and forcing his way through the 
'Ne Plus Ultra' defence fortifications, remarked: 
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I heartily congratulate with you upon it, for 
whatever malice and faction will allow some 
people to think of it here, I am sure whenever 
they don't prevail it must be looked upon as 
one of the greatest actions has happened this 
war and what I hope will go a great way towards 
securing us from an ill peace which some, I 
fear., are very impatient for. 19 
Their anxiety over the peace proposals was so great that the Whigs 
were ready to approach Oxford with an offer to assist the passage of 
a bill against the practice of Occasional Conformity, a measure the), 
had defeated three times between 1702 and 1704, which was being 
pressed by the High Tories, and in return they wanted Oxford to 
re-organize the ministry and revise the peace preliminaries, 
Sunderland was responsible for presenting this suggestion to Oxford. 
On 9 November 1711 the Queen wrote to her Lord Treasurer, 'I cannot 
imagine what Lord Sunderland proposes to himself in making you a visit, 
but I am very easy about it., not doubting you will manage him as is 
best for my service'. 
20 
The offer proved to be unacceptable and the 
Whigs now turned to their old adversary the Earl of Nottingham. 
Nottingham resented his exclusion from office by Oxford, but was also 
genuinely apprehensive at the conduct of the negotiations with France 
and was determined to oppose the peace when Parliament met. In 
return for his support on this issue the Whigs agreed to back a bill 
against the practice of Occasional Conformity, 
21 
Oxford deferred the meeting of Parliament until 7 December 1711 
because of his unease at the reception the announcement concerning the 
Peace would meet. In her speech the Queen divulged that 'both 
place and time are appointed for opening the Treaty of a General Peace'. 
As usual an address of thanks for the Queen's speech was moved, which 
occasioned a debate in which Nottingham proposed an addition 'that 
no peace could be safe or honourable to Great Britain, or Europe, 
if Spain and the West Indies were alloted to any branch of the House 
of Bourbon'. Guernsey argued that such an addition should be debated 
at some other time and he was supported by Lord North and Grey and 
Oxford himself. Buckingham overruled this objection and Wharton 
supported Nottingham, Sunderland observed, 
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my Lords... is it possible, that any member 
of this illustrious House should be unprepared 
to debate an affair, -which, for these ten years 
past, has been the principal subject matter of 
our consultations? Do we not sit in t -he same 
House and are we not the peers who have 
constantly been of opinion, that-no safe and 
honourable peace can be made unless Spain 
and the West Indies be removed from the 
House of Bourbon? It is true I see some 
new faces among us, but even that Lord who 
sits on the Woolpack.., may well remember 
that, in the late reign four Lords were 22 impeached for having made a partition treaty. 
Marlborough, Cowper, Halifax, and the Bishop of Salisbury all spoke 
in favour of Nottingham's. amendment to the address which was carried 
by 62 votes to 54. Sunderland was a member of the committee to draw 
up the address. Nottingham reported the address from the committee 
the following day when the ministry tried to have his amendment 
removed. Upon the division Sunderland and Abingdon were appointed 
tellers. The latter was reluctant to count, whereupon Sunderland 
said, 'if he [Abingdon] did not do his duty he would his and tell 
without him'. 
23 
Both men proceeded to their work and the attempt 
to alter the address was defeated. In her reply the Queen declared, 
'I should be sorry anyone would think I would not do my utmost to 
recover Spain and the West Indies from the House of Bourbon'. This 
wa-s an obvious slap in the face for Nottingham and the Whigs. 
Robert Walpole had proposed a similar amendment in the Commons, where, 
though the division went in favour of the government, eleven Tories 
did support Walpole's motion. This not only served to reveal the 
divisions in the Tory party, but also probably marks the emergence 
of the Hanoverian or 'Whimsical' Tories in the lower House. A week 
later Nottingham introduced a bill against Occasional Conformity and, 
with Whig acquiescence, it quickly passed both Houses. 
24 
The absence of several Scottish peers from the Lords had 
contributed to the ministerial defeat on the address to the Queen. 
The Junto's policy of driving a wedge between Oxford and his Scottish 
supporters was proving successful and it was the unwillingness of the 
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upper House, and the Junto in particular, to allow the Duke of 
Hamilton to take his seat in the Lords as Duke of Brandon., a British 
peerage conferred after the Union, which paved the way for the victory 
of 7 December 1711. Oxford, aware of the importance of the Scottish 
votes to the ministry in the House of Lords, was prepared to allow 
a full-scale debate on the matter. on 20 December. The Junto, jubilcLnt 
at their recent success)were determined to use this issue to 
recover their supremacy in the Lords. 
Counsel was heard on both sides and the debate centred on the 
interpretation of the twenty-second article of the Treaty of Union, 
which established Scottish representation at Westminster, and the 
precedent of the Duke of Queensberry's elevation to a British peerage 
as Duke of Dover. The Whigs tried to avoid the issue of Queensberry, 
with Sunderland arguing that it was 'a case never decided only connived 
at for a time'. 
25 oxford spoke on behalf of Hamilton and requested 
that the opinion of the judges should be sought. This was opposed 
by Wharton and Sunderland as 'a matter of their privileges [and] 
had nothing to do with that'. 
26 Oxford's motion-was rejected by 
fourteen votes. On the question of the twenty-second article of 
the union the W. higs had a stronger case. Halifax argued it imposed 
a limitation upon the number of Scottish peers allowed to sit in the 
Lords. The final division, on the resolution 'that no patent of 
honour granted to any peer of Great Britain who was a peer of Scotland 
at the time of the Union can entitle such peer to sit and vote in 
Parliament or to sit upon the trial of peers', was carried in favour 
of the Whigs by 57 votes to 52; Sunderland voted with his colleagues 
in the majority. 
27 
Scottish resentment at the ministry's failure 
deepened. Oxford, in an attempt to solve this problem, persuaded 
the Lords to reconsider the Hamilton question in January 1712, but 
the attempt to alter the decision of the House was unsuccessful, 
was only at the end of February 1712 that oxford could once again 




The setbacks in the Lords in December 1711 threatened Oxford's 
control of the upper chamber and especially the ability of the 
ministry to carry the peace successfully through Parliament. 
Furthermore,. the Queen's confidence in Oxford was shaken. Oxford 
responded by inducing Anne to create twelve new Tory Peers who would 
restore the government Is majority. The new Lords included three 
suspected Jacobites, Bruce, Bathurst and Lansdowne; two relatives 
or Oxford, Hay and Foley, together with two of his allies, Mansell 
and Trevor; the remaining creations were Compton, Mountjoy, Paget 
and Middleton. These promotions were announced in the London Gazette 
on 31 December 1711, along with the news that Marlborough had been 
dismissed as Captain-General. The Duke was under pressure from an 
inquiry by the Commissioners of Public Accounts into charges of 
corruption against him. The forthcoming report of the commissioners 
and Marlborough's opposition to the ministry on 7 December 1711 were 
sufficient to allow Oxford to get the Queen and the Cabinet to 
approve Marlborough's removal Vromthe head of the army. 
The new peers had an immediate effect in the House of Lords, On 
22 December 1711 the Whigs and Nottingham secured the appointment of a 
29 
committee, including Sunderland, to address the Queen that her 
plenipotentiaries at the imminent peace congress in the Dutch Republic 
should have particular instructions to work with the allies to preserve 
their union and to obtain a just and lasting settlement for all. The 
same day Parliament was adjourned for the Christmas period. The Commons 
agreed not to meet again until 14 January 1712, but the Whigs, anxious 
to retain the initiative, decided that the Lords should sit again on 
New Years day. The new peers entered the House on 4 January 1712 and on 
the same day the Queen's answer to the address of 22 December 1711 
was delivered. Anne acidly informed the Lords that, 'the assurances 
I gave at the opening of this session were sufficient to convince 
everyone that I would not send my plenipotentiaries without giving 
them the instructions desired by this address'. She then requested 
the House to adjourn until 14 January. Somers objected that this 
was unprecedented and that a committee should be appointed to search 
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their records. He was supported bY Nottingham, but Scarsdale 
and Ferrers recommended complying with the Queen Is request: 
Then Lord Sunderland rose up in a passion 
and said he was amazed Lords should so call 
out for the question and not give themselves 
time to look into their books. Nobody 
likewise had more respect for the Queen 
than he, but anything that was done irregular 
could never be imputed to the Crown, but to 
the ministry, and Itwas of dangerous 
consequence to let such advice pass without 
any examination for who know what designs a 
ministry had to carry on, If this was 
suffered to pass into a precedent in one 
House and not in t1other Itwas but for them 
to advise to have a command to have that 
House adjourned for a week, a month or 
30 for the time that would serve their turn. 
Sunderland also aroused Poulet's wrath by ridiculing his proposal to 
see whether the House had prejudiced its privileges when they returned 
after obeying the Queen's command. Sunderland was backed by 
Godolphin and answered by Oxford. The new peers, however, carried 
the day and it was agreed to adjourn until 14 January. 
31 
The Junto had finally lost control of the House of Lords, but 
they were still determined to oppose Oxford's peace plans and were 
intent upon displaying their loyalty to the Grand Alliance in public, 
Both the Elector of Hanover and the Emperor were very apprehensive 
that Britain might make a separate peace with France. This worry, 
combined with the failure of a Hanoverian protest because the 
Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh had accepted a Jacobite medal in 
June 1711, led to a decline in relations between the Elector of 
Hanover and the British government. In November 1711 the Elector 
sent his most experienced diplomat, Hans Casper, Baron von Bothmer, 
to London with instructions to work against the peace settlement and 
to exhibit openly the differences between Hanover and London. 
Bothmer delivered the Elector's formal protest against the peace 
preliminaries to Henry St. John on 28 November and a week later this 
paper was published in the Whig Daily Courant. This revelation and 
this Hanoverian intervention in British domestic politics caused a 
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sensation and placed the Elector of Hanover firmly on the side of the 
Whigs. The Emperor likewise was anxious at recent developments in 
Britain's conduct particularly when in November 1711 his representative, 
Count Gallas, had been forbidden the Court and his recall was desired 
because he was openly consorting with the Whigs and protesting too 
vehemently against the peace. In response the Emperor sent Prince 
Eugene to atone for this incident and to prevent any peace that did 
not include Spain. Eugene was to go so far as to offer 30,000 
Austrian and Imperial troops for use in the peninsula during 1712.32 
On 1 January 1712 there was a dinner at Lord Hervey's house in 
St. James's Square where Bothmer was able to meet and discuss 
politics with Sunderland, Somers, Halifax, Wharton, Marlborough, 
Godolphin, Cowper, Devonshire, Portland, and Scarborough. Three weeks 
later Prince Eugene dined at Sunderland's house and on 25 January 
there was a splendid dinner and ball at the Earl of Portland's house 
where Sunderland, Marlborough, Devonshire, Bolton, Hervey, Townshend, 
Godolphin and Dorchester met the Imperial resident, Hoffman. Great 
hopes had surrounded Eugene's visit, but he soon learned that the 
ministry would not drop the preliminary articles and indeed was 
determined to wreck the whole Grand Alliance. The objections from 
Hanover and Vienna made little impression in London, while Bothmer's 
association with Marlborough and the Whigs merely served to irritate 
the government. Eugene left for The Hague in March 1712 and 'neither 
he nor Bothmer believed that the Oxford ministry had any intention of 
renewing the Grand Alliance and both men were convinced that an 
Anglo-French alliance was the preliminary step to restoring the Prince 
of Wales'. 
33 
Eugene was unimpressed by the opposition to Oxford, 
believing that differences between Marlborough, Godolphin, and 
Sunderland on the one hand and Somers, Cowper, and Halifax on the 
other rendered any anti-ministerial policy ineffectual. Eugene's 
analysis is very questionable, for the opposition had effectively 
challenged the ministry in December 1711 and serious doubt is cast 
by Eugene's observation that the ministry could easily be overthrown. 
This was at the time when Oxford had just proved himself to be, in 
171 
Wharton's words, 'the strongest man in England' for 'he had 
challenged the Junto Lord's, the toughest and most sophisticated 
party men of the period, in their strongest of strongholds, the 
Upper Chamber, and he had beaten them to their knees'. 
34 It was the 
strength of Oxford's position rather than divisions within the 
opposition that made any of their policies seem ineffective, 
35 
The events of 1712 demonstrated the inadequacy of Eugene's 
assessment of the strength of Oxford's ministry. In January 
Robert Walpole was expelled from the Commons and sent to the Tower 
on charges of corruption and in the same month the Duke of Somerset 
was dismissed as Master of the Horse. In February the Barrier 
Treaty of 1709 was condemned and those who had negotiated and signed 
it were declared enemies to the Queen. At the same time the Whigs 
achieved their only success in the Lords during this session. The 
Utrecht peace negotiations had opened on 18 January 1712 and the terms 
presented by the French caused an-outcry. In the Lords Sunderland, 
Halifax, Cowper, Orford and Godolphin were named on a committee to 
address the Queen concerning the French proposals, The address 
condemned the French suggestion that the Queen's title should be 
acknowledged only when the peace was signed. Anne was assured 
'that this House will stand by and assist your Majesty with our lives 
and fortunes. in carrying on this war in conjunction with your allies, 
till a safe and honourable peace can be obtained for your Majesty 
and your allies'. The Queen gave her thanks for the address. 
36 
Oxford's authority in Parliament clearly shows in his resolve 
and ability to push through the peace policy. He was insistent that 
Britain would not engage in the 1712 campaign in Flanders and it 
was Oxford who was primarily responsible for the infamous 'restraining 
orders'. In May 1712 St. John directed the Duke of Ormonde, the 
new British commander, not to engage in any offensive action, a policy 
which enabled the French to defeat the allies without British 
involvement. Britain's desertion of the allies was made even 
clearer at Utrecht when John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, informed 
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the allied delegates that the Queen now felt at liberty to conclude 
a separate peace. Both the allies and the Whigs were outraged at CO 
this betrayal of the allies and the latter attacked the ministry over 
the 'restraining orders', but suffered heavy defeats in both Houses 
of Parliament. On 6 June 1712 the secret preliminary articles were 
revealed to Parliament and debated the following day. The Whigs 
particularly disliked the proposal, made necessary by recent deaths 
in the French royal family which brought Philip V close to the 
succession to the French throne, that Philip should renounce his claim 
to France and only rule in Spain. Twenty-four Whig peers protested 
against this suggestion, but the House decided by 90 votes to 54 
to expunge the protest from the Journal of the House. Parliament 
was adjourned on 21 June 1712 and Oxford was so powerful and the 
Whigs were so desperate that they were encouraging the allies to 
invade England. Neither the Elector of Hanover nor the Dutch would 0 
countenance such a proposal with the Oxford ministry so obviously in 
a dominating political position. 
37 
The apparent futility of the Whig opposition may help to explain 
Sunderland's absence from, the House of Lords from the end of March 1712 
to the adjournment of Parliament in June. 
38 There is no direct 
evidence to account for Sunderland's failure to attend the House, but 
interestingly enough a year previously it had been observed: 'I hope 
Lord Sunderland is not so much out of order as some of my letters make 
him. If so he has layed the politics too much to heart'. 
39 It is 
also clear that Sunderland was untypically pessimistic about the 
opposition's prospects in 1712. He told Nottingham: 
As to the present posture of our affairs 
they seem to be such that, the quieter we 
are at present the better, For these 
people have by corruption, and one way or 
other, got such a majority in both Houses 
that, till the nation open their eyes which 
will never be till the peace is actually 
made and proclaimed, and -,... hen they will 
soon see the villainy and ruin of it though 
they are at present intoxicated with the L 
expectation of it. Till that is it seems 
17 3 
to be running our heads against a wall to 
stir any thing. What those that wish 
well to their country have to do is to be 
upoll the watch for any favourable accident 
that may happen, either by the death of the 
King of France, the Pretender etc., or by 
some division among what is called the 
Tory party, which may separate them from 
the ministry. 40 
By November, however, Sunderland was becoming more positive and 
hopeful as he again informed Nottingham: 
if we are informed right from all parts in 
the country, there begins to be a great 
alteration in the minds of the people and 
their eyes begin to open... The Parliament 
is now put off to the 13th of January, and by 
what we hear is not likely to sit as soon even 
as that. However, it were very much to be 
wished that our friends would come to town 
generally sooner than they seem inclined to 
do, and in particular your Lordship would do 
SO. For as the ministry keep off the 
Parliament so long in order to prepare things 
the better, that whatever they have a mind 
to impose will be swallowed, so those that 
wish well to their country should take the like 
pains before that time to open people's eyes, 
and to show them the snares that are laid 
for them. 41 
If Sunderland had been ill, the most likely explanation for such a 
long absence from Parliament, it may be that the ostensible futility 
of the political situation in 1712 triggered off or at least 
contributed to his illness. Sunderland's sanguine temperament was, 
however, bound to re-assert itself, Even if he had been present in 
the Lords at this time the ministry's dominance was such that he 
would not have been able to do much to improve the fortunes of the Junto. 
Sunderland's disenchantment was also shared by Marlborough, who 
was so dissatisfied with the present state of affairs that he 
decided that it would be best for him to go into exile. In normal 
circumstances Sunderland would not have approved such a step, but it 
was Probably his sense of frustration combined with the hope that 
Marlborough would be able to topple the ministry by invading England 
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which induced him to endorse his father-in-law's decision. In 
January 1712 the Duke had been censured by the Commons upon 
receiving the report of the Commissioners of Public Accounts. 
The House had voted that 'the taking of several sums of money 
annually by the Duke of Marlborough from the contractor for 
foraging the bread and food wagons in the Low Countries was 
unwarrantable and illegal'. Marlborough was not impeached, but 
he was still apprehensive that further charges would be brought 
against him if he remained a potential rallying point for the 
opposition within Britain. He made his decision to go abroad 
following the death of Godolphin on 15 August 1712; it was basically 
for political reasons. Marlborough hoped he might eventually lead 
an allied invasion of England which would thwart Oxford's peace policy 
and secure the Protestant Succession. Nottingham was amazed at this 
decision and pleaded with Sunderland to try to persuade Marlborough 
to remain in England. In reply, Sunderland admitted that to begin 
with he too had been surprised, 
but upon talking with my Lord Duke upon it, 
I must own, he gave me such reasons for it 
that I could not answer. First in relation 
to himself, he said that if one did put one 
self in his place one might easily imagine the 
uneasiness of being under perpetual 
persecution, both in Parliament and out of it, 
that he has a mind to make his court, or to 
save himself from persecution. That as to 
the public, he really thinks it will be for 
the service of that for him to be out of the 
way for sometime. For as one of the first 
motives that induced the present ministers to 
begin their villainies to England was with a 
design to get rid of him, so when he is out 
of the way they-can't say, that he is heading 
any faction against the Queen, nor have any 
ground to frighten either her or others 
with telling them, that he must come into ýlay 
again if the public measures are altered. 
4 
For political support at home during his absence Marlborough depended 
upon Cadogan, James Craggs senior, and Sunderland)all of whom 
corresponded with him while he was in exile. 
43 
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The bleak and discouraging political prospects in England 
may help to explain why, from the end of 1712 onwards, Sunderland 
and the Juntc increasingly turned their attention towards the 
Hanoverian Succession. Under the terms of the Act of Settlement of 
1701 the Electress Sophia and her heirs had been designated next in 
line to the Crown of Great Britain in the event of William III and 
Anne dying without issue. By 1712 there was little doubt that the 
Queen would not produce an heir of her own body and, though the 
Elector of Hanover viewed the prospect of ascending the throne of 
Britain with a keen sense of anticipation, he was determined not to 
do anything that might prejudice the interest of his House and he 
especially sought to avoid any policy which might jeopardise the 
succession by arousing the Queen's hostility. Sunderland, however, 
was eager to seize the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the heir 
to the throne by making it perfectly obvious that the Whigs were the 
only reliable support for the Protestant Succession in the House of 
Hanover. The Whigs were seeking a reinsurance policy to restore 
them to power in the next reign. At the same time they also wanted 
Hanoverian assistance in their present political struggle. The 
hope of reviving his political fortune played a major part in 
restoring Sunderland's enthusiasm for the political fight and he 
flung himself wholeheartedly into espousing the Hanoverian cause 
with his usual zeal and application while importuning the Electoral 
Court to give additional support for the Whigs. Sunderland's 
enthusiastic devotion to Hanover and his pleading for help were so 
intense that it raised doubts at Hanover which were to hinder his 
progress early in the new reign. 
By the beginning of 1713 Sunderland had fully recovered his 
optimism, energy and aggression. His ardour seems to have been too 
much for the more cautious Hanoverians, for on 13 January 1713 the 
Baron de Grote was commended upon restraining 'the excessive 
forwardness and vivacity of Lord Sunderland'. 
44 Four days later 
Robethon once more advised de Grote 'it is very proper to put a stop 
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to the frequent visits of Lord Sunderland without disobliging 
him however,. 45 Both Sunderland and the Junto in general were 
regarded with a certain scepticism at Hanover. At the end of 
1712 Junto proposals, including a scheme to establish the Electress 
Sophia in England, while Anne was still alive, by virtue of the 
Treaty of Utrecht, met an unenthusiastic response. A Hanoverian 
suggestion that Parli, c%-ment should be pressed to secure a pension for 
Sophia and to ensure that the Pretender should be excluded from the 
succession, even if he became a Protestant was dropped apparently 
on the advice of the Junto. The Elector's adviser, Jean de Robethon, 
told de Grote that with these orders Ije me flatte que Sunderland 
et Halifax seront content'. 
46 
The Junto also persuaded Bothmer to 
promise pensions from Hanover in order to buy the support of 
impoverished Scottish peers in the House of Lords. The Elector 
agreed to give Lord Fitzwalter Z600 and de Grote was to assure 
Sunderland that he would be reimbursed for the Z300 he had already 
advanced to Fitzwalter. In March 1713 a memorial was sent from 
Hanover requesting the advice of Sunderland, Somers, Townshend, and 
Halifax about what steps the Hanoverian Court should take upon the 
Queen's death and what procurations, patents, or orders should be 
ready to be sent at the same time. The reply, drawn up by Lord Chief 
Justice Parker, Somers, and Cowper, was dispatched by Sunderland to 
Bothmer with an appeal that the Electoral Prince should be sent over 
to England even without an invitation from Parliament, Sunderland 
argued that this was labsolument necessairel and Illadvis unanime 
de tous les amis qui mlont charge de vous llecrire'. 
47 The Elector, 
who was determined not to offend the Queen, refused to consider this 
suggestion. 
48 Sunderland and the Whigs received more bad tidings 
with the conclusion of the peace negotiations. 
These had begun at Utrecht in January 1712 and were finally 
brought to an end on 31 March 1713 with the signing of the Treaty 
of Utrecht by Britain, France and the Dutch Republic. During the 
final stages of this agreement the rivalry between Oxford and St. John 
had become increasingly bitter. They had strongly disagreed on how 
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the peace talks should be concluded while St. John's elevation to 
the peerage as a Viscount, instead of as an Earl, permanently soured 
his relations w-', -Lh the Prime Minister. Bolingbroke's challenge to 
Oxford in 1712 was an obvious failure and, though he retained 
considerable influence over the discussions at Utrecht, the Treaty 
was clearly Oxford's handiwork. 
49 Under its terms Louis XIV 
recognized the Queen's title and the Protestant Succession, and 
agreed to the expulsion of the Pretender from Lorraine. In the 
Mediterranean Britain retained Gibraltar and Port Mahon which made 
her the dominant naval power in the area. Louis XIV also promised 
to destroy the fortifications at Dunkirk which had been a base for 
French privateers. Across the Atlantic Britain's possessions of 
St. Kitt's, Acadia, Newfoundland and Hudson's bay were recognized 
by France. Britain was given the Asiento monopoly of the slave 
trade in Spanish America for thirty years. Commercial treaties were 
to be negotiated with France and Spain that would give Britain 
exclusive trade rights. 
so 
Parliament met on 7 April 1713 and in her speech from the throne 
the Queen announced the signing of the peace Treaty and she declared 
that there was perfect amity between her and the Electoral Court. 
This pronouncement upon Anglo-Hanoverian relations was designed by 
Oxford to outwit the Whigs whose increasingly close connection with 
the Hanoverians was probably causing the Lord Treasurer some unease. 
The dexterity of Oxford's move is well attested to by the Whigs 
themselves, Sunderland, Halifax, Townshend, Somers, Orford, Cowper, 
and Parker deliberated for two days on the best response they could 
make to Oxford's move. All they could come up with was to exploit 
the situation created by the announcement by having the Electoral 
Prince come over to England. At the beginning of August 1713 
Sunderland even went so far as to suggest that the Elector should 
visit England, but, if not I certainly the 
Electoral Prince should be 
sent over. Whig unease is evident in Sunderland's letter, He 
observed: 
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but if he [the Elector] will neither come 
himself nor send the Electoral Prince I 
assure you that all our friends of all 
ranks wi, l consider themselves as abandoned. 
Perhaps this will not be relished a-, 
Hanover, but I would not be a faithful 
servant to the Elector and the Protestant 
Succession if I did not acquaint you with 
the just state of the affair. Sl 
The idea of seeking a parliamentary invitation to the Electoral Prince 
to enter the kingdom and the request of a pension was thought to be 
unwise. L'Hermitage, the Dutch resident in England, advised 
Hanover, let de plus Md. Sunderland mlavoue de bonne foi, que cela 
pouvoit donner prise a My L. Oxford de faire rejetter cette 
proposition parce que les deux partis en differentes occasions en 
avoient declines, et que comme il pouvoit venir selon, il etoit 
mieux laiser la chose sans, la tenter'. 
S2 Once again the Elector 
was unwilling to gratify Whig demands, but Sunderland and his 
associates must have been encouraged by the divisions which appeared 
in the ministry once the peace was settled. 
53 
The short parliamentary session of 1713 provided the background to 
the growing tensions and animosities within the Tory Party. Oxford 
and Bolingbroke were openly at odds, Dartmouth and Bolingbroke were 
hardly on speaking terms, and Anglesey was increasingly estranged 
from the government. 
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These rivalries produced a resolute and 
relentless Junto onslaught on the ministry. The initiative lay with 
the Whigs who criticised the peace, exploited Scottish hostility 
to the union and harried the ministers over the Pretender's residing 
in Lorraine. Oxford was facing another serious challenge for the 
leadership from Bolingbroke and it appears that the Junto tried to 
intimidate Oxford in Parliament to try -t-o-force him into an agreement 
with them. Sunderland played a prominent part in the Whig attack in 
the Lords, skirmishing with both Oxford and Bolingbroke, He acted 
as the link with the Scots in formulating the attempt to dissolve the 
union and the opposition to the Malt Tax. Sunderland's ruthless 
assiduity is clearly visible throughout the session and it culminated 
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with his meeting with Oxford in July 1713 in an attempt to extract 
concessions from the Lord Treasurer. 
4 The news Of the sign,. ng of the Treaty of Utrecht was warmly 
received in the House of Commons where an address of thanks was 
immediately voted to the Queen for her speech. The House of Lords 
responded differently; Sunderland, Halifax, Wharton, Townshend, 
Nottingham and Guernsey opposed an address of thanks arguing tha t 
the articles of the treaty should have been presented to the House 
first, Halifax wondered how the Lords could be expected to approve 
something of which they were completely ignorant. Oxford replied 
that the thanks of the House were merely for the success of the Queen's 
endeavours and a copy of the articles of peace was available to anyone 
who desired to see it. The address was carried by 75 votes to 43.55 
During the debate Peterborough, in an obvious reference to Marlborough, 
alleged quite accurately that there had been attempts to make a 
Captain-General for life. Sunderland, though aware that Peterborough's 
claim was true, felt compelled to defend his father-in-law and 'took 
it up saying it was a thing of great consequence if true, therefore he 
[Peterborough] would do well to prove it'. 
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Peterborough, unable to 
substantiate his charge, made no answer. Sunderland was also 
involved in Irepartees' with Bolingbroke. Whilst making his first 
speech in the Lords the Secretary of State condemned the factious 
opposition to the Utrecht settlement, to which Sunderland replied 
'there might be faction in a ministry with as much more danger as 
they had power in their hands'. 
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Undeterred by the setback over the address to the Queen the 
Whigs continued their offensive and were now ready to exploit Scottish 
disenchantment with the Union which they had helped to fuel. The 
Linen duty, the refusal to allow the Duke of Hamilton to sit in the 
Lords as Duke of Brandon, and the increased Salt 'J'-'ax of 1712 had all 
served to increase Scottish disillusion. The breaking point came in 
May 1713 when extremist Tory pressure in the Commons forced the ministry 
to introduce a bill to extend the Malt Tax to Scotland in contravention 
of the Treaty of Union. The Earl of Findlater sought leave to bring 0 
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in a bill to dissolve the union, though guaranteeing the Protestant 
Succession in the House of Hanover. Mar, Islay, Argyll, Loudon, and 
Balmerino spoke to the same effect while Sunderland maintained 'that 
though he had a hand in making the Union yet if it had not that good 
effect which was expected from it he was likewise for dissolving it'. 
58 
Nottingham, Halifax, and Townshend were reluctant to approve this 
motion unless effectual guarantees were provided for the succession. 
Sunderland, and perhaps Wharton as well, was unhappy at this 
temporizing of his colleagues and it seems it was only Argyll's 
aggressive speech which persuaded many Whigs to support Findlater's 
motion. With Sunderland and Clarendon acting as tellers the proposal 
was defeated, after the inclusion of proxies, by 71 votes to 67.59 
Whig irresolution, however, was primarily responsible for the 
opposition failure. Two Whig Bishops, each carrying two proxies, 
left the chamber thus depriving the Whigs and the Scots of six votes. 
No attempt was made to introduce a similar motion in the Commons for 
the Whigs were too outnumbered for any hope of success. 
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The Scots 
and the Whigs now turned their attention to opposing the Malt Tax. 
The Whigs held a meeting to discuss how far the Malt Tax 
constituted a breach of the union and, afterwards, Sunderland visited 
Balmerino promising support if the Scots would propose delaying the 
commitment of the bill until, in a debate on the state of the nation, 
the articles of the union relating to the tax could be considered. 
Sunderland also requested Balmerino to oppose the imposition of the 
bill on England as well as Scotland. The Scots accepted the Whig 
offer for, in a very full committee of the whole House on 8 June 1713, 
the Scots, Whigs, and Nottingham declared that the Malt Tax could not 
be applied to Scotland without a breach of the union. In an attempt 
to conciliate the Scots Oxford answered that though the tax might be 
put upon malt it could be remitted by the Crown later and not levied. 
Sunderland answered that 'he wondered such expressions as tended to 
establish a despotic dispensing power should come from that noble 
Lord'. 
61 Oxford retorted 'that his family had never been for promoting 
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and advising arbitrary measures as others had donet. 
62 
Taking this 
as a reflection upon his father Sunderland vindicated him and added 
'tha-z the other Lord's family was hardly known in those days'. 
63 
The ministry, however, carried the division by 64 votes to 54; proxies 
were not called for as they were known to be equal. The Malt bill 
was reported from the committee by Lord Delawarr and it was resolved 
that it should pass. A protest had been discussed beforehand by 
Balmerino, Sunderland, Halifax and Nottinghamiand most of the Scots 
nobility along with Sunderland, Scarborough, Somerset, and Lonsdale, 
representing the Whigs entered a protest into the journal that 
the Malt bill was a violation of the union. 
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The outstanding opposition success of the session was the defeat 
of the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty, though this victory was 
primarily due to Tory defections in the House of Commons. There 
was vigorous opposition to the treaty from British commercial and 
trading interests who conducted an extensive campaign in the form of 
petitions and deputations to Parliament. The Whigs were quick to see 
the possibilities offered by this opposition and they adopted the 
cause of the merchants and manufacturers. Somers, Halifax, Cowper, 
and Nottingham led the attack in the Lords, but it was in the Commons 
that the decisive struggle took place. Bolingbroke was determined 
that the treaty should pass and, despite increasing opposition from 
Tory M. P. 1s, he persisted in trying to force it through the House, 
On its second reading the bill carried by only 202 votes to 135; the 
House was barely half full and there were clearly many abstentions, 
The bill was defeated in a division on the 8th and 9th articles of 
the treaty by 194 votes to 185. It had been opposed by the leading 
Hanoverian Tory, Sir Thomas Hanmer, and his decision greatly influenced 
Tory M. P. 1s, The rejection of the Commercial Treaty was a severe 
setback for the ministry. 
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The Whigs followed up this success on 30 June 1713 when Wharton 
moved an address to the Queen that she would use her pressing 
instances with the Duke of Lorraine and other friendly states not to 
receive or allow the Pretender to remain within their dominions. 
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Sunderland seconded Wharton and oxford had little choice but to 
declare the ministry's willingness to support the motion. 
Sunderland was named in the committee which drew up the address. 
In reply the Queen promised to renew her efforts with the Duke of 
Lorraine, but she also observed that if there were less dissension 
at home that would be the best way to secure the succession. Neither 
Oxford nor Bolingbroke WWr$ present in the Lords when the Queen's 
answer was delivered and Buckingham complained that he had not heard 
of any attempts being made to remove the Pretender from Lorraine. 
Sunderland, with the support of Nottingham, carried a motion to 
deliver a second address to Anne expressing surprise that her 
endeavours had not had their full effect, while promising the full 
support of the House for her efforts to comply with their request. 
The Lord Steward reported that the Queen had received this second 
address graciously, though Oxford and Bolingbroke were to ignore the 
issue of the Pretender's residence in Lorraine until the end of the 
year. 
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Parliament was dissolved in July 1713 and a general election 
was called. 
Sunderland could feel pleased with the opposition's conduct 
during this short parliamentary session. He told Bothmer, 'we 
exert ourselves more this session, and with greater success, than 0 
we had reason to expect'. 
67 
The pressure in Parliament at the same 
time as Bolingbroke's most serious challenge for the leadership of the 
Tory party explain Oxford's willingness to talk with the Whigs. In 
July he met with Sunderland, Somers, Halifax, Cowper, and Orford. 
68 
Nothing came out of this meeting, probably because in August Oxford 
had re-organized the ministry and strengthened his own position, 
while Bolingbroke's authority was diminished. As a consequence Oxford 
needed to pay less attention to any Whig proposals. 
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The general election of 1713 was fought out in August and 
September. The Whigs hoped to widen the divisions amongst the Tories 
by using the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty as an election issue. 
The Tories on the other hand had the full backing of the Court and 
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the Clergy and were able to utilise the enthusiasm with which the 
Treaty of Utrecht had been received. The Tories were outstandingly 
successful in Cornwall, S)ta2fordshire, and London. The Whigs did 
badly in boroughs, where in previous elections they had held their 
own. In Scotland the Court carried the election of the sixteen 
Scottish representative peers with ease, but most of the 
, 
Scottish 
M. P. 's returned to Westminister belonged to the ranks Of the 
opposition. 
70 There is little evidence of Sunderland's activity 
in these proceedings though in all likelihood he would have campaigned 
with his usual vigour. Sunderland did help Nottingham to get his 
son elected in Rutland by getting the Duke of Rutland's support for 
Lord Finch. 71 As usual Sunderland was optimistic about the outcome 
of the election as he told Nottingham: 
upon the whole there are a great many 
alterations for the better which one may 
hope, with the misled ones who will come 
to their senses at last, will yet save 
this nation for nothing but the 
extravagant majority the Court had most 
part of last Parliament can possibly 
support such an administration. A 
great deal will turn upon the part 
Lord Anglesey and Sir Thomas Hanmer will 
act. I don't much doubt the first from 
his good sense after what passed at the 
end of last session. For the latter, I 
have heard so many different accounts of 
his last journey to London that I don't 
know what to judge of him. I hope your 
Lordship does correspond with Lord Anglesey, 
in the present interval of Parliament, 
because by it you will know how far you 
may depend upon him, and by it will 72 
contribute very much towards fixing him. 
The Tories, however, achieved another outstanding electoral success 
outnumbering the Whigs by approximately 363 seats to 1SO. 
73 
Sunderland was not greatly dismayed at the outcome of the 
election for he was now convinced that the fortunes of the Whigs 
would improve with the accession to the throne of the Elector of 
Hanover which, given the Queen's poor health, could not be long 
74 
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The new Hanoverian envoy in London, Baron de Schiitz, informed 
Robethon that Sunderland 'does not despair of the affairs of this 
country as many others do'. 
75 Sunderland continued to press 
Hanover for help. He once more sought money to buy the favour of 
poor Scottish-peers in the Lords and to assist the Whigs to carry the 
elections to the Common Council of London. Hanover, unfortunately, 
was still reluctant to grant Sunderland's requests and must have 
found his efforts considerably irritating. 
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Though Bolingbroke's bid for the Tory leadership in the summer 
of 1713 had failed he was still intent on replacing Oxford and he 
was ready to capitalize on the divisions within the Tory party, 
Bolingbroke aimed at widening his following in the House of Commons 
while ingratiating himself at Court with Lady Masham. This 
strategy was assisted by the apparent lethargy of the Lord Treasurer 
who was absent from Windsor for regular periods. The Queen's 
illness at Christmas emphasised the immediacy of the question of 
the succession, which the Tories had great difficulty coming to terms 
with. The Treaty of Utrecht had permanently soured the British 
government's relations with Hanover; the willingness of leading 
ministers to approach the Pretender merely exacerbated the situation, 
While Thomas Harley was sent to Hanover to reassure the Elector of 
the Queen's resolution to stand by the Act of Settlement, both 
Oxford and Bolingbroke, independent of each other, were in contact 
with the Pretender. By March 1714 both of them had realised that 
the refusal of James to renounce the Catholic faith had put an end 
to any possibility of a Stuart restoration. Oxford and Bolingbroke 
tried to curry favour at Hanover, but the Secretary of State was more 
concerned with uniting the Tories around himself and to entrench the 
Tory party so firmly in both Church and State that the new monarch 
would be forced to come to terms with him and the Tories. Meanwhile 




Anne's declining physical condition and the omission of any 
reference to Hanover in her speech from the throne at the opening 
of the session on 2 March 1714 increased the misgivings at Hanover 
about the prospects of securing the British Crown, The Elector and 
Bothmer agreed that something. would have to be done. Marlborough 
was given full powers to defend the Hanoverian claim should the 
Pretender invade England on the Queen's death. In response to 
appeals from the Whigs and Hanoverian Tories the Elector approved 
the question which Schiltz put to Lord Chancellor Harcourt in April 
1714, on behalf of the dowager Electress Sophia, as to whether the 
Electoral Prince could be summoned to sit in the House of Lords 
as Duke of Cambridge. The Privy Council felt obliged to issue the 
writ of summons, but to show the Queen's displeasure Schutz was 
forbidden the Court and his recall was pressed at Hanover. Wisely 
George decided not to send his son to England and he publicly 
repudiated Schiýtz. 
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The opposition was dejected at the turn of 
events and Kreyenberg told Bothmer that Sunderland, Townshend, Halifax, 
and the Hanoverian Tories 'all agree that if the Elector does not 
choose to send the Electoral Prince it will be proper to declare so 
in order that the Elector may take advantage of it in this Court, and 
that our friends may consider of something else and the conduct they 
are to follow to keep up the spirits of their party'. 
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The anxiety of the opposition over the intentions of the 
administration produced another determined and vigorous attack on the 
ministry. It centred upon the government's failure to do anything 
about the Pretender who was still residing in Lorraine and the failure 
to succour Britain's Catalan allies who were resisting Bourbon 
aggressi, on. Sunderland led the Whig assault on both these points 
and he aimed at causing maximum embarrassment for the ministers for 
having neglected the Lords' address of 1713 to have the Pretender 0 
removed from Lorraine. 
On 17 March 1714 Sunderland, Wharton, Cowper, Nottingham, and 
Halifax pointed out the danger to the Protestant Succession if the 
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Pretender was suffered to remain in Lorraine. It was agreed to 
address the Queen on four points: for an account of what had been 
done to force the Pretender out of the Duchy and the response the 
Duke had made; for a report of the peace negotiations with an 
account of what measures were being taken to render the peace 
universal; what instances had been made to restore the Catalans 
to their ancient privileges; and a statement of all money granted 
by Parliament since 1710 for the war in Spain and Portugal. At the 
beginning of April the papers relating to the Catalans were read 
and Sunderland, Wharton, Halifax, and Cowper represented that 'the 
Crown of Great Britain having drawn in the Catalans to declare for 
the House of Austria and engaged to support them these engagements 
ought to be made good'. 
80 Despite Bolingbroke's efforts, it was 
resolved to address the Queen to continue her endeavours to ensure 
'that the Catalans may have the full enjoyment of their just and 
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ancient privileges continued to them'. Sunderland, Wharton, 
Townshend, Halifax and Cowper were included in the committee to draw 
up the address. 
82 
The opposition now turned to the Pretender. 
On 5 April 1714 Sunderland remarked: 
that notwithstanding the earnest application 
last session by both Houses to her Majesty, 
to use her utmost endeavours to get him 
[the Pretender] removed from thence [Lorraine], 
yet he was assured by Baron Fostner, the Duke 
of Lorraine's minister, some weeks before his 
departure, that to his certain knowledge no 
instances had 
8 Ket 
been made to his master for 
that purpose. 
Bolingbroke replied that he had made such representations in the 
Queen's name to which Halifax answered that Baron Fostner had said 
the same to him only four days ago so that Bolingbroke must be ' 
mistaken at least in point of chronology. It was decided to address zn- 
the Queen to insist upon the removal of the Pretender from Lorraine 
in the event he should attempt to land in Britain and to get the 
Emperor and other Princes to guarantee the Protestant Succession. 
Wharton then proposed 'whether the Protestant Succession was in danger 
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under the present administration? ' The debate lasted seven hours 
and the government only managed to defeat the motion by 76 votes to 
64. Signi.,: icantly a group of prominent Hanoverian Tories including 
Anglesey, Carteret, Orrery, Ashburnham, Abingdon and-the Archbishop 
of York voted with the Whigs. 
the House of Commons. 
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A similar motion was defeated in 
The Duke of Bolton reported the address from the Lords' committee 
and upon consideration several amendments were made. The House 
affirmed by 55 votes to 43 that it should be left to the discretion 
of the Queen about the timing of a proclamation against the Pretender. 
Lord Trevor proposed a further alteration, arguing that to offer a 
reward for apprehending a criminal who had not yet committed the 
crime could not be authorised in law. Sunderland answered that since 
it was a point of law whether it was permissible to offer a reward for 
the arrest of a person dead or alive most of the Lords were not 
sufficiently competent to decide this matter. It was decided to change 
the promise of a reward for detaining the Pretender dead or alive to 
'apprehend and bring the Pretender to justice'. The rest of the 
address remained unchanged. In answer to the address the Queen 
asserted that at present she saw no reason for issuing a proclamation 
against the Pretender and that the Hanoverian Succession would be 
strengthened if an end were put to the fears and jealousies which 
had been promoted. An address of thanks was ordered to be drawn 
up. When the report of this address was being considered Sunderland 
moved to have the words 'not without reason' or 'justly' added while 
the Duke of Leeds and Lord North and Grey suggested including the word 
'industriously'. The Whigs strenuously opposed this Tory proposal, 
but it was agreed by 63 votes to 61 to add 'industriously'. The 
address affirmed the support of the House for the Queen 'in all proper 
measures for supporting her Majesty's government and for strengthening 
the Protestant Succession in the House of Hanover as the only 
effectual means to put an end to those fears and jealousies which have 
been so universally and industriously spread throughout this kingdom'. 
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With the consideration of the peace treaties Sunderland was 
nominated to the committee to draw up an address of thanks to Anne 
for the peace which delivered the country 'from the heavy burden of 
a consuming land war unequally carried on and become at last 
impracticable'. The Queen was also advised to use her efforts to 
complete the settlement of Europe on the basis of the principles 
contained in her speech from the throne. The address was approved by 
the Commons and delivered as a joint recommendation from both Houses 
of Parliament. 
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The storm in Parliament over the succession, the request for the 
writ for the Electoral Prince as Duke of Cambridge, and the Commons' 
criticism of the peace with Spain convinced Bolingbroke that 
firmness was absolutely necessary. The reconciliation established 
with Oxford at the beginning of the session was abandoned. Bolingbroke 
had already begun to root out prominent Whigs in the army and the 
success of this policy encouraged him to go even further. He saw 
a bill to close Dissenting schools and academies as a means to unite 
the Tories. The Schism bill was piloted through the Commons by 
his subordinate Sir William Wyndham and it passed the House with large 
majorities. 
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In the Lords Hanoverian Tories such as Anglesey and 
Abingdon rallied to support the Schism bill, but Nottingham and the 
Whigs were implacably opposed to its being approved. In a committee 
of the whole House on 9 June 1714 Halifax urged that the Dissenters 
should be allowed to educate their children in their own schools. 
His argument was endorsed by Sunderland and Cowper among others, but 
Bolingbroke, Anglesey, Abingdon, Buckingham and Harcourt spoke against 
Halifax's proposal which was defeated by 62 votes to 48.88 Two days 
- the extension of the bill later the opposition's attempt to prevent 
to Ireland was narrowly beaten by 75 votes to 74 with Sunderland and 
Anglesey acting as tellers, 
89 There was a protest by thirty-three 
peers, including Sunderland, Somers, Halifax, Cowper, Townshend, 
Wharton, Nottingham, and Orford. 
90 Ironically enough the bill came 
into effect on 1 August 1714, the very day the Queen died. 
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Bolingbroke had gratified both the Queen and the Tories with the 
Schism bill yet he was still not in complete control of either the 
ministry or Parliament, while oxford was fighting an effective 
rearguard action using his influence with -he Queen. $_ Bolingbroke 
was also under fire in the Lords owing to the more dubious aspects 
of the Spanish Commercial Treaty. The treaty was a particularly 
unsatisfactory arrangement which neglected British mercantile 
interests and discontent with amendments made at Madrid led to an 
inquiry in the House of Lords. 
91 
On 2 July 1714 the Queen was 
addressed to lay 'an account before this House in what method the 
third, fifth and eighth articles, which are ratified and substituted 
in the room of the third, fifth, and eighth articles ofthe Treaty of 
Commerce concluded at Utrecht were proposed, treated. and agreed in 
order to the ratification of them'. The Queen merely replied that 
the amendments made at Madrid were considered and that she 'judging 
that these differences were not so material as to deserve that the 
Treaty of Commerce should be any longer kept open, ordered a warrant, 
in the usual form, to be prepared for the immediate ratification of 
the treaty'. 
92 
This answer was clearly designed to shield 
Bolingbroke so Sunderland complained that 'if the House was to receive 
such answers from the Crown they were of no use and might walk out 
and never come in again'. 
93 The Lords appointed a committee, which 
included Sunderland, to address the Queen to have the treaty altered 
to 'render the said trade practicable and beneficial to your 
Majesty's people'. 
94 
Before the inquiry could make any real progress 
the Queen, at Bolingbroke's instigation, prorogued Parliament on 
9 July 1714.95 
With the end of the parliamentary session the struggle between 
Oxford and Bolingbroke entered its final phase. Bolingbroke 
continued pressing the Queen to dismiss the Lord Treasurer and she 
finally gave way on 27 July 1714. At the same time it was plain that 
Anne's health was declining rapidly and it was essential to appoint a 
new Lord Treasurer to prevent Oxford returning to office under the 
terms of the Regency Act. At a committee of the Council on 30 July 
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Harcourt proposed that Shrewsbury, who was then Lord Lieutenant of 
Ireland, should succeed Oxford. The Queen agreed and he was 
appointed later the same day. Sunderland, expectant, impatient, 
and anxiousýtold Nottingham of this development. 
The Queen was very much out of order all 
day yesterday and this morning she was 
seized with a fit of apoplexy which 
continued upon her above two hours. She 
then so far recovered as just to know 
people and to speak with difficulty. 
They have since applied all the remedies, 
even the most violent, but without any 
effect, so that all the physicians agree 
she will die tonight or tomorrow. They 
have declared. this to the Council which 
sat all day at Kensington. I am now at 
Monsieur Bothmer's who has desired me to 
send this express to you, to beg you 
without loss of time to come up 
immediately. We have sent to our other 
friends that are within reach. It is of 
the last consequence and therefore for 
God's sake don't delay a moment, 97 
He continued: 
On 31 July the Queen's worsening condition led to the summoning of the 
Privy Council where 'there was a very great appearance of Whig Lords 
particularly Lord Somers, Cowper, Sunderland, Somerset, Argyll, [and] 
Sir Richard Onslow . 
98 
Hanover was kept informed of proceedings and 
on Sunday 1 August 1714 the last Stuart ruler of Britain died; the 
future now lay with George, Elector of Hanover. 
The last four years of Queen Anne's reign had been a difficult 
time for Sunderland. Up to 1710 his career had been characterised 
by almost continual success but from then until the Queen's death 
provided a marked contrast and was the most severe political 
crisis he had yet faced. Sunderland, however, came through this 
period with characteristic zest and vigour even though on occasion the 
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despondency and gloom of apparently fruitless opposition cast shadows 
even upon him. Sunderland's strength of purpose, his ruthless 
determination, his devotion to the Protestant Succession in the 
House of Hanover, his readiness to shoulder the responsibility for 
encouraging others when all seemed in vain and to pursue any policy 
to attack the government was a powerful example. Sunderland had 
made an outstanding contribution to the Whig cause when the tide was 
with them, but when it turned his efforts were little short of 
magnificent. He saw clearly that his future, together with that of 
the Whig party, lay with the accession of the Elector of Hanover. 
He was determined that the Whigs should demonstrate their loyalty 
and commitment to Hanover so that the new King would have no doubt 
that they were his only true and reliable friends in Britain. 
Sunderland had pointed the way to salvation, but the very depth of 
his zeal and enthusiasm was to prove his undoing for it unnerved the 
more moderate souls at Hanover, in the same way his Whig principles 
had alienated the Queen, and instead of reaping the reward of his' 
endeavours he encountered doubts and suspicions about his character. 
That he was able to overcome these reservations relatively quickly was 
in part due to his experience during Anne's last years, for 
Sunderland himself, as a consequence of the setbacks and 
disappointments, emerged as a much more subtle and calculating 
politician. It was almost as if he had been studying the schemes 
and intrigues of Oxford for in the new reign he was to show that he 
too could apply the principles of Court management which had been 
of immense value to his gkeat rival. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SERVICING OF AMBITION AUGUST 1714 
TO APRIL 1717 
lincZination for power is naturaZ to aZZ who think 
they have it within their reach' 
The accession of George I in August 1714 had been eagerly awaited 
by the Whigs. They anticipated full royal support in proscribing 
their Tory opponents and establishing their own political ascendancy. 
Sunderland was confident that his-probity, ardour, and militancy in 
promoting the Hanoverian Succession would be amply rewarded. His 
omission from the Regency Council and his appointment as Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland were deep and bitter shocks. Sunderland had 
little enthusiasm for the Viceroyalty of Ireland and any nominal 
interest in that office disappeared as the difficulties, limitations, 
and frustrations that accompanied it became apparent. Sunderland's 
failure to obtain the post he coveted, the Northern Secretaryship, 
derived from the resentment of the King and his Hanoverian entourage 
at Sunderland's constant demands for assistance during Anne's last 
years together with their apprehensions of his partisan political 
opinions. It is clear, however, that there was no attempt to deny 
Sunderland either favour or access to the King and as the reign 
progressed Sunderland was able to dispel the King's fears and to 
increase his own authority and influence. By 1716 Sunderland, with 
his forthright espousal of Hanoverian foreign policy, was one of the 
most powerful and important of the King's English ministers. His 
standing was such that with the consent of the King and the assistance 
of the Secretary of State for the South, James Stanhope, he was able 
to attempt to install himself as the King's chief minister. 
Sunderland did not intend a thorough reorganization of the 
administration for he merely wanted to diminish the power and 
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significance of Charles, Viscount Townshend and John, Duke of 
Argyll who appeared an increasingly dangerous threat to his own 
position. Sunderland carried out his plan with subtlety, cunning, 
4 and dLSsimulation leaving little doubt that he had recently matured 
into a skilled and experienced politician yet he also made a 
disastrous miscalculation. He revealed the accusations he had made 
at Hanover that Townshend and Robert Walpole were setting up the 
Prince of Wales against the King, This disclosure so incensed 
Townshend and Walpole that they were unwilling to acquiesce in 
Sunderland's supremacy. Consequently, Sunderland, instead of 
controlling the Whig party, had split it apart. 
THE REGENCY COUNCIL AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AUGUST TO 
SEPTEMBER 1714 
'A great disappointment to Lord SunderZandl 
Sunderland was among the members of the Privy Council who assembled 
at Kensington Palace following the Queen's death on 1 August 1714. 
Under the terms of the Regency Act of 1706 a Council was to govern 
the country until the new ruler could arrive from Germany. The 
list of Regents nominated by George was announced land my Lord 
Sunderland looked very pale when the names were read' 
1 for he, 
Marlborough, Wharton and Somers were left out of the interim 
government. Five of the members were included by virtue of offices 
held in the Queen's last ministry and among the rest were: 
Abingdon, Anglesey, Argyll, Bolton, Carlisle, Cowper, Devonshire, 
Halifax, Kent, Montrose, Roxburghe, Nottingham, Orford, Pembroke, 
Scarborough, Somerset, and Townshend. The oath of allegiance was 
taken and George was proclaimed King at St. James's. -, on S August 1714 
the Regents opened the new session of Parliament. After the Lord 
Justices' speech had been read to both Houses, Sunderland was 
chosen as a member of the Lords' committee to draw up an address 
of thanks which he reported to the House. It congratulated the King 
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upon his succession and urged his presence in the kingdom as soon 
as possible. A Civil List of E700,000 a year was then voted along 
with the arrears owing to Hanoverian troops who had served in the 
recent war. It was also agreed. to renew the reward of E100,000 It, 
for the apprehension of the Pretender should he attempt to land in 
Britain. 2 
George I left Hanover at the end of August 1714 and after 
journeying via The Hague he arrived at Greenwich on 8 September. He 
was received by the Archbishop of Canterbury at the head of the Regency 
Council and then proceeded to St. James's Palace. The first priority 
facing the King was to establish a new administration. Though the 
influence of George's Hanoverian counsellors, Baron Bothmer and 
Jean de Robethon in particular, in deciding the composition of the new 
ministry has recently been questioned 
3 
there can be little doubt as 
to the importance of their views. Bothmer had been associated with 
the Whigs for a considerable time and he used his authority on their 
behalf. It seems he was under the impression that Sunderland did not 
wish to be Secretary of State and was very surprised when Cadogan 
informed him of Sunderland's aspirations. To give Sunderland the 
Northern Secretaryship would have meant disobliging Lord Townshend 
who 'as negotiator of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of Barrier and Succession 
of 1709 had rendered services which George held to be of the greatest 
importance for the cause of Hanover'. 
4 
Bothmer hoped that Sunderland 
would be satisfied with the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland., but this 
office was clearly a 'great disappointment to Lord SunderlandI. 
S 
Among the other appointments Cowper became Lord Chancellor, Halifax 
First Lord of the Treasury, Nottingham President of the Council, 
Marlborough Captain-General and Master General of the Ordnance, 
Stanhope Secretary of State for the South, Orford First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Somers was given Cabinet rank without portfolio, Walpole 
was made Paymaster of the Forces, Pulteney Secretary-at-War, 
Shrewsbury Lord Chamberlain, Montrose Secretary of State for Scotland 
and Roxburghe Scottish Lord Privy Seal. 
6 
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It is not difficult to understand why Sunderland was excluded 
from the Regency Council and passed over for the Secretary of 
State's office. Hanover had always been rather embarrassed by his 
zeal on their behalf and his regular demands, during the close of 
Anne's life for money and for a member of the Electoral family to 
be sent to reside in Britain, had been regarded with suspicion 
by the Electoral Court which wished to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing 
the Queen. Sunderland was probably regarded as being too ambitious 
and too staunch in his Whig ideals which was probably misinterpreted 
as Republicanism. In 1688, prior to his arrival in England, 
William III had felt that Republicanism was a strong force 
7 
and 
furthermore 'the radical element in Whig ideology had been much 
publicized on the continent'. 
8 On at least one occasion Sunderland 
himself had to reassure Hanover that the Whigs did not intend to 
establish a Republic in England. Sunderland also had an unwarranted 
but influential reputation on the continent for extreme Whiggery and 
Count Wratislaw's anxieties concerning Sunderland's supposed 
Republicanism could only have served to increase the doubts at 
Hanover. 9 
Though the King and his Hanover . lan ministers were wary of 
Sunderland., it is evident that there was no deliberate attempt to keep 
him away from George I or force him into the political wilderness. He 
had access to the King and the monarch was ready to bestow favours 
upon him. Sunderland was also too prominent a politician even as 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and was too loyal to the Hanoverian cause, 
for the King to be able, or even to want, to render him politically 
ineffective. Bothmer did consult Sunderland about ministerial 
appointments and his views on Shrewsbury were not without weight for 
the Duke was deprived of the offices of Lord Treasurer and Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland. Sunderland was regarded as one of the leading 
members of the Cabinet together with Cowper, Marlborough, Halifax, 
Nottingham, Townshend, Somers and Stanhope. When loyal addresses 
were delivered to the King in September 1714 that of the borough of 
Bewdley was presented by Lord Herbert of Cberbury who was introduced 
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to George by Sunderland. Sunderland was named as Carver at the 
King's coronation and at the actual coronation ceremony 'the Lords 
who bore the regalia were in turn the iz,: arl of Salisbury with 
St. Edmund's staff; the Lord Viscount Longueville with the spurs; 
the Earl of Dorset with the sceptre and cross; the Earl of 
Sunderland, the Earl of Pembroke, and the Earl of Lincoln with the 
10 three swords'. 
II LORD LIEUTENANT OF IRELAND SEPTEMBER 1.714 TO AUGUST 1715 
'Nothing else in view but to promote worthy men 
and do aZZ the good he can in his administration' 
Sunderland made no attempt to d-isguise the contempt and disdain 
that he felt for his new office. 
his tenure as Lord Lieutenant. 
He never visited Ireland during 
His intention to remain in England 
was obvious from the beginning, but initially he did exhibit some 
interest in Irish affairs. He presided over a comprehensive pur-ge 
of the Irish administration, but his ignorance of Ireland and Irish 
politics was a major weakness. He relied heavily upon the counsel 
and recommendations of his Irish advisers and on most occasions he 
had little alternative but to endorse their proposals, The one 
instance when he acted on his own initiative, and against the advice 
of the Irish Lord Chancellor, Alan Brodrick, by seeking to persuade 
Sir Richard Levinge to accept a judge's post, resulted in a 
humiliating failure. Sunderland merely approved the suggested 
promotions in the Irish Church. Likewise in formulating policy his 
ideas were submitted for consideration in Dublin and in the face of 
Irish hostility and objections he was willing to give way and modify 
the administration's programme. Sunderland was totally unqualified 
to initiate or take the lead in most aspects of Irish government and 
he had to follow the suggestions of others. By the end of March 1715 
he had had enough. He gave up transacting Irish business, claiming 
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that he was prevented from doing so by illness. From then until 
August he intervened only in matters of outstanding importance and 
in which he had a decisive voice. 
The Lord Lieutenant was the executive of the Irish administration. 
He carried out the duties of a monarch, though he was usually only 
resident inIreland for the parliamentary session held every two years. 
In his absence Lords Justices were nominated and they were responsible 
for the government of the kingdom. The Lord Lieutenant relied upon 
the assistance of the Irish Privy Council, which was perhaps the most 
important element in the administrative structure, and it usually 
included the most significant ministerial supporters. The Viceroy 
was served by a large number of secretaries, clerks, and messengers., 
the most important of whom was the Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant 
or the Chief Secretary as he was usually known. He was nominated by 
the Lord Lieutenant and usually gave up the office when a new Viceroy 
was created. Sunderland chose Joseph Addison as his Chief Secretary 
and Charles Delafaye as his private secretary. They had both worked 
with Sunderland when he had been Secretary of State in the previous 
reign and they were tried and trusted associates. Above all both 
had extensive knowledge of Irish affairs; Addison had sat in the Irish 
House of Commons as M. P. for Cavan and had been Lord Wharton's 
secretary when he was Lord. Lieutenant between 1708 and 1710. 
The most important features of the Irish administration were 
finance, the army and the judiciary. It was the army which helped 
the Viceroy and the judiciary implement their decisions, though it 
was the financial organization which had the largest number of 
employees, The Court of Exchequer was the central financial body 
and it was composed of the upper exchequer, which received all - 
government funds and controlled payments, and the lower exchequer 
which was ostensibly a debt collecting agency. In reality 93% of the 
revenue was collected by the Revenue Board. In general terms the 
administration was small, organizationally inefficient, and archaic; 
there was considerable bribery and corruption together with large 
scale absenteeism. In fact, 'the Irish administration lurched into 
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the eighteenth-century like a leaky brigantine, struggling to make 
headway and shipping water as it went along'. 
11 
The Lord Lieutenant played a key role in the Irish legislative 
process. Under Poyning's Law legislation had to be approved by the 
British Privy Council before it could pass through the Irish 
Parliament. After being accepted the proposal would be sent back 
to the Irish Parliament and, having been accepted by both Houses, the 
finished bill would be presented to the Lord Lieutenant who would 
discuss it with the Irish Privy Council and then dispatch it to 
London. The Viceroy was also responsible for the management of the 
Irish Parliament. He usually relied on the party leaders in the 
House of Commons to carry out political supervision and they had to 
be cajoled into doing his bidding rather than being directed. These 
men had great bargaining power in any negotiation and normally they 
were Irish politicians, though men such as Edward Southwell and 
Charles Delafaye were able to play an active and effective role by 
virtue of their familiarity with Ireland. Knowledgeable Irishmen 
were essential to a new Lord Lieutenant as most English politicians, 
Sunderland was typical in this respect, were profoundly ignorant of 
Irish proceedings. Sunderland relied upon the views of Alan Brodrick, 
who was soon made Irish Lord Chancellor, Lord Tyrawly, the Commander- 
in-Chief of the forces in Ireland, William King, Archbishop of Dublin and 
a Lords Justice, William Conolly, Chief Commissioner of the Irish 
Revenues, John Forster, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and William 
Whitshed, Chief Justice of the King's Bench. 
12 
At the start of George's reign the Whigs in Britain commenced 
upon a wholesale purge of the Tories from office and Sunderland and 
his Irish Whig associates were eager to do the same in Ireland. 
Sunderland, Addision, and prominent Irishmen, probably including 
Brodrick and Foster, met in London in late-September and early- 
October 1714 in order to decide how to proceed. It was agreed to 
make major changes in the Irish Privy Council. To begin with Addison 
drew up a list of the Council as it stood at the Queen's death. 
Remarks were made alongside the names of the most suspect members 
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together with proposed additions to the Council - Addison then drew 
up a further paper and Sunderland marked those who were to be removed 
while enlarging the list of members to be added. Sunderland then 
presented this document to the King, who approved it, and a final 
statement was prepared including the alterations that had been settled 
and this constituted the new Privy Council. A copy of this 
memorandum was then sent to Dublin and'the new Council was sworn in 
by the Lords Justices on 9 October 1714.13 
After completing the membership of the Privy Council Sunderland 
and his advisers turned to the judiciary. The Lord Chancellor, 
Sir Constantine Phipps, was to be turned out and 'Monsieur Brodrick 
est propose a la consideration de Vostre Majeste pour la place de 
Chancelier d'Irlande, Clest un gentilhomme d1un tres grand bien, tant 
en Angleterre, quIen Irlande... et qui a toujours este un des plus 
e zeles, pour les interets de Vostre Majeste, et de sa succession'. 
William Whitshed was to be made Chief Justice of the King's Bench, 
Joseph Dean, Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and John Forster Chief 
Justice of the Common Pleas; 'touts trois des personnes de grand bien 
dans le pays, tres abiles, et tres qualifies pour ces postes'. 
Mr. Justice Macartney was restored to his place as a puisne judge 
and Jeffrey Gilbert, John Pocklington, Sir John St. Leger and 
Sir Richard Levinge were to be made judges, though the moderate Tory, 
Gilbert Dolben, was to be retained Isans. llesperance qulil pourTa se 
comporter bien a l1avenirl. George Gore was to be Irish Attorney- 
General and Mr. Rogerston, Solicitor-General. All these proposals 
were drawn up in French by Sunderland and then submitted to the King 
for his approval. 
14 
The warrants appointing Forster, Whitshed, Dean, and Brodrick 
passed the Privy Seal on 30 September 1714 and on 9 October Phipps 
was deprived of the Great Seal which was entrusted to Dean until 
Brodrick arrived from England five days later. All the other 
judicial changes went through without any difficulty, apart from the 
attempt to get Levinge to accept a judge's place. That he should 
agree to this idea was seen as being important since it would remove a 
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potential troublemaker from the Irish House of Commons. In 
November 1714 Brodrick and Whitshed told Sunderland that Levinge 
would not undertake a judicial appointment and urged that a place 
should be given to Sir Henry Luther. In response, Sunderland told 
the Archbishop of Dublin: II should have been glad that Sir Richard 
Levinge had accepted of being one of the judges, and will yet hope 
that he may possibly alter his mind, since that place will not be 
disposed of for some time'. 
is The Archbishop was still prepared 
to try to persuade Levinge to accept the position, whereas Brodrick 
disapproved entirely, believing Levinge should not have any employment 
in the administration. The Lord Chancellor repeated his views 
early in the new year, but Sunderland was still prepared to persevere 
much to Brodrick's increasing annoyance. In February 1715 it 
appeared that Levinge might give way, but he stuck to his decision 
and Sunderland's patience was soon at an end. It was decided that 
Serjeant William Caulfield should have the post that had been offered 
to Levinge. 
16 
The Irish Church was another area in which the faithful were to be 
rewarded. In consultation with the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Thomas Tension, Sunderland put forward Timothy Goodwyn for the 
bishopric of Kilmore and Ardagh, Edward Synge for the bishopric of 
Rapho, and Dr. Nicholas Forster for the bishopric of Kilial-OR, -t- The 
Lords Justices' approved these promotions and they were implemented 
between November 1714 and January 1715. The Archbishop of Dublin 
was another source of information on clerical matters for Sunderland 
and he no doubt endorsed King's opinion that it was necessary to 
diminish Tory influence throughout the Church hierarchy. King 
submitted the names of the worthy who merited a Church living and 
Sunderland gave his consent. 
17 
Sunderland's reliance upon Irish counsel is admirably illustrated 
by the changes that took place among the revenue commissioners. To 
begin with it was Forster who instructed Sunderland about the 
directions which ought to be given to the commissioners concerning the 
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disposal of offices. The list of names which Sunderland sent 
to William Conolly in January 1715, with a. recommendation to-be 
employed in the revenue service, was immediately questioned by 
Conolly, Sir Thomas Southwell and Mr. Medlicott. Sunderland was 
only prepared to renew his instances on behalf of Sir John Eccles 
and Colonel Sandford; the other proposals were left entirely to 
the discretion of the Irish. Conolly then told Sunderland that 
Eccles was to be made Collector at Dublin Port and Sandford Collector 
of the Excise at Dublin and though it had not been possible to 
appoint another of Sunderland's nominees to a collectorship at Cork 
a place had been found at Athlone. The Lord Lieutenant's request 
that Mr, Badham. should be retained as Collector at Younghall on pain 
of good behaviour was accepted and after examining the charges 
thought to be prejudicial to Mr. May, another of Sunderland's 
suggestions, they were found to be groundless. Sunderland approved 
these arrangements. 
18 Similarly, with the new Sheriffs who were 
created in October and November 1714 the Lord Lieutenant merely 
observed: 'It was a great satisfaction to me to see so good a list 
of Sheriffs, and particularly that you had been able to fix upon a 
right man for Galway'. 
19 
The difficulties which Sunderland's predecessor, the Duke of 
Shrewsbury, had faced in controlling the Irish Parliament emphasised 
the importance of effective parliamentary management. 
20 Once again, 
however, Sunderland was not in a position to take the initiative. 
Brodrick told him that William Conolly should be put forward as the 
administration's candidate for the Speakership of the House of Commons. 
Forster supported Brodrick as he felt that the Attorney-General was 
not up to the duties expected of a Speaker. When Conolly agreed to 
serve, Sunderland remarked, 'I am very glad that upon Mr. Attorney- 
General's declining the office of Speaker Mr. Conolly has been 
persuaded to accept it, since no man will be more capable than he of 
going throl it and of serving his King and Country'. 
21 It was also 
necessary to tighten the administration's control of the House of 
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Lords and no doubt oxford's peerage creations in England in 1712 
served as a precedent for Sunderland and the Irish. The idea of 
peerage promotions had probably first been discussed by Sunderland 
and the Irishmen in London in 1714. Whitshed sent suggestions to 
Sunderland with Brodrick and Sir John Percival the two most prominent 
names DO his list. The aim was twofold: to reward those of proven 
fidelity and to produce a complacent House of Lords. Sunderland 
approve'd most of Whitshed's recommendations and the Chief Justice 
then told Archbishop King, Forster and Dean. Sunderland then 
advised Brodrick that 'the King having determined to make the peers 
mentioned in the enclosed list Barons of Ireland, in case it be to 
their liking, as by what I have heard there is reason to think it is, 
I must desire your Lordship will please take some proper way of knowing 
their sentiments and what titles they would have'. 
22 Sunderland also 
directed Whitshed to assist settling the details of the new creations. 
Sunderland received further nominations in January and March 1715, while 
Brodrick and Percival were created Lords Middleton and Percival 
respectively in April 171S. On 20 August 171S Sunderland informed 
the Archbishop of Dublin that the King had approved the second set 
of peerage promotions. 
23 
The changes in the Irish administration, the promotions in the Irish 
Church, and the measures taken to discipline the Irish Parliament would 
have been unthinkable if Sunderland had not been able to exploit 
the knowledge and experience of leading Irish Whigs. Sunderland's 
authority as Lord Lieutenant might have been enhanced if he had been 
willing to go to Ireland. It is, however, unlikely that, even with a 
sounder un 
, 
derstanding of Irish affairs, he would have questioned the Vr0f0SQ1E 
ýwpr"rý; oq, made in Ireland for they were unlikely 
to include any whose Whig credentials had not been sufficiently 
attested. Circumstances were different when it came to formulating 
policy. The Irish administration and its British superiors did not 
always agree over what measures should be carried out and it was 
here that differences arose between Sunderland and his Irish advisers, 
Sunderland's position was very weak and he was forced into a subordinate 
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role having to give way to the whims and objections emanating 
from Dublin. He could not tolerate such a relationship and two 
alternatives suggested themselves: either proceed to Ireland to 
try to stamp his authority on proceedings or abnegate his 
responsibilities as Lord Lieutenant. 
On 28 December 1714 Sunderland directed Conolly, Whitshed, 
Brodrick and Forster to consider what heads of bills should be 
prepared by the Irish Privy Council. To save time and money he 
urged that the bill for the additional duties should be one of them 
and that it should have 'a retrospect and charge stock in hand for 
without it the duties will fall much short of what they have formerly 
produced and will be of little advantage'. 
24 The Irishmen felt it 
would be unwise to include such a clause in a money bill begun by 
the Privy Council when a proposal of this nature should have come 
from the House of Commons. Sunderland told Brodrick, 'the reasons 
your Lordship gives against charging stock in hand appear to me 
very strong and I doubt but they will have the same weight with others'. 
25 
The sending over a bill to renew the additional duties was, however, 
approved to Sunderland's satisfaction, while the idea of a charge on 
stock was dropped. 
26 
Sunderland was still concerned that the additional duties alone 
would be insufficient to meet the 'exigencies of the government'. 
27 
Conolly, in reply, argued that in a few years the duties would meet 
the administration's financial needs and he made it clear that the 
Irish Parliament would not approve any proposition for borrowing money 
which Sunderland had tentatively suggested. Sunderland was still 
not convinced, but Conolly stood firm, declaring that the duties 
would yield double in the second year and though some parts of the 
civil and military list might be postponed the prejudice would not 
be great until the arrears were discharged. By this time Sunderland 
realised it was futile to continue pressing his point. He told 
Conolly: 
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the business of the funds must be left 
entirely to you and our other friends 
in Ireland. I shall therefore say no 
more of it than that any scheme of 
running the establishment into debt 
or postponing payments would be no 
means for the King's honour or to the 
satisfaction of those employed under 
him. But I still entertain better 
hopes and persuade myself that before 
the meeting of the Parliament our 
friends will have contrived the 
methods of raising a sufficient supply 
to secure us from these inconveniences 
and themselves from the reproach of 
having been wanting in any point of 28 duty and assistance towards his Majesty. 
Conolly reassured Sunderland that there would be no great arrears 
and that the establishment was unlikely to be run into debt or 
that Sunderland would be inconvenienced in any way. 
29 
Sunderland had 
been forced to give way over the revenue and he also had to make 
concessions concerning the troops which the British government wished 
to subsist in Ireland. 
In the early-eighteenth-century Ireland was seen as a particularly 
convenient location for stationing troops who could not be maintained 
elsewhere. 'To put it crudely, Ireland was regarded by the English 
administration as little more than a garrison. ' 
30 In January 1715 
Sunderland told Brodrick, Tyrawly, and Conolly, that as all the troops 
who had returned from Flanders could not be maintained upon the English 
establishment a force, which would make the army in Ireland up to 
12,000 men, was to be sent to the kingdom. Furthermore, 'that as 
these forces were not provided for beyond Michaelmas last they should 
be put upon the Irish establishment from that time, but not to be any 
charge to that kingdom till the time of their landing there'. 
31 
Dublin was willing to accept Sunderland's proposals on the understanding 
that infantry alone would be dispatched and that they were to remain 
there while the kingdom was maintaining them. 
32 
Encouraged by the positive response from Ireland Sunderland then 
suggested that the troops should be put on the Irish establishment from 
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the previous Michaelmas. This notion was totally unacceptable in 
Ireland. Sunderland told Tyrawly that it would be dropped and that 
had it been left to him no such thought would have beer, entertained 
from the start. After considerable effort Sunderland prevailed 
with the Treasury to issue an order, 
by which those seven batallions are not to 
come upon the Irish establishment till the 
2Sth March [1715], and before that time 
they will, or most of them, be in Ireland 
or far advanced on their march that way. I 
must desire your Lordship [Tyrawly] to inform 
our friends of this transaction, that they 
may see what endeavours are used to do them 
service, which was effectually done in this 
case, and be convined that neither the King 
nor anybody else would endeavour to impose 
upon them anything that should be 
unreasonable or impracticable. 33 
There was delight in Ireland at this news and a week later Sunderland 
advised Tyrawly that the troops were embarking for Ireland and orders 
were to be sent to put them on the Irish establishment from Lady Day. 
34 
Sunderland, however, had again been forced to yield his ground and some 
members of the Irish administration must have wondered how he had 
managed to acquire such a formidable reputation as a politician and 
an administrator. 
The difficulties which faced Sunderland in his attempt to manage 
the Irish administration, and principally his subjection to -vp)'r)7Qn 10 M11'Q) 
destroyed any vestigial interest he had in that kingdom. The state of 
politics and the pressure of business at home had been the initial 
excuse for his not venturing to Ireland, but, though willing to 
transact Irish business, the disputes over the revenue and the army 
led to precipitate action by Sunderland. At the beginning of April 
1715 there were widespread =Eurs that he was unwell. On 12 April 
Addison assured the Archbishop of Dublin that Sunderland had merely 
gone into the country to recover from a feverish indisposition. 
Addison felt compelled to write again that Sunderland had gone to Bath 
and that his distemper was 'nothing but the cholick occasioned by a 
too frequent use of vomits to which the physician added the drinking 
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of small beer in too great quantities when he has found himself a 
little heated'. 35 Sunderland may have been unwell and, if so, 
it was probably caused by his dissatisfaction and irritation at 
being burdened with the Lord Lieutenancy, though it is more certain 
that his alleged illness was a facade behind which he concealed 
his refusal to carry out his duties as Lord Lieutenant. From now on 
Addison, in London, assumed responsibility for Ireland. Sunderland, 
however, did not abstain completely for he was prepared to intervene 
when he felt it was necessary. 
36 
One such occasion arose when the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, 
Joseph Dean, died in May 1715. Lord Chancellor Cowper recommended 
Jeffrey Gilbert to succeed, while Lord Chief Justice Parker nominated 
Sir Richard Levinge. Sunderland had already been embarrassed by 
Levinge and was now determined that no favour should be granted to him. 
On 4 May Sunderland requested Stanhope to dispose of the matter 
quickly in order to prevent Sir Richard obtaining the post 'which 
certainly would be as great a blow to the King's service in Ireland 
as could happen, there not being one Protestant gentleman in Ireland 
that I know of, that has not the worst opinion of him in the world'. 
37 
Sunderland approved Cowper's nomination and directed him to consult 
with Stanhope, Townshend, and Marlborough. He then told Parker that 
he could not support his request on behalf of Levinge as 'it would be 
of the greatest prejudice to the public service'. 
38 Parker tried to 
get Sunderland to change his mind, but met with no success. Gilbert's 
appointment was delayed by the question of who would replace him and 
Sunderland instructed Addison to consult Marlborough and Cowper. 
Addison met Marlborough tw. ice in the first week of June and he informed 
him how important it was to get Gilbert made Chief Baron oil the 
Exchequer and that Sunderland was implacably opposed to Levinge. On 
16 June the King signed the warrant appointing Gilbert and he was 
sworn in for that term, Sunderland expressed his satisfaction to 
Cowper at the promotion and thanked Stanhope for his help. 
39 
Sunderland was also active in helping to counter the threat posed 
by the Jacobites in 1715. On 24 July he directed the Lords Justices 
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to send three of the regiments which had recently arrived in 
Ireland to Scotland. He instructed Lord Tyrawly to remove 
unreliable officers from their commands and asked the Lords Justices 
to inform him how the Protestants in Ireland were provided with arms 
and ammunition; what method they proposed to provide the necessary 
stores which were to be distributed in an emergency; about the 
condition of forts, castles, garrisons and ordnance stores and what 
had been done to put them in good order and repair. The Lord 
Justices gave the necessary orders to- embark the troops for Scotland 
in July and they arrived on 27 August. 
40 Similarly, when Sunderland 
received news in July 1715 that 'honest men' were being turned out of 
the Irish Revenue service and 'ill ones' retained, he directed 
Conolly to inquire into this allegation and he enclosed a letter to 
the Commissioners of the Revenue to dismiss any officers whose loyalty 
was suspect. It turned out that there was some substance to these 
reports and though changes were made in the revenue service it was felt 
essential to retain moderate Tories who provided valuable services; 
Sunderland approved the alterations that were made. 
41 
Ten days later 
Sunderland informed the Lords Justices that owing to his health the 
King had excused his going to Ireland and that he was to be succeeded 
by Lords Grafton and Galway. On 31 August 1715 Sunderland became 
Lord Privy Seal, the post having become vacant on the death of 
Wharton in April 1715.42 
III THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WHIG ASCENDANCY SEPTEMBER 1714 TO MAY 1716 
land recover the reputation of this Kingdom' I
The first eighteen months of the new reign were characterised by a 
vigorous and unrelenting attack by the Whigs upon their political 
adversaries. The Tories were dr-i-ven from office and their leaders 
arraigned by Parliament for their part in the Treaty of Utrecht. 
1715 rebellion also proved advantageous for it allowed the Whigs to 
The 
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stigmatise their Tory opponents as Jacobites and to complete their 
exclusion from power. The Whigs bolstered up their own authority 
by passing the Septennial Act which extended the maximum life of the 
House of Commons from three to seven years. Sunderland derived great 
satisfaction from the renaissance in Whig fortunes, while at the same 
time his own reputation and influence grew following the setbacks 
of 1714.. He overcame the forebodings of the King and the Court and 
his standing improved dramatically. George came to rely upon 
Sunderland more and more in domestic politics and he was 
increasingly the recipient of royal favour. Sunderland's growing 0 
power at Court was complemented by a strengthening of his grip over 
the Whig party and greater influence in the Church. It became 
increasingly obvious that it was Sunderland who would be likely to 
reap the fruits of political superiority. 
The Whigs were determined to enfeeble and demoralise their opponents. 
By October 1714 twenty-five Tory Privy Councillors had been dismissed 
and by the beginning of 1715 only four Tory Lords Lieutenant remained 
in office. Nearly all the county commissions were remodelled by 
Lord Cowper. Tories were removed from important places at Court, 
in the judiciary, the army and navy boards, the Admiralty, the Board 
of Trade and the revenue departments. Parliament, which had not 
been summoned after the King's landing at Greenwich, was dissolved on 
5 January 1715 and the royal proclamation for the new Parliament 
was unashamedly pro-Whig. The writs for the election were issued on 
15 January and were returnable two months later. The Tories were 
confident of their chances but the loss of the four London seats to 
the Whigs was an ominous sign and was to influence significantly the 
results in other large boroughs. In all, the Tories lost nineteen 
county seats in England and Wales yet it appears that their defeat 
in 171S was largely due 'to the electoral system rather than the 
electorate'. 
43 It was the seats in which the representative system 
was unbalanced that the Tories suffered the bulk of their losses. 
Nevertheless, the 'results were a great tribute to the industry, 
alertness and organizing ability of the ministry'. 
44 A Tory majority 
209 
of 240 had been transformed into a Whig lead of 65, not including 
the Scottish seats. Despite having made major gains in Scotland, the 
Whigs there were already split. The tKo factions centred around 
the Squadrone and the Duke of Argyll; Whig representation was divided 
between them. In the election of the Scottish representative peers 
the Court list was carried, with the help of some intimidation, 
almost unanimously. The Tory cause had not been helped by the 
Pretender issuing a manifesto which was sent to prominent figures 
in England, including Sunderland. 45 There is little evidence about 
Sunderland's activities during the course of the election though it is 
undeniable that he would have been active, enthusiastic, and industrious 
on behalf of the Whigs. He certainly anticipated the forthcoming 
Parliament with delight telling the Archbishop of Dublin: 'We have, 
God be praised, as good a prospect of a Parliament here as there ever 
wast. 
46 
The Tories, however, were not the only ones who had seen 
significant changes since George I came to the throne in 1714. 
The Whig party also underwent considerable changes particularly 
in the composition of its leadership. The Junto literally 
disintegrated; Wharton died in April 1715 followed by Halifax in 
October of the same year and finally Somers in April 1716. Orford 
remained at the Admiralty and he was in fact to be the last survivor 
of the Junto, after Sunderland's death in 1722., not dying himself until 
1727. With the vacuum at the head of the Whig party a new and younger 
generation of Whigs came to the fore. The most prominent of them 
were Charles, Viscount Townshend, Robert Walpole, and James Stanhope. 
Townshend and Walpole had been political allies since their entrance 
into Parliament, a connection which had been strengthened by Townshend's 
marriage to Walpole's sister Dorothy in 1713, and they stood at the head 
of the Whig interest in Norfolk. Though a member of the House of 
Lords Townshend's most significant contribution during Anne's reign 
was his negotiation of the Anglo-Dutch Barrier Treaty in 1709 and it 
was his diplomatic experience which resulted in his appointment as 
Secretary of State for the North in 1714. Robert Walpole, despite 
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being second to Townshend at this time, had built up a good reputation 
as a politician and an . administrator. He was regarded as a capable 
manager of the House of Commons, he had been one of the prosecuting 
counsel at Sacheverell's trial, and had served as Secretary-at-War 
under Marlborough. At George's accession he had been given the 
post of Paymaster General of the forces and following Halifax's death 
he was made Chancellor of the Exchequer. James Stanhope had- 5pený 
most of the previous reign as a soldier and a diplomat in Spain and 
from 1706 to 1710 he had been in regular correspondence with Sunderland, 
when he was Southern Secretary, and they had developed a close and 
effective working relationship which laid the foundation for their 
partnership under George I. Though much of his time had been spent 
abroad)Stanhope, like Walpole, had-been a member of the prosecution 
against Sacheverell and after his return to England in 1712, as 
Sunderland had done, he had devoted himself to the Hanoverian 
Succession. Stanhope's diplomatic and military experience helped 
him to secure the post of Secretary of State for the South. 
47 The 
Whigs, despite their newly established authority faced difficulties 
of their own. 
The election of 1715 saw the Whigs recover a majority in the House 
of Commons for the first time since 1710 but it was noticeable that 
they were no longer the tight-knit and coherent group they had been 
under Anne. Marlborough had wanted the position of Groom of the 
Stole but had been fobbed off with the offices of Captain-General 
and Master General of the Ordnance and he blamed Townsh-end and Walpole 
for his not being made Groom of the Stole. Furthermore, there were 
jealousies among leading Whigs in the army. Argyll bitterly resented 
Marlborough's military reputation and was vehemently opposed to 
Marlborough's protege, Cadogan. 
48 As a result Sunderland, with his 
strong ties with both Marlborough and Cadogan, must have regarded 
Argyll as a potential enemy, especially when it is remembered that the 
Argyll faction in Scotland was the chief rival of Sunderland's 
Scottish alliesthe Squadrone. Sunderland, meanwhile, had animosities 
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of his own. He held Townshend responsible for his relegation to 
the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland and was incensed at Townshend's 
appointment as Secretary of State and the arrogant and disdainiul 
way he was treated by Townshend. It was noted that Sunderland 
'had no good will to the Lord Townshend by whom he thought himself 
unwortýly used and, as he called it, treated like his footman'. 
49 
Not only were there personal differences between Townshend and 
Sunderland but also important disagreements on foreign policy which 
were reflected in the divisions in the Whig party. Sunderland, 
as he had been from the start of his political career, was convinced 
that Britain must play an active and energetic part in the affairs 
of Europe. Townshend, and a section of the Whig party, had begun 
to question the merits of this policy particularly when it seemed that 
British resources and interests were being sacrificed to further 
Hanoverian ends. 
so Sunderland had no time for these anxieties as he 
told Townshend in 1716: 
I must not omit too acquainting your Lordship 
that the King is very much surprised at the 
strange notion that seems at present to 
prevail, as if the Parliament was not to 
concern themselvesin anything that happens 
in these parts of the world [Hanover], which 
he looks upon not only as exposing him to 
all kind of affronts, but even to ruin. And, 
indeed, this notion is nothing but the old 
Tory one, that England can subsist by itself 
whatever becomes of the rest of Europe, which 
has been so justly exploded by the Whigs ever 
since the Revolution. 51 
Sunderland's commitment to George's foreign policy both as Elector 
of Hanover and King of Great Britain explains his growing influence 
with the King and also accounts for his close alliance with Stanhope 
who shared Sunderland's views on foreign policy. 
52 
Parliament assembled on 17 March 1715 and four days later the Lord 
Chancellor read the King's speech to both Houses. In a conspicuous 
reference to the late ministry the King observed: 'I... thank my 
faithful and loving subjects for that zeal and firmness that hath 
been shown in defence of the Protestant Succession against all the 
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open and secret practices that have been used to defeat it and I 
shall never forget the obligations I have to those who have 
distinguished themselves upon this occasion'. 
53 Sunderland was a 
member of the committee to draw up an address of thanks, which Bolton 
reported on 22 March. It provocatively declared that the King, 
with the help of Parliament, would be able to 'recover the reputation 
of this kingdom in foreign parts, the loss of which, we hope to 
convince the world by our actions, is by no means to be imputed to 
the nation in general'. 
54 Despite some opposition the address was 
carried by 66 votes to 33. The Commons were especially determined to 
pillory the former administration and Robert Walpole moved the 
address of thanks which condemned the previous ministry and proclaimed 
55 
that its leaders would be brought to account, 
The attack on the leading Tories had been conceived long before 
Parliament met. In December 1714 Strafford had been recalled from 
the Dutch Republic and he was summoned before the Privy Council in 
January 1715. At this meeting Nottingham told Strafford that he 
should deliver up all his papers relating to the peace negotiations 
at Utrecht. Strafford prevaricated replying that he had done his 
duty at the conferences and that he had only been the second delegate 
at these discussions. When he had withdrawn, it was argued that 
Strafford should be told that the King would give immediate orders 
for securing his papers. Sunderland was 'of the same opinion and 
also that other persons should be sent, with such as the Earl of 
Sunderland should appoint, to seal up all boxes etc., with his baggage'. 
56 
Sunderland's suggestion was accepted and Stanhope and Townshend 57 
accompanied Strafford to his house and removed two boxes of papers. 
These papers were almost certainly among those which Stanhope 
delivered to the Commons in April 1715. The documents were referred 
to a select committee under the chairmanship of Walpole. On 9 June 
Walpole read the committee's report and two days later Bolingbroke 
was impeached, though by this time he had already fled to France. 
Shortly afterwards Oxford and Ormonde were likewise impeached for High 
" 13 
Treason, while Strafford was impeached for High Crimes and 
Misdemeanours. The articles against Oxford came up to the Lords 0 
on 9 July and Lord Coningsby impeached him at the bar of the House. 
An attempt was made to adjourn the consideration of the articles until 
the following Monday, but Sunderland, Nottingham, Axgyll, and Townshend 
maintained that they should be examined immediately. This was agreed 
to by 86 votes to 54. It was then moved to consult the judges to 
see if the charges constituted treason. This suggestion was opposed 
by Sunderland, Cowper, Argyll, Montrose, Nottingham, Townshend, 
Dorset, and Islay and it was rejected by 84 votes to S2. The House 
decided to commit Oxford to the Tower, but when he-pleaded to be 
allowed to remain at his own house due to ill-health it was carried 
with the support of Sunderland and Shrewsbury. In August Oxford 
petitioned the Lords to have access to the papers which had been 
delivered to the secret committee. Sunderland was a member of the 
Lords'committee which granted Oxford's request. Bolingbroke was 
soon joined in France by Ormonde and both were declared guilty of 
High Treason by an Act of Attainder. Strafford, like Oxford, remained 
to face his accusers, but before real progress could be made the 
outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion shifted attention elsewhere. 
58 
There had been widespread unrest, particularly in the south and 
west of England, throughout the summer of 1715 and in July the King 
informed Parliament that he had received information of a projected 
invasion; both Lords and Commons expressed their indignation and 
affirmed their loyalty to the Crown. Prominent Jacobite suspects were 
arrested and the arms and horses of Papists were seized in London and 
in other towns. The militia were called out and troops were 
stationed at Oxford and other disaffected places in the west of England. 
By its action the government extinguished any hope of a rebellion in 
southern England and the rebels were forced to concentrate upon 
Scotland and the Anglo-Scottish border. The Earl of Mar launched 
the rising in Scotland on 26 August and by September the Jacobite 
army had captured Perth, though at the same time troops sent to 
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Scotland by Sunderland from Ireland had arrived. The Duke of 
Argyll was given command of the government forces and he concentrated 
his ai-T.. y at Stirling in order to prevent Mar advancing into the Lowlands. 
Jacobite hopes suffered a severe blow in August with the death of 
Louis XIV which deprived them of effective foreign support, while 
the British government could apply to the Dutch for the 6,000 troops 
promised as aid under the terms of the Barrier Treaty. Part of 
Mar's army managed to join up with Jacobites in the north of England, 
but after advancing into Lancashire they were surrounded at Preston 
where they surrendered on 14 November 171S. The day before Mar and 
Argyll had faced each other at Sheriffmuir and though the encounter was 
indecisive it was clear that the initiative now lay with Argyll. By 
the time the Pretender arrived in Scotland the rebellion was largely 
at an end and all he coulct do was to re-embark with Mar for France 
on 4 February 1716.59 
It was Stanhope and Townshend, the two Secretaries of State, who 
bore the main administrative burden during the rebellion. 
60 
Sunderland, however, was responsible for sending important re-inforcements 
to Scotland and he had also made inquiries into unrest at Bath. 
61 
He drew up a plan in the event that: 
the rebellion had produced a war in this 
country [England] to have the kingdom 
divided into several districts or 
associations of several counties together, 
and to be put under some person of the 
best interest and estates in each division., 
and well affected to the government, who 
was to have power of raising forces etc., 
and so to have had several armies in the 
several parts of England as auxiliaries to 
the Grand Army. 62 
Sunderland's zeal to bring those responsible for the Treaty of Utrecht 
to account and his steadfastness to the House of Hanover during the 
rebellion cannot have failed to have impressed the King. 
During the course of the unrest in January 1716 the King notified 
Parliament that the Pretender had landed in Scotland. Sunderland and 
Townshend were the most prominent members of the Lords' committee which 
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was appointed to draw up the address of thanks to the King for his 
speech. Sunderland's influence is clearly discernible in the tone 
of the address. It declared that the House was convinced, 
that it is not only requisite for the security, 
but also for the future ease and interest of 
your Majesty's subjects to exert themselves 
on this occasion, in a more than ordinary 
manner, to put a speedy end to these present 
disorders and to prevent those calamities 
which must attend a lingering rebellion 
within the kingdom, and to discourage its 
being supported by any assistance from 
abroad. And that we will, to the utmost of 
our power, assist your Majesty not only in 
subduing the present rebellion, but in 
destroying the seeds and causes of it, that 
the like disturbances may never arise again 
to impair the blessing of your Majesty's 
reign. 63 
The Whig offensive was to be resumed against the Tories and their 
arguments that all Tories were Jacobites at heart now had greater 
credence thanks to the rebellion, 
The Jacobite Lords, who had been captured at Preston, had been 
impeached for High Treason in January 1716. They were found guilty 
and condemned to death on 20 February in Westminster Hall. Their 
executions were ordered for 6 March, but there was great pressure upon 
the government to grant a reprieve. When the matter was debated in 
Parliament the ministry succeeded in adjourning the discussion in the 
Commons by a slender majority, but in the Lords on 27 February 
Annandale moved to address the King to grant a respite to the 
prisoners and he was seconded by Nottingham and Aylesford. Townshend 
and the Whigs tried to get the issue adjourned, but they were 
defeated and the motion was approved by five votes. Sunderland, 
Cowper, Orford, and Townshend then proposed an addition to the 
address that no reprieve should be given without len tirer 
quelque eclairesment sur le fait de la conspiration et obliger ces 
seigneurs condemnez dlen declarer ce qulils scavoient'. 
64 The House 
would appear to have rejected this idea for there is no such clause 
in the Lords' address of 22 February 1716.65 The government did, 
16 
however, carry a motion that the King should only defer judgement 
where the Lord in person appeared to merit such consideration. In 
the even-z, only Derwentwater and Kenmure were executed, the others 
either escaped or were pardoned. 
65 
The intervention of Nottingham and Aylesford on behalf of the 
Jacobites gave the Whigs an opportunity to get them dismissed and 
there were rumours that Sunderland would replace Nottingham as 
Lord President. More significantly, in"April 1716, Devonshire 
introduced a bill into the Lords to repeal the Triennial Act arguing 
that the danger and uncertainty of the times required the extension 
of the maximum life of the House of Commons from three to seven years. 
There was strong opposition to the bill but it passed the House with 
large majorities. In the Commons the opposition had little hope of 
defeating the bill and its third reading was approved on 7 May by 
264 votes to 121. Sunderland took no part in the debates in the 
upper House owing to the illness and death of his wife on 15 April. 
Tory proscription was now complete and the Whig supremacy seemed 
assured. 
66 
As the Whigs were establishing their predominance Sunderland's 
authority was growing rapidly. Sunderland's political attitudes both 
in foreign and domestic policy gratified George I immensely. 
Sunderland was allowed to remain in England while he was Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland and his appointment as Lord Privy Seal in 
August 171S is the first clear indication of the King's favourable 
disposition towards Sunderland. Though George I would have been 
impressed by Sunderland's willingness to prosecute the leaders of 
Queen Anne's last ministry Sunderland's leniency towards Oxford in 
August 1715 would almost certainly strike a responsive note with the 
King; it may not be just a coincidence that Sunderland became Lord 
Privy Seal in the same month. It was Sunderland who drew up the 
King's speech to Parliament on 9 January 1716. In March 1716 a bill 
was introduced into the Commons to allow Sunderland 'to take in 
England, the Oath of office as one of the Vice-Treasurer's and receivers 
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General and Paymaster General of all his Ma3estyls revenues in the 
kingdom of Ireland, and to qualify himself thereby for the enjoyment 
cf the said office'. 
67 
The bill was approved-by Parliament in 
April 1716. In June it was rumoured that Sunderland was to be 
awarded the Green Ribbon of Perth and Mar and the next month he was 
created sole Vice-Treasurer and Treasurer at War in Ireland. 
68 
By 
mid-1716 it was apparent that Sunderland had eased the apprehensions 
that the King had for him at his accession and was on the way to 
becoming the King's most important English minister. 
Sunderland, in conjunction with his ally Charles Trimnell, Bishop 
of Norwich, was gradually asserting his primacy over the Church of 
England. At the start of 1715 Sunderland and Cowper were active 
in distributing Church livings and during 1715 and 1716 Sunderland was 
increasingly associated with William Wake, successively Bishop of 
Lincoln and Archbishop of Canterbury. At the end of 1715 Sunderland 
and the Bishop of Norwich helped to obtain the bishopric of Bangor 
for the Whig controversialist, Benjamin Hoadly. 
69 
By 1716 it was obvious that Sunderland was the rising power in 
the Whig party and recognition of this fact led the Duke of Newcastle 
to unite his political fortunes with those of Sunderland. Newcastle 
was related to both Sunderland and Townshend, and it was Sunderland along 
with the Earl of Lincoln, who had introduced Lord Pelham, as Newcastle 
then was, into the Lords as Viscount Houghton and Earl of Clare on 
21 March 1715. To begin with Newcastle was primarily connected with 
Townshend, but by June 1716 he had clearly shifted his allegiance to 
Sunderland to whom he looked for directions, When Marlborough 
suffered a paralytic stroke at the end of May 1716 Sunderland was 
in touch with Newcastle instructing him how to proceed in and out of 
Parliament. 70 
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IV SUNDERLAND'S DRIVE FOR SUPREMACY MAY 1716 TO APRIL 1717 
'it is hard to conceive how so much viZZainy and 
infatuation couLd possess the heart of any man' 
By the summer of 1716 circumstances were very much in Sunderland's 
favour. Unfortunately, his authority was not undisputed and there 
were leading Whig politicians who would not tolerate being subordinate 
to him. Townshend and Argyll were two men who were likely to suffer 
a political eclipse as a result of Sunderland's growing power and 
were also likely to prove major obstacles to his assuming the leadership 
of the Whig party. Sunderland had important grievances both personal 
and political against both men, Sunderland resented Townshend's 
position as Secretary of State together with his overbearing attitude 
and they disagreed about how far Britain should be willing to support 
Hanover lan foreign policy. Argyll had helped to bring down 
Sunderland and the Whig government in 1710 and he was an enemy of 
Sunderland's political allies both in England and Scotland. 
Furthermore, there was also the danger that these two politicians 
might unite against Sunderland -(LSý. seemed increasingly probable 
during 1716. Sunderland., with the support of the King, Stanhope, 
Newcastle and Cadogan, felt confident that he could oust Argyll and 
Townshend and establish his position as the King's leading minister. 
He used Townshend's reluctance to further Hanoverian interests in 
Europe and the tensions which existed between the King and Prince of 
Wales to turn the King against the Secretary of State in the same way 
he had used Argyll's devotion to the Prince of Wales to have George I 
bring about the Duke's dismissal from office. Sunderland, however, 
made one miscalculation by revealing the arguments he had used with 
the King against Townshend and this guaranteed that he would n. ot be 
at the head of a united Whig party. 
The King was determined to visit Hanover in 1716 even in the face 
of the combined opposition of Sunderland, Stanhope, Townshend, 
Devonshire, Marlborough and Cowper. In the absence of the King the 
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Prince of Wales would act as Regent and not only would the Prince 
have greater power, but the influence of his Groom of the Stole ana 
favourite adviser, the Duke of Argyll, would in consequence be 
enhanced; a position which he would undoubtedly use to the 
detriment of Sunderland, Marlborough, and Cadogan. Even more 
alarming were reports that 'the strict friendship struck by the 
Duke of Argyll with Mr. Walpole and Lord Townshend has produced a 
very good effect and entirely strengthens their interest. And the 
Duke of Marlborough being unlikely to come again to business, has, 
as is said, weakened all that side of interest'. 
71 If the combined 
strength of the Argyll and Townshend factions worked-against him and 
dominated the Regency Administration this would be a major setback 
to Sunderland's aspirations and so he decided to strike quickly and 
decisively against his opponents. Sunderland and Cadogan, upon the 
news of Marlborough's stroke in May 1716, went to visit the Duke at 
St. Albans where they planned their strategy; Argyll was to be 
dealt with first. 
72 
Sunderland's position was strengthened by the backing he received 
from the King's Hanoverian ministers who were now disillusioned with 
Townshend and Walpole because of the latter's opposition to German 
interference in English politics. Sunderland, Cadogan and the 
Hanoverians tried to secure the dismissal of Argyll, who had 
-ary of State for engineered the resignation of Montrose as Secret 
Scotland in 1715, and hoped to replace him with Roxburghe. The King 
was willing to appoint Roxburghe, but this alteration was prevented 
by the intervention of Townshend, Walpole, and Stanhope. Sunderland 
then tried to check Argyll indirectly by reducing the powers which 
the Prince of Wales could exercise as Regent, Sunderland drew up a 
list of prerogatives which the King reserved to himself, while the 
Prince acted in his absence, and when the Prince objected to the restraints 
Sunderland was ready to have him omitted from the Regency Council. 
Faced with this prospect the Prince eventually agreed to Sunderland's 
proposals to curtail his power. In the conduct of foreign policy the 
Prince was not allowed to make any decisions without the King's personal 
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approval. The Prince was unable to make any important civil or 
military appointments and in Parliament he was, as far as was 
possible, to 6ithhold the royal assent to bills until the King 
returned from Hanover. Encouraged by this success Sunderland once 
more turned his attention against Argyll who had urged the Pri*nce 
not to accept any limitations upon his authority as Regent. In 
using this opportunity Sunderland again obtained the approval of the 
King who on this occasion was unwilling to tolerate any opposition. 
Argyll and his brother Islay were removed from all the offices they 
held under the Crown and the Prince of Wales was forced to dismiss 
Argyll as his Groom of the Stole. Argyll's removal was viewed as 
a blow to Townshend and Walpole, but Sunderland was unable to proceed 
against Townshend because of the King's departure for Hanover, 
73 
Sunderland's triumph over Argyll demonstrated the intimacy and 
strength of his relations with the King and this revelation was of 
great significance for the Southern Secretary James Stanhope. 
Stanhope had been on good terms with Townshend and Walpole and 
together they had defeated Sunderland's first attempt to remove Argyll, 
but Stanhope, who believed in bold and assertive action in foreign 
policy, was becoming more and more concerned about Townshend's 
reluctance to promote Hanoverian interests in the Baltic. 
74 Stanhope, 
conscious of Sunderland's power and aware that he and Sunderland agreed 
that it was necessary to support the King's Hanoverian interests in 
Europe, was, like Newcastle, ready to shift his allegiance to 
Sunderland. At the end of July 1716 Sunderland wanted leave to 
visit the continent to continue his schemes against Townshend. 
wrote to Stanhope: 
the King having been so good as to allow me. 
to go to Aix-la-Chapelle, this latter 
season, to drink the waters Ihave since 
mentioned it to the Prince who has been 
pleased to allow me the same liberty. I 
acquainted his royal highness that, it would 
be necessary to appoint commissioners to 
execute the office of Privy Seal during my 
absence.,. and that Mr. Southwell, Mr, Vernon.,. 
and Mr. Andrew Charlton... would be very proper 
persons. He was pleased to agree to it, and 
ordered me to write to you ... , 
Lord Townshend 
also writes to you about it. 15 
He 
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The King readily agreed to Sunderland's nominations and Stanhope 
advised Sunderland that after he had taken the waters at Aix 'you 
should take a tour to Hanover. I can offer you as good a lodging 
as you will find there and a hearty welcome'. 
76 
The willingness of the Prince and Townshend to assist Sunderland's 
departure seems inexplicable given his recent conduct, yet the fact 
was that Sunderland, with great cunning, had allayed their anxieties 
about his behaviour. Like Robert Walpole, Sunderland recognised 
the extent to which Princess Caroline influenced the Prince of Wales 
and he successfully cultivated his interest with her. 
77 Caroline 
told Lady Cowper that she preferred Sunderland to Townshend and that 
Sunderland had 'owned to her that he had been for the restrictions 
and said I shall be the same whenever I see the like occasion. He 
owned he was for displacing the Duke of Argyll but not in the manner 
they did'. 
78 Sunderland convinced Robert Walpole of his friendship 
and Walpole informed Stanhope at the end of August: 
Lord Sunderland left us and will soon be with 
you. We parted with all the professions and 
assurances of mutual friendship and union that 
was possible, He seemed indeed sensible of the 
ill consequences of the measures he had engaged 
in, and seemed to return to his senses, and do 
his best endeavours to set things right again 
when he had set them wrong. 79 
Likewise, 'Lord Sunderland took leave of Lord Townshend with a thousand 
protestations that he would do nothing to hurt any of them, and that 
80 
his main intention in going was to persuade the King to come soon back 
Before he left for Europe Sunderland and Cadogan visited 
Marlborough at Bath in the first week of August and it appears that 
? nothing was talked of... but the great changes that were to be done 
when the King came over'. 
81 Sunderland was impatient to leave 
England as he told the Duchess of Montagu)II never was more concerned 
than at my being detained by business in England a week longer than I 
designed'. 82 Sunderland and Cadogan, who was being sent to The 
Hague to watch Horatio Walpole, the minister and plenipotentiary at 
the Dutch capital, departed on 25 August 1716 and arrived in Brussels 




Sunderland and Stanhope, meanwhile, dissembled with Townshend 
and Walpole. Stanhope was trusted implicity by the ministers in 
England, for they were unaware that he was now allied with Sunderland, 
to such an extent that a private means of communication was set up 
between them using Stephen Poyntz an under-Secretary of State. At 
the beginning of September Stanhope informed Townshend and Walpole, 
through Poyntz: 
you may be perfectly eased of any 
apprehensions from one quarter, since 
Itwas with difficulty that I prevailed 
this morning for leave, that Lord 
Sunderland should come hither after 
drinking the water of Aix, and you will 
easily imagine if it had not been 
granted where the fault would have been 
laid, so I really did press it and 
obtained it with difficulty. 84 
In early-October Sunderland wrote to Townshend hoping 'matters go on 
smoothly and quietly with you at home. I shall always endeavour to 
contribute all in my power towards 
Lordship to present my humble duty 
Further assurances of loyalty were 
told Townshend that 'my Lord Sunde 
their doing so ... I beg your 
to their Royal Highnesses' . 
85 
sent in October 
86 
and Stanhope 
rland you will imagine is not 
idle and truly so far as I can contribute to determine him my 
endeavours will not be wanting'. 
87 
Sunderland arrived, at Hanover at the end of October and set about 
undermining Townshend's position, One of the strongest weapons 
Sunderland possessed was the jealousy which existed between the King 
and the Prince of Wales. As Guardian of the realm the Prince made 
full use of the meagre opportunities which had been left to him by 
Sunderland. He regularly attended Cabinet meetings, mastering the 
business that was discussed, and extensively and ostentatiously 
courted public goodwill. Bothmer felt that the Prince was abusing 
his authority and reported to Hanover that he was courting such 
dissident Whigs as Argyll, together with Tories and even Jacobites. 
88 
Sunderland played on the King's apprehensions by accusing Townshend 
and Walpole of 'having entered into engagements with the Prince and 
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the Duke of Argyll and formed designs against the King's authorityi. 
89 
It was this argument which proved the key to Sunderland's success, for 
as Townsliend observed: 
I found myself removed from being Secretary, 
by a person so near the King as Lord 
Sunderland grounded on a charge of the 
highest nature ... These are all the reasons I have yet heard for my disgrace. Lord 
Sunderland, indeed, did sometime ago write 
me a letter in one of his frenzy fits, in 
which he lays down very extraordinary 
notions, as such doubts as he will find 
very impracticable as far as they relate 
to this country upon the subject of the 
northern affairs: but I made him no answer 
to his letter. 90 
As Townshend mentioned in this letter Sunderland had also exploited 
the difference of opinion between himself and Townshend over foreign 
policy to turn George I against the Northern Secretary. As Elector 
of Hanover George was a member of an anti-Swedish coalition in 
northern Europe. His chief concern was to obtain control of the 
duchies of Bremen and Verden from Sweden in which he was eager to 
employ the British navy, though Britain was nominally at peace with 
Sweden, to further his ends. George also wanted French support for 
his northern policy because of his deteriorating relations with 
Russia. He was determined to conclude the treaty which Stanhope and 
Dubois, the French foreign minister, had been negotiating in the summer 
of 1716. Townshend had begun to have doubts about the use of 
British resources to further Hanoverian ambitions and he did not share 
the urgency of the King and Stanhope to get the alliance with France 
completed at The Hague. Sunderland, with his unreserved commitment to 
the King's interests abroad)was able to secure the help of Bernstorff 
to increase the pressure on the King to replace Townshend as Secretary 
of State. When Stanhope demanded an explanation from Townshend about 
the delays in London and The Hague in completing the treaty with 
France 91 Sunderland told Townshend: 
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but upon my arrival here, and Mr. Secretary 
Stanhope's having acquainted me with the 
treaty itself, and every step taken in it; 
I was entirely convinced that no 
negotiation had ever been managed with 
more pains and prudence, nor no treaty ever 
brought to a conclusion more glorious, nor 
more advantageous to the King and England; 
especially under the circumstances Europe 
is like to be in, by these proceedings of 
the Czar, the King of Prussia, etc. which 
very probably may make France, take a 
pretence from these delays., to avoid signing 
at last, and what is more yet is, that the 
occasions of this delay, leave it in the 
power of France to say it is not their 
fault. I am sincerely concerned at 
anything that may be prejudicial to the 
King's service, and particularly at anything 
that may not rightly be understood among 
those in his service, that always have, and 
always ought to act cordially together; and 
that is the single reason why I say anything 
upon so unpleasant a subject. I must therefore 
be so plain as to tell you that I never saw 
the King resent anything so much as this 
affair, in which he thinks, not only 
Mr. Secretary Stanhope but himself not well 
used; and indeed I think, it wants to be 
explained. 92 
The King, as a consequence of Sunderland's efforts, was prepared to 
dismiss Townshend and in December a courier arrived from Hanover with 
the news that the Secretary of State had been relegated to the Lord 
Lieutenancy of Ireland. 
After disposing of Argyll and Townshend, Sunderland was now 
concerned with uniting the other Whigs around him, Apart from 
transferring Townshend to Ireland the only other ministerial change 
in England was taking the Privy Seal out of commission and giving it to 
the Duke of Kingston, Sunderland was intent upon 3aininj. control of 
Scotland as a further check to Argyll, Roxburghe was made Secretary 
of State for Scotland, the Duke of Montrose took over the Great Seal, 
and Lord Polwarth became Lord Treasurer. 
93 
On 15 December N. S. 
Stanhope wrote to Walpole that the King was uneasy having received: Is 
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many advices, which came neither through my 
hands nor Lord Sunderland's. But I cannot 
help observing to you, that he is jealous 
of certain intimacy's with the two brothers 
[Argyll and Islay]. I hope his Majesty's 
presence in England, and the behaviour of 
our friends in the Cabinet, will remove these 
jealousies. No man can contribute more to 
this than yourself, and I must tell you that 
my Lord Sunderland, as well as myself, have 
assured the King that you will do so. You 
know that ill offices have been done you 
here which might have made some impression 
if my Lord Sunderland and I had not in good 
earnest endeavoured to prevent it. 94 
Walpole's attitude was not promising as he revealed to Sunderland when 
thanking him 'for the good offices you have done me with the King 
and must think myself very unhappy that they were not necessary, with 
this comfort that I hope his Majesty will one time be convinced that I 
have served him with zeal, fidelity, and integrity'. 
95 Sunderland 
now committed a fatal mistake. 
In order to get Orford's support Sunderland wrote to him and 
recounted the accusations he had made to the King concerning the 
association, of Townshend and Walpole with the Prince of Wales and 
Argyll, Orford, who was violently opposed to using the navy in 
-o the Baltic to serve Hanoverian ends, immediately showed the letter t 
Townshend. 96 Townshend could hardly contain his anger and resentment. 
He wrote to Simon van Slingelandt: 
the fatal consequences of any misunderstanding 
between the King and the Prince are so very 
obvious and the bare insinuation of such a 
design as is implied in Lord Sunderland's 
letter, is a charge of so high and extensive 
a nature, that it is hard to conceive how 
so much villainy and infatuation could 
possess the heart of any man as to suggest 
such an infamous accusation, not only without 
evidence, but without the least colour or pretence 
And I defy my Lord Sunderland, or anyone else, to 
produce one single instance of my having made an 
ill use of the confidence with which his royal 
highness was pleased to honour me, or of the 
Prince's having invaded the regal prerogative 
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in any the minutest branch, or having deviated 
in any particular of his behaviour, since his 
Majesty's leaving England... So that upon the 
whole, I am satisfied you will agree with me 
in thinking, that after being turned out of 
the Secretary's office in such a manner, my 
accepting the Lieutenancy of Ireland; under 
the circumstances abovementioned, would have 
appeared to the world like a confession of 
some degree of guilt, and a tacit compounding 
for pardon. 97 
It was the discovery of the charges Sunderland had made against 
Townshend and Walpole that introduced such bitterness into the 
dispute and made it unlikely that the Whigs would be able to remain 
a united party. 
With the threat that. Townshend would not accept the Lord 
Lieutenancy of Ireland and with the added danger that Walpole, who 
was so prominent in managing the House of Commons, would stand With 
him, Sunderland realised that his letter to Orford had been a grave 
error. When the King left Hanover in January 1717 Sunderland and 
Stanhope met Cadogan at The Hague to decide what to do next. They 
decided to try to persuade the Dutch, who were deeply concerned by 
Townshend's dismissal, to urge him to accept the Irish Viceroyalty. 
Stanhope wrote to Walpole that he and Sunderland were ready to do all 
they could to make Townshend easy. Three days later Baron 
Duyvenvoorde informed Townshend that Sunderland and Stanhope had 
assured him Ique si vous avez la complaisance de ceder en ceci a la 
volonte du Roy en acceptant la Vicerouate d'Ireland, S. M. vous 
donnera dans peu de temps toutes les marques de sa faveur, que vous 
voudrez demander ou souhaiter'. 
98 As for Sunderland's letter to 
Orford, Duyvenvoo-rde declared: 
my Lord Sunderland, M. Stanhope et M. de 
I- Bernstorff mlont fort assouree que my Lord 
Sunderland n1a rien contribue contre vous. 
Pespere qulil pourra vous per. suader de ceci, 
et que tous ceus qui sont interessez dans 
la lettre qulil a eu 11imprudence dlecrire 'a 
vous oublient ce qui y est contenu, a fin que 
la paix et lunion soient retablies dans le 
parti, et que les malintentionnez ne 
profitent pas de vOtre desunion, 99 
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The King also assisted Sunderland when he arrived back in London and 
had a long interview with Townshend and Stanhope. After Townshend 
had been assured that he need not go to Ireland he kissed hands as 
Lord Lieutenant; 100 the reconciliation seemed unlikely to endure 
for very long. 
With Townshend's removal from the Secretaryship Sunderland 
appeared to have established his ascendancy. Bonet obserVed that 
Sunderland lagira derriere le rideau et sans avoir de department pour 
les affaires celui qulil a de Vice Tresorier d'Irland'. 
101 Though 
he did not hold an office which conferred Cabinet status Sunderland 
was present at Cabinet meetings. 
102 It was confidently asserted 
that 'Lord Sunderland is looked upon by everybody to be the greatest Cý 
man at Court'. 
103 Similarly, 'Lord Sunderland is thought to be at 
the head of all councils'. 
104 The Duke of Argyll, who had experienced 
Sunderland's power at first hand, told his brotherithe Earl of 
Islay that Sunderland 'seems to have more power than I'm afraid is 
consistent with the welfare of the King and Country'. 
105 There is 
little doubt that at the beginning of 1717 Sunderland was the King's 
first minister, but he would not preside over a united Whig 
administration for very much longer. The affairs of northern Europe 
once more provided the stimulus for dissension, 
The difficulties which Charles XII was facing in raising finance 
to allow Sweden to continue fighting in the Northern War led to his 
ministers in London, Paris, and, The Hague entering into discussions 
with the Jacobites. In return for financial support they promised 
military assistance for a Jacobite insurrection in Scotland. The 
British government was kept well informed of these negotiations and 
in January 1717 at a Cabinet Council i-t was decided to apprehend 
the Swedish minister in London)Count Gyllenborg, together with his 
papers. It was then agreed to request the States General to arrest 
Baron G6rtz, Charles XII's adviser, who was then at The Hague; to 
stop the mail boats from England for twenty-four hours; and to inform 
the British resident at Stockholm of these developments. 
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On 3 February 1711" the Lords of the Committee decided to begin 
preparations for sending a fleet to Lhe Baltic, to maintain the 
army at full strength, and to prohibit the export of corn to Sweden. 
Sunderland's administration reacted so strongly because of the 
growing opposition to the King's Northern policy; it was feared that 
reductions in the army might be insisted upon and grants for a 
fleet refused. There was also the possibility that Walpole and 
Townshend might use the issue to embarrass the government. The 
announcement of a Jacobite plot to Parliament in February resulted in 
loyal addresses to the King from both Lords and Commons. As yet 
Walpole and Townshend had done nothing to alarm the ministry. 
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While the House of Lords was debating the Mutiny bill in March 
1717 Townshend began to oppose the administration and it is likely 
that his behaviour encouraged the Tories for, on the third reading 
of the bill, they began to object to its contents. Their complaints 
were answered by Sunderland, Cowper, Devonshire, and Newcastle and 
the bill passed by 32 votes to 9. The Tories, however, raised 
further difficulties over the unrest at Oxford upon the Prince of 
Wales's birthday on 30 October 1716. Once the Mutiny bill had passed 
the ministry were prepared to allow an inquiry into this episode, but 
Sunderland, Cowper, Kingston, Parker, Coningsby, Cadogan and Townshend 
managed to emasculate Tory attempts to make an issue out of the 
disturbances during the debate on 3 April 1717. Though Townshend had 
supported the government on this point he appears to have been 
directly responsible for Tory assertiveness in March and early-April 
1717.108 
On 3 April'1717 the Commons were moved to grant supplies to secure 
the kingdom from the Swedish menace. The proposal was debated four 
days later in committee and 'the House were greatly displeased at 
the manner of making this demand, and more at two persons now at 
the head of affairs Lord Sunderland and Stanhope whom they think are 
servile ministers to the King's German ministers'. 
109 The supply 
was granted in the committee by the narrow majority of 165 votes to 
150 and the next day the report to the House was only agreed to by 
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154 votes to 150. Though Walpole voted with the government he took 
no part in the debate and with Townshend's recent conduct this was 
sufficient provocation. On 9 April Townshend was dismissed as 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and this was followed by the resignations 
of Walpole, Pulteney, Methuen, Orford and Devonshire. In the 
reconstituted ministry Sunderland became Secretary of State for the 
North, Stanhope First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Joseph Addison Southern Secretary,, Newcastle Lord 
Chamberlain, James Craggs junior Secretary-at-War and Bolton Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland. 
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Sunderland's advance between 1714 and 1717 was rapid and remarkable. 
At first the King and his advisers regarded him with trepidation and 
unease. Sunderland wasted little time in convincing the King that 
his fears were unfounded and George I's conversion was confirmed by 
Sunderland's appointment as Lord Privy Seal in August 1715. Because 
of Sunderland's willingness to support Hanoverian ambitions in Europe 
and because of Sunderland's obvious devotion to the Hanoverian 
Succession in Britain George began to trust him more and more. 
Sunderland with his growing power at Court was able to win over 
important Whig politicians such as Stanhope and Newcastle and Sunderland 
felt sufficiently assured to try to establish an unquestioned ascendancy 
as the King's chief minister, He adroitly outmaneouvred and displaced 
Argyll, but the methods he employed against Townshend proved 
prejudicial to Sunderland's own authority. By using the resentments 
in the royal family and Townshend's reluctance to approve the employment 
of British resources in the Baltic Sunderland was able to persuade 
George to dismiss the Secretary of State. Unfortunately, when the 
accusations Sunderland made at Hanover, that Townshend and Walpole were 
conniving with the Prince of Wales, became known it was almost certain 
that Walpole and Townshend would be unwilling to accept Sunderland 
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as leader of the Whig party. Furthermore, Sunderland's blatant 
Hanoverianism alienated a section of the Whig party a-i6 WCLS 
ready to follow Townshend and Walpole when they resigned. 
Sunderland was now Prime Minister, but his position in Parliament 
was precarious and it remained to be seen how he would deal with 
this difficult and dangerous political situation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: PRIME MINISTER APRIL 1717 TO JUNE 1720 
'Le Comte de SunderZand qu'on peut regarder 
come Ze premier ministre d'etat ' 
The split in the Whig party was the first for nearly twenty years; 
a combination of Tories and dissident Whigs now threatened the 
security of Sunderland's administration. It was clear, however, 
that it would not be easy to create a durable alliance between the 
two opposition groups. The Tories wanted to replace the existing 
Whig government with a coalition of Whigs and Tories which they hoped 
would lay the basis for a Tory political recovery, Walpole and 
Townshend were not interested in promoting the Tory cause, but merely 
sought to force their way back into office on their own terms, 
Sunderland's task was twofold: he had to consolidate his influence 
with the King and he had to try to dominate-both Houses of Parliament. 
Sunderland's strength at Court was based upon his connection with 
the Duchess of Kendal and his skilful cultivation of an increasingly 
intimate and enduring relationship with George I. This culminated 
in Sunderland's appointment as Groom of the Stole in February 1719. 
By these means Sunderland obtained royal approval for his ruthless and 
vindictive persecution of the Prince of Wales. He was also able to 
outmaneouvre Bernstorff, when the Hanoverian minister opposed his 
government in both domestic and foreign policy, and he had the full 
authority of the Crown behind the administration's policies. Similarly, 
Sunderland quickly established his authority over the House of Lords 
and., apart from the acquil+ct of the Earl of Oxford, his mastery of the 
upper chamber was complete. Sunderland was responsible for carrying 
the ministry's programme through the Lords, He decided when I 
legislation should be introduced, whether it should be amended, and if 
it was to be defer-red. His contribution in debate was usually 
decisive and his control of the House was perhaps only equalled by 
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Walpole's ascendancy in the Commons when he was at the head of the 
administration after Sunderland's death. It was in the House of 
Commons, howaver, that Sunderland's authority was most precarious 
and ultimately it was his inability to impose his will on the lower 
House that forced him to come to terms with Walpole and Townshend. 
Sunderland lobbied, bribed, and intimidated Whig M. P. 1s; negotiated 
with both Jacobite and Hanoverian Tories; and exploited Stanhope's 
success abroad as well as re-organizing his ministry in an attempt 
to solve this problem. To begin with, while he was consolidating 
his power and searching for a solution to the problem of managing the 
Commons, Sunderland pursued a cunning and restrained policy. In 
particular throughout 1717 he refused to embark on any scheme which 
would cause unease about the status of the Church of England for it 
was bound to arouse strong feelings amongst the Tory party. Likewise 
in secular affairs Sunderland's aim was to damp down and dispose of 
awkward issues, such as the trial of the Earl of Oxford, as quickly as 
possible and with the minimum of disturbance. It was only from late 
1718, when he was convinced that he was strong enough at Court and 
in Parliament, that Sunderland felt he could give way to his soaring 
ambition and introduce the Peerage bill, the repeal of the Septennial 
Act and the University Reform bill which were intended to establish an 
unparalleled political supremacy. His attempt broke down because his 
following in the Commons was not substantial enough to carry through 
such an extremely opportunist programme. Though his government only 
suffered one serious political reverse Sunderland was convinced that 
he would-have to settle with Walpole if he was to have any security 
in the Commons. His power and influence were undiminished and Walpole 
and Townshend returned to office on his and not their own terms. 
Sunderland's authority now seemed complete. He had solved the 
problem of controlling the Commons and he was master of both Court 
and Parliament with his only serious rival subordinate to him. 
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I SECRETARY OF STATE: APRIL 1717 TO MARCH 1718 
FserviZe ministers to the pLeasures of 
the King's German ministers' 
With the accession of George I the Secretary of State for the northern 
department was of greater importance than his southern counterpart 
since he was responsible for German affairs. Sunderland's ambition 
to be northern Secretary had been thwarted in 1714, but by April 1717 
he was able to acquire this office with little difficulty. One of 
the attractions of the post was that it would allow him to demonstrate 
his support for the King's Hanoverian interests which he knew was 
certain to increase the King's esteem and regard for him. Sunderland's 
activity in foreign affairs was not to be as significant as he had 
perhaps hoped for he was to be preoccupied with domestic politics. 
Furthermore, Stanhope's outstanding ability as a diplomat meant 
that he., rather than Sunderland, was better suited to carry the 
responsibility for the government's foreign policy. Sunderland's 
activities as Secretary of State involved topics of considerable importance 
yet the negotiation of foreign alliances and the search for peace in 
Europe was Stanhope's sphere of activity. That Sunderland was Prime 
Minister and responsible for domestic politics and that Stanhope was 
foreign minister was confirmed in the exchange of offices of 1718. 
The evidence of Sunderland's concerns as Secretary is deficient both 
for Sweden and Prussia, though in the case of Sweden the tense 
relations between her and Britain when Sunderland was in office 
probably accounts for this lack of material. Yet the documentation 
which is available indicates Sunderland's unreserved support for 
George's interests both as Elector and King. 
The activities of the Secretary of State have been examined in 
detail for the period when Sunderland was Secretary of State for the 
South. The Hanoverian connection gave greater authority to the 
northern Secretary, but, apart from this, there had been little change 
since 1710. Both Secretaries were responsible for domestic affairs 
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and abroad Sunderland's sphere of activity included the Empire, 
Germany, the Dutch Republic, Scandinavia, Poland, and Russia. 
Sunderland also dealt with naval matters in the Baltic and North Sea. 
1 
The alliance which had been signed with the Emperor in June 1716 
had not dealt with the arrears that Britain owed for the service of 
Imperial troops in Spain in the War of the Spanish Succession and 
which were estimated at E100,000. In exchange for this payment the 
British government wanted. to add a separate article to the Treaty of 
Westminster in which the Emperor declared that the Pretender and his 
followers were forbidden entry to Imperial territory. 
2 In May 1717 
the British envoy at Vienna, Abraham Stanyan, pressed the Imperial 
government to send orders to the Austrian Netherlands to have 
suspected Jacobites expelled. There were long delays, owing to the 
cumbersome workings of the Austrian administration, and even when 
the orders had been drawn up Stanyan and Sunderland thought they 
were unsatisfactory. 
3 The arrears which Britain owed to the Emperor 
were settled at Z130,000, but the British ministers made it plain that 
payment depended upon Imperial agreement to the separate article against 
the Pretender. Sunderland sent a draft of the article to Stanyan to 
be concluded at Vienna. 
4 There was great reluctance to name the 
Pretender, but Sunderland repeatedly instructed Stanyan to insist that 
he must be expressly mentioned in the arti. cle and Stanyan and 
St. Saphorin declared that an Austrian refusal on this matter could 
prejudice British assistance to the Emperor in his disputes with Spain. 
5 
In October 1717 there was an attempt at Vienna to have these 
negotiations transferred to London, but Sunderland told Stanyan that 
this was mere chicanery and the talks had to be resolved in the 
Imperial Capital before the British Parliament met on 21 November. 
6 
The Imperial ministers still sought to avoid a direct reference to 
the Pretender and a decision was deferred until they received the 
advice of the Imperial diplomat, Pendtenriedter, who was then 
negotiating with Stanhope in Britain. 
7 Sunderland's ultimatum and 
Pendtenriedter's opinion that the British would not yield over the 
Pretender led the Imperial Court to give way and on 8 December N. S. 1717 
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Stanyan informed Sunderland that the Emperor had agreed to the 
A 
secret article as it had been sent from London. - The Austrians, 
however, demanded that in any fature treaty with Britain for the 
support of the Hanoverian Succession the word 'Protestant' should 
be excluded from the agreement and that the article concerning the 
Pretender was to be distinct from the settlement of the arrears. 
9 
The secret article was ratified in London at the end of December 1717 
and on 7 January 1718 a committee of the Lords met at Sunderland's 
office where the ratifications were exchanged; the arrears were 
paid on 13 January, 
10 
The Jacobite question also complicated diplomatic relations 
between Britain and the Dutch Republic. Early in 1717 Sunderland's 
ministry had requested the Dutch to arrest the Swede, Baron G6rtz, 
who was implicated in a projected Jacobite insurrection in Scotland. 
G6rtz had fled The Hague, but he was detained at Arnhem as a 
prisoner of the States of Gelderland. G6rtz's papers and his 
secretary, Gyllenborg, were secured in the Dutch Capital. 
11 
Sunderland was eager to have G6rtz moved to a more secure place than 
Arnhem; he wanted access to G6rtz's papers and sought to persuade 
the United Provinces to join the British embargo of trade with Sweden. 
12 
Heinsius was determined not to provoke the Swedes and endanger Dutch 
interests and he was reluctant to grant any of Sunderland's demands. 
13 
Sunderland was intent upon keeping up the pressure upon the Dutch, 
but Charles Whitworth, the envoy at The Hague, doubted whether they 
would meet Sunderland's requests or even keep G6rtz under arrest for 
much longer. 
14 
In the face of Dutch intransigence Sunderland believed that it 
would be advisable to make some concessions. The British government 
announced that it was willing to accept a formal declaration from the 
Regent of France, who was mediating between it and Charles XII of 
Sweden, that if the Swedish King disowned Count Gyllenborg, who was 
under house arrest in London, and G6rtz ) then Gyllenborg would be 
allowed to return to Sweden and Britain would discuss arrangements for 
the release of G6rtz with the States General. 
15 A week later 
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Sunderland advised Whitworth that upon receiving the King of Sweden's 
declaration George I was ready to free G6rtz, providing he did not 
remain within the Dutch Republic and was immediately dispatched for 
Sweden. 16 The British proposals were given a mixed reception by 
the Dutch. 17 In early-July 1717 George I was given the promised C). 
declaration by the Regent and Count Gyllenborg was sent back to Sweden. 
18 
By this time, however, the provincial assembly at Gelderland had 
become impatient and this combined with pressure by G6rtz's friends) 
secured his release on 2 August N. S. 1717.19 Sunderland directed 
Whitworth to express the King's resentment at this decision and two 
days later he ordered the envoy not to concern himself about G6rtz 
apart from insisting that he should not be allowed to enter the other 
six provinces of the Dutch Republic. 
20 G6rtz remained at Zutphen 
for some time and in the autumn he obtained a pass from Peter the 
Great and returned overland to Sweden. 
21 As G6rtz's secretary, 
Gyllenborg, was detained at the expense of the British government 
Whitworth secured his r-eleas, -e at the beginning of September 1717,22 
Though Sunderland would have preferred G6rtz to have been confined 
even longer than he was, his arrest had prevented him causing further 
trouble: but Anglo-Dutch relations were severely strained by the Dutch 
refusal to antagonise Sweden. 
23 
The tensions between the Maritime powers were exacerbated by Dutch 
reluctance to back Britain's aggressive naval policy in the Baltic. 
No Dutch ships had sailed with Admiral Byng in the spring of 1717,24 
but Sunderland was resolved to have the support of the Republic the 
following year and was ready to seize any opportunity to bring them to 
a more aggressive posture in northern Europe. At the beginning of 
October 1717 he ordered Cadogan and Whitworth to sustain the States 
of Holland in their decision to grant letters of reprisal to their 
merchants against Swedish privateers and, if the States General did not 
approve this resolution, Whitworth was nevertheless to press the 
States of Holland to prosecute their decree with vigour. ýVhitworth 
reported the possibility that the States General might send a fleet 
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to the Baltic in the spring of 1718 in order to protect their 
commerce and Sunderland told him to encourage the States General 
to take such a step. 
25 Sunderland and Whitworth were encouraged 
by the enthusiasm of the States of Holland towards dispatching a 
fleet to the Baltic and it seemed very likely that the States 
General would approve. The States General were ready to grant the 
necessary money and to appoint Admirals for the naval force, but the 
final decision had not been taken when Sunderland was replaced as 
Secretary of State by Stanhope in April 1718.26 The Dutch did 
finally agree to send a fleet to the Baltic in 1718.27 
Sunderland's bellicosity towards Sweden is also evident in his 
dealings with Denmark during his period as Secretary of State. The 
British fleet under Byng had sailed for the Baltic at the end of March 
1717, reaching Copenhagen roads on 22 April N. S. 
28 Sunderland had 
instructed the British envoy at the Danish Court, Lord Polwarth, to 
press the speedy equipping of the Danish fleet and to make every 
effort to assist preparations for an attack on the Swedish naval base 
at Karlskrona. Similar directions were issued to Byng. 
29 The Danes 
appeared to respond positively to Polwarth's efforts, but, upon 
observing the fortifications of Karlskrona, Byng felt that the Danes 
would not undertake an assault. 
30 Instead they suggested an 
alternative expedition against Gotland and though Sunderland told 
Polwarth to encourage the Danes, he did not expect to achieve anything 
significant that summer. His belief was well founded, for at the end 
of July the project on Gotland was laid aside. 
31 Sunderland had 
already given Byng leave to send some ships back to Britain and on 
26 July he ordered the Admiral to send all but ten of his ships home 
as soon as possible. Ten warships were felt to be adequate +, -o deal 
with the Swedes and Byng immediately complied with his orders, sailing 
home himself in November. 32 Sunderland had left little doubt about 
his support for the King's interests abroad, but it was to be at home 
that his efforts were to be really employed. 
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II CONSOLIDATION AND CONCILIATION APRIL 1717 TO NOVEMBER 1718 
'the new faction against the whoZe administration 
and indeed against the King himseZf' 
Sunderland was immediately aware of the danger which faced his 
ministry. The opposition's success in carrying a motion that a 
High Churchman, Dr. Andrew Snape, should preach to the House of 
Commons and the government's narrow victory in the charges of 
corruption brought against Lord Cadogan demonstrated, for the present, 
that Sunderland must act cautiously in both Church and State. The 
proposed repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts was 
dropped, Convocation was prorogued to avoid serious clerical unrest 
arising from the Bangorian Controversy, and Sunderland was willing 
to gratify the Archbishop of Canterbury in ecclesiastical promotions. 
Sunderland's policy helped to retain the support of the Whig Bishops 
in the House of Lords and avoided arousing Tory passions. In state 
affairs Sunderland also followed a moderate course giving way during 
Oxford's trial when it was clear the government could not carry the 
House of Lords with it on this question. In late 1717 the administration 
also yielded to Walpole's supply proposals when it would have been 
unwise to try to carry their own recommendations. Sunderland also 
tried to achieve a reconciliation with the Prince of Wales, but the 
Prince's personal hostility to Sunderland and his unwillingness to 
accept the Prime Minister's terms led Sunderland to pursue a harsh 
and vindictive policy to the heir to the throne which, if it achieved 
little, highlighted Sunderland's strength at Court and his influence 
with the King. By early 1718 the debates in the House of Lords over 
the Mutiny bill and the bill for Forfeited Estates gave the first clear 
indication that Sunderland had recovered from the setback of Oxford's 
trial and was now dominating the chamber. In the Commons, however, 
the situation still remained unsatisfactory. Sunderland's lobbying 
of Whig M. P. 's had paid only temporary dividends and his attempt to 
drive a wedge between the opposition Whigs and the Tories and then to 
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reach an agreement with the latter failed. Consequently, in March 
1718, Sunderland reorganized the government and this)together with 
the approval of the Commons for the ministry's foreign policy, 
seemed to indicate that Sunderland was now strong enough, both at 
Court and in Parliament, to proceed with his scheme for a unique 
political superiority. 
Ever since the passage of the Occasional Conformity Act in 1711 
and the Schism Act of 1714 the Whigs had assured the Dissenters 
that they could expect relief under the new dynasty. The first 
years of George I's reign proved to be a disappointment, but by early 
1717 the Dissenters had good reason to be optimistic. 
33 Sunderland 
was by now ready to consider the repeal of the penal laws against 0 
the Dissenters, along with a bill to reform the Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge. The subject may have been mentioned to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury as early as 23 January 1717, but certainly 
by March Sunderland was discussing his intentions with Lord Cowper 
and Archbishop Wake, while Stanhope was sounding opinion amongst 
Whig M. P. 1s. There was opposition among Whig M. P, Is and upon the 
Episcopal bench; Bishop Nicolson of Carlisle was strongly opposed to 
L repeal and he seems to have expressed the sentiments of a majority 
of the Bishops. Sunderland was still prepared to go ahead with 
his plans for, on 13 May 1717, he requested Cowper to attend a 
meeting of the Lords of the Committee at the Cockpit and that he 'should 
bring with you the University bill the King having spoke to me again 
about it'. 
34 Sunderland was also canvassing support among Whig 
M. P. 's The same day, however, Walpole and the Tories succeeded in 
carrying a motion that Dr. Andrew Snape, a High Churchman, should 
preach to the House of Commons on 29 May. This indicated that 
Sunderland was not in control of the lower chamber. It was a setback 
for the ministry and put an end to Sunderland's attempt to assist the 
Dissenters for the present. 
35 
Sunderland was determined to prevent any unrest involving the 
Church. Unfortunately, on 31 March 1717, the Bishop of Bangor 
preached his sermon 'My Kingdom is not of this World' before George I. 
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Hoadly had already argued that the State could remove any clergyman 
who opposed the Civil power and that the authority of the Bishops 
came from the Crown not God, but he now went even further by 
replacing the visible Church by unlimited private judgement. 'Such 
a sermon might have been preached by an extreme Dissenter, but it 
was an astonishing performance when delivered by a Bishop before 
King George I. Not surprisingly, it provoked one of the greatest 
religious controversies of the century'. 
36 His opinions were naturally 
anathema to nearly every Churchman and a multitude of replies from 
Anglican divines attacked Hoadly and when the Lower House of 
Convocation complained about his opinions it seemed likely that it 
would merely intensify the internecine strife which had bedevilled 
relations between the two Houses, of Convocation since 1701. 
Sunderland was desperate to avoid such a development and he wrote 
to Archbishop Wake: 'If this evening between six and seven be a 
convenient time for your Grace, Lord Chancellor, Lord Parker, the 
Bishop of Norwich, and Mr. Stanhope will be at my house at that time to 
have the honour of meeting you, the King having ordered them and me to 
wait upon you to consider the affair of the Convocation. ' 
37 
Convocation was prorogued on 17 May and did not meet again for business 
until 18S1. This decision of Sunderland's strained relations 
between the Prime Minister and his clerical allies and accounts for 
the public denial that he had been responsible for the prorogation. 
38 
Sunderland's statement was obviously an attempt to calm unease at 
the government's action, while the promotion of Edward Chandler to 
the Bishopric of Coventry and Lichfield was a conciliatory gesture 
to Archbishop Wake. 
39 
By 1716 the longevity of the Bishop of Worcester was a subject 
of considerable speculation and with his death seemingly imminent 
the Bishop of Norwich wrote to Suncterland in February 1717 advising 
the translation of the Bishop of Oxford to Worcester when Bishop 
Lloyd died. Wake wanted the Bishop of Lichfield to replace Lloyd 
and to install his own creature, Dr. Edward Chandler, at Lichfield. 
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The Bishop of Sarum was ready to speak to Sunderland on Chandler's 
behalf, but the Bishop of Norwich was very cool in his response to 
Chwfidler's entreaties. 
40 The resilience of the Bishop of Worcester 
prevented a decision for a further five months, 'Out on 7 August 1717) 
Sunderland wrote to Wake that he had 'put the King in mind of his 
intention, when the Bishop of Worcester was last ill, of removing 
thither the Bishop of Lichfield, and promoting Dr. Chandler to 
Lichfield, and the King seems determined to do so'. 
41 
Lloyd finally 
died on 30 August and Sunderland and Wake agreed to translate the 
Bishop of Lichfield to Worcesteranho-nominate Chandler as his 
successor. The translation was completed at the end of September 
and Chandler was consecrated Bishop of Lichfield on 17 November. 
42 
The proceedings in Parliament in the summer of 1717 must have convinced 
Sunderland that he would also have to act cautiously in dealing with 
the Lords and Commons. 
Just before Stanhope moved to the upper Chamber in July 1717 he 
had carried through the Commons Walpole's Sinking Fund scheme, which 
was designed to reduce the national debt. 
43 For the rest of the 
year, however, the initiative lay with the opposition in the lower 
House. In May an attack was launched on Lord Cadogan for 
mismanagement and possible embezzlement of funds at the time when 
Dutch troops were transported to Britain to suppress the 1715 rebellion. 
The government was forced to allow an investigation. Sunderland 
began to rally the Whigs in the Commons and this, combined with Tory 
reluctance, merely to s-erve the interests of the opposition Whigs, 
helped the ministry to dispose of the inquiry. The accusations were 
considered in a committee of the whole House on 4 June 1717 and after 
preliminary debate the government moved that the Chairman should leave 
the chair which was approved by 205 votes to 194.44 Sunderland 
recorded the names of the Whigs who had voted for and against Cadogan 
in this division 
45 in order that disciplinary measures could be taken 
against those who had opposed the government because, as he told the 
Duchess of Marlborough, 'it's certain the King does resent that day's 
proceedings [4 June], more than ever he did anything in his life, for 
27 42 
though the question was upon Lord Cadogan, that was but a leading 
one to others, that were settled by the new faction against the 
whole administration and indeed against the King himself'. 
4ý 
In making this observation Sunderland certainly had in mind the 
attempt the opposition would make to exploit the renewal of the trial 
of the Earl of Oxford, Oxford showed that his imprisonment had not 
dulled his political acumen for he delayed petitioning the House of 
Lords until the resentment against him abated and. his Whig opponents 
were divided. 
47 Oxford presented his appeal to the peers on 22 May 
1717. On the following day it was suggested that the impeachment 
had been determined by the intervening prorogation and a committee was 
appointed to search for precedents. Lord Trevor reported from the 
committee and the question was put whether Oxford's case had been 
decided. Buckingham, Argyll, Nottingham, Abingdon, Aylesford, 
Islay, and North and Grey joined those who declared that it had, 
while Sunderland., Coningsby, Harcourt, and Trevor were among those 
who maintained the negative of this. The motion was rejected by 
87 votes to 45.48 It was then decided when the trial should 
commence. Buckingham proposed 6 June and was seconded by Lord Ferrers, 
Sunderland answered: 
That no man had any greater regard to the 
privileges of the peerage, or would do more 
to maintain them HTkn 61*; )Aýý; that he had a 
hearty concern for the sufferings of those 
who had the misfortune to lie under 
impeachments: that he had already 
complained, in the case of the Earl of 
Strafford, of the delays of the Commons 
in these prosecutions because he thought 
the whole peerage concerned therein: but 
that there might be just reasons for these 
delays; and therefore, to preserve a good 
correspondence between the two Houses, he 
was either for sending a message to the 
Commons to know whether they were ready 
for the trial of the Earl of Oxford, or 
to fix the 13 June for the said trial. 
The motion for 6 June was thrown out by 85 votes to 44. It was then 
agreed, without dividing, that the 13 June should be set for the start 
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of the trial and a message to this effect was sent to the Commons. 
49 
On 12 June a message was sent back to the Lords desiring a further 
postýcnement of the trial. Sunderland moved that tile Commons should 
be allowed a further fortnight, but he was opposed by Devonshire 
who argued that twelve days were enough. The House approved 
Devonshire's proposal by 76 votes to 57. 
so 
Sunderland in the meantime was trying to undermine Walpole's 
association with the Tories. Walpole was in an embarrassing 
predicament because he had been the leading advocate of Oxford's 
impeachment, but if he was to retain the goodwill of the Tories he 
would have to support the attempt to get Oxford acquitted. Sunderland 
decided that Walpole should once again chair the Commons' committee 
concerned with Oxford's prosecution and Walpole, along with some other 
M. P. 1s, was summoned to a meeting at Secretary Addison's office on 
13 June to settle the impeachment proceedings. 
51 
Walpole, however, 
avoided the maximum discomfort by absenting himself from the committee's 
meetings. 
52 
Oxford's trial began in Westminster Hall on 24 June 1717. When 
Sir Joseph Jekyll appeared at the bar of the House to make good the 
first article of the impeachment Lord Harcourt moved that the Lords' 
should adjourn to their own House. Having done so Harcourt proposed 
that the Commons' should first give judgement upon the charges of High 
Treason against Oxford before they considered the other articles. 
Lord North and Grey seconded Harcourt, but Sunderland told the House 
1: impeachments 'that the Commons had ever been permitted in cases of - 
to choose their own methods of proceeding and that it was likewise the 
practice in all other inferior courts. That in this case it would be 
unreasonable to compell the Commons to skip over the first ten articles 
which might clear up and very much conduce to strengthen the evidence 
on the llth and 12th ,. 
53 A long debate ensued in which Argyll and 
Islay reflected severely upon the Prime Minister. It was finally 
resolved by 86 votes to 56 to put Harcourt's motionjwhich carried 
without a division. The Commons protested immediately, requesting 
a conference with the Lords about the prosecution of impeachments. 
244 
The Lords, however., would not alter their verdict and a series of 
conferences followed., with Sunderland acting as one of the Lords' 
managers, but neither side would give way and the Lords eventually 
appointed 1 July as the date for Oxford's trial, On that day the 
Commons did not appear in Westminister Hall and after a short interval 
the Lords retired to their House. Harcourt suggested that the 
charges of Treason against Oxford should be dropped 'which Sunderland 
opposed, and said if he was discharged of any for want of prosecution, 
he ought to be discharged of all'. 
54 Sunderland knew that it would 
be futile and unwise to try and secure a conviction when the mood of 
the House was so plainly in favour of clemency and therefore the 
wisest course of action was to dispose of this issue with the minimum 
of fuss and embarrassment to the government. His motion was approved 
and the Lords then returned to Westminster Hall where all the Lords 
present voted to acquit Oxford. Sunderland, Marlborough, Cadogan, 
Coningsby and some others withdrew before the peers entered the Hall. 
The defeat over Oxford's trial left no one in doubt of the weakness 
of the Sunderland ministry and the Prime Minister must have been 
relieved when a troublesome session came to an end a fortnight later. 
He immediately embarked upon a search for a solution to the insecurity 
which threatened his authority. 
Sunderland's first attempt to increase his parliamentary following 
involved an attempt to reach an agreement with a section of the Tory 
party. The King's speech on 6 May 1717 mentioned that an Act of 
Grace was to be introduced into Parliament and this can be seen as 
the first indication of Sunderland's readiness to approach the Tories. 
In response Harcourt and Trevor did, occasionally, follow a more 
moderate course during the conclusion of the Oxford affair, indicating 
their readiness to consider any proposals from Sunderland. 
56 
Once 
Oxford had been cleared it was decided in Cabinet to introduce into 
Parliament an Act of Grace which Sunderland delivered to the House of 
Lords on 15 July 1717. 
S7 Sunderland was also prepared to play a 
more dangerous game by seeing if he could enlist the support of 
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Bolingbroke to persuade the Tories to sever any connection with 
Walpole and Townshend, Bolingbroke was eager to assist Sunderland 
in the '. iope that he could obtain a pardon and be permitted to return 
to England. He was allowed to send over his agent, John Brinsden, 
who met Sunderland and Lord Carnarvon and who was introduced to the 
King. Sunderland, however, felt that it would be unwise to try to 
get Parliament to pardon Bolingbroke and this explains the Prime 
Minister's reluctance to enter into correspondence with the other 
leading Jacobite exile j the Earl of Mar, in September 1717,58 The 
Tories themselves were unwilling to listen to Bolingbroke's counsel) 
while the Act of Grace in itself was insufficinet to convince them of 
Sunderland's good intentions. 
59 Sunderland, therefore, decided to 
approach the Tories directly, 
In October 1717 the King visited Newmarket for the horse racing, 
but, as Parliament had only been prorogued until Wednesday 9 October, 
60 Sunderland required further time for his discussions with the Tories. 
He inquired of the Lord Chancellor 'whether in case the King should 
have a mind to stay at Newmarket longer than Monday one might continue 
so as to have a council at Newmarket for the prorogation of Parliament 
61 
and also for the proclamation for notice of their doing business . 
Two days later Sunderland again wrote to Cowper informing him that 
Parliament was to be prorogued until 21 November and urging him to 
lose no time in sending up the commission for the King to sign if a 
council was held at Newmarket, 
62 In the event, however, the King 
returned to Hampton Court where, at a council meeting, Parliament 
was prorogued until the end of the third week in November. 
63 
Sunderland could now approach the Tories, He contacted Lord Trevor 
who was summoned to Hampton Court where Sunderland introduced him to 
the King. It appears that a number of meetings took place between 
Sunderland and Trevor at which the Prime Minister offered a new 
Cabinet Council, including four Whigs, four Hanoverians, and four Tories; 
Trevor was to be created Lord President. Trevor showed little 
inclination to accept these terms and he demanded the dissolution of 
Parliament, for he regarded frequent, parliaments as being essential 
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to the constitution, and he also warned Sunderland not to repeal 
the Occasional Conformity Act. 
64 The talks came to nothing. 
Sunderland's attempts to achieve a reconcilation with the PriTIce 
of Wales were also to end in failure. The first steps towards an 
accommodation with the Prince were taken in March 1717 when Stanhope 
had a meeting with Princess Caroline. On 16 April it was reported 
that 'Lord Sunderland designed yesterday to kiss the Prince's hand 
but the Prince would not see his Lordship and will give it's 
presumed for a reason the letter he [Sunderland] wrote to my Lord 
Orford'. 65 The Archbishop of Canterbury spared no effort to try 
and get the Prince of Wales to allow Sunderland to wait upon him. 
He urged Lady Cowper to interpose her efforts to bring about a 
reconciliation, he met with Sunderland, and consulted Princess Caroline 
and the Bishop of Carlisle)but it all came to nought. 
66 
The summer 
and early autumn of 1717 saw no lessening of the Prince's hostility 
to Sunderland 
67 
and as Lord Percival commentedilthe Prince, who on 
occasion of the letter writ by my Lord Sunderland to the Earl of 
Orford, has never since shewed any sort of countenance to that first 
mentioned Lord'. 
68 As the hostility intensified in late 1717 
Sunderland, no doubt angered by the Prince's intransigence, became 
increasingly ruthless and vindictive towards him. It was a measure 
of Sunderland's standing with the King that he could behave as he did. 
On 20 October 1717 the Princess of Wales gave birth to a son who 
-he Duke was at once the centre of controversy, His parents wanted t 
of York to stand godfather while Sunderland argued that Newcastle, -C). 
as Lord Chamberlain, should have that honour. The King accepted 
Sunderland's advice, to the great annoyance of his son. 
69 
The 
Prince's resentment was such that after the christening ceremony on 
28 November he accosted Newcastle and used, 
very unbecoming words ... in the King's 
presence, His Majesty being willing 
to give him an opportunity of recalling 
his error did this morning send the 
Dukes of Kingston, Kent and Roxburghe to 
enquire whether he had spoken such words, 
which except one (the altering of which 
*12 4 ", 
left the matter much as it was before) 
His Royal Highness owned, adding such 
aggravating expressions in relation to 
the Duka of Roxburghe who offered to 
excuse what he had done as being in 
obediance to the King's positive 
command, that His Majesty being informed 
thereof thought fit to confine His Royal 
Highness to his apartment till farther 
order, resolving to let him see he will 
be master of his own family. 70 
The Prince wrote submissively to his father the following day and in 
a further communication on 1 December he declared that he bore no 
malice towards Newcastle. Upon receiving these letters the King 
summoned Sunderland and Stanhope to him, on Sunday 2 December, and 
delivered the Prince's letters to them, 
71 Sunderland was now ready 
to humiliate the Prince and to destroy his political influence. 
It was decided to order the Prince to leave St. James's Palace 
and Sunderland had a list of the officers and servants of the Prince 
drawn up for examination. He then instructed the Dukes of St. Albans, 
Montagu, and Bolton, Lord Cowper, Lord Hinchinbrooke, William Clayton 
and Charles Howard that as their wives were employed by the King they 
should no longer wait upon the Princess and her family. Sunderland 
told Marlborough that the Prince and his family should have neither 
horse nor foot guards to attend them and that all the army officers 
who held posts in the Prince's household should be informed that the 
King expected them to give up these offices. The Prince immediately 
obeyed the King's order and he and the Princess set up house in rented 
accommodation in Leicester Square. On 4 December 1717 Sunderland 
and Addison gave foreign envoys in London the ministerial account of 
the dispute in the royal family. Archbishop Wake was reluctant 
to follow the instructions forbidding the King's servants to wait 
upon the Prince and on 28 December he visited Sunderland to ask that 
as a divine he should be allowed access to the Princess, The next 
day Wake was advised by Sunderland that the King could make no 
exceptions, but if the Archbishop informed a Secretary of State when 
the Princess desired to see him his request would be laid before the 
King for his approval. Wake agreed to accept these conditions, 
72 
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Encouraged by the humility the Prince of Wales had shown in 
his letters to the King and the promptness with which he obeyed the 
command to leave St. James's, Sunderland probably believed he could 
force the Prince to submit to George I on very unfavourable terms. 
It would seem that proposals for an agreement were presented to the 
Prince early in December, but they were unacceptable to him. 
73 
By the end of the month or early in '1718 Sunderland was ready to try 
again. He drew up a paper containing five points which the Prince 
was expected to accept in order to show his sincere desire for a 
reconciliation. 
74 
The document was carried to the Prince by the 
Speaker of the House of Commons, Spencer Compton, to whom George 
-1. 
Augustus declared Iqulil ne pouvoit pas se soumettre a ces 
conditions qui etoient les memes et encore plus dures que celles qulil 
avoit deja refuse il ya quelque tems'. 
75 Following this second 
refusal Sunderland was ready to strike directly at the Prince's 
wealth and authority. 
At Sunderland's instigation the King was prepared to inform 
Parliament that he had resumed the various grants made to the Prince 
in order to make provision for the rest of his family and that he would 
assume responsibility for the care and education of his grandchildren. 
76 
Sunderland also directed the Attorney-General, Sir Edward Northey, to 
peruse 'the several grants to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales' 
and to declare whether those relating to the nomination of his 
servants were not revocable. Northey felt it would be of little 
value to revoke this power and consequently Sunderland dropped the 
attempt to obtain control of the Prince's household and income. 
77 
Despite this setback Sunderland was still intent upon securing 
custody over the Prince's children. 
In the House of Lords on 20 January 1718 Sunderland delivered 
a letter to Lord Chancellor Cowper to be sent to Lord Chief Justice 
Parker seeking the opinion of the judges: 
Whether the education and. care of the 
persons of his Majesties grandchildren 
now in England and of Prince Frederick, 
elder son of his Royal Highness the 
Prince of Wales, when*his Majesty shall 
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think fit to cause him to come into 
England, and the ordering the place of 
abode, and appointing their governors 
and governesses, and other instructions, 
attendants and servants, and the 
approbation of their marriages when 
grown up, belong of right to his 78 Majesty as King of this realm or not. 
Cowper greatly resented the fact that Sunderland had drawn up the 
question without consulting him. 
79 Two days later the judges met 
at Lord Parker's chambers where Sunderland's inquiry was read. 
The Prince, being informed, desired that his counsel should be heard. 
The judges communicated this request to the King and Sunderland 
instructed Parker that George I gave permission for counsel to appear 
on the Prince's behalf. 
80 Sunderland also informed the Prince of 
the decision. 
81 
After deliberating for two days the judges 
declared, by a majority of ten to two, that the King had the rights, 
mentioned in Sunderland's letter, with respect to the Prince's 
children. 
82 
The King had fully approved of Sunderland's conduct in the dispute 
with the Prince of Wales, thus confirming the Prime Minister's 
growing authority at Court. This strength was based upon Sunderland's 
vigorous upholding of the dignity and interests of the Crown both at 
home and abroad. Sunderland was also developing a more intimate 
relationship with the King which gave him considerable influence over 
the disposal of offices within the royal household and allowed him to 
dismiss nominees of the Hanoverian ministers. In November 1717 it 
was observed that at informal Court gatherings there 'was every night 
the Duchess of Munster and the neighbouring ladies, The King some- 
times playing at billiards and other times looking upon her with 
those that played at cards, on Sunderland at chess with Mr. 
and upon other picqueteers'. 
83 Similarly, when Sunderland married his 
third wife, Judith Tichborne, in December 17171she was received at 
Court and presented to the King. 
84 In April 1717 Sunderland had 
secured Newcastle's appointment as Lord Chamberlain, replacing the 
Duke of Bolton, who was transferred to the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, 
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and in July he had Bolton, together with Grafton and Dorset-, 
dismissed as Gentlemen of the Bedchamber because of their opposition 
to the government. Significantly, Grafton and Dorset had been 
given their posts upon the recommendation of Bothmer and this is 
the first indication that Sunderland could challenge the influence 
of George I's German ministers at Court. In September and November 
1717 Sunderland was trying, unsuccessfully as it turned out, to 
persuade Lord Carlisle, whose son had married one of Sunderland's 
daughters, to accept the office of Lord President. 
8S 
Sunderland's 
interest with the King and at. Court was the most encouraging 
feature of 1717. The new parliamentary session, unfortunately, once 
again highlighted Sunderland's vulnerability in the Commons though, 
more positively, it revealed that he was now in a commanding position 
in the Lords following the temporary setback in the summer of 1717. 
Walpole attacked supply proposals for the army in the Commons 
during December 1717 and January 1718, forcing the acceptance of 
his own suggestions. Walpole and the Tories then proceeded to harry 
the government over the Mutiny bill and the opposition came close to 
a major victory. 
86 
The Mutiny bill was read for the first time in 
the Lords on 13 February 1718. Trevor and Argyll opened the debate 
by opposing the bill and 'Sunderland answered Argyll and reflected 
on him for voting one session that the peace was safe and honourable 
and the next that it was a disadvantageous one'. 
87 It was observed 
upon the debate that 'Lord Sunderland speaks short but first and when 
he gives the hint all his party takes it', 
88 The second reading 
took place on 18 February and the bill was considered in committee 
two days later. 
89 
Lord Trevor moved to instruct the committee that 
no punishment should be inflicted at any Court Martial that extended 
to life and limb, Stanhope retorted that this would render the bill 
ineffectual. A debate then ensued which lasted for five hours. 
Anglesey argued that it was dangerous to maintain a large army in time 
of peace, especially when it was governed by martial law. Sunderland 
replied 'that among the Romans, the wisest people in the world and the 
greatest lovers and assertors of public liberty, mart-ial laws and 
251 
discipline were invigorated by decrees of the senate and were in 
force in times of peace as well as in times of war'. As a result 
the motion was defeated by 91 votes to 77.90 The Tories continued 
their attack in the committee on 21 February when it was proposed 
to reduce the standing army from 16,347 men to 12,000 men: 
my Lord Sunderland les reponnsa en 
representent que ce nombre etoit 
petit pour un royaume come celui de 
la Grande Bretagne, mais il passa 
1'egerment sur les mecontentements 
du peuple qui rendiut ce nombre et 
un plus grand necessaiTe. Il ne 
toucha que la situation de 1'Ecosse 
soutenant que dix mille montagnards 
A etoient capables de renverser toute 
la milice qui y est. 91 
It was agreed by 72 votes to 50 that the 16,000 men should stand as 
part of the bill and a motion to resume the House was defeated by 
74 votes to 48. The Lords then considered the clause which made 
mutiny and desertion punishable by death. The question whether the 
words 'death or' should be retained in the bill was carried without 
dividing and the bill passed the House on 24 February, 
92 On 4 March 
1718 the Forfeited Estates bill was read for the first time and a 
recommendation for a second reading was opposed by Trevor, Harcourt, 
North and Grey, and Argyll. They were answered by Sunderland, Stanhope, 
Parker, and Coningsby, and it was resolved to give the bill a second 
reading. The bill passed this stage two days later and after being 
examined in committee it was approved by the House. 
93 
The debates 
in the Lords left little doubt that Sunderland was very much master of 
that assembly and together with his authority at Court it was evident 
that his administration was now stronger than it had been for nearly 
a year. Only the House of Commons remained unbowed and to help to 
remedy this weakness Sunderland decided to reorganize the ministry. 
In March 1718 James Craggs junior, 'a true disciple of Lord 
Sunderland'.. 94 replaced Joseph Addison as Secretary of State for the 
South. John Aislabie, a former Tory M. P. who had supported Cadogan in 
June 1717 and had been one of the leading ministerial speakers in the 
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Commons in November and December 1717, became Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and was named in a new Treasury Commission with George CO 
Baillie, John Wallop, and William-Clayton. Nicholas Lechmere was 
made Attorney-General, while in April Lord Parker succeeded Cowper 
as Lord Chancellor. Stanhope became Secretary of State for the 
North in place of Sunderland who took the offices of First Lord of 
the Treasury and Lord President of the Council. 
95 The exchange 
of posts between Sunderland and Stanhope was merely a recognitlon of 
political realities. Sunderland was at the head of the King's 
administration totally dominating domestic policy, with Stanhope, 
who had little aptitude for politics, 
96 
content to follow his lead; 
though it is clear he was Sunderland's closest associate and confido-nt. 
His real value to Sunderland was his ability as a diplomat and his 
skill in conducting the government's foreign policy, 
Sunderland, however, was not completely satisfied with this 
arrangement for he wanted Lord Carlisle to be Lord President, 
97 
while 
he himself was to be First Lord of the Treasury and Groom of the Stole. 
The Duke of Montrose observed that Sunderland was 'very far from being 
fond of the change. I may tell you he's inclined more to be Groom of 
the Stole than P[resident] of the Council, but that's a post the K[ing] 
has no inclination to sell'. 
98 Sunderland also disliked holding two 
posts w6o both gave a place on the Council, 
99 
though in compensation, 
as Bonet remarked, the office of First Lord of the Treasury 'confrere 
un grand credit par le pouvoir quIelle donne de deposer d1une infinite 
de bonnes places'. 
100 Sunderland's inability to secure the position 
of Groom of the Stole was probably due to the King's refusal to give 
this office to an English minister until he was on very close personal 
terms with him and, furthermore, the Hanoverian ministers, particularly 
Bernstorff, now regarded Sunderland with suspicion and unease. They 
were determined to keep the office of Groom of the Stole vacant 'for 
an able English politician near the king might have quickl'y deprived 
them of their monopoly of the royal confidence and checked to some extent 
their enormous influence in English affairs', 
101 A year later 
Sunderland's intimacy with the King was sufficient for him to overcome 
2S3 
Hanoverian oppositionoqJt-cobtain the post with ease. Sunderland's 
relations with Bernstorff began to deteriorate from early 1718 as his 
authority with th,.,, King grew and showed every sign of advancing even 
further. 
The 1717-1718 parliamentary session had ended on 21 March 1718 
and throughout the summer and autumn of 1718 attention was centred on 
foreign affairs. With the backing of the French, and of Dubois 
above all, Stanhope had brought the Emperor to accept his plan for 
peace in southern Europe that. would settle the territorial disputes in 
Italy between the Emperor Charles VI and Philip V of Spain. Stanhope 
then tried to prevent Spanish aggression in Italy and to persuade Spain 
to approve his scheme. To this end Admiral Byng, with a fleet of 
twenty ships, had sailed for the Mediterranean in July 1718 with 
instructions to oppose the Spanish and to protect Imperial dominions, 
In August Byng destroyed the Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro and Stanhope 
was now ready to go to war with Spain in order to force her to accept 
his peace initiative. 
102 
When Parliament met on 11 November 1718 the King's speech was 
designed to prepare the ground for a declaration of war against 
Philip V. Lord Carteret moved an address of thanks which included 
congratulations upon Byng's recent victory. The opposition attacked 
the government over what many felt was unprovoked aggression by Byng 
and it was moved to omit from the address the words 'to congratulate his 
Majesty upon the seasonable success of his naval forces'. But, with 
Sunderland cautiously managing the debate and Stanhope speaking with 
great warmth, the motion was accepted as it stood by 83 votes to SO. 
Sunderland was named in the committee to draw up the address. 
103 The 
Whig opposition in the Commons also criticised Byng's conduct, but in 
the vote on the address of thanks they were defeated by 60 votes. The 
government's majority rose to seventy-one in the debate on the address 
approving the declaration of war on Spain which Sunderland delivered 
into the House of Lords on 17 December 1718.104 The conflict with 
Spain was pursued with restraint and success and by January 1720 Spain 
had joined the Quadruple alliance. The successful implementation of 
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the government's foreign policy and particularly the victory at Cape 
Passaro had rallied support to the administration in the Commons and 
for the first timc since March 1717 Sunderland had a substantial 
majority in the lower House. This was all the encouragement he 
needed to introduce his scheme to make his position virtually 
unassailable. 
III SUNDERLAND'S OFFENSIVE NOVEMBER 1718 TO JUNE 1720 
rnous somes en de bonnes mains, nous somes 
gouvernes par un -&nsense 
Sunderland knew that his power as the King's chief minister depended 
upon his ability to manage both the Crown and Parliament, Failure to 
control either one of these two strongholds rendered him politically 
vulnerable. Aware of his strength at Court Sunderland sought to 
carry through a programme which would make his authority in the Lords 
and Commons incontestable and thereby give his administration a degree 
of security which no ministry had possessed since 1689. Sunderland's 
bid for hegemony dominated the 1718-1719 and 1719-1720 sessions of 
Parliament. It was the Prime Minister who was responsible for 
planning, modifying, and implementing the ministry's parliamentary 
strategy. Sunderland rallied the government's followers for 
the opening of the sessions, he bought off Tory peers such as Saye 
and Sele, Hatton, and Clarendon, and struggled to win the support of 
the Episcopate. The bill to repeal the Occasional Conformity and 
Schism Acts was a piece of shrewA and deliberate calculation designed 
not only to give relief to the Dissenters but also, by its moderate 
tone, to prepare the way for the legislation which Sunderland believed 
necessary to safeguard his political future. It would be difficult 
for the opposition Whigs to oppose repeal of the disabilities upon 
the Dissenters without laying themselves open to the accusation of 
cynical factionalism; repeal would appeal to the independent Whigs in 
the Commons; and its restrained nature might even serve as a further 
2SS 
recommendation by not alienating the Bishops. The reception which 
repeal was given would also help to indicate the feasibility of 
introducing Sunderland's legislation into Parliament. The readiness 
of Argyll to come to terms with Sunderland and ýhe of3 
Groom of the Stole can only have served to increase his confidence. 
Sunderland's personal standing in the Lords allowed him to carry the 
Peerage bill through the House ) but the hostility it was certain to 
raise amongst M. P. 's and his inability, even with the full backinR 
of the Crown)to placate this opposition led Sunderland to drop the 
bill for the 1718-1719 session. During the summer of 1719 
Sunderland crowned his ascendancy at Court by humbling Bernstorff 
for his opposition to the government. After this victory, and 
confident that he could once more use Stanhope's achievements in 
foreign policy to win over the Commons, Sunderland was ready to re- 
introduce the Peerage bill. Sunderland carried the bill through 
the Lords with ease but he was defeated in the Commons by Walpole. 
Sunderland was now convinced that only by buying off Walpole could his 
administration be secure in the Commons. It was a testimony to the 
extent of Sunderland's predominance that he could dictate the terms 
of reconciliation to Walpole and Townshend. 
Sunderland was meticulous in his preparations for the meeting of 
Parliament in November 1718. He urged his supporters in the Lords 
and Commons to hasten their journey up to London so that the ministry 
would be at full strength when the struggle began. At the same time 
Sunderland had been augmenting his following in the Lords, In 
February 1718 he had procured, in return for a pension, the assistance 
of the Tory, Lord Saye and Selejand it is likely that a similar bargain 
was struck with Lords Clarendon, Hatton, Jersey, Yarmouth, and 
Maynard for they, along with Saye and Sele, all voted for the repeal 
of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts in December 1718. 
Sunderland also paid particular attention to the Bishops in the House 
of Lords. Bishop Nicolson of Carlisle was implacably opposed to 
repeal of the penal legislation against Dissenters and he had served 
as a focus of Pcclesiastical discontent in early 1717, but Sunderland 
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had effectively banished Nicolson from British political life by 
having him created Bishop of Londonderry in Ireland in 1718.105 
Sunderland was assiduous in his courting of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. In October 1718 he approved Wake's nomination of White 
Kennett for the Bishopric of Peterborough; as far as Sunderland was 
concerned Kennett was an excellent choice for he was eager to attach 0 
himself to Sunderland's interest, he was moderate in his attitude 
towards the Dissenters, and he supported the repeal bill in December. 
106 
Sunderland also tried to influence Wake towards favouring repeall by 
promising a letter from the King to be sent to all the Bishops 
condemning heretical and unorthodox opinionSq6uýwhich the Archbishop 
was greatly worried. Wake, however, could not be moved from his 
opposition to the bill and when it was about to pass the House of 
Commons Sunderland. lost interest in the projected royal letter and 
the idea was laid aside. 
107 
Sunderland had been considering what form the legislation to 
assist the Dissenters should take from May 1718, but it was only at the 
end of the year that the plan was finalised. 
108 On 23 November 
Sunderland inquired of Archbishop Wake if it would be convenient if 
he, along with, Stanhope, Craggs and Parker, waited on him at Lambeth 
the following day. At dinner that day Wake was probably told that the 
Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts were to be repealed. 
109 On 
12 December Sunderland again wrote to Wake that: 
I had several things to have talked to your 
Grace upon, if I had waited upon you this 
morning, and in particular by the King's 
order to have shewn your Grace the enclosed 
copy of the Bill about the Occasional 
Conformity, which Lord Stanhope is to 
bring tomorrow into the House. Your Grace 
will see by it, that though it is absolutely 
necessary, for the King's affairs to have 
this matter brought on yet there is in the 
framing and shaping it, all the regard had 
to the dignity of the Church, and the ease 
of the clergy, as was possibly consistent 
with making it effectual for the public 
service of the government, and indeed I think 
it truly so framed, as not to leave a real 
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conscientious and religious objection to it, 
The King therefore hopes it will not meet 
with your Grace's disapprobation. I am 
sure there neve:, 7 was a King who was more 
sincerely and more strongly determined to 
support the established Church, and consult 
its honour, nor who has a greater desire 
to shew the utmost regard to yourself, as 
the head of that Church under him, and 
this you will find more and more every day, 
both in little and in great things, for 
indeed all those that are concerned in 
the King's administration are out of 
principle determined to pursue in this 
the King's intentions and are out of 
inclination and true esteem, your Grace's 
faithful servants. 110 
The bill which Sunderland had drawn up in consultation with the Bishops 
of Lichfield, Sarum, Worcester, Gloucester, Lincoln, and Bangor repealed 
the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts, It protected clergymen 
who refused to administer the Sacrament to a Dissenter, in order to 
allow him to qualify for office. If a person desirous to receive the 
Sacrament, in order to hold office, gave notice in writing of his 
intention to present himself on a certain day then if the minister 
refused to administer the Sacrament this was equivalent to actual 
bestowal; evidence of refusal was to be presented within three months 
of the person's admission to office; and, finally, no magistrate was to 
carry his insignia of office to any place of public worship other than 
the established Church, Despite these concessions the Archbishop of 
Canterbury would not support Sunderland, even after being spoken to 
in the lobby of the House of Lords the following day. 
ill 
Stanhope opened the debate by requesting that the Occasional 
Conformity and Schism Acts should be read and after this had been 
done he moved to introduce the bill for their repeal. He was seconded 
by Sunderland. Once the bill had been communicated Nottingham 
proposed that a very long day should be set aside for the second 
reading together with a call of the House, Sunderland moved for a 
second reading the following Tuesday and he was seconded by Stamford. 
Devonshire, Townshend, and North and Grey favoured a long day, but 
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Sunderland's suggestion was about to be put to the House by the Lord 
Chancellor when Islay stood up and, though he spoke against the 
Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts, complained against the clause 
in the repeal bill which would abrogate the Test Act. Cowper spoke 
likewise and 'my Lord Sunderland yielded to Thursday and gave to 
understand that the clause against which exception was taken should 
be dropped, and bound down Earl Islay and Lord Cowper upon what 
they had said with relation to the other two acts'. 
112 
The discussion on Thursday 18 December was monopolised by the 
Bishops and it was apparent that the removal of the Sacramental Test 
raised most objections. In the committee the next day Sunderland, 
true to his word, 'himself proposed the waiving... and afterwards 
owned that it had never been part of the bill unless the Bishops of 
Gloucester, Lincoln, and Bangor had declared they would not appear 
for the bill without it'. 
113 Upon the committal debate Devonshire, 
Buckingham, Anglesey, Nottingham, Oxford, Abingdon, Aylesford, Lumley, 
Harcourt and Cowper spoke against, while Sunderland, Stanhope, 
Newcastle, Montrose, Peterborough, Cholmondeley, Islay, Carteret, and 
Coningsby spoke in favour; the motion carried by 95 votes to 77. 
On Saturday 20 December it was agreed by 65 votes to 33 to engross 
the bill the following Monday, During the third reading on the 
Tuesday Nottingham moved to add a clause to the bill that no one should 
be allowed to hold office without subscribing to the articles of 
faith of the Church of England, He was opposed by Sunderland, 
Stanhope, and Islay and the proposal was rejected. 
114 In the debate 
'very high words passed between Lord Sunderland and the late 
Chancellor [Cowper] ... accusing one another of dishonesty and 
betraying their country, several broken sentences uttered which, if 
any had but gently blown the flame would have been filled up, and 
several secrets revealed which had long been desired'. 
115 
The bill was read for the first time in the Commons on 




Le Sieur Robert Walpole, Whig mecontent, 
ne fut pas plus retenu apres avoir impute 
ce bil au Ministere, au Comte de Sunderland 
en particulier, il rapella le changement de 
religion du feu Comte son Pere; les ruineux 
conseils qulil donnoit au Roy Jacques; les 
intelligences secretes qulil entretenoit 
I alors avec le Prince d'Orange, qulil traita 
de perfide, -et le merite qulil se fit sous 
le Roy Guillaume de cette conduite, mais 
qulil ne vouloit point faire de parable'. 116 
The Duke of Montrose declared that Walpole's speech 'was the most 
impertinent one I ever heard', 
117 but it achieved little for the bill 
was committed by 243 votes to 202. It passed its third reading in 
the Commons on 10 January by 215 votes to 157.118 
Sunderland's triumph with the repeal bill was rewarded in February 
1719 when the King made him Groom of the Stole. 
119 There was no longer 
any doubt about Sunderland's standing with George 1.120 Bonet 
informed the King of Prussia 'Il West pas moins suprenant que my 
Lord Sunderland ait accepte cette charge ... qui est une veritable 
charge de favori, avec qui un Roy se plait, et a qulil donne cette 
charge pour lui donner un entree libre de son appartemens privez-1.121 
Sunderland gave up the position of Lord President and was replaced 
by the Duke of Kingston, while the Duke of Kent became Lord Privy 
Seal. More significantly, Argyll was given the office of Lord Steward, 
Walpole's relations with Argyll and Islay had deteriorated in 1718 
and the two Scots, impressed by Sunderland's power, were prepared to 
come to an arrangement with him, as Islay himself had demonstrated in 
the debates over the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism 
Acts. 122 Negotiations took place in January and February 1719 and 
an agreement was reached. Argyl l's return to the ministry helped to 
compensate for Cadogan's erratic behaviour. The latter's connection 
with Stanhope and Craggs was becoming more and more strained, 
Sunderland was probably better disposed towards Cadogan than the two 
Secretaries of State, but he could not ignore the value of Argyll's 
support. Furthermore., Cadogan's attempt to create ýintimate relations 
with the King and his association with the Hanoverian ministers meant 
that he could no longer be trusted. Sunderland, aware that Argyll's 
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promotion would be a source of great unease to his Scottish allies, 
the Squadrone, re-assured Montrose of his continuing fidelity and 
ensured that the Squadrone retained its dominance in Scotland by 
excluding Argyll from Scottish affairs. 
123 Fortified by these 
successes Sunderland was now ready to introduce the Peerage bill. 
Sunderland was personally responsible for drawing up the Peerage 
bill. 124 Under its terms the sixteen Scottish representative peers 
were to be replaced by twenty-five hereditary peers nominated by the 
King and in the event of one of these peerages becoming extinctithe 
choice of a replacement also lay with the Crown. There were to be 
no more than six further additions to the English peerage and, as 
with the Scottish nobility, when a title died out it was the monarch 
who was to appoint a successor. 
125 Sunderland, Montrose, Roxburghe 
and Argyll had settled the arrangements for the twenty-five hereditary 
Scottish peers. The present sixteen representative peers were to be 
incorporated into the twenty-five with the addition of Atholl, 
Hamilton, Queensberry, Douglas, Marchmont, Murray, Morton, Tweeddale 
and 'Alquig'. 
126 
The Duke of Somerset moved to introduce the Peerage bill into the 
Lords on 28 February 1719 and he was supported by Argyll and 
Sunderland. Carlisle urged that a day should be appointed for the 
House to go into a committee upon the bill. Oxford opposed Somerset's 
suggestion, but he was answered by Sunderland, who said 'that though 
the number of peers were limited, yet the Crown would still be the 
fountain of honour, and preserve its prerogative of creating new peers 
upon the extinction of old titles, for want of male issue, which 
happened frequently; and that those extinctions would give the prince 
on the throne sufficient opportunities to bestow honours upon 
commoners of distinguished merit and abilities'. Sunderland closed his 
speech by supporting Carlisle's motion, which was agreed to accordingly, 
and the debate was adjourned until 2 March, 
127 As if to emphasise 
the point Sunderland persuaded the King to deliver a message to the 
Lords, read by Stanhope, 'that he has so much at heart the settling 
261 
the peerage of the whole kingdom2 upon such a foundation, as may 
secure the freedom and constitution of Parliament in all future ages, 
that he is willing his prerogative stand not in the way of so great 
and necessary work'. 
128 This message was the cause of heated 
debates and 'the Lords Oxford and Sunderland clashed and went out; 
the House observed it; sent after them; called them to their places, 
and there made them promise upon honour, that what had been said 
there should occasion no further misunderstanding betwixt them'. 
129 
On 3 March 1719 the Lords went into committee upon the bill and 
Sunder'-and, in a speech which lasted almost an hour 
130 
and was 
described by his opponents 'as one of the greatest performances they 
ever knew in Parliament', 
131 
opened the debate. He commenced, 
with-an historical deduction (as he called it) 
of the steps that had been taken towards a 
union from the time of King James the first. 
[He] said, that the constant obstruction to 
it had been picking the number of Scotch peers 
and negotiating their manner of sitting in the 
English House. That at the Union, when 
both sides had agreed upon the number, they 
were established up9n a footing derogatory 
- 
to 
the dignity of both peerages. That he had the 
honour of being a commissioner and should have 
never agreed to this part of the treaty had it 
not been for establishing the succession in 
the House of Hanover. That he was in the late 
Queen's service when the Duke of Dover was 
created and represented to her, that it would 
be looked upon as an invasion of the Union and 
that he doubted whether even that Lord's 
services would procure him an easy seat in the 
House of Lords. He then said, that Lord had 
been admitted quietly, yet in the next instance, 
which was the Duke of Brandon, they had passed 
a resolution which excluded for ever any such 
Lords from the benefit of English peerages. 
That if this were adhered to (as he believed it 
would be) they should lose the company of the 
young Duke of Dover, who notwithstanding his 
father's merit [illegible] a youth of great 
hopes would not be allowed a seat there. 
He believed both peers thought the tenure by 
which the Scottish Lords sat very improper and 
then proceeded to open his scheme of having 
262 
twenty-five hereditary, instead of elective, 
but that these sixteen might be allowed to 
sit till the end of the sessions when the 
whole might be named. He then took notice 
of the great increase of the English peerage 
in the late reigns, and that his Majesty 
had graciously offered not to insist upon 
his prerogative if that stood in the way. 
And having talked a good deal of limiting 
the number he said it might be, however', 
proper to come to some resolution and then 
concluded for putting the question 
"Whether in lieu of the sixteen elective there 
should be twenty-five hereditary peers for the 
future to represent the peerage of Scotland". 132 
Lord Cowper replied that it was unjust for the twenty-five to be 
nominated except by the peerage of Scotland, to which Sunderland 
answered 'that then they must summon a Scotch Parliament for that 
the Commons as well as the Lords had passed the act in that kingdom 
which made the Scotch peers elective; that he did not think the 
consent of either necessary. That in the Septennial bill, (the merits 
of which he would not enter into) the Commons of Great Britain had 
continued themselves for a longer time than they were chosen, without 
consulting their principals'. 
133 It was then agreed to accept 
Sunderland's resolution and the bill received its first reading on 
14 March 1719 and its second reading two days later. 
134 
It was evident that the Peerage bill would pass easily through the 
House of Lords, but Sunderland was doubtful whether he could obtain the 
necessary majority in the House of Commons. Throughout March 1719 
he had been trying to persuade Whig M. P. 's such as Alan Brodrick, the 
Irish Lord Chancellor, who sat in the English House of Commons, to 
vote for the bill. Sunderland tried to bribe these M. P. 's, no doubt 
using the Secret Service money which he had under his control from late 
1717, but he met with little success. The uncertainty about how a 
large group of Whig M. P. 's would vote led Sunderland, sometime in 
March 1719, to draw up a prediction of how the voting would go on 
the Peerage bill in the Commons, According to his figures he had a 
solid bloc of 211 votes, while the opposition could muster 2222 votes. 
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The problem lay in forecasting how the remaining 122 M. P. 's, 
which Sunderland classified as 'doubtful', would behave. His 
estimates of how many doubtfuls would support the government was 
far from encouraging. At best, Sunderland concluded, he would 
have a majority of twenty, but even that Hgure appeared 
optimistic. 
135 Sunderland, however, continued his efforts. On 
the evening of 13 April 160 Whig M. P. 's gathered at the house of 
Sir Hugh Boscawen where, 
Sunderland leur exposa qulil avoit considere 
ce bil comme une chose avantageuse au-- parti 
Whig, par la creation de 25 pairs Ecossois, 
et par celle de six Anglois, si llon le projet 
qui avoit ete forme., ensorte que ce parti 
auroit toujours ete dominant dans aet-teýchambre. 
Il le representa aussi comme necessaire pour 
remedier aux abus des Ministres d'Etat ont 
fait de cette prerogative royale. Il finit 
par exposer que, nonobstant la diversite de 
sentiments qulil y avoit sur ce bil, il 
esperoit qulils demeureroient unis sur les 
autres points qui interessent sa Majeste 
et son Gouvernement. De ces 160 il en eut 
plus de cent que se declareront contre un 
bil qui tendoit a elever la chambre haute au 
dessus de la leur,. mais ils prominent de 
concurir avec ces ministres d'Etat dans les 
autres -mesures. 
136 
The bill was due to be given its third reading in the Lords the 
following day, but instead 'Lord Sunderland in an eloquent speech today 
has signified that the bill of Peerage is to be dropped this session 
and to be renewed the next'. 
137 Four days later Parliament was 
prorogued. 
138 Sunderland was to spend the whole of the summer of 
1719 preparing for the re-introduction of the Peerage bill. He was 
determined to root out any opposition and once again to exploit 
Stanhope's success abroad to lay the foundations for this attempt. 
The Hanoverian minister Bernstorff, was deeply perturbed by 
Sunderland's commanding position at Court and he was apprehensive of 
Stanhope's attempt to come to terms with Sweden and Prussia because 
it ran counter to his own plan for peace in the north and also 
threatened his own personal territorial interests in northern Germany, 
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Bernstorff opposed the Peerage bill and he helped to establish an 
alliance., including Hanover, the Emperor, and Poland which was 
hostile to Prussialwhile trying to sabotage the diplomatic missions 
of Lord Carteret to Stockholm and Charles whitworth to Berli 
1359 
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Both Sunderland and Stanhope greatly resented Bernstorff's behaviour 
and Sunderland observed of the Hanoverian Iqulil pouvoit etre bon 
ministere a Hanover, qulil nletoit pas propre pour etre sur un grand 
theatre'. 
140 Stanhope, who accompanied George I to Hanover in the Cý 
summer of 1719, was struggling to overcome Bernstorff's wrecking policy. 
The Secretary of State wrote to the Prime Minister, 'you may depend 
upon it that he [Bernstorff] will do us all the mischief he can. 
think, however, as I told you before, that we shall weather the 
present danger'. 
141 Bonet was not so sanguine, remarking 'Clest 
un malheur que my Lord Stanhope soit seul ministre dlEtat Anglois 
a Hanover, et qulil n'ait pas le Comte de Sunderland avec lui pour 
le consulter et pour le soutenirl. 
142 By the end of July 1719 
Stanhope was in agreement with the Prussian envoy. He again wrote to 
Sunderland, 'I have mentioned to the Duchess [of Kendal] your 
Lordships coming over and judged it most proper to open it her self 
to the King. I can assure you we both very much approve it, and for 
my own part I most earnestly desire you were here, You will see by 
my dispatches to Craggs the confused situation of our northern affairs'. 
143 
Sunderland tried to encourage Stanhope and dispatched the warrant for 
the King to sign to allow him to visit Hanover. 
144 
A week later 
Sunderland wrote to him, 'I return your Lordship many thanks for the 
favour of your letters, with the King's licence, and your kind 
invitation to Hanover, which I shall make use of as soon as possible 
I can'. 
145 In the meantime Carteret at Stockholm and Whitworth at 
Berlin completed a series of treaties involving Britain, Hanover, 
Sweden, and Prussia. Sweden agreed to cede Bremen and Verden to 
Hanover and Stettin and part of Pomerania to Prussia. In return 
Britain promised Sweden financial and naval assistance against. her 
remaining enemies in the north. 
146 On 14 August Sunderland 
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congratulated Stanhope upon the treaty between Britain and Prussia 
and declared that he would leave for Hanover the following Thursday. 
Sunderland reached The Hague on 24 August and arrived at Hanover 
at the end of the month. 
147 
The struggle with Bernstorff lasted throughout September and 
early-October 1719, but Sunderland, thanks to his great influence 
with the King and George I's confidence in his chief minister, 
eventually emerged victorious. On 22 October N. S. Sunderland 
informed Newcastle 'that neither Bernstorff nor Cadogan have any 
credit'. 
148 
Upon his return to England Sunderland gave further 
details of his triumph to Lord Carlisle. He affirmed: 
I beg leave to congratulate you upon the 
good situation of the King's affairs in 
all parts, which gives a reasonable and 
near prospect of a peace both in north 
and south. I must also congratulate you 
upon another thing; that is the resolution 
the King has taken not to suffer his 
Germans to meddle in English affairs, he 
having forbid them to presume so much as 
to speak to him about them. And this he 
has ordered all his servants to declare 
to everybody to be his resolution, and 
tells it himself to as many as come to 
him. 149 
The King crowned Sunderland's success by declaring that he would be 
made a Knight of the Garter. Sunderland told his wife 'as for the 
Blue Ribbon the King has in the handsomest and kindest manner told me 
he designed it for me as soon as he should return to England'. 
150 
Throughout his battle with Bernstorff Sunderland had still been 
preoccupied with the re-introduction of the Peerage bill into 
Parliament. 
Early in August 1719 Sunderland importuned Stanhope 'for God's 
sake hasten the King's going to the G6hr for I hear he thinks of - 
being in England not sooner than the middle of November. If so that 
entirely defeats the doing any considerable business before the 
holidays, the ill consequences of which are but too plain, whereas if 
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by meeting early, as has been for these two last sessions, the 
main of the money affairs are got over by that time, the King has 
the session in his hand'. 
151 Sunderland renewed his plea at the 
end of the month adding 'that holding the Parliament, by the middle 
of November... with the wonderful success you have had, both in 
north and south, would make everything easy, and fix his authority 
in England, as much as it is everywhere abroad'. 
152 
At Hanover 
Sunderland advised that it would be necessary to be in England at 
the beginning of November and in September, no doubt with great 
relief, he informed his wife that 'the orders for the rising of the 
Parliament on the 23rd of November O. S. are sent, the King being 
determined to be in England wind and weather permitting the first 
week in November', 
153 
In September Sunderland-revealed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
John Aislabie, that the King was resolved to support the re-introduction 
of the Peerage bill and the bill to reform the Universities of Oxford 
and Cambridge. 
154 Sunderland also outlined his plans to Newcastle, 
stating 'our affairs in all parts go as well as can be wished; after 
that our winter campaign can't fail, especially since the King is 
more determined than ever to persist with vigour in the measures 
you and your friends wish. He is resolved to push the Peerage bill, 
the University bill, and the repeal of the Septennial bill. if 
this won't unite the Whigs nothing will'. 
155 The reform of the 
Universities had been first considered in 1716 and 1717, but it had 
been dropped along with the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and 
156 
Schism Acts in May 1717. Sunderland believed it was necessary for 
the government to tighten its grip on the Universities, especially in 
the light of the disputes involving the Master of Trinity College, 
Cambridge, Dr. Richard Bentley, with the Fellows and Vice-Chancellor 
of the University. These quarrels had been brought before the King 
and Sunderland in Council. 
157 The repeal of the Septennial Act was, 
like the Peerage bill, designed to help maintain Sunderland"'s control 
of Parliament. Stanhope wrote to Newcastle arguing that the best 
way to secure the passage of the Peerage bill was to win over the 
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Commons by repealing the Septennial Act. Newcastle, who was 
enthusiastic about the Peerage and University bills, had grave 
doubts as to the wisdom of this step as he told both Sunderland and 
Stanhope. 158 In the event the defeat of the Peerage bill put an 
end to the rest of Sunderland's scheme. 
The departure from Hanover was delayed by a meeting with the King 
of Prussia and Sunderland eventually left for The Hague on 2 November 
N. S. 1719. He arrived. back in England at the end of the second week 
in November. 159 He was already active in preparing for the meeting 
of Parliament, Sunderland had increased his following among the 
Bishops by having Dr. Hugh Boulter, 'one of the honestest, steadiest, 
and worthiest clergymen in'England', 
160 
appointed Bishop of Bristol. 
161 
Sunderland was again discussing the nominations for the twenty-five 
hereditary Scotch Peers and he was active in obtaining the proxies 
of those of his supporters in the House of Lords who had not come up 
to London. There were even rumours that Sunderland was to be made 
Lord Treasurer at the opening of Parliament, 
162 
On 23 November the King's speech appealed to both Lords and 
Commons 'to think of all proper methods to establish and transmit to 
your posterity the freedom of our happy constitution, and particularly 
to secure that part which is most liable to abuse. I value myself, 
upon being the first who hath given you an opportunity to do it, and 
I must recommend it to you to complete those measures which remained 
imperfect the last session', 
163 Sunderland., together with Argyll, 
Montrose, Roxburghe, Coningsby, Archbishop Wake, and the Bishop of 
Bristol, was a member of the committee which drew up the address of 
thanks. This acknowledged the King's efforts on behalf of his people 
and the constitution and concluded-optimistically that these 'must 
necessarily draw all suitable returns of the utmost gratitude from all 
your Majesty's faithful subjects who have a true value for such 
inestimable blessings'. 
164 
Two days later Buckingham introduced the Peerage bill into the 
Lords where it was given a first reading, On 26 November it was read 
for the second time and upon the motion to commit Cowper objected 
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to the precipitate manner in which the bill had been brought on. 
Sunderland answered: 
That it could not with any justice be said, 
that any precipitation had been used in 
this affair, since the bill in question had 
been brought on the last session and then 
thoroughly examined; so that he doubted not 
but every member of that House was fully 
apprized of it and ready to give his vote 
for or against it: that the reason why it 
was brought in so soon at this time, he 
conceived to be, that it might give no 
interruption to the other important affairs 
which the King had recommended to his 
Parliament: and as for any secret meaning 
in this bill, his Lordship solemnly declared 
that he knew of no other, but what his 
Majesty had been pleased graciously to 
intimate in his speech, viz. the securing 
the freedom of our constitution, by 
preventing for the future the abuse of 
one branch of the royal prerogative, of 
which they had a fatal instance in the last 
reign, and which had given just offence to all 
sober men. 165 
Following Sunderland's speech the bill quickly passed through the 
committee stage and it passed the House on 30 November 1719. It was 
read for the first time in the Commons on 1 December and the second 
reading took place a week later. Lord William Paulet moved to 
commit the bill and was supported by Craggs, Lechmere and Aislabie. 
They were opposed by Richard Steele and Horatio Walpole, but the most 
telling performance came from Robert Walpole. He gave one of the 
most outstanding speeches of his career. He deliberately played upon 
the ambitions and jealousies of the country gentlemen to such effect 
that he virtually guaranteed the defeat of the bill. After almost 
eight hours debate the ministry moved that the bill should be 
committedibut this proposal was rejected by 269 votes to 177 and) 
encouraged by this successIthe opposition moved to throw out the 
bill which carried without a division. 
166 Sunderland had made a 
major miscalculation over his strength in the House of Commons. He 
had hoped that his victory over Bernstorff and the success of the 
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ministry's Policy in Northern Europe would have a similar effect to 
the achievements abroad in 1718 and rally backbench opinion to the 
government in the Commons and ensure the passage of the Peerage bill. 
There was now only one alternative left to Sunderland; he would have 
to buy off Walpole and Townshend. 
An agreement with Walpole was made even more necessary because 
the House of Commons would have to be persuaded to grant e600, OOO 
to pay off the accumulated debt of the Civil List and it was unlikely 
that this would be approved without Walpole's support. Walpole and 
Townshend, on the other hand, could derive little satisfaction from 
their period in opposition and were eager to get back into the 
government at almost any price. The first step was to reconcile the 
King and the Prince of Wales. Negotiations began in February 1720 
managed by Sunderland, Stanhope and Craggs for the government and by 
Walpole, Methuen, and Townshend for the opposition Whigs. Sunderland 
persuaded a reluctant King to be reconciled with his son, while 
Walpole, through his influence with Princess Caroline, brought the 
Prince to agree to wait upon his father. 
167 On 23 April the Prince 
of Wales submitted to the King. Sunderland informed Wake: 
I have the honour of acquainting your Grace 
with a piece of news that, I dare say, will 
be more agreeable to you than any thing that 
has happened since the King's accession to 
the Crown. It is the reconciliation of 
the King and Prince and to the mutual 
satisfaction of both sides. The immediate 
consequence of this will be the entire 
reunion of the Whig Party, in both Houses, 
which will be attended with all other good 
consequences honest men can desire-168 
The same day 'Lord Townshend, Lord Cowper, etc., were at Court, and 
they and Lord Sunderland caressed one another'. 
169 The next day 
the dissident Whigs waited upon the King and on Monday 25 April there 
was a dinner at Sunderland's attended by Parker, Newcastle, Stanhope, 
Craggs, Aislabie, Orford, Devonshire, Cowper, Townshend, Methuen, and 
Walpole. 
170 
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In May 1720 Walpole piloted provision for the Civil List debt 
through the Commons and in June he was rewarded with the office of 
Paymaster General. Townshend replaced Kingston as Lord President 
who was sacrificed along with Argyll. The allies of Walpole and 
Townshend were also rewarded. Methuen became Comptroller of the 
Household and Sir Charles Turner and Richard Edgecumb became 
commissioners of the Treasury, 
171 It was clear, however, that 
Walpole's faction had only been admitted to the government upon 
Sunderland's terms for he had refused to give Walpole his former 
position as First Lord of the Treasury while Sunderland's group 
dominated the Treasury Commission. Sunderland, who was created 
a Knight of the Garter on 24 May, dominated the Court and the House 
of Lordsibut he had had to abandon the Peerage bill and acknowledge 
that he could not control the Commons without help. Through Walpole 
he was able to manage that House, 
172 Sunderland was still Prime 
Minister and as Lady Cowper observed, in conversation with Bernstorff 
on 22 May 1720, '1 have seen several Treasurers, but none with the 
authority and unlimited power of the Earl of Sunderland. The Earl 
of Oxford never had the quarter of the power, nor the insolence that 
Lord Sunderland has'. 173 Similarly in June 1720 Lord Middleton 
declared of Sunderland 'there is no withstanding the current of his 
present power'. 
174 
Faced with a divided Whig party Sunderland had quickly consolidated 
his authority at Court and he had also established his pre-emine-mce in 
the House of Lords. Unfortunately, he was unable to obtain and 
maintain a firm grip upon the House of Commons. He had approached 
the Tories, but they were unwilling to provide the support he required. 
For a time it appeared that Sunderland had won over a sufficient number 
of independent Whig M. P. 's to give him a reasonably secure working 
majority in the Commons. As a result he went ahead with his bid for 
untrammelled political power. His attempt failed because these same 
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M-P, 's., under the influence of Walpole's dissident and factious 
MOHVCLS, were unwilling to allow Sunderland the degree of power to 
which he aspired. Though Sunderland couid not master the Commons 
on a permanent basis neither could Walpole. After three years in 
opposition his only significant achievement had been the defeat of 
the Peerage bill. It was the recognition, by both Walpole and 
Sunderland, that a reconciliation was the only alternative to 
continued strife in the Commons which produced the Whig re-union 
in 1720. It was, however, not an accommodation between two 
equally balanced groups for Sunderland was clearly much more powerful 
as Walpole and Townshend confirmed by their eagerness to accept any 
offer from him to get back into the ministry. With their return 
Sunderland dominated both the Court and Parliament and as things 
stood there was no serious challenge to his authority. 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 1720 TO APRIL 1722 
'So much to the prejudice of his reputation 
when the matter was doubtfuLl 
That a First Lord of the Treasury, who had little financial expertise 
and who depended upon his subordinates for the administration of his 
department, could accept an extravagant and highly speculative scheme 
to reduce the national debt testifies to the strength and self- 
confidence of the Sunderland administration. Sunderland's intimate 
relationship with the directors of the South Sea Company and his 
readiness to carry the South Sea bill through Parliament stemmed 
chiefly from his wish to diminish the burden of the national debt, 
That the undertaking was also personally lucrative only served to 
increase its attraction as far as he was concerned. Sunderland was 
at the centre of the frenzied monetary activity in the summer of 1720 
yet his willingness to acquiesce in this single-minded pursuit of 
wealth, on behalf of himself and the South Sea directors, was to have 
disastrous consequences. It was Sunderland's attempt to safeguard 
the financial monopoly of the South Sea Company which precipitated the 
collapse in the late-summer and autumn of 1720. Sunderland, like the 
majority of his contemporaries, was blind to the implications of the 
South Sea disaster, but once he realised the magnitude of the disruption 
he responded immediately. Both Sunderland. and the King returned from 
Hanover and the meeting of Parliament was deferred until the government 
could work out a plan for a financial recovery. His shortcomings 
as a financier forced Sunderland to rely upon the remedies of 
Robert Walpole and both men did all they could to calm the storm of 
resentment and anger which threatened to engulf Parliament and the 
country. It was their combined efforts which helped to stabilise 
the political life of the nation. Yet Sunderland's dependence upon 
Walpole meant that he would have to make major concessions to his 
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political rival and Walpole, as a result, was able to obtain the 
offices of Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Lord of the Treasury; 
the latter post was vacated by Sunderland because of his involvement 
in the South Sea debacle. 
Sunderland suffered further grievous blows with the loss of 
Stanhope, Craggs, and Aislabjejwhich allowed Walpole to consolidate 
his strength with his brother-in-law, Townshend, replacing Stanhope 
as Secretary of State for the North. Sunderland, however, once 
again revealed his resilience and determination by rallying his 
supporters and installing Carteret as Southern Secretary. Furthermore, 
Sunderland retained his great influence with the King and his control 
of the House of Lords; it was his mastery of the upper chamber which 
enabled him to emasculate the Lords'enquiry into the South Sea Company. 
Nevertheless, in order to manage the House of Commons, Sunderland had 
to rely exclusively upon Walpole and it was the Norfolk man's skill in 
manipulating this turbulent assembly which allowed him to baulk the 
Prime Minister at Court. Consequently, Sunderland sought an alliance 
with a section of the Tory Party which would form the basis of a 
Whig-dominated coalition in the Commons. This strategy was designed 
to give Sunderland the opportunity to dismiss Walpole and Townshend. 
Walpole, realising that the source of his power lay with the present 
House of Commons, was resolved to perpetuate the existing Parliament 
as long as it served his interests. Sunderland was in fact unable to 
dissolve Parliament in 1721, but Walpole could not prevent a 
dissolution the following year. The compromise was the short 
parliamentary session of 1721-1722 after which both men sought to 
undermine the other in the general election. Before the result of 
the election was known Sunderland died on 19 April 1722. 
" 2"ý 
I THE SOUTH SEA DISASTER: 
'the great South wind' 
SUMMER 1720 TO SUMMER 1721 
Sunderland took little part in the talks between the South Sea 
Company and the ministry over the proposals to help settle the problem 
of the national debt. Once the agreement had been concluded 
Sunderland gave his full support to the proposals. When the South 
Sea bill was under consideration in the House of Lords the Prime 
Minister was briefed about the details of the design by the directors and 
it was his speech which guarazteed the acceptance of the proposed 
legislation. Sunderland was heavily involved in the four money 
subscriptions taking responsibility for the lists of the rich and 
famous, leading Whig and Tory politicians, clergymen, and influential 
foreigners. In this activity he worked in close and extensive 
co-operation with Robert Knight, the cashier of the South Sea Company. 
It was the directors'fear that their efforts miaht be emulated which 
led Sunderland to direct the Attorney and Solicitor-Generals that 
unlawful subscriptions should be prosecuted. It was the 
implementation of this order whicMprew' , 
-pil-oAlth&4fthi 
in the price of South 
Sea stock. To begin with Sunderland, probably as a result of the 
advice he received from the directors., was confident that share 
prices would recover, but when it became clear that the situation in 
England was getting out of control Sunderland realised drastic action 
wa s necessary and he immediately returned to London. He fully 
approved, having little alternative, Walpole's engraftment scheme 
and together he and Walpole forced its acceptance by a hostile South 
Sea Company and a Bank of England which was more concerned with how it 
could benefit from the misfortune of its rival. The co-operation 
between Sunderland and Walpole continued throughout the 1720-21 
parliamentary session with Sunderland keeping a tight rein on the 
House of Lords and Walpole striving to stem the tide of vengekace in 
the Commons. It took all the endeavours of both men to save the 
ministry from the resentment of the members of the House of Commons. 
27S 
The South Sea Company had been founded by Robert Harley in 1711 
to deal with the unfunded portion of the national debt. Under the 
terms of the South Sea bill, which passed that year, unfunded 
government securities were to be exchanged for shares in South Sea 
Company stock for which the Company was to receive an annual payment 
from the Treasury. Two years later, at the Treaty of Utrecht, the 
Company obtained the privilege of trading with Spanish America 
together with the Asiento contract which allowed it to transport 
slaves to the Spanish West Indies for thirty years. Despite these 
apparently favourable r4erms failure characterised the trading 
activities of the Company and by 1719 it was in financial difficulties. 
Inspired by the success of John Law in France its directors sought 
government backing for a project by which they would assume 
responsibility for a large part of the national debt. Discussions 
were held between the directors and prominent ministers in the summer 
and autumn of 1719. Sunderland took no part in these, leaving 
Aislabie and Secretary Craggs to represent the administration. By 
January 1720 it had been decided that the holders of government 
annuities were to be given South Sea stock in return for their existing 
securities and that the Company would pay the Treasury a lump sum for 
the right to make this offer. From the ministry's point of view the 
main attraction of the plan was the relief it would give to the burden 
of the national debt. 
1 
On 22 January 1720 the South Sea Company's proposals were 
introduced into the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and, though he was seconded by Craggs, it was agreed that the Commons 
should be ready to consider other suggestions. The only serious 
challenge to the South Sea Company came from the Bank of England, but C> 
at the end of February the House approved the Company's undertaking. 
The South Sea bill was read for the first time on 17 March and at the 
beginning of April it was sent up to the Lords. 
2 The bill passed its 
first reading and a second reading was ordered for 5 April. That 
morning Sunderland, Stanhope, and Aislable met with representatives 
of the Company's directors who advised Sunderland on the details of 
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the scheme. 
3 Later that day the bill was given its second reading 
and a motion to commit was made. It was opposed by North and Grey, 
Wharton, Cowper, and Buckingham: 
The Earl of Sunderland answered most of their 
objections and among other things said, that 
they who encouraged and countenanced the 
scheme had nothing in their view, but the 
easing the nation of part of that heavy load 
of debt it labours under. That, on the 
other hand, the managers for that Company 
had, undoubtedly, a prospect ofp-rivate gain, 
either to themselves or their corporation, 
bik that when that scheme was accepted neither 
the one nor the other could forsee that the 
stocks would have risen to the price they 
were now advanced. That if they had 
continued as they were at that time, the 
public would have had the far greater share 
of the advantage accruing from that scheme, 
and that if the stocks were kept up to the 
price they had been raised to, which was not 
unlikely, it was but reasonable that the 
South Sea Company should enjoy the profit 
procured to it by the wise management and 
industry of its directors, which would enable 
it to make large dividends among its members 
and thereby to compass the ends intended by 
this scheme. 
The motion was carried by 83 votes to 17. The bill was considered in 
committee the following day and it passed its third reading on 
7 April. 4 
Within a week there was a very successful first money subscription 
and by the time the second subscription occurred at the end of April 
speculative fever had gripped London. The price of South Sea stock 
rose dramatically and the largest single increase coincided with the 
third money subscription in June. 
5 -, Sunderland was at the centre of 
applications to be included in the list of subscribers, receiving 
appeals from the Duke of Montrose, the Earl of Findlater, the Bishop of 
Bangor, the Duchess of Marlborough, and leading Tory politicians. 01 
Sunderland's wife subscribed E2,000 and his list in this subscription 
totalled el67,000.6 Sunderland then gave the various solicitations 
he received to Robert Knight in order that the Rames could be placed CO 
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in the subscription list. 
7 The Duchess of Marlborough was 
particularly anxious that her recommendations should be accepted 
in time and Sunderland had to go to great lengths to calm her 
unease. He informed her: 
I know I sent their names up, according to 
your Grace's commands, under my own hand. 
I own I thought the return I had in a 
letter from the Treasurer of the South Sea 
Company, and which I showed Mr. Hodges, 
had been satisfactory. However, to make 
your Grace as easy as I can, I sent the list, 
as you sent it me, up again this morning to 
the South Sea by Mr. Stanhope, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, who has brought me an 
answer from the Treasurer of the Company 
that they had taken care of these names 
before and that I might depend upon it. 8 
At the end of June South Sea stock was priced at just under 1000. 
Unfortunately the whole exchange of debts was a brilliant but 
unscrupulous and dangerous confidence trick, The success of the 
Company's project depended upon forcing up the market price of South 
Sea stock so that this stock could be exchanged for large shares in 
the national debt. As such it was only viable as a short term 
expedient. The behaviour of the Company was imitated by the Bank 
of England and the Royal African Company, while a host of new 
companies, some of them fraudulent, were founded to the great 
annoyance of the directors of the South Sea Company. They petitioned 
the ministry to do something to prevent the growth of these new 
organizations and the government responded by passing the Bubble Act 0 
which was given the royal assent on 11 June 1720, Two weeks later 
Sunderland ordered the Attorney and Solicitor-Generals to consider 
how to prevent the growth of unlawful subscriptions in the City of 
London. As a direct result of Sunderland's instruction writs were 
issued against three companies and the prosecutions which resulted 
began the fall in all stock including that of the South Sea Company, 
9 
'What both the government and the South Sea directors failed to 
realise was that the smaller bubbles were unlikely to be suppressed 
without destroying the largest one as well. ' 
10 Undeterred by the 
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fall in the price of their shares the Company proceeded with the 
fourth money subscription on 24 August. This time Sunderland took 
care of the lists of the Dukes of Newcastle and Marlborough along 
with ones sent from the Dutch Republic. 
11 
Sunderland left England for Hanover on 19 August, reaching 
The Hague three days later. 
12 
He arrived near the end of the campaign 
to elect a new Pensionary of Holland following the decline and death of 
Heinsius. 13 Initially, Sunderland had commanded the British envoy at 
The Hague, Charles Whitworth, that 'Monsieur Fagel is the person we 
should most wish for, as well as the likliest to succeed, if he will 
be persuaded to it, which I should hope his affection to his country, 
and the King's pressing instances, would. prevail upon him to consent 
to,. 14 Fagel, however, was unwilling to stand and Sunderland advised 
Whitworth 'if Monsieur Slingelandt should succeed it will be the same 
to the King's interest and the common cause'. 
is Sunderland had given 
Whitworth access to Treasury funds to be used on behalf of the British 
candidate 
16 
and told the envoy 'this whole matter must be left to your 
prudent management and I am sure it can't be in better hands'. 
17 
Whitworth, regreWably, does not appear to have acted with sufficient 
vigour. He was aware of the importance of Van Hoey's support for a 
potential Pensioner, but does not seem to have made a serious attempt 
to win him over to Slingelandt's cause. 
18 Once at The Hague 
Sunderland tried to rally support for Slingelandt, but it was too late 
for Hoornbeck was elected Pensionary of Holland on 12 September. 
19 
After congratulating him upon his success Sunderland left for Hanover. 
By the time Sunderland reached Hanover the South Sea crisis had 
deepened and the clamour for revenge was growing. 
Throughout September 1720 South Sea stock fell steadily and at 
the beginning of October it stood at 290. In the first half of 
September Sunderland was confident that this was only a temporary 
setback, 
20 but by 23 September he was increasingly worried. He 0 
informed his wife that 'I am very uneasy at the falling of the South 
Sea, bUt I do verily believe it will rise again. As for any advice 
what you are to do I can give none at this distance, but think you 
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would do well to send to Mr. Warner and Mr. Higgins who can 
certainly advise you the best'. 
21 At the beginning of October 
Sunderland was calculating how much of his investment in the South 
Sea Company was secure and it had been decided that the King should 
return to England and that Parliament should be summoned. 
22 
As the 
full extent of the crisis became apparent Sunderland decided he would 
have to return to England immediately to forestall criticism that, 
as the nation plunged into financial disorder, the King and his 
ministers had been content to remain at Hanover. He did not relish 
his return as he wrote to Lord Carlisle: 
all I will say now is that I know very well 
that when misfortunes happen in most 
countries, and particularly in England, it's 
the way to lay it at the door of those who 
have a share in the administration. That, 
therefore, ever since I meddled in public 
business I never thought of anything but 
doing the best I could for the public, with 
honest intentions, and with as much prudence 
as any poor understanding is capable of; and 
for the consequences afterwards, one must 
sit easy under them. That never was more 
the case than in this affair of the South 
Sea, which had almost the unanimous 
approbation and applause of all parties, in 
Parliament and out of it., and which of a 
sudden, in the compass of a very few, not 
months, not weeks, but days, has taken so 
strange and surprising a turn. 23 
After being delayed at Helvoetsluys by contrary winds Sunderland and 
Admiral Byng arrived in London at the beginning of November. 
24 
The King arrived in Britain in mid-November, 
25 
but the meeting of 
Parliament was delayed until early-December to give the ministry an 
opportunity to draw up a programme for financial recovery. Aislabie,, 
Craggs, and the South Sea directors tried, unsuccessfully, to find a 
solution in September and this failure of the men upon whom Sunderland 
relied for financial administration meant that the Prime Minister would 
have to turn to Walpole. 
26 
In late-October and early-November Walpole 
and his Banker, Robert Jacombe, devised a formula whereby the capital 
of the South Sea Company was to be broken down and engrafted into the 
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Bank of England and the East India Company. 
27 
The South Sea 
Company felt that Walpole's expedient had merely been designed for 
the benefit of the Bank and Sir George Caswell infirmed Sunderland 
of his determination to oppose the plan. 
28 
The Bank of England, 
meanwhile, eagerly sought to exploit the difficulties facing the 
South Sea Company for its own advantage. 
29 On 15 November Sunderland, 
Walpole, and Townshend had a meeting with the directors of the South 
Sea Company and the directors were told, almost certainly in the 
strongest terms, to accept the proposal and to stop causing 4ý1 
difficulties. The following day the directors of the Bank of 
England were summoned to the Treasury where Sunderland made it clear 
that the King fully approved the agreement which had been drawn up 
and any problems with its implementation should be resolved. 
30 
In the face of the combined efforts of Sunderland and Walpole the 
scheme was accepted by both the Bank and the South Sea Company. 
31 
Now that the administration had a remedy they could lay before 
the Lords and Commons Parliament was allowed to meet on 8 December 
1720.32 The lower House was in a furious mood and, though Walpole 
was able to introduce his engraftment scheme, he could not impose his 
authority on the assembly. On 12 December it was agreed, without a 
division., that Parliament should examine the proceedings of the South 
Sea Company and in January 1721 the Commons appointed a Committee of 
33 
Secrecy to look into the conduct of the South Sea directors, On 
21 and 22 December 1720 the House of Lords ordered that papers 
relating to the South Sea Company be laid before them. 
34 Sunderland 
was already taking measures to stifle. - the inquiries into the South Sea 
scandal. On 7 January 1721 the Prime Minister had a meeting with 
the Company's directors where they were told not to implicate the 
government in the more dubious aspects of the South Sea project. 
35 
Sunderland probably told Robert Knight to destroy any incriminating 
evidence and then to get out of the country. Certainly a fortnight 
later, Knight fled to the Austrian Netherlands. In early-February 
Sunderland, in a speech to the Lords, confirmed rumours that Knight 
had been arrested by the Imperial authorities. The Peers then 
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resolved to address the King to issue orders to have Knight secured 
and brought back to Britain. Sunderland, however, bribed the 
governor of the Austrian Netherlands, the Marquis de Prie, with 
E50,000 out of the Civil List, not to release Knight. The King 
informed Prince Eugene that he would be obliged if the privileges 
of the province of Brabant could be maintained to prevent Knight's 
extradition. When Knight fled to France later in the year the Regent 
was advised, through the Duchess of Kendal, to ignore the requests 
of the British ambassador for Knight's return. 
36 Sunderland also 
approached leading Tories including Harcourt, Trevor, Carleton and 
the Bishop of Rochester to see if they could be persuaded to support 
the government in Parliament. Sunderland also made overtures to the 
Duke of Argyll and his brother, Lord Islay, for their assistance. It 
was these efforts, together with his mastery of the upper chamber, 
which enabled Sunderland to neutralize the Lords inquiry while giving 
the impression that the ministry was doing all it could to seek out 
and punish those responsible for the financial disaster of the South 
Sea bubble. 37 
On 9 January 1721 the deputy governor and sub-governor of the 
South Sea Company brought several papers, called for in December 
1720, before the House of Lords and the following day the House went 
into a grand committee upon public credit. Stanhope and Carteret 
urged that the estates of those who were criminally responsible should 
be confiscatpd: 
The Earl of Sunderland owned, that he had been 
for the South Sea scheme because he thought it 
calculated for the advantage of the nation 
in order to lessen the public debts, and in 
particular to take off the heavy incumbrance of 
long annuities. That no man could imagine that 
so good a design could have been so perverted in 
the execution, as to produce quite contrary 
effects. But that, in his opinion, no act 
of Parliament had ever been so much abused 
as the South Sea Act and therefore he would go 
as far as any body to punish the offenders. 
28 2 
Wharton declared that no respect should be paid to persons and the 
offenders should be punished with the utmost severity. North and 
Grey, Abingdon, and the Bishop of Rochester commented upon the 
adverse effects of the South Sea project, while Cowper attacked 
those who had been appointed by Act of Parliament to supervise the 
directors of the Company. To vindicate himself Sunderland replied: 
That by the South Sea they were directed to 
appoint such persons as they should think 
fit to be managers of the said Act. That 
as they had reason to look upon those 
persons who had the principal share in 
framing this scheme as the most able and 
proper to execute it, they had accordingly 
appointed some of the South Sea directors 
to be managers and directors of the 
Treasury; concluding that in this they 
had followed former precedents. 
The question was then put, 'That the constitution from the Commissioners 
of the Treasury, dated the 6th of May 1720, appointing the directors 
of the South Sea Company to be managers and directors for performing 
such matters and things as, by the Act for enabling the said Company 
to increase their capital stock, are directed, has been conformable to 
precedents and legal'. Sunderland's speech resulted in the motion 
carrying in the affirmative by 63 votes to 28.38 Sunderland's 
approaches to the Tories were already beginning to have effect for it 
was noted that Lord Harcourt voted with the administration in the 
division, 39 Finally, 'My Lord Sunderland moved the House to enter 
upon the enquiry tomorrow and that the directors should be ordered to 
attend'. 
40 On Thursday 12 January, the deputy and sub-governors of 
the Company, together with the directors, the treasurer, the deputy- 
treasurer and secretary were examined by the Lords. 
41 Sunderland and 
Stanhope then moved,, 'that the directors of the South Sea Company, in 
the loans by them made upon the stock and subscriptions, have been 
guilty of a breach of trust and ought, out of their private estates, 
to make good whatever losses the Company may sustain thereby'. 
42 
01 
The motion was agreed to without a division 
43 
and it was observed 
that 'the Court carry on the enquiry and prosecution with all 
imagineabl e vi gour 1.44 
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The inquiry into the South Sea collapse revealed that bribery 
had been used in 1720 to persuade the government to accept the South 
Sea Company's proposals. In particular ý574,500 of fictitious 
stock had been given to prominent politicians as the South Sea 
bill passed through Parliament. 
45 The entire ministry was under 
suspicion, but Sunderland's involvement in the corruption, no doubt 
due to his instructions to the South Sea directors, was unclear. 
On 15 February 1721 Lord Clarendon reported from the Lords' Committee 
which had examined the directors. Charles Joye had declared that 
Knight had told him that Sunderland never received any stock and, though 
Edward Gibbon said that he had been informed that Sunderland was to 
receive Z50,000 worth of stock, he did not know whether any payment had 
been made. 
46 Even when it appeared that inquiries which could embarrass 
Sunderland might be undertaken Sunderland's overtures to the Tories 
helped to defuse the danger. Sir John Blunt had been asked if 
Sunderland had been given any stock: 
Sir John answered no. Thus the clerk entered 
it [into the Committee's report], but my Lord 
Windsor stood up and appealed to the House 
whether Sir John answered so peremptorily 
and did not use the words I gave him none, 
which, said my Lord, carry a very different 
meaning from that absolute denial entered 
by the clerk. Upon this the Bishop of 
Rochester said, it might possibly be as my 
Lord Windsor affirmed, but other Lords 
might not remember it and it would be very 
hard upon that noble Lord [Sunderland] to 
alter an entry already made so much to the 
prejudice of his reputation when the matter 
was doubtful. So the whole report was 
allowed to stand. 47 
The Secret Committee of the House of Commons made its first report 
on 16 February 1721. In his testimony before these M. P. 's Sir John 
Blunt left little doubt that Sunderland did obtain e50,000 of South 
Sea stock as a reward. Joye and Gibbon made similar declarations 
to this committee as they had given to the equivalent committee in the 
House of Lords. Richard Holditch merely said that he was uncertain 




days later the committee issued its second report and the wrath 
of the House now focussed upon the government. The evidence that 
had t1i'le Treasury Secretary, Charles Stanhopeland Chancellor Aislabie 
engaged in corrupt practices was very strong, but Sunderland, probably 
due to personal loyalty and friendship but also self interest, tried 
to help both men so far as he could.. Charles Stanhope was a very 
close personal and political associate of Sunderland, having accompanied 
him to Hanover in 1719 and 1720 and having worked with him at the 
Treasury. Sunderland probably persuaded the King to request three 
members of the Secret Committee to abstain from the Commons vote on 
Stanhope and this was the majority by which he was cleared on 
28 February 1721.49 With Walpole refusing to assist Aislabie (both 
he and Sunderland knew how important Aislabie was to the Prime 
Minister in the Commons), Sunderland could do little for him and 
twelve resolutions were passed against Aislabie; he was expelled 
from the House and sent to the Tower on 8 March. After sending 
Sir John Carswell to the Tower two days laterithe committee turned its 
inquiry towards Sunderland's involvement in the South Sea Bubble. 
so 
In early March the members of the Secret Committee considered 
that part of their report which concerned Sunderland and drew up a 
series of resolutions against him. 
50 On 14 March Sir Joseph Jekyll 
moved that the report pertaining to Sunderland should be read, after 
which Walpole managed to adjourn the consideration until the following 
day upon the pretext that it would allow. the House to examine the 
witnesses who had been questioned by the committee. 
52 The next day 
the Commons was very full and the Prince of Wales was present in the 
5 1"? 
gallery to animate his followers against Sunderland. 13 Jekyll again 
proposed to consider the report of the committee and he was supported 
by Hutcheson and Sloper. The statements which the directors of the 
South Sea Company had made to the committee were read and five of the 




Mr. Pelham... and Mr. Walpole informed 
the House that his Lordship [Sunderland] 
had empowered them to declare that no 
stock had ever been taken in for him by 
Knight or note given. So that the 
question in truth was neither more or 
less than whether we should give credit 
to that assertion or Sir John Blunt's 
oath. A good deal of pains was taken 
to falsify the oath by asking the 
witnesses at the bar., whether Knight 
had told them of this stock being taken 
in presence and hearing of Sir John. Blunt 
(as he had sworn). They owned Knight's 
telling them of the stock so taken in for 
Lord Sunderland. One of them said he 
was alone with Knight when he told him 
of it; two others owned Sir John's 
being in the room when he told it them, 
but did not belieýg him in hearing of 
what Knight said, 
Jekyll, after personal reflections upon Sunderland, 
56 
moved: 
That it appears to this House that, after 
the proposals of the South Sea Company 
were accepted by the House, and a bill 
ordered to be brought in thereupon; and 
before such bill passed, Z50,000 of the 
capital stock of the South Sea Company 
was taken in by Robert Knight, late 
cashier of the said Company, for the use 
and upon the account of Charles, Earl of 
Sunderland, a Lord of Parliament and First 
Commissioner of the Treasury, without any 
valuable consideration paid, or sufficient 
security given, for payment for, or 
acceptance of the same. 57 
Walpole, Pulteney, John Hungerford and Sir John Walter spoke in favour 
of Sunderland and were opposed by Jekyll, Grey Neville, Hutcheson, 
Sloper, Shippen and Sir Thomas Hanmer, among others. The debate 
lasted until 8 p. m.,, when the question was rejected by 233 votes to 
172.58 Though it was observed, that 1172 was a great number against 
a Prime Minister' 
59 
and Sunderland himself declared 'that whenever 
an English Minister had but 60 majority in a House of Commons he was 
undone', 
60 in the circumstances Sunderland was acquitted by a 
286 
comfortable majority. That the administration could obtain a 
majority of this size in the immediate aftermath of the South Sea 
disaster was no mean achievement and it bears comparison with the 
votes Sunderland's ministry obtained in the Commons in late 1718 
and early 1719 which induced Sunderland to introduce the Peerage 
bill, 
There were a number of facts which help to explain the ministry's 
ability to defeat the attack upon Sunderland. Even Thomas Brodrick, 
who, apart from Sir Joseph Jekyll, received the largest number of 
votes when elected to the Commons' Secret Committee in January 1721 
and who showed little inclination to favour Sunderland, 
61 felt he 
had been duped by the South Sea directors and pointed to the fact that 
Sunderland's family and friends had lost heavily in the crash. 
62 
Certainly Sunderland's ignorance of finance put him at a distinct 
disadvantage in relation to the directors and he appears to have 
been the victim of his own lack of expertise and hTS-VU41-104 rather 
than anything else. Another member of the Secret Committee, 
Nicholas Lechmere, took to his bed rather than have to face the 
responsibility ofvoting either for or against Sunderland; to the evident 
annoyance of his father-in-law, Lord Carlisle, who expected him to 
vote for Sunderland. 
63 There was a widespread belief that the evidence 
against Sunderland was insufficient to convict him 
64 
as Lord Percival 
noted: 'I observe that most people think there was not sufficient 
evidence produced of his [Sunderland] being concerned in the manner his 
enemies set forth and a leading Tory member told me he would not hang 
a dog upon the proof which was offered. I know not how it is, but 
he [Sunderland] is in much better esteem than Walpole, especially with 
the Tories'. 
65 Percival had not been privy to the negotiations the 
Prime Minister had been conducting with the Tories since the 
beginning of the year and from which he now reaped great benefit, 
Sunderland obtained considerable Tory support, 
66 including Harcourt's 
67 followers and also from Ila pluspart des Thorys les plus declares'. 
Ironically, Whig M. P. 's had been pressured into voting for Sunderland 
68 
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by being +, -old that if they 
did not, and Sunderland was found 
6Q 
guilty, they would help to establish a Tory ministry. - Walpole's 
assistance was, of course, invaluable, 
70 
as was the Support of the 
Argyll faction in the Commons. 
71 The French envoy in London, 
Destouches, had little doubt of the significance of Sunderland's 
acquittal as he informed Dubois: 'Cetýe victoire est decisive et 
non seulment met my Lord Sunderland dans une meilleure posture que 
jamais mais elle acheve d'atterer le parti du Prince de Galles dont 
tous les amis ont vote contre ce ministre'. 
72 
It had taken the united strength of the government to secure the 
acceptance of the engraftment project and to temper the ill-feeling 
in Parliament and both Sunderland and Walpole knew that, at least 
in Parliament, it would be advisable to continue to act in unison 
until the end of the session. In April Sunderland and Townshend 
delivered congratulations from the House of Lords to the Prince and 
Princess of Wales upon the birth of a son. 
73 Sunderland continued 
to back Walpole's plans for financial reconstruction 
74 
and between 
May and July 1721 a Committee of the Whole House of Commons considered 
measures to restore public credit, The committee drafted a series 
of important resolutions which were incorporated into an address to 
the Crown on 25 July. A bill encompassing these resolutions was 
brought before the House on 1 August and it was given the royal 
assent on 10 August. Walpole was chiefly responsible for the bill 
'which applied the harsh cautery of common sense to the soaring dreams 
and meglomaniac expectations of the South Sea years'. 
75 Sunderland 
and Walpole also tried to ease the retribution which was to be 
inflicted upon John Aislabie)as far as was realistic in the 
circumstances. 
In April 1721 a bill had been introduced into Parliament to 
confiscate the estates of the South Sea directors and a motion was 
made to add to it 'the bill for restraining John Aislabie from 
76 
going out of the kingdom and for discovering his estates and effects'. 
Walpole was unable to prevent this proposal being accepted though as a 
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concession it was agreed that Aislabie should only forfeit his 77 
estate acquired after 20 October 1718. The confiscation bill 
was o--i. ly one of Aislabie's worries for he heard rumours of Vie 
King's dissatisfaction at the way he had handled royal investment 
in the South Sea Company, 
78 Aislabie, who was in the Tower: 
presumed to write to his Majesty, humbly 
beseeching him to appoint some persons to 
examine it in what manner he thought fit. 
Upon which my Lord Sunderland and Lord 
Carteret came to me in the Tower, when 
my Lord Sunderland assured me from the 
King, that he was well satisfied with 
the account, and had given orders to 
tell me so; and with that would give 
me that E6,000 South Sea stock in 
consideration of my sufferings. And the 
same Lords sometime after I was, released 
from the Tower did me the honour to visit 
me at my house and gave me the same 
assurances there. 79 
Sunderland also sought to assist Aislabie in the Lords when the 
DirectorsIbill came up for consideration in July 1721. After the 
second reading had been ordered on 10 July a petition from Aislabie, 
that he be heard by counsel on his behalf, was presented to the House. 
Townshend strongly opposed admitting it, but 'some other Lords spoke 
more favourably of Mr. Aislabie, particularly the Earl of Sunderland, 
though not directly, and so the petition was received and ordered to 
lie upon the table'. 
80 Petitions were then presented on behalf of 
two South Sea directors and another debate arose over whether or not 
they should be received. Strafford, Trevor, Bathurst, and North and 
Grey urged that there was as much reason for admitting these 
petitions as there had been for accepting Aislabie's. Sunderland, 
Townshend, and Newcastle replied that the Lords had resolved that 
the directors were guilty of a notorious and fraudulent breach of 
trust and this bill was the consequence of these resolutions. The 
directors had not raised objections against these decisions when asked 
at the bar of the House and that their offence was so great that they 
were not entitled to this indulgence. It was agreed to read the 
resolutions which had been passed against the directors and the 
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petitions were rejected without a division. 
81 On 11 July the Lords 
desired a conference with the Commons to explain why Aislabie and 
James Craggs senior had been included in the Directors, bill. 
Sunderland, Carteret, and Townshend were members of the committee 
to draw up what was to be offered to the Commons at a conference. 
After considering the report of this meeting the Lords resolved 
that Aislabie was at liberty to be heard by the House on Tuesday 
18 July. 82 That day Harcourt proposed that Aislabie's witnesses 
might be heard separately, but Townshend argued this would take too 
long and might result in the loss of the bill. Sunderland backed 
Townshend stating that it was necessary to pass the bill as it had 
been sent up from the Commons in order to quieten the anxieties of 
the people. After his witnesses had been examined Aislabie made two 
long speeches on his own behalf; the only members of the government 
he mentioned were Secretaries Stanhope and Craggs who by now were 
both dead. Sunderland's efforts on behalf of Aislabie were suitably 
rewarded. The Directors' bill received the royal assent on 29 July, 
but it was not until 1723 that the question of Aislabie's estate was 
decided. 83 
Ministerial solidarity was also evident in the defeat of the 
attempt of the Archbishop of Canterbury to counter the growth of 
irreligion. * In March 1721 Wake confer-red with Lords Nottingham and 
Trevor about possible ways to suppress profaneness and blasphemy and 
to prevent the 
_-propagation 
of Arian ideas, Nottingham drew up a bill 
which he sent to Wake, but the Archbishop, after consulting his 
episcopal brethren, thought it would be better to wait for the present. 
Nottingham, however, was set upon going ahead and on 20 April 
Willoughby de Broke introduced a bill into the Lords to suppress 
profaneness and blasphemy. 
84 The next day Wake visited Sunderland 
to try to get him to support the bill,. but though he persisted in his 
endeavours until the end of the month Sunderland would not agree. 
85 
The measure was given a second reading on 2 May 1721 and Wake moved 
for committing, but Onslow proposed that it should be thrown out and 
Sunderland, Carteret, Argyll, Wharton, Islay, Townshend, Cowper, and 
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the Bishop of Peterborough spoke to the same effect. Nottingham, 
Bathurst, Trevor, and the Bishop of Litchfield supported the bill, 
but it was agreed by 60 votes to 31 to put it off for three weeks. 
86 
Sunderland was displeased by Wake's speech for the bill, believing 
that it reflected both on him. and the administration, but the 
difference between them was quickly patched up. 
87 Once the South 
Sea crisis had passed the animosities between Sunderland and Walpole 
began to come to the surface and, though a facade of unity was 
maintained in Parliament, few doubted that a major struggle for power 
was developing. 
II THE FINAL CONFLICT: SUMMER 1721 TO SPRING 1722 
'a kind of peace between SunderZand... and WaZpoZe I
The reconciliation between Sunderland and Walpole which had been 
effected in 1720 could not conceal the underlying tension within the 
88 
government, yet Sunderland's authority at this time was such that 
Walpole could not provide a serious challenge. The South Sea crisis 
changed all this, Though cleared of charges of corruption) 
Sunderland, as First Lord of the Treasury, was still heavily 
implicated in the financial scandal and he had to resign this office 
which, together with the Chancellorship of the Exchequer was given to 
Walpole as a reward for his efforts on behalf of Sunderland and his 
followers. Walpole, with the support of Sir Charles Turner and 
Richard Edgecumb, was now in a position to dominate the Treasury 
and use it to serve his own interests. This in itself was a major 
setback for Sunderland, but it was accompanied by further grievous 
blows which tore the heart out of his ministry. 
89 On 4 February 1721 
while the Lords were engaged in the, inquiry into the South Sea affair 
the Duke of Wharton drew a parallel between the recent division in 
the royal family and that caused by Sejanus in the Imperial family in 
Ancient Rome. This was a direct reflection on Sunderland and Stanhope 
and the latter, after making a vehement reply denouncing Wharton, 
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collapsed and was taken home. Stanhope took tea with Sunderland 
and Newcastle the following morning, but later in the day he died. 
Twelve c'Lays later Secretary Craggs died of smallpox. 
90 Sunderland 
was now forced to allow Townshend to become Northern Secretary in 
place of Stanhope, but he compensated for this reverse by securing 
Carteret's appointment as the other Secretary of State. Carteret's 
promotion was seen as 'un coup de la prudence de my Lord Sunderland 
qui met part la les affaires entre les mains d1un homme dont il 
est sur et qui est eleve de my Lord Stanhope'. 
91 Sunderland also 
secured the support of Argyll and Islay in return for creating them 
Master of the Household and Scottish Privy Seal respectively. 
Sunderland was reconciled with Cadogan, while the office of Postmaster 
General was held jointly by Edward Carteret and Galfridus Walpole. 
92 
Sunderland had once again demonstrated his ability to recover from 
even the most severe setback and with his strength at Court and in 
the House of Lords he was still the dominant figure in the 
administration. In February 1721 Sir John Vanbrugh shrewdly remarked 
that 'by all I can learn, I incline to think Lord Sunderland will not 
be dropped. I believe he still has the King, which, with the 
consideration of his great ability in Parliament may probably incline 
Lord Townshend and Mr. Walpole to think it for their own service to 
draw with him'. 
93 Though underestimating the position of Walpole and 
Townshend, Vanbrugh had identified the sources of Sunderland's 
power. A spate of vacancies in the Church gave Sunderland the 
opportunity not only to demonstrate his authority with the King but 
to augment his strength in the Lords. 
Upon the death of the Bishop of Winchester in July 1721 
94 
Sunderland wrote to Archbishop Wake: 'I am commanded by the King to 
let your Grace know that he has named the Bishop of Norwich to succeed 
[at Winchester and] Dr. Green to be Bishop of Norwich'. 
95 
At the 
beginning of September Sunderland had the Bishop of Bangor translated 
to Hereford and Dr. Reynolds named as his replacement. 
96 A week later 
Sunderland again wrote to Wake: 'The King has ordered me to acquaint 
your Grace that, upon the Bishop of Durham's death, he has named the 
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Bishop of Salisbury to succeed and the Bishop of Gloucester to 
succeed him at Salisbury. As for Gloucester the King, being very 
desirous t3 do something for Dr, Willcox,... has determined to make 
him Bishop of Gloucester'. 
97 Sunderland informed Newcastle that 
'we shall now have nineteen Whig Bishops out of the 26 which is a 
pretty reasonable proportion'. 
98 It was observed that 'there have 
been a great many promotions of late in the Church and all done by 
the one person the Lord Sunderland. A deanery was all that Lord 
Townshend could get for Dr. Canon whose friend he is'. 
99 
The position 
facing Sunderland in the Commons, unfortunately, was far from 
satisfactory. 
The death of Craggs and the expulsion of Aislabie deprived 
Sunderland of his chief lieutenants in the Commons and he was forced 
to rely exclusively upon Walpole to manage the House. Walpole's 
influence with M. P. 's was, together with his control of the Treasury, 
his chief asset in any struggle with Sunderland and he was able to 
use this advantage to check Sunderland's influence at Court. Sunderland 
intended to promote his allyCharles Stanhope to the post of Treasurer 
of the Chamber. 
100 Walpole was not prepared to agree to Stanhope 
having this office and he was able to blackmail Sunderland and 
Carteret into giving way. Carteret announced the disappointment to 
Newcastle: 
Charles Stanhope's advancement is put off 
by Mr. Walpole's assuring us that it will 
revive matters in Parliament concerning 
South Sea. He is contented that he 
[Stanhope] should have the place at the 
end of the Parliament. This has 
mortified Lord Sunderland and me not a 
little, but when Mr. Walpole has taken 
upon him that all South Sea matters 
shall be kept out of Parliament next 
sessions we could not persist in a 
point, which would bring us to answer 
for any ill event in Parliament. These 
arguments did not prevail with us by 
virtue of their own weight, but we could 
do no otherwise considering all, 101 
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That Walpole was now in a position to challenge Sunderland at Court 
meant that he could threaten to undo nearly a decade of endeavour 
by Sunderland to establish himself as the King's first minister. 
This was a development Sunderland was unwilling to tolerate, 
Sunderland was resolved to reorganize his following in the Commons, 
to reach an agreement with a section of the Tory party, and to 
dissolve Parliament. 
In February 1721 Lord Dering acquainted his brother that the 
deaths of Stanhope and Craggs had 'bereft the rest of the ministry 
of much support, especially in the House of Commons where they seem 
to have little influence left. My Lord Sunderland endeavours to 
make new friends'. 
102 It seems that Daniel Pulteney was being 
groomed by Sunderland for the leadership of his Whig following in 
the Commons. After Sunderland's death Speaker Onslow declared 
of Pulteney: 
His animosity to Mr. Walpole arose from 
his intimacy with Lord Sunderland, to 
whom he was brother-in-law by having 
married the sister of my Lord Sunderland's 
last wife. He was in the depth of all 
that Lord's political secrets, as far 
at least as he trusted anybody, and was 
designed by him to be Secretary of State 
in the scheme he formed of a new 
administration. 103 
Pulteney was certainly well qualified to serve as Secretary of State 
for the North., having been envoy to Denmark throughout the previous 
reign. In 1717 he had been appointed to the Board of Trade and 
when Sir George Byng was created Viscount Torrington in 1721 
Sunderland had secured Pulteney's transfer to the Admiralty Board as 
Byng's successor. The only drawback about Pulteney was his 
inexperience in the House of Commons for he had only been elected in 
March 1721.104 To compensate for this it seems likely that Pulteney 
would act with his cousinWilliam Pulteney, who brought him into 
Parliament for the borough of Hedon in October 1/121 and who was, by 
1721, bitterly opposed to Walpole for failing to secure an office 
for him when the Whigs were reconciled in 1720. William Pulteney did C). 
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in fact go on to co-operate with his cousin after Sunderland's 
death and was one of the most able and dangerous of Walpole's 
opponents. 
105 Daniel and William Pulteney had been chosen to 
lead the Sunderland Whigs in the Commons yet alone this group could 
not maintain control of the House. 
Sunderland's acquittal on 15 March 1721 had demonstrated the value 
of Tory assistance in the House of Commons and he was eager to 
exploit any advantage he could out of this connection. It is clear 
that Sunderland's prime concern was to win over a number of prominent 
Tory politicians and their followers which would allow him to assume 
the offensive by dissolving Parliament and establishing a new 
administration and thereby ousting Walpole and Townshend, Though 
Sunderland approached numerous elements within the Tory party his 
most serious overtures were directed towards men such as Harcourt, 
Trevor, and Carleton. Harcourt had shown his willingness to reach 
an accommodation with Sunderland early in 1721 and in return for his 
support the Prime Minister was again ready to consider pardoning 
Bolingbroke. Not only would this win over Harcourt, but Bolingbroke 
would also serve as a powerful counter to Walpole's influence. 
Sunderland and Harcourt discussed the question of Bolingbroke in 
March 1721 after which Harcourt delivered Sunderland's instructions 
to his friend, and former Tory colleague, Sir Robert Raymond who 
had been created Attorney-General in 1720, Raymond drew up a draft 
of a bill to pardon Bolingbroke which was to have been inserted into 
the Act of Grace of July 1721 and would have restored him to his lands, 
title, and his seat in the House of Lords. Though the attempt had to 
be given up because of Walpole's opposition, Sunderland continued to 
court Harcourt and Lord Carleton. 
106 On 25 June Sunderland had Lord 
Carleton appointed Lord President of the Council, in place of 
Townshend, and offered Harcourt a promotion in the peerage to the rank 
of Viscount. 
107 On 11 August Townshend informed Walpole that he 'had 
this morning a long debate before the King with Carteret about 
Lord Harcourt's being made a Viscount. He did not carry his point 
then, but I fancy when Sunderland comes to his assistance it will be 
done', 108 
29 .5 
Sunderland was also engaged in negotiations with other Tory 
factions, but these approaches were often contradictory and 
ultimately unworkable and were not characterised by the seriousness 
that marked his treating with Harcourt and Carleton. It would 
appear that Sunderland's intention in consulting with these groups 
was to try _t(y gain a temporary tactical advantage and to pre-empt 
any attempts which Walpole might make to come to terms with one or 
other of the elements in the Tory party. Like Harcourt, Francis 
Atterbury, the Bishop of Rochester, and Alexander Urquhart had 
helped Sunderland in his difficulties with the South Sea inquiry'09 
in the hope that he would be ready to espouse their interest. it 
is inconceivable that Sunderland had any serious intention to assist 
the Jacobites, but he was alive to the advantages that could be 
derived from keeping up their expectations. Sunderland was prepared 
to help Atterbury in his-legal dispute over the dormitory at 
Westminster as Edward Harley contemptuously observed: 'Ruff 
[Atterbury] by snivelling and cringing to Lord S(underland] has got 
him to prevail with the C[hancell]or to speak out against his own 
order'. 
110 The meetings between Sunderland and Atterbury continued 
into April, during which time the Bishop spoke on behalf of Aislabie 
in the Lords. On 16 May the dormitory case came before the House of 
Lords for the final time and Atterbury carried his point by 28 votes 
to 26 with Sunderland and Carteret voting for him, 
ill Sunderland 
had secured Atterbury's assistance at a bargain price and he was ready 
to keep in touch with Atterbury, probably in the hope he could get his 
backing and that of his adherents in the general election which would 
follow the dissolution of Parliament in the summer. Even if little 
progress was made Sunderland was at least able to prevent the Bishop 
committing himself to Walpole and Toxvnshend, who were also approaching 
Atterbury- 112 Sunderland's intentions towards the Jacobites are 
confirmed by George Lockhart, who told the Pretender that Urquhart, 
who had returned to Scotland in August 1721, 'seemed very desirous 
that your friends would enter into measures with Sunderland, 
particularly with a view to the elections of a new Parliament 
insinuating his Lordship would give them good terms'. 
113 
'796 
Sunderland's desire for as much Tory benevolence in the 
4 forthcoming election as possible helps to explaLn his approaches 
to the Tory M. P., Aichibald Hutcheson. Apart from their desire 
for a new Parliament Sunderland and Hutcheson had little in common, 
but from Sunderland's point of view Hutcheson would be of value in 
an election and like the Bishop of Rochester he was also being courted 
by Walpole. Sunderland did not intend to make any serious 
concessions, but Hutcheson never seemed to realise this and, to 
Sunderland's delight, he was always keen to confer with him. 
114 
Sunderland also approached the Harleyites, but he can not have expected 
to achieve much when it was known that he was attempting to bring 
back Bolingbroke, Oxford saw through Sunderland's approaches and 
though William Bromley proved receptive he too soon became 
disillusioned. 115 He told Oxford: 'I had a good deal at second CP 
hand of the project then pretended to be carrying on, but wanting 
faith I absolutely declined the opportunities offered and pressed 
upon me of receiving all possible assurances from the first, Promises 
were made to me so large that it was affronting me to imagine I 
could think them sincere and be imposed upon by them', 
116 At the 
beginning of August the French envoy in London, Destouches, wrote to 
the Abbe Dubois: 'My Lord Sunderland que Pon croit d1accord avec 
les chefs des Thorris quIon fasse une nouvelle election'. 
117 
If Sunderland was determined to dissolve Parliament Walpole was 
equally insistent that its life should be prolonged as long as possible, 
'believing he will hardly be able to influence and conduct another as 
he has this Parliament'. 
118 Walpole's great strength was his 
connection with the backbench M. P. 's and it was this which allowed 
him to challenge Sunderland's authority; a dissolution could put his 
influence over the Commons in jeopardy. Walpole brought all his 
influence to bear and advised the King that it was necessary that 
Parliament should continue sitting'19 and Sunderland 'did not think to 
push the matter too far', 
120 The Duke of Montrose declared to Mungo 
Graham, laffairs here look strangely. I shall tell you plainly, but 
let it be to your self till you hear more, that Walpole appears to 
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have got the better of Sunderland and I take it to be now certain 
that we shall have another session of this Parliament in November 
next. Judge what a jumble and mass of confusion we are likely to 
live in'. 121 
Sunderland had suffered a major setback, but Carteret was quick 
to reassure Newcastle. He wrote: 
In the next place I can with pleasure 
acquaint you that neither Lord Sunderland 
nor I have lost any ground with the King. 
This affair has been well managed; the 
particulars of it must remain to be talked 
over when I shall have the happiness to see 
you. Lord Sunderland is in good humour and 
I shall only add that when I told the King 
how matters were agreed he said to me Je 
veus qulils sachent que j'aurai une 
particuliere distinction pourMild. 
Sunderland et vous. 122 
Yet, as Carteret admitted, 'the King is resolved that Walpole shall 
not govern, but it is hard to be prevented'. 
123 
Encouraged by this success, and that over the promotion of 
Charles Stanhope, Walpole then overreached himself by suggesting that 
the present Parliament should be extended indefinitely. 
124 
Sunderland, smarting over his recent setbacks and still intent upon 
having an election as soon as possible, now stood firm. The dispute 
threatened to split the ministry apart and it was only the efforts of 
Newcastle and Townshend that produced a compromise. Writing of the 
outcome Montrose declared: 'it's certain the Parliament will meet 
at the day appointed, you may depend upon it. It's as sure that we 
shall have a very short session and that all prospects of continuing 
it are laid aside, This was a point adjusted and agreed upon by 
both sides of our ministry and those of lem whose interest it would 
be most to have it continued are sensible that's a pull too hard for 
them'. 
126 Sunderland now had to counter Tory annoyance at his 
failure to obtain a dissolution of Parliament. 
127 
Archibald Hutcheson was easily persuaded of Sunderland's 
continuing sincerity, as he informed the Prime Minister: 'I can 
retain no doubt of your sincere endeavours to have procured for the 
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people of Great Britain, an-opportunity of being represented in 
Parliament by an immediate new choice; since nothing could have been 
more for your own, and the honour and interest of his Majesty and 
the Nation'. 128 The Jacobites were, like the Harleyites, now 
suspicious of Sunderland, treating with considerable scepticism his 
explanation of why Parliament had not been dissolved. The Earl of 
Orrery told the Pretender that Sunderland 'pretends still to be a well 
wisher to the Tories, who cannot but be a little shocked with this 
disappointment'. 129 In an attempt to dispel Tory apprehensions 
Sunderland had Harcourt's Viscountcy confirmed on 11 September and 
Harcourt was introduced into the Lords with his new rank at the 
end of October. 
130 Sunderland also urged Harcourt and Carleton up 
for the opening of the session in order to demonstrate their support 
and co-operation with his administration. 
131 
The compromise session opened on 19 October and the ministry again 
presented a united front. Carleton, Carteret, Sunderland and 
Townshend served on the Lords1committee which drew up the address of 
thanks for the King's speech. Almost immediately a well organized 
but small group of Tory peers, together with a few Whig dissidents, 
notably Cowper, Wharton, and Coningsby, began to harry the 
administration in the Upper House. Their numerical inferiority meant 
they could do little real damage but their activities kept the 
government on its toes* it served as a useful propaganda exercise, 
and it livened up the debates. 
132 On 13 November the King's 
speech was under consideration when North and Grey, Cowper, Trevor, 
Bathurst, Wharton and Coningsby insisted that there should be an 
inquiry into the Navy debt. 'The Lord Carteret, Lord Townshend, the 
Earl of Sunderland, and Lord Teynham answered, that near two-thirds 
of that debt had been contracted in the last reign, which they were 
ready to make appear to the House. ' It was agreed to consider the 
Navy debt the following Friday. 
133 As before, Cowper, Bathurst, 
Aylesford, Coningsby, and North and Grey used this opportunity for 
adverse reflections upon the size of the debt and were replied to by 
Sunderland, Harcourt, and Islay, 'who represented that about Zl, loo, 000 
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of that debt had been contracted in the last reign, and the remaining 
part upon extraordinary emergencies and in pursuance of the address of 
both Houses, which they were ready to make appear'. It was then 
decided to lay an account of the Navy debt, as it stood in September 
1714, before the House. 
134 The examination into the Naval arrears 
continuted from November 1721 to the end of January 1722 and though 
the opposition was regularly defeated by large majorities it maintained 
significant pressure upon Sunderland's government. 
135 Similar tactics 
were employed in the course of the debates on a whole series of 
issues., including the Mutiny bill, the recent treaty with Spain, the 
Infection bill, the Quakers bill, the question of ships being built 
for foreigners in England, whether the terms of the Act of Settlement 
had been contravened by sending a fleet to the Baltic, the bill for 
securing the freedom of elections, and the problem of the national 
debt. 136 The opposition forced an unprecedented number of divisions 
and took the opportunity to protest at each defeat they suffered. 
There were twenty-six recorded protests which was an unusually large 
number for a single session. 
137 
This increasing sniping began to take its toll upon the 
administration's nerves. There were heated and prolonged debates on 
5 December 1721 138 and a week later Sunderland complained about the 
remarks Coningsby had made concerning the Lords Justices, who had been 
appointed when the King went to Hanover in 1720. Despite Coningsby's 
attempt to soften what he had said, Sunderland 'insisted, that the 
Earl Coningsby's words ought to be wrote down in order to have him 
sent to the Tower'. Harcourt's intervention and an apology from 
Coningsby prevented the matter going any further, 
139 
By February 
1722 Sunderland's patience was at an end. In the debate on the 
second reading of the bill 'For the better securing the Freedom of 
Elections' he had said 'that it had been a common thing in former reigns 
for money to be issued out of the Treasury, and even remitted from 
France, for promoting the election of persons in the Court interest', 
The consequence of this statement was that the protest against the 
rejection of the bill declared that public money was often used to 
influence elections. 
140 On 19 February Sunderland said in the House 
of Lords! 
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That every member of that illustrious assembly 
had, indeed, a right to dissent from and protest 
against any bill depending, or any resolution 
taken in the House, but that it was an 
intolerable abuse to wrest any man's words 
and put false constructions upon them, as had 
been done in an instance relating to himself. 
That he durst appeal to any Lord in the House, 
that was not a protestor, whether, in the 
debate about the bill above-mentioned, he 
said, or intimated, ýthat the issuing public 
money for elections had ever been practised 
in this reign. For what he meant was only 
in King Charles' and King James' time. His 
Lordship added, that the business of protests 
was managed now after another manner than 
formerly. For at present it was grown 
customary to protest even against bills that 
were passed into a law, and to get them 
printed and handed about in coffee houses, 
and sent all over the kingdom to inflame the 
minds of the people against the administration. 
And, therefore, he thought it time to have the 
method of protesting regulated. 141 
Sunderland also remarked 'that in general the whole protest [against 
the rejection of the Freedom of Elections bill] was derogatory to the 
honour of the House, and therefore he moved to have it expunged'. 
142 
He was supported by Wharton, Townshend, Argyll, Carteret, Harcourt, 
Newcastle and the Bishop of Salisbury. On the other side Cowper, 
North and Grey, Strafford, Aylesford, Bathurst and the Bishop of 
Rochester spoke against Sunderland's motion, but, upon the division, it 
was carried by 55 votes to 22.143 'Lord Sunderland then moved to 
appoint a day to consider of the nature and manner of protesting; 
accordingly Thursday next was appointed and the Lords ordered to 
be summoned. ' 
144 
After further consideration, on Thursday 22 February and the 
following Saturday, Sunderland took note on Tuesday 27 February 'that 
the privilege of entering protests had of late been so much abused that, 
in his opinion, some restraint ought to be put to it by limiting the 
time for entering protestations upon asking leave of the House, which 
was never denied. And therefore he moved: "That such Lords as shall 
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enter their protestations with reasons shall do the same before two 
o'clock the next sitting day, and sign them before the House rises", 
14S 
Sunderland's proposal carried by 55 votes to 18 
146 
and it was then 
urged that the motion should be made a standing order of the House. 
This was accepted on 3 March and the same day Sunderland argued that 
the protest of 19 February 1722, over putting off the consideration 
of the Navy debt, should be removed from the Journals. This was 
passed by 42 votes to 16, Two days later Sunderland moved to delete 
the reasons given for the protest of 17 January 1722 against the 
Lords rejection of the petition from the clergy of London against 
the Quakers bill and this was approved by 54 votes to 18. Parliament 
was dissolved on 7 March 1722,147 and Sunderland began to intensify 
his efforts for an electoral victory which would give him control of 
the House of Commons. 
Sunderland campaigned with vigour, industry, and remorseless 
application, determined to seize every opportunity to get the better of 
Walpole. The extent of his activities is quite staggering for he 
laboured in Northumberland, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, 
Herefordshire, Warwickshire, Leicestershire, Staffordshire, Wiltshire, 
Berkshire, Devon, Cornwall, Buckinghamshire, Norfolk and the City of 
London. He was supported by the Dukes of Rutland, Bolton, and Wharton, 
the Duchess of Kendal and Lords Warrington, Holdernesse and Orkney. 
His most important ally was the Duke of Newcastle, whose efforts on 
behalf of Sunderland in Sussex and Nottinghamshire were only matched 
in terms of application by Sunderland himself. 
148 Sunderland and 
Carteret were active on behalf of Tory candidates as John Brinsden's 
unsuccessful efforts at Wootton Bassett indicate. 
149 Sunderland 
was still in contact with Archibald Hutcheson, despite having had 
the bill to secure the freedom of elections thrown out of the Lords 
in February 1722,150 though it seems that Sunderland's connection 
with the Harleyites would not have been of great value for as Bromley 
remarked after the Prime Minister's death, 'I could not reconcile his 
actions with his intentions'. 
151 Sunderland was also very active 
in Scotland and it seems that his intention was nothing less than to 
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secure the support of all the sixteen Scottish Representative Peers 
and all forty-five Scottish M. P. 1s. 
The situation in Scotland was almost Byzantine in its complexity. 
At the time the Whigs were re-united in 1720 Sunderland had relied 
almost exclusively upon the Squadrone, who dominated the Scottish 
administration, to manage Scotland. In return Sunderland made it 
clear to Roxburghe and Montrose that they would have the full backing 
of the government in the forthcoming election. 
152 Furthermore, 
Sunderland and the Squadrone intended to reintroduce into Parliament 
the part of the Peerage bill which related to the Scottish nobility. 
153 
The rewards given by Sunderland to Argyll and Islay for their assistance 
in March 1721 and the election of the Tory peer, Lord Aberdeen, 
following the death of Lord Annandale, served to complicate even 
further the complex web of Scottish politics. 
154 Sunderland was now 
in the almost impossible position of trying to retain the support of 
both the Squadrone and the Argyll faction who only seemed able to 
agree on how much they detested. each other. By a dexterous 
management of judicial and administrative appointments Sunderland 
managed to establish a degree of harmony and at the same time to 
retain his influence over both groups. Sunderland also encouraged 
the Squadrone to approach Lord Aberdeen to see if it were possible 
to get Tory support in the election. At the same time orders were 
given to Argyll and Islay that both they and the Squadrone were to 
have a share in the administration in Scotland and that encouragement 
should be given to the Tories. Both Argyll and the Squadrone proved 
too eager to negotiate with the Tories for both groups tried to bring 
in the Tories at their rivals' expense., as the discussions over the 
sixteen peers to be included in the Court list for the election of 
the Scottish Representative peers reveal. Matters threatened to get 
out of hand and Sunderland intervened to give orders that Aberdeen 
was to be the only Tory peer in the Court list. Aberdeen, 
disillusioned by this decision, declined to be included and Sunderland 
put forward Hopehodn as a replacement, which was agreed to unanimously. 
156 
Sunderland, however, was not to reap the fruits of these endeavours. 
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As the election results were being reported in April 1722 
Sunderland was confer-ring with Harcourt in London when he began to 
complain of heart palpitations. By 18 April his condition had 
deteriorated rapidly and Dr. Mead was called out to attend to him. 
Upon the Doctor's arrival Sunderland 'pointing to his side said 
he was upon the rack and was blooded immediately'. 
157 Later in the 
evening the King's principal Surgeon was called out of bed to 
administer to Sunderland, but even after a further letting of blood 
there was still no improvement. A further blood letting took place 
on the morning of 19 April, but, as before, it had no effect and, 
after the Bishop of Winchester had administered the Sacrament, 
Sunderland died at about three o'clock in the afternoon. 
158 The 
autopsy was carried out by Dr. Mead and the Surgeons, Buffiere, 
Amiens, and Aime. 
159 
Upon the opening of his body there appeared 
a great inflammation of the Pleura on the 
left side a little above the diaphragm, which 
was supported and mortified and has discharged 
into the cavity of the breast above a pint of 
matter. That the lungs adherent to this 
part were inflamed and mortified, as was also 
the left kidney, and that in the right 
ventricle of the heart was a polipus two 
inches thick which branched out into the 
arteria pulmonalus and stopped the vessel. 160 
Upon being informed by Carteret of Sunderland's death the King 'sent 
a nobleman to condole the Countess on her loss and to assure her of 
his royal favour to her and the children his Lordship left behind'. 
161 
Political and personal ambition, self interest, and ignorance had 
led Sunderland to countenance the dubious proposals for reducing the 
national debt which had been put to him by the directors of the South 
Sea Company. Sunderland must bear a heavy responsibility for the 
South Sea crash for it was his desire to serve his own interests 
together with those of the South Sea Company directors that produced 
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the crisis. Forced, by his own shortcomings as a finance minister 
and his weakness in the House of Commons, to rely upon Robert Walpole, 
Sunderland realised that, if the administration was to survive, he 
and Walpole would have to co-operate closely to weather the storm. 
Once the immediate crisis had been dealt with the old antagonisms 
came to the surface, The Bubble and the death of Stanhope allowed 
Walpole and Townshend to press for a more prominent position in 
Sunderland's administration. This, Sunderland was not prepared to 
concede. He reorganized his Whig followers in the Commons, 
strengthened his grip on the Lords and sought to come to terms with a 
section of the Tory party in order to assert his authority over the 
House of Commons. Despite having retained the full support of the 
King, Sunderland could not prevent Walpole using his skill in 
managing the Commons to outmaneouvre him. These differences 
between Sunderland and Walpole over the dissolution of Parliament 
threatened to wreck the government, but a compromise was produced 
whereby an election would take place in 1722 as required under the 
terms of the Septennial Act. Sunderland, together with his Tory 
followers, sought to destroy Walpole in the election and, though it 
is uncertain if he would have achieved his aim, Sunderland's death 
left the way open for Walpole and Townshend to succeed to the power 
and authority to which he had for so long aspired and for which he 
had laboured so vigorously. 
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CONCLUSION 
Power, principles, pragmatism, success and failure all mingle together 
to form the fibre of Sunderland's political career from 1695 to 1722. 
Sunderland was devoted to an almost obsessive degree to the pursuit of 
power and was on occasion prepared to go to any lengths to achieve itj 
even to the extent of appearing to compromise his own beliefs and 
opinions. Yet it is clear that Sunderland was not interested in 
power merely for its own sake. He wanted to use it to achieve certain 
specific goals which derived from the political principles he adhered 
to from the very beginning of his career right up to the moment of his 
death. He believed in limited monarchy, particularly that represented 
by the Protestant Succession in the House of Hanover, the complete 
subordination of the Church to the State, and that Britain's security 
depended upon an active and interventionist foreign policy. Sunderland 
realised that to achieve his goals both in terms of the search for 
power and the programme he sought to implement he must be able to 
adapt and to use all the means at his disposal. It was a tribute to 
his outstanding ability and his phenomenal industry that he was able 
to implement such a major part of his political convictions. Though 
he never achieved the full power to which he aspired his achievements 
are remarkable. At his death George I was firmly established upon the 
throne, the Whig conception of monarchy, with the King ruling with the 
consent and co-operation of the 'political nation' in both Houses of 
Parliament, had triumphed over its Tory counterpart. The Church was 
effectively subordinated to the interests of the State and the Whig 
dominated Ecclesiastical Bench meekly followed the dictates of their 
secular masters. Abroad Britain had once again emerged as an 
important and influential force in European politics and the 
government's foreign policy had helped to bring about peace in Europe 
and to give Britain the security she needed. Sunderland left Walpole 
306 
with a rich Political inheritance on which he established his own 
ascendancy. Sunderland was one of the most successful and outstanding 
politicians of the early-eighteenth-century and had he not died in 
1722 it seems likely that his supremacy would have continued well 
into the 1730's and perhaps beyond. It was Sunderland who provided 




W. T. Morgan has claimed that Sunderland was responsible for the 
return of nine M. P. 's to Parliament at the 1715 election. 
1 The 
evidence cited is an undated memorandum in B. L. Stowe Ms. 247, 
ff. 193-199. The document is endorsed 'Names of Members'. The 
following is an abstract of the document as it relates to Sunderland. 
'Wm. Strickland Lord Sunderland and Duke of Bolton 
Sr. Fr. Drake Mr. Craggs Lord Sunderland 
Mr. Henley Lord Sunderland 
Lord Carbery Lords Sunderland and Cadogan 
Sir Wm. Strickland Lords Sunderland and Stanhope 
Gab. Roberts Lord Sunderland 
Sr. Wm. Monson Duke of Newcastle and Sunderland 
Norris Lords Sunderland and Stanhope Gilbon 
Sidney Wortley Lord Sunderland 
Edw: Wortley Lord Sunderland 
John Morgan 
Tho: Lewis Lord Sunderland 
Grey Nevil 
Bar: Shute Lord Sunderland 
Tho: Broderick Lord Sunderland' 
William Strickland was returned as M. P. for Carlisle in 1715 by 
Lord Carlisle, 
Francis Henry Drake was returned as M. P. for Tavistock in 1715 by 
a combination of his own interest with that of the Bedfords. He did 
not succeed to the family Baronetcy until January 1718. 
John Henley was returned as M, P. for Lyme Regis in 1715 upon the 
family interest. 
George Evans, Lord Carbery was defeated at Carbery in the election 
but upon petitioning the House of Commons he was declared M. P. for 
Carbery on 1 June 1715. 
308 
Sir William Strickland was returned as M. P. for the Pitt borough 
of Old Sarum on 3 August 1716. 
Gabriel Roberts lost his seat at Marlborough in the 171S election 
but recovered it upon a petition in May 1717, 
William Monson was returned for Aldborough by Newcastle in 1715 but 
did not succeed to the family Baronetcy until April 1718, 
Edward or Sir John Norris were returned for Liverpool and Rye 
respectively in 1715. 
Gilbon no-one with this surname appears to have sat in the House 
of Commons between 1715 and 1754. 
Honourable Sidney Wortley Montagu was elected for Huntingdon in 1715. 
Edward Wortley Montagu was elected for Westminster in 1715. 
John Morgan was elected for Monmouthshire in 1715. 
Thomas Lewis. There are three M. P. 's with this name who were 
elected in 1715 at Monmouthshire, New Radnor Boroughs, and Southampton. 
The first, though a Whig, voted against the government each time his 
vote was recorded. The second, originally an associate of Robert 
Harley's, voted against the Septennial bill but thereafter became 
a reliable government supporter. The third was a Tory who voted 
against the administration in all recorded divisions of this 
Parliament. 
Grey Neville was returned for Berwick-upon-Tweed in 1715, 
John Barrington was returned for Berwick-upon-Tweed in 1715 on the 
local nonconformist interest, 
Thomas Brodrick was returned for Stockbridge in 1715.2 
Furthermore, James Stanhope was not created a peer until 1717 and 
Newcastle did not become Duke until August 1715; up to that time 
he was Earl of Clare. As Earl Stanhope died on S February 1'1721 it 
seems the above document : 3hould be dated between April 1718 and 
February 1721.1) 
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